HIRUNDO

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Hirundo is the Latin word for martlet, a mythical bird without legs, always shown in flight, unceasing in its quest for knowledge. The McGill coat-of-arms has three martlets.

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Both the front and back cover photos were taken by members of McGill's 2013 'McGilliad' expedition—a trip to Greece organized by McGill professors and students in collaboration with teachers and students from John Abbot College. The front is Hunter Book's photo of the theatre at Epidauros, while the back is a picture of a statue of Apollo taken by Patrick Helferty. Clara Nencu is the photo editor who transformed the pictures into their final versions.

Hirundo accepts essay contributions from undergraduate students of McGill University, at least 2,000 words in length, which relate to the ancient Mediterranean world. Hirundo is published once a year and uses a policy of blind review in selecting papers. It is journal policy that the copyright to the contents of each issue belongs to Hirundo. Essays in either French or English should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief at:

hirundo.history@mcgill.ca

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Editor's Preface

Presented here to you is the twelfth edition of McGill University's undergraduate Classics journal, *Hirundo*. For over a decade, the journal has sought to give McGill undergraduates a place to publish and share their work with the world. Previous editions have seen quite a diverse range of disciplines brought together in this journal, and this year's is no exception. Inside, you'll find treatments of Greek philosophy, Roman literature, Egyptian history, Classical archaeology, Classical reception, and more.

Katrina Van Amsterdam opens the volume with a paper examining ancient Greek attitudes towards the other with special reference to the influence of the Persian Wars. Meghan Poplacean builds on the theme of ancient foreign relations in the context of the fall of Saguntum in the context of the Punic Wars. Continuing this edition's Roman studies, Giulietta Fiore treats the foundations of Rome through the lens of Virgil's *Aeneid*, paying special attention to Roman identity. Aaron Golish transposes us into a literary key with his paper, exploring and elaborating the distinction between self-reference and metatheatre in Greek tragedy. Madeline Silver then takes on the task of comparing Greek and Roman heroes as they are depicted in the great epics of antiquity in her paper relating Achilles and Aeneas. After this, we switch tracks to philosophy with Douglas Campbell's treatment of knowledge as it is discussed in Plato's *Theaetetus* and *Meno*. Erin Sobat follows with his paper describing the reign of the Egyptian Pharaoh Akhenaten, and the influence of his reign on Egypt's religious landscape. Elizabeth DeBlock ends this year's edition by bringing us back to modern times, discussing the role of the Classics in the world of the eighteenth century United States. Be sure to read on however, as students Daniel Galef and Jemma Israelson have made creative contributions to this year's backmatter, in the form of an original dramatic composition and a photo essay, respectively.

Sincere thanks are due to this year's academic advisor, Professor Michael Fronda. Just as in past years of *Hirundo*'s life, Professor Fronda has been a great source of help and direction for the journal. No less are we grateful for the generous financial assistance provided to us by Department of History and Classical Studies, the Papachristidis Chair, the Dean of Arts' Development Fund, the Classics Students' Association of McGill, and the Arts Undergraduate Society.

Personal thanks go to each and every one of this year's editors. Despite busy school schedules and demanding curriculums, *Hirundo*'s editors managed to go above and beyond the call of duty. Special thanks go to last year's Editor-in-Chief, Elizabeth Ten-Hove, who provided much assistance throughout the year. *Hirundo* is now in its twelfth year of publication, and it is the industriousness and passion of all those mentioned here that have made this possible. Happy reading!

Lewis Innes-Miller
Editor-in-Chief

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When In Greece, Do as the Persians Don't: Defining the Identity of the Greeks Against the Persian Imperial 'Other'

"By attributing a population with certain characteristics in order to categorize and differentiate it as an Other, those who do so also establish criteria by which they themselves are represented."[1] This statement by Robert Miles is particularly true when applied to the ancient Greeks. The Greeks of the early 5th century defined themselves against the 'other' or the 'barbarian' in establishing their identity as a common people, both politically and culturally. In the wake of the Persian invasion of 480-479 BC, the Greeks reconsidered the values that gave them distinction and shaped those qualities by contrasting them with the Persian 'barbarian'. By solidifying the opposition between the governments of the burgeoning Greek *poleis* and the Persian imperial monarchy, the Greeks defined themselves against the Persians as they developed and solidified their political identity.

The ancient Greeks did not recognize a common identity amongst themselves until the time of the Persian Wars. As such, there was little ethnocentric stereotyping, derogatory or otherwise, of 'barbarians' before this period. Indeed, Homer does not use the word *barbaros* as anything except a descriptive word.[2] Yet there were still no Greeks, at least not in the sense of a cohesive people with a common identity. Thucydides states that the term 'barbarian' is missing from the Homeric epics because there did not exist at that period a category such as 'Greek' against which a non-Greek could be defined.[3] Thus, in order for some to be Greeks, it meant that others had to be declared barbarians.[4]

The attribution of superiority "to Greeks by Greeks" provided a highly subjective definition of cultural unity.[5] While Hellenic identity was previously aggregative, with peer groups created around various genealogies, the construct of Greek identity in the early 5th century BC was primarily 'oppositional' in nature.[6] The general separation between a Greek and a barbarian was the possession, or lack thereof, of specific characteristics. The

[1] Robert Miles, *Racism* (London: Routledge, 1989), 38-39.

[2] Paul Cartledge, *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 53.

[3] Thuc. 1.3.3.

[4] François Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History*, trans. Janet Lloyd (London: University of California Press, 1988), 323.

[5] J.K. Davies, "Greece after the Persian Wars," in *Cambridge Ancient History: The Fifth Century BC*, vol. 5, 2nd ed, ed. David M. Lewis et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), 16.

[6] Jonathan Hall, *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 179.

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boundary between the two was clear.[7] Greeks had shared customs and values that could be expressed in a common language, providing a very real facet of cultural unity. These values included *hybris* (excessive pride or self-confidence), *ate* (destructive behavior leading to the person's downfall), *time* (honor), *dike* (justice), *arete* (inherent virtue or excellence), and *charis* (grace or obligation).[8] Those who lacked those essential qualities, whether good or bad, were thus 'barbarian'. Indeed, Aristotle believed that being a barbarian meant that one simply possessed the wrong combination of both character and intelligence.[9]

Where the Greeks were rational, the barbarians were consumed by Eastern excess and luxury and lacked the typically Greek quality of *sophrosyne* (moderation).[10] Where the Greeks valued freedom, the barbarians - most notably the Persians - were happy to be in servitude to their king. Herodotus makes this clear in his *Histories* with the conversation between Demaratus, the exiled Spartan king, and Xerxes, the Persian king. Though Demaratus clearly states that he only speaks for the Lacedaemonians, his words reflect a general Greek sentiment: they would resist a Persian invasion regardless of unfavorable odds, for they would not passively accept any situation that brought slavery to Greece.[11] The stereotypes of barbarians also included images of untidy hordes, incomprehensible speech, and the impression of immense wealth and feminization of culture. Contrasts were made between eastern luxury and Greek simplicity, tyranny and democracy, and emphasizing the idea of Greek superiority.

Visual representations of the distinctions between Greeks and barbarians were plentiful. The clothing in most of these representations clearly differentiates the two. Greeks, usually depicted as hoplites, are shown unclothed and clean-shaven, with the typical weaponry of the period.[12] The barbarians are almost always clothed in pants and long-sleeved garments that are decorated with animal stripes or spots; they also have soft hats, full beards, and a quiver and bow.[13] Attic vases that depict these differences have a general pattern, though variations on the image do exist.[14] The message is apparent: the Greeks are militarily superior to the barbarians. Yet the more telling portraits of barbarians

[7] Robert Browning, "Greeks and Others: From Antiquity to the Renaissance," in *Greeks and Barbarians,* ed. Thomas Harrison (New York: Routledge, 2002), 259.

[8] Davies 1992, 17.

[9] Cartledge 2002, 56.

[10] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 57; Hall 2002, 177.

[11] Hdt., 7.101-102.

[12] Erich S. Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011), 40.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

include ones that depict them as weak and effeminate. The "Eurymedon vase," in particular, from the first half of the 5th century serves as a prime example of this type of imagery. The description of the vase by Erich Gruen describes it in vivid detail:

> The red-figure oinochoe . . . portrays on one side a nude, evidently Greek, male striding forth, with phallus in right hand and left hand outstretched, and on the other side a figure in oriental garb . . . in frontal pose, bent over, and hands raised. The inscription, extending between the figures, appears to read "I am Eurymedon, I am bent over".[15]

Gruen does not see the imagery as a depiction of the superiority of the Greeks over the barbarians.[16] Yet the vase does show a difference in how the two people are portrayed. While the imagery may be comedic in essence, it does follow the more martial trope of the oriental-garbed barbarian and the naked Greek. This fits with the vase's supposed reference to the battle of the Eurymedon River, an Athenian victory over Persian forces in the mid-460s.[17] Regardless, it is likely that the artist was making a reference, albeit one of a crude and sexual nature, to the contrast between Greeks and barbarians.

In the early 5th century, references to, and representations of, barbarians multiplied rapidly.[18] Stereotyping of the 'barbarian' by the Greeks added to the sense of a growing Pan-Hellenic identity. The Persian War of 480-479 and its aftermath organized the stereotypes of the barbarian, solidifying the polarity between the luxury and tyranny of the East and the austerity and democracy of the 'superior' Greeks.[19] It was around this time that the contrast between Greek and barbarian came to mean the contrast between Greek and Persian.[20] By the time of Aeschylus' *Persians*, first performed at the Athenian Great Dionysia festival of 472, the process of 'othering' was fully established in the Hellenic mindset.[21] The contrast between Greek and Persian was brought to the forefront, a decisive change in the way the

[15] Gruen 2011, 42.

[16] Ibid., 44.

[17] Gruen 2011, 42.

[18] Hall 2002, 175.

[19] Thomas Harrison, "General Introduction," in *Greeks and Barbarians,* ed. Thomas Harrison (New York: Routledge, 2002), 4.

[20] Hartog 1988, 323.

[21] Cartledge 2002, 54.

Greeks conceived of their own identity.

The symbolic equivalence of Persian with barbarian plays a large role in Herodotus' *Histories* amidst his discussion of the Persian Wars. According to Herodotus, when the Greeks blocked the expansion of the Persians at Salamis and Plataea they proved themselves superior to the "barbarian, despotic slave state."[22] Herodotus, through dialogue, makes the comparison between "soft" and "hard" peoples: the soft people being the decadent barbarians, the hard being the fierce Greeks.[23] The Persians begin as hard people, but after conquests of soft peoples they too weaken and become interested in wealth and luxury.[24] His *Histories*, written for a Greek audience, categorizes peoples according to a Greek mindset.[25] In this vein, it is necessary that there is a natural distinction between Greeks and barbarians, and more often between Greeks and Persians.

This attitude reigns throughout the narrative. Much of the comparison between the two peoples occurs within a political context, as he discusses the tyrannical nature of the Persian governing power. Within the narrative, a process develops by which Herodotus equates all Persians, and thus all barbarians, with tyranny. As the Persians obey the Great King, there is an inevitable link between barbarians and royal power.[26] This connection allows for royalty to be essentially barbaric in nature, and thus every king - barbarian or not - resembles the Great King, the *ho barbaros*, to some extent.[27] This process establishes a tangible opposition between the Persians and the Greeks, with royal power portrayed as thoroughly non-Greek.

Herodotus becomes even more specific with his distinctions as he brings tyrants into the narrative. The king and the tyrant are "two of a kind," as the portrayals of both are contrived in relation to one another.[28] For Herodotus, monarchy is, at its essence, tyrannical. In the speech of Otanes, one of the Persian co-conspirators of Darius, the words *mounarchos*, *mounarchie*, and *tyrannos* are used interchangeably.[29] The first person to speak in the so-called Constitutional Debate, Otanes takes a stand against monarchy

[22] Kurt Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece*, trans. Renate Franciscono (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 59.

[23] Hdt. 9.122.

[24] James Redfield, "Herodotus the Tourist," in *Greeks and Barbarians,* ed. Thomas Harrison (New York: Routledge, 2002): 40; cf. Hdt. 1.74, 126.

[25] Ibid., 30.

[26] Hartog 1988, 323-324.

[27] Ibid., 324.

[28] Ibid., 325.

[29] Hdt., 3.80; Hartog 1988, 326.

because the single ruler has no constraint on his powers. The King can violate the law, kill people without trial, rape women, and conduct themselves in a corrupt and selfish manner without any sort of repercussions.[30] Rule by the people prevents this; it provides equality before the law and is free from the base desires of one man. In that same interchange of dialogue Darius speaks about his preference for the "rule of one," as he states:

> What government can possibly be better than that of the very best man in the whole state? The counsels of such a man are like himself, and so he governs the mass of the people to their heart's content; while at the same time his measures against evil-doers are kept more secret than in other states.[31]

When Darius speaks of this, his message is one that both Persians and Greeks would understand. He "speaks Greek" when he refutes the arguments for oligarchic and democratic rule, as he believes that those give rise to power struggles that lead to monarchy.[32] The key difference here occurs in the definition of monarchy. As Herodotus' narrative details, monarchy is inherently linked to tyranny in the Greek mindset. A Greek would see Darius' explanation as oligarchy and democracy giving way to tyranny, whereas a Persian would see power in the hands of a single individual as a positive form of governing.[33]

The Greeks, of course, have their own storied history with tyrannical rulers, fleshed out to some degree by Herodotus through individual portraits of tyrants within the *Histories*. In all of the stories, the description of the sole leader as a *tyrannos* is used in a negative capacity.[34] The best example of a discussion of Greek tyrants is in the speech of Socles, in which he attempts to discourage the Lacedaemonians and their allies from returning a tyrant to power in Athens.[35] His story is primarily anecdotal, but serves a purpose in the larger narrative: the process of tyranny, not the tyrant himself, is the problem. Tyranny may not seem bad at first, but once it matures it becomes inherently

[30] Hdt., 3.80; cf. Carolyn, Dewald, "Form and Content: The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus," in *Popular Tyranny*, ed. Kathryn A. Morgan (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), 29.

[31] Hdt., 3.82.

[32] Hartog 1988, 326.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Dewald 2003, 27.

[35] Hdt., 5.92.

unjust and unrestrained in its corruption.[36]

The stories of tyranny in Herodotus typically focus on the evils of a single ruler. Any man, Otanes states, could not remain accountable to his subjects in a position of sole power, as "such license is enough to stir strange and unwonted thoughts in the heart of the worthiest of men."[37] The Greek tyrants receive the same treatment as the Persian and other 'barbarian' tyrants do, as Herodotus records the outrageous deeds of all. Indeed, he mentions around fifty Greek tyrants, of which about fifteen are developed in some detail.[38] The stories of both Persian and Greek tyrants show the general moralizing tone Herodotus takes when dealing with tyranny. With the exceptions of Amasis and Darius, he fits the tyrants into a conventional mold, which he uses to prove the folly of autocratic rule.[39] One such tyrant is Pisistratus of Athens, who is used to provide background of the governing of Greek *poleis* during the end of the sixth century.[40] The Pisistratids are the focus of Socles' impassioned speech against tyranny and are denounced as corrupt murderers. Herodotus does praise some of Pisistratus' actions: it is noted that Pisistratus "administered the state according to the established usages, and his arrangements were wise and salutary."[41] Nevertheless, by the time Herodotus was writing, Greeks were accustomed to viewing tyrants in a negative light.

Tyrannicide was a celebrated and widely popular topic by the 5th century BC. Indeed, a statue of the Tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton was erected in Athens soon after the end of the Persian Wars.[42] A previous statue of the two men had been removed on Xerxes' orders, giving credence to the thought that the Athenians already placed significant value on the Tyrannicides before the early 5th century.[43] Songs were sung in honor of Harmodius and Aristogeiton at the Panathenaic Festival, and of the heroes from Phyle who brought down the "Thirty Tyrants."[44] One stanza of the song about the

[36] Dewald 2003, 31.

[37] Hdt., 3.80.

[38] John Gammie, "Herodotus on Kings and Tyrants: Objective Historiography or Conventional Portraiture?" *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45 (1986): 188.

[39] Ibid., 189-190.

[40] Ibid., 192.

[41] Hdt., 1.59.

[42] Kurt Raaflaub, "Stick and Glue: The Function of Tyranny in Fifth-Century Athenian Democracy," in *Popular Tyranny*, ed. Kathryn A. Morgan (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2003), 63.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyrana*, 7.4.

Tyrannicides likens them to Achilles and Diomedes, heroes of the Trojan War.[45] By the late 5th and early fourth centuries, elite Athenian families claimed to be "anti-tyrannists" and tried to connect their history to those who expelled tyrants in earlier centuries.[46] This was not just an Athenian sentiment. Thucydides' Alcibiades of Sparta makes a statement that shows anti-tyranny to be more universal among Greeks: "For my family have always been at variance with tyrants, and as all that is opposed to despotic power has the name of democracy, so from the fact of that opposition of ours the leadership of the people has remained with us."[47]

This aversion to tyranny explains the aversion to the threat of monarchy brought by the Persians. By 480-479 the association of monarchy with tyranny was commonplace amongst the Greeks, and thus the Greeks sought to distance themselves even farther from their own history with tyranny. The Greek tyrants became part of the case against Persia, acting as examples of the larger problem of imperial despotism.[48] Isocrates, writing in the late 5th and early 4th centuries, discusses the Greek tyrants in his *Panegyricus*, saying, "Whom did these tyrants not reach? Or who was so remote from public life that he was not compelled to come into close contact with the calamities into which such creatures plunged us?"[49] He speaks similarly of the Persians, showing fierce animosity towards their governmental structure and his perception of their general cowardice. The connection between tyranny and the Great King is certainly clear in Isocrates' work, which speaks to the pervasive nature of the Greek views on the Persian barbarians:

> For how, with their habits of life, could either a skillful general or a good soldier arise amongst them, seeing that the greater part of them are a disorderly mob without experience of danger, enervated for war, but for servitude better trained than our household slaves? Those, again, who are in greatest repute among them have never yet lived a life of equality, common intercourse, or citizenship, but spend all their time either as oppressors or as slaves - the surest way for men to have their characters corrupted; their bodies

[45] Raaflaub 2003, 65.

[46] Ibid., 68.

[47] Thuc., 6.89.4

[48] Dewald 2003, 48.

[49] Isoc. 4, 13.

> they pamper through their riches, and their souls they render abased and fearful through their monarchical government; they are subjected to inspection on the very threshold of the royal palace, fall prostrate before the King, and in every way practice humiliation, worshipping a mortal man and addressing him as a deity, and holding the gods of less account than men.[50]

The term *despotes* is used somewhat interchangeably with *tyrannos*, as well as with the King, the gods, even the law.[51] The description of the Great King as a *despotes* fits well with the political and cultural stereotyping of the Persians of the 470s and onwards. The *despotes* exercises his power over the bodies of his subjects, mutilating their bodies as he sees fit.[52] Likewise, the Persian king motivates his army with the whip. In the Greek mindset marks on the body is a sign of slavery, making the lashed and branded Persians the slaves of their King.[53] The Great King has ultimate power over his subjects: life or death. In Aeschylus' *Persians*, first performed in 472 BC, it is explained that Xerxes's forces will die if they allow the enemy to win and escape his clutches.[54]

The king-subject dichotomy is thus inherently similar to that of the master-slave.[55] Aristotle believed that the Greeks were 'naturally' free and that barbarians were 'naturally' slavish, allowing Greeks to rule barbarians simply for their own good.[56] Most slaves in the Greek world by the early 5th century were originally 'barbarian'. The ideology that barbarians were made for servitude existed even amongst Greeks who owned no slaves themselves.[57] Such a philosophy was not held by the Persians, especially not by the Great King. Herodotus indicates that Xerxes' desire to bring the world under his rule is akin to bringing the whole world into slavery.[58] In Xerxes' view, the Greeks who are not driven by the threat of the lash had no chance at being braver than the Persians, who by the nature of

[50] Isoc. 4, 150-151.

[51] Hartog 1988, 334.

[52] Hdt., 3.48; 3.69, 79; 7.35, 238; 9.172.

[53] Hdt., 5.6.

[54] Aesch., 369-371.

[55] Hartog 1988, 335.

[56] Cartledge 2002, 55.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ann Ward, *Herodotus and the Philosophy of Empire* (Waco, TX: Baylor UP, 2008), 163.

their relationship with the state are obligated to serve bravely.[59] Demaratus, in Herodotus' narrative, counters this statement by asserting that "though [the Greeks are] free men, they are not in all respects free; Law is the master whom they own, and this master they fear more than your subjects fear you."[60] Later in the *Histories*, a Persian commander questions why the Lacedaemonians refused the friendship of Xerxes. The Spartan delegates reply with a simple condemnation of the Persian master-slave system: "A slave's life you understand, but never having tasted liberty, you cannot tell whether it be sweet or no. Had you known what freedom is, you would have bidden us fight for it, not with the spear only, but with the battle-axe".[61]

Opposition between the free Greeks and the suppliant barbarians is freely explored in literature. Early in the *Persians* the queen Atossa, Xerxes' mother, relates her dream in which two women are forced to pull Xerxes' chariot. One woman, dressed in Persian clothes, is obedient to the yoke, but the woman wearing Dorian garb struggles so much that the yoke snaps and Xerxes is thrown from his chariot.[62] The dream is simply an act of foreshadowing. At the moment when Xerxes tries to incorporate Greece into his dominion, he learns that he cannot succeed.[63] It is interesting to note that the two women are described as "sisters . . . of the same stock"; Aeschylus is alluding to a common genealogical root between the Greeks and the Persians.[64] The dream points to the problem as being Xerxes' goal to harness east and west to his empire, not to any similar lineage between the two peoples.[65] It is the difference in ideology rather than ethnicity that divides the Greeks from the Persian barbarians.

The Greeks, like the woman in Atossa's dream, refused to be servile to any man. As the Messenger states: "O songs of Greeks, go on, / Bring freedom to your fatherland, bring freedom to / Your children, wives, and seats of your ancestral gods, / And your forbears' graves; now the struggle is for all."[66] Indeed the expression "yoke of servitude" occurs repeatedly in the tragedy, signifying the horror with which Greeks viewed the servitude

[59] Hdt., 7.103.

[60] Hdt., 7.104.

[61] Hdt., 7.135.

[62] Aesch., 181-199.

[63] Christian Meier, *A Culture of Freedom: Ancient Greece and the Origins of Europe*, trans. Jefferson Chase (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011), 34.

[64] Aesch., 185-186; Gruen, 20.

[65] Gruen, 20.

[66] Aesch., 402-405.

endured by the Persians.[67] The Persian *choros* later states that they hope Xerxes' defeat will liberate them from tribute as well as provide them with the opportunity for free speech.[68] Such portrayals speak to the servile character of the barbarians, in contrast with the Greeks who naturally shake off the yoke of tyranny and despotism. They are subject to no one but themselves.[69]

Aeschylus' work, however, is written almost a decade after the defeat of the Persians at Salamis and Plataea. Pindar wrote *Isthmian* VII around 478 BC, when the victory was still fresh. His work, unlike that of Aeschylus, provides a greater sense of danger appropriate to the recent threat of a Persian invasion.[70] The beginning of the poem speaks of a newfound freedom from earlier suffering:

> ...inasmuch as the trouble that Hellas could not brook, the stone of Tantalus above our head, hath now been turned aside for us by one of the gods; but, as for me, the passing away of terror hath caused stern care to cease; yet is it better to look evermore at that which lieth before one's foot, for man is entangled in a treacherous time that maketh crooked the path of life. Yet even this may be healed for mortals, if only they have freedom.[71]

This section of the poem has been interpreted to be referencing the threat made by the Greeks to destroy Thebes for its allegiance with Persia.[72] It is now thought, however, that Pindar may be making a statement of a more Pan-Hellenic nature: his message can be interpreted as referring to the feeling of relief at the deliverance of the Greeks from both Xerxes' attack and Persian servitude. Regardless of its intended meaning, though, the poem contains one of the earliest known uses of *eleutheria*, freedom.

The epigraphy from the late 470s and early 460s BC also makes reference to the concept of *eleutheria*. One such epigram, likely dating from around the end of the 460s, begins with the statement that, "We strove to augment the day of freedom for Hellas and

[67] Raaflaub 2004, 60-61.

[68] Aesch., 584-594.

[69] Aesch., 242.

[70] Raaflaub 2004, 61.

[71] Pind., 8.10-15.

[72] Raaflaub 2004, 61.

the Megarians."[73] It is believed to have been engraved on a cenotaph that served as a memorial for Megarians who died during the Persians Wars.[74] One epitaph dated to the late 470s praises Adeimantus, a commander of the Corinthian forces at the Battle of Salamis, thanking those "to whom all Greece put on the garland of freedom."[75] Another epitaph for men fallen in battle states, "We strove to crown Greece with freedom and lie here in possession of unaging praise."[76] This inscription may be the one mentioned by Pausanias, making it the epitaph of the Athenians at the Battle of Plataea:

> Roughly at the entrance into Plataea are the graves of those who fought against the Persians. Of the Greeks generally there is a common tomb, but the Lacedaemonians and Athenians who fell have separate graces, on which are written elegiac verses by Simonides. Not far from the common tomb of the Greeks is an altar of Zeus, God of Freedom.[77]

A cup with a drinking song engraved on it has the phrase, "beautiful garland of freedom"; as it was found amongst Persian rubble on the Acropolis, scholars believe that the cup could very well be from the victory celebrations of 480-479.[78] The dates of these epigraphic examples are debatable, meaning that all could vie for the earliest example of the use of *eleutheria*.

From the epigraphic evidence it is clear that in the immediate aftermath of the wars, the Greeks saw their confrontation with the Persians through the lens of fighting for *eleutheria* and against barbaric slavery.[79] This view of freedom that existed for the Greeks was one of survival, both for the individual and for the *polis*. The line in Aeschylus' battle cry, "now the struggle is for all," speaks to this idea.[80] The Greeks would have had a sense of what lay in store for them if the Persians were successful in their invasion, visible in the fate of the Ionians: there would be tribute payments as well as restrictions on governmental

[73] Ibid., 62.

[74] Raaflaub 2004, 62.

[75] Ibid., 63.

[76] Ibid., 63.

[77] Paus., 9.2.5.

[78] Raaflaub 2004, 62.

[79] Ibid., 63.

[80] Aesch., 405.

autonomy and foreign relations with other areas.[81] Accepting such a fate was contradictory to every quality on which the Greeks prided themselves. Thus the freedom they were defending was considered a "basic necessity" rather than an ideology.[82]

Yet this sense of a struggle for freedom was heightened in the years following 480-479, to the point where freedom from the barbarians became an ideal tantamount to Greek identity. Compare Pindar's *Isthmian* 8, quoted above, written immediately following the end of the Second Persian War, to his *Isthmian* 5 written before the Battle of Plataea, which is without mention of freedom or servitude:

> Full many an arrow hath my deftly speaking tongue to ring out in praise of those heroes; and even now could the land of Aias attest in war that she was saved from falling by her sailors, yes, Salamis, in the ruinous, heaven-sent storm, when slaughter thick as hail fell on unnumbered warriors. Yet, do thou drown thy boast in silence. Zeus giveth *this*, and giveth *that*,—Zeus, who is lord of all.[83]

Many other epigraphic examples dated to the period during the wars contain no mention of slavery or liberty, and certainly no concept of victory over barbarians. Most only mention a victory "over the enemy," and speak to the *arete* of those fallen in battle.[84] The Greek contemporaries may have been aware of a potential danger of servitude to the Persians, and were certainly concerned about the preservation of their freedom, but there was no immediate difference between the danger of this invasion and any other. The Greeks simply thanked the gods for their deliverance, and honored those who had died. Yet within a decade of the Battle of Plataea, the Persian Wars were considered to be the "freedom wars," a notion that would dominate the Greek viewpoint for years to come.[85]

This change of viewpoint likely occurred in the mid-470s, and the fact that the Greeks were victorious in stopping the invasion was probably a contributing factor. Whereas the emphasis had previously been on survival, victory allowed the Greeks to

[81] Raaflaub 2004, 66.

[82] Ibid., 67.

[83] Pind., 5.46-53.

[84] Raaflaub 2004, 64.

[85] Ibid., 65.

soak in the full reality of the danger they had escaped.[86] As time passed, the focus shifted from the miracle of Greek success as the Greeks "placed increasing emphasis on their achievement and adjusted its interpretation" to fit their new mentality.[87] Indeed, the Greek heroes began to be equated with those of the Trojan War. The new mentality of Greek superiority fit well with the already prominent view of the natural propensity of Persian barbarians towards servitude, leading to the addition of an inclination towards freedom to the list of 'Greek' qualities. This quite possibly contributed to the eventual decision to continue the war with the Persians.[88] The victory of the Greeks and the politicization of freedom allowed the move from basic survival (*soteria*) to the new, independent freedom expressed by *eleutheria*.[89]

The defeat of the Persians in 480-479 was conceptualized by the Greeks as not only as a "triumphant affirmation of Greek culture and collectivity over alien invaders, but over the demon of tyranny."[90] The cultural and political 'other' was crucial for the formation of a Pan-Hellenic identity, used by the Greeks to begin defining what it meant to be Greek. The Persians were ruled by despotic monarchs, so the Greeks had to distance themselves from tyranny; the barbarians were naturally slavish and submitted to servitude to their Great King, so the Hellenes fought harder for basic autonomy for their *poleis* and their individual selves. Isocrates sums up the sentiment well in his *Panegyricus*:

> Our feelings are naturally so hostile to them, that the very stories that we are most pleased to linger over are those of the Trojan and Persian wars, by which we can learn of their misfortunes. And you will find that, while the war against barbarians has afforded us hymns of praise, war against the Hellenes has been a source of lamentations, and that the former are sung at our feasts, while the latter we remember in our misfortunes. I think indeed that even the poetry of Homer has acquired a greater reputation for the noble way in which he praised those who fought against the barbarians, and that it was on this account that our

[86] Raaflaub 2004, 86.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid., 88.

[89] Ibid., 159.

[90] Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 59.

> ancestors gave to his genius a place of honor both in musical contests and in the education of the young, that by often hearing his epics we may fully understand the enmity which exists between us and them, and that, in emulation of the virtue of those who fought against Troy, we may strive after deeds such as theirs.[91]

It should be noted that the sources for the period are not entirely anti-barbarian. Herodotus and Aeschylus, in particular, do not entirely demonize the Persians with their works, though they do not praise them either. Herodotus writes about the despotism and brutality of the Persian rulers, but he exposes Greek brushes with tyranny as well. While being an equal-opportunity advocate for both sides, Herodotus does express a myriad of ideological differences in the *Histories* that would help explain the reasons behind the enmity between the two peoples. Aeschylus' work, while more pointed in its message, does speak from the point of view of the Persians and thus makes them a sympathetic narrator of sorts. Yet both of these works are written by Greeks for a Greek audience, and as such there is an undercurrent of the advantages of Hellenism over barbarism in the texts. Each expresses themes of order over irrationality, democracy over tyranny, and ultimately Greek over barbarian. It is these themes that became the focal point for the Greeks in creating a political and cultural separation on which to build their own identity.

Thus the collective action of many of the Greek *poleis* in repelling the Persian invasion of 480-479 solidified the concept of the barbarian. The Greeks of the early 5th century used this 'other' to establish their common political and cultural identity. They cemented the common qualities of the Greeks as lovers of freedom, rational thinkers, brave fighters, and obeyers of law over tyrants. In stark contrast, they created a barbarian persona of luxury, femininity, tyranny, and servitude. The Greeks, with their burgeoning *poleis*, stood at odds with the despotic Persian monarchy, allowing the Greeks to develop a sense of Pan-Hellenism with which to build their identity as a common people.

Katrina Van Amsterdam

[91] Isoc. *Pan*. 158-159.

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Gambling, Threats and Miscalculations:
Discussing Rome's Reaction to the Fall of Saguntum and the Beginning of the Second Punic War

The debate surrounding the causes of the Second Punic War is by no means a new one. Ancient and modern scholars alike have debated, examined and subsequently re-examined the data countless times. Whether Hannibal was fueled by sacred oath, as Polybius posits, or the fervor for war came to him in a dream[1], the result was the same; Rome and Carthage would engage in yet another long and bloody war. Traditionally, the fall of Saguntum is seen to be the catalyst to warfare. And to some, including Polybius himself, the Mediterranean was seen as a veritable powder keg on the brink of explosion. Rome and Carthage would eventually and inevitably collide. Following the events of the late third century, each party expanded their influence throughout the Mediterranean, and it was in Iberia that these spheres would eventually overlap, resulting in unavoidable hostilities. However, both Rome and Carthage refrained from engaging openly. Each was awaiting a pretext to strike – a pretext that Saguntum would readily provide. While the fall of Saguntum, in retrospect, may conveniently fit within this theory of expanding spheres of influence, the political nature surrounding 218 BC and the years leading up to it may not have been so clear cut. This should bring pause to those ready to retroject modern models of state conduct onto an ancient past. As the following will reveal, the events surrounding Saguntum quickly become confusing and contradictory to this theory.

Rome's reaction to the siege of Saguntum was inherently ambivalent. Despite sending an embassy to Hannibal outwardly threatening the general in an effort to dissuade him from attacking the city, they did nothing during the siege of Saguntum in 219 BC. At times, seemingly on a whim, Rome places grave importance on the city and then shortly thereafter dismisses it entirely. The role that Saguntum itself played during the late third century BC becomes quickly confusing. Was the city a catalyst to warfare or something else? Were both parties simply looking for a reason to strike?

Polybius states firmly that the siege served as the spark for the entire affair that, to him, was clearly inevitable.[2] But whether or not that notion can be taken seriously first requires a deeper study of Saguntum as a city itself, in addition to their bond with Rome. Polybius suggests that there were ties between Saguntum and Rome previous to its fall, and that Rome had arbitrated a civil dispute resulting in the execution of some Saguntine officials some years earlier. Kramer credits Roman involvement in Saguntine affairs to strong diplomacy on the part of the Massilians – a northern city with established trading

[1] David Vessey, "Silius Italicus on the Fall of Saguntum." *Classical Philology* 69.1 (1974): 1

[2] Polyb. 2.36

connections to Rome.[3] Kramer posits that the Massilians, concerned with Hannibal's northward expansion and the threat it would present to Massilian economic interests, went to Rome and urged her to become more concerned with Iberian affairs. It was this involvement that enabled the Saguntines to realistically seek Roman arbitration during the 220s. This arbitration would result in some bound, formal or informal, between the two cities. When Hannibal finally attacked Saguntum, Rome was ready to respond in arms on account of her connection. However, there are two critical problems with this theory. Firstly, Kramer bases the "effectiveness" of Massilian diplomacy not on any formal inscription or evidence of an existing treaty between Massilia and Rome, but rather on the *invocatio* of Massilian Artemis into Rome proper in 229 BC.[4] A great deal of speculation has surrounded this idea, and the sway that the Massilians realistically had upon Roman senatorial matters has likely been grossly exaggerated. Secondly, it implicitly resides upon the notion that Rome did indeed seek war and that they were prepared, if not waiting, to act. Hoyos and Scullard both build upon this idea of jilted Roman fides as being the source and pretext for a war the Romans themselves would immediately initiate with the embassy sent to Carthage in 218 BC. All these theories seem to posit, though implicitly, that Saguntum was the ultimate catalyst to warfare.

While this jilted fides is integral to the progression towards war, it is unlikely that it was the immediate factor to produce it. The hesitation on Rome's part to intervene during the siege of 219 BC suggests that they were either not prepared or not moved enough to act. Further, the embassies sent to Iberia and Carthage throughout the third century BC may not have been acts of war, but rather diplomatic attempts (or miscalculations) to avoid it. The nature of these embassies was not to stimulate war, but rather to keep a reign upon Carthaginian affairs in Iberia while Rome was preoccupied elsewhere – nominally northern Italy and Illyria. Rome had no real designs for Iberia proper, at least not before the war itself began. The beginning of the war for Rome actually came sometime after the fall of Saguntum, only after news indicating Hannibal's swift movement north reached Rome. In short, Saguntum did not serve as a *direct* catalyst to warfare from the Roman perspective. The progression to war itself was more slow, and even more undesirable, than previously believed. To better illustrate this, the following will focus on a chronology of the events leading up to and following the fall of Saguntum as described by Polybius with the aid of Dio where appropriate, followed by a more focused discussion surrounding Saguntum's connection with Rome directly.

When attempting to decipher the nature of the events surrounding Saguntum, it

[3] Frank R. Kramer, "Massilian Diplomacy before the Second Punic War." *American Journal of Philology*. 69.1 (1948): 1

[4] Kramer 1948,15

is best to begin with a historical discussion of Rome's involvement in Iberia prior to 218 BC. The earliest record of contact between Carthage and Rome concerning Iberian affairs is preserved in a fragment of Cassius Dio.[5] The fragment states that in 231 BC, Rome sent *legati* to investigate Hamilcar's involvement in Spain. To this, Hamilcar replied that his occupation of Iberia was for the purpose of acquiring enough money to repay the war indemnity after the First Punic War. At this time, according to Errington, Dio suggests that the *legati* "were at a loss how to censure him"[6]. Though the veracity of this fragment is debated, if it is believed to be true, would suggest that Rome was at least mildly interested in Carthaginian movement relatively early on. The purpose of this embassy, however, may have been missed by Dio. It is unlikely that the legates actually desired to intervene in Iberian affairs at this time, but rather the purpose of the embassy was rooted in observation. Mobilizing a force to quell Carthaginian "threat" in Iberia would not have been practical at this time being so far from where Rome was currently operating in Italy. Simply to understand Hamilcar's movements, his pace, and whether or not he may prove a threat to Roman interests in the future seems a more practical explanation for the embassy. The legates' inaction is not one out of frustration, but is rather indicative that at this time, Rome was not concerned with interfering in Spanish affairs. Rome had interest in what was occurring within Spain in so far as acquiring information, but acting, at least aggressively, on this information was not seen as a priority.

When this fragment is taken into account with the start of Gallic intervention in 225 BC[7], it makes sense that Rome would want to insure that all fronts would be accounted for prior to engaging in a potentially drawn out war with their northern enemies. It is unlikely that in 231 BC Rome expected Hamilcar to pose any real threat to their dealings with Gaul. However, as noted before, it was the potential future of this threat with which Rome concerned itself. Even in 226 BC, when the Ebro treaty was signed between both parties, Hasbrudal's armies were some 200 kilometers south of the river.[8] This would suggest again that Rome did not see Carthage, at this moment, as a direct threat to their operations in Italy, however to ignore their presence completely would be imprudent and foolhardy. The line of the Ebro river itself seems arbitrary. Whether the line was to be drawn at the Ebro or the Pyrenees, the purpose of the treaty was not to secure territory but rather to avoid any Carthaginian involvement, now or future, with the Gauls of northern Italy.

Polybius furthers this argument, stating: "So they sent envoys to Hasbrudal and entered into a formal treaty with him, in which no mention was made of the rest of

[5] Cassius Dio frg. 48

[6] R. M. Errington, "Rome and Spain before the Second Punic War." *Latomus* 19.1 (1970): 14

[7] Polyb. 2.23

[8] Errington 1970, 14

Iberia, but the Carthaginians undertook not to cross the Ebro river for military purposes".[9] Polybius' phrasing is pertinent. He stipulates that the treaty was not only formal, but that Carthaginian (and only Carthaginian) movement was bound in a strictly militaristic sense. Nowhere is trade controlled, nor is it stipulated that Rome shall not operate south of the river. The Ebro treaty and the possible embassy to Hamilcar demonstrate Rome's sentiments towards Iberia as a whole – implying they were not interested in directly intervening nor conquering the region. This is further emphasized through the lack of mention within the treaty to Iberia's interior. Carthage had full dominion to act as they desired but within their bonds. Rome was invested in other regions and in order to secure these interests, Rome had to ensure that Carthage kept within Iberia and Iberia only.

A year after the Ebro treaty, Rome went to war with Gaul.[10] The Boii in a coalition of kings marched towards the Po, threatening Italian colonies. This was in direct response to recent Roman occupation of land.[11] Land redistribution was conducted in 232 BC under Flaminius' agrarian law concerning the *ager Gallicus*. This occupation posed a shift from seasonal warfare in which the Romans would periodically war with the Gauls and then leave to permanent Roman involvement and settlement.[12] The Ebro treaty, then, appears to be a document in which Rome is attempting to avoid Carthage's involvement while they consolidated their hold on the north. The war with the Boii was ultimately successful with uprising quelled in 222 BC, however tensions persist in the region despite this. It would not be too great of a stretch of the imagination to presume that Rome worried about the future of their colonies, namely Cremona and Placentia, in the region. The Gauls were prone to aggressive military behaviour and it was unlikely that this would be their last attempt at uprising. While things were quiet now, Rome likely wanted to avoid the potential of future disturbances instigated through Carthaginian, albeit distant, involvement.

In 221 BC, Hannibal receives command and begins expanding north.[13] Within the year, settlements south of the Ebro with the exception of Saguntum were "too cowed to resist Hannibal with any effectiveness"[14]. The success of the general and the appeals from Saguntum piqued the interest of the Roman senate which sent an embassy to him in 220 BC, stating that Saguntum is not to be harmed and reaffirming the Ebro line.[15] Despite the

[9] Polyb. 2.13

[10] Polyb. 2.23

[11] Polyb. 2.21

[12] Kramer 1948, 9

[13] Polyb. 3.14

[14] Ibid.

[15] Polyb. 2.15

threat, Hannibal would attack the city in 219, resulting in its fall eight months later with no Roman intervention[16]. There was no real help for their aggrieved ally beyond yet another embassy sent to Carthage during the same year. Before discussing Rome's reaction to the siege, however, a further study of Rome's foreign obligations beyond Iberia is necessary.

As previously stated, Rome's policy towards Carthaginian involvement in Iberia was one of containment. This is well demonstrated through the Ebro Treaty of 226, which allowed Rome to war with the Gauls in Northern Italy without fear of foreign intervention. Another opportunity for containment presented itself in 220 BC. It was during this period that Hannibal was moving rapidly throughout southern Iberia. An embassy was then sent to Hannibal, warning him not to attack Saguntum lest they force Rome to act.[17] Superficially, this embassy may be interpreted as being prompted by fear of a strengthening Carthaginian presence in Iberia. Further, the message carried by the embassy was also a direct threat to Hannibal himself, representative of a mounting aggression towards Carthage on behalf of the Romans. However, this would be to ignore Rome's foreign interests. It was during this year that Rome began yet another war – this time with Illyria.[18] During this war, both consuls were called outside of Rome to fight east of the Adriatic sea, far from Iberia. It is very unlikely then, given the position of the consuls, that Rome would choose to push for another conflict at this time. It is even more unlikely that they were even preparing for the notion of war with Carthage – their legions were spread thin and those who were not were still recovering from years of warfare in the north. Further, memories of the first Punic War, though perhaps distant now, would still have held a significant weight. It is unlikely, given their military capability at the time that Rome was prepared to fight another lengthy war with an opponent that had proven difficult to subdue before. If they were in no position to wage war, then, why is it that they sent to Hannibal at all? Why would they then choose to outwardly threaten Hannibal if they were not prepared to act accordingly? Why not simply leave Saguntum to fall quietly?

The situation in Saguntum during the 220s is characterized by urban and local tensions exacerbated by Carthaginian expansion.[19] Polybius makes mention of the domestic dispute within Saguntum as being so severe that it warranted foreign arbitration. Hannibal, having established himself around the city, called officials of the city before him and offered to arbitrate the matter himself.[20] To this, the officials responded with a scoff

[16] Polyb. 2.20

[17] Polyb. 2.15

[18] Polyb. 3.16

[19] B.D. Hoyos, *Unplanned Wars: The Origins of the First and Second Punic Wars.* Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. (1998): 190

[20] Ibid.

and instead stated that they would seek the help of the Romans. Rome responded positively and through their arbitration, some Saguntine officials were executed in an effort to restore order to the city.

Local territorial disputes exacerbated the internal discord of the city. The dispute was between Saguntum and a northern tribe. Livy claims them to be the Turitani, but this is unlikely. Regardless, the dispute was territorial in nature and likely longstanding, however, with Hannibal's expansion northward, the political climate had shifted.[21] The tribe had recently become allies to Hannibal meaning that Saguntum could no longer realistically preserve her independence for very long without some form of external help. When the interior of Saguntum's city apparatus began to collapse, the city had a few options. Either it could turn to Hannibal to mediate, as he had offered, and risk domination like their northern neighbours, or it could look elsewhere. Rome was far enough that it was unlikely that Saguntum would totally lose her autonomy with her aid. Saguntum was acting out of self-interest for her independence, or at least the majority of it, when she approached Rome. Rome had arbitrated disputes throughout the Mediterranean before. It was this intervention that secured Sardinia after the first the first Punic War, making Roman friendly Saguntum an ideal foothold and a possible thorn in Hannibal's side. Further, involvement in Saguntum may have put Rome in a more optimal logistic position for keeping an eye on Hannibal's movements throughout Iberia. There was very little risk for Rome to involve herself in this dispute at this time and only to gain with the potential of establishing a supervisory foothold in Iberia. It is for this reason that Rome likely agreed to help the distant Iberian city. Through arbitration, Saguntum had become a "friend" or, as Dorey posits, a "*dediticus*" of Rome.[22]

Sources on the exact nature of the tie between the two cities are ambiguous. It is clear that Saguntum was a "friend" of the Roman state as the second embassy to Hannibal illustrates, however the exact nature of this "friendship" is questionable. Scholars like Dorey strongly argue that no formal treaty between Saguntum and Rome ever existed.[23] However, it remains clear that Rome still held some sort of responsibility for her friend, even if she was not a formal ally. It was precisely this friendship that ultimately drew Rome into more aggressive relations with Carthage. Because of their bond of friendship, Rome was bound to help her ally. At minimum, she was required to appear as though she was willing to help. It was for this reason of appearances that Rome sent the embassy to Hannibal in 220 and later one during the siege to Carthage. Rome was simply fulfilling the bare minimum requirement to her Iberian friend without being willing to fully commit any

[21] Hoyos 1998, 191.

[22] T.A. Dorey, "The Treaty with Saguntum," *Humanitas* 11/12 (1959-1960): 1.

[23] Ibid.

amount of force behind her words. She could not afford, given the amount of allies and friend relations throughout the Mediterranean and Italy, to appear completely inactive. She could not let Saguntum fall without at least the pretence of care. It is this notion of mere appearances that is stressed, however. Whether or not Saguntum stood at the end of the day was of little to no concern to Rome – it was the attempt to preserve her greater political image in the face of her allies that concerned Rome, however weak an attempt it may have been.

It is for this reason that when Saguntum fell in 219 BC, Rome still failed to act meaningfully. Her only response was to send yet another embassy, this time directly to Carthage, demanding the release of Hannibal to the Roman state.[24] Again, this embassy carried with it threats. Rome demanded that Carthage surrender Hannibal directly to them as recompense for the fall of Saguntum – an unrealistic demand that Carthage could not have been expected to bend to. Again, this threat was one made out of pretence and responsibility to at least appear to be acting in favour of a fallen friend, but as far as strict action was concerned, despite her words, Rome was still unprepared.

Polybius states that the embassy to Carthage was sent immediately following the fall of the city. He makes mention that, within his sources, the senate deliberated heavily before sending this embassy. War was tensely discussed, however Polybius dismisses the notion stating "Why would the Romans assemble to debate whether or not they should go to war after the Carthaginian capture of Saguntum, when a year later they had threatened the Carthaginians with war if they merely set foot on Saguntine territory?" [25] Under the fundamental assumption that Rome had been anticipating war and awaiting an opportunity to strike, Polybius' dismissal of the council proposed within his sources holds true. However, if one were to hold the opposite view – that Rome was indeed hesitant and unwilling to go to war, the presence of the council seems equally, if not more so, probable. With the absence of the consuls and the hesitation outlined at length above, it is likely that these discussions concerning Saguntum occurred. It was at this time that Rome began to consider the possibility that war may be at their doorstep, yet the issue was clearly contentious. Had Rome pushed Carthage too far with her empty threats? If so, what was their next course of action? Moreover, was there a possibility at further avoiding warfare? This is based upon much speculation and without Polybius' sources; it is difficult to discern the content of the assemblies themselves. However, it is not too far of a stretch to posit that these may have been questions the senate posed themselves at the time. Regardless, the issue of Saguntum and its aftermath was highly contentious.

Much of the above argument has centered around an idea of empty threats – of

[24] Polyb. 2.20

[25] Polyb. 2.20

Rome pushing the boundaries of Carthage in an effort to assert her dominance. Rome liked the idea of a weak Carthage. By testing her, Rome would be assured in her position over her neighbour and the Mediterranean at large. By keeping Carthage at bay, Rome was able to operate relatively freely within the Mediterranean. These inflammatory threats were not amongst the first Rome has made against her neighbour. In a fragment of Cassius Dio preserved by Zonaras, a similar tense situation in which Rome threatens Carthage with outright war is described. The following concerns Carthaginian piracy around Sardinia during 233 BC.

> The Romans declared the Carthaginians, as the instigators of these wars, to be the enemies, and they sent to them demanding money and bidding them remove their ships from all these islands, since these ports belonged to them. And to make their mind perfectly clear, they sent a spear and a herald's staff, bidding they choose one, whichever they please. The Carthaginians, quite dismayed, returned a sufficiently curt answer, in which they stated that they chose neither of the articles sent to them, but were ready to accept either that the Romans might leave them. Henceforth, the two nations hated each other but hesitated to begin war.[26]

If one believes in the veracity of this source, it offers a very interesting glimpse in Roman and Carthaginian conduct. The above is yet another blatant threat on behalf of the Romans, another instance in which Rome attempted to throw their political weight into cowing the Carthaginians. This threat is comparable to those made concerning Hannibal as it is equally inflammatory. The language is even similar. Above, Rome presents a spear or staff, letting Carthage choose between war or peace. In 2.33, Polybius states the same: "…he bore peace or war for them, and that he would leave them with one or the other; it was up to them which he produced."[27] Likely, when Rome continued this form of empty intimidation in the 220s they expected a similar result – that nothing should come of it. After all, Rome was only acting in meager defence of her friend; a defence that consisted of performing the bare minimum in terms of appearances, not a defence that would result in action. The difference here, however, is clear. Instead of the situation simply dissipating, Hannibal was ignited

[26] Cassius Dio, Zon. 8.18

[27] Polyb. 2.23

into action. Rome had miscalculated.

Hannibal moved quickly. He secured both Libya and Iberia, amassed his army, and began his march north towards the Alps. He sent word to the Celts, announcing his friendship and intent on crossing the Alps. They answered favourably and Hannibal set out in earnest.[28]

Before continuing on, it is best to pause and discuss why Hannibal would choose to act so aggressively, especially in light of the history of empty threats provided by Rome. There are a few factors at play. With the fall of Saguntum, Hannibal was able to replenish his resources. Recent victories in Spain left him in a relatively strong position to continue campaigning. Furthermore, the beginnings of Roman intervention in Iberia likely did not sit well with the general. Though beginning innocently enough, Rome's involvement with Saguntum could prove to be a greater thorn in his side later. It was this sort of intervention that resulted in the loss of Sardinia after the First Punic War. Thus Hannibal's actions were a result of recent victories, frustration with the possibility of future Roman intervention and upset over the continuation of empty threats. This time Rome had pushed too far.

Yet Rome, according to Polybius' narrative, still failed to mobilize immediately. Far from amassing an army as soon as Saguntum fell, it was only later when news had reached Rome of Hannibal's crossing the Ebro that Rome "set about recruiting troops and generally getting ready for war".[29] This shows a few things. Firstly, Rome may have been surprised that Carthage would finally act on their threats. Secondly, Rome always was truly hesitant to engage in warfare; they were not prepared. If Rome was merely awaiting a pretext to war with Carthage, they would have begun amassing an army long before Hannibal crossed the Ebro and arguably even before the siege of Saguntum. If they were so ready to war, they would have begun preparations as early as the embassy in 220 in which Rome first threatened Hannibal.

Rome's reaction at this point also requires further scrutiny. Again I stress that Rome's policy towards Carthage prior to this point was one of containment. Rome desired to keep a certain amount pressure upon their enemy so that they may continue to move about the Mediterranean freely. During this period, they were predominantly concerned with securing recently acquired territory in northern Italy and their Illyrian campaign. When Hannibal began his march north, when news had reached Rome that he had crossed the Ebro and was moving towards the Alps, it was the threat to their claim to northern Italy that truly set Rome into motion. Namely, two colonies near the Po River, Placentia and Cremona, would be threatened.[30] According to Polybius, the Boii, which were suppressed

[28] Polyb. 3.33-35

[29] Polyb. 3.40

[30] Ibid.

in 225BC, were waiting a reason to rebel. An allegiance with Hannibal would have created an opportunity to reignite hostilities in the region. It was for this reason that Rome acted. The Second Punic War did not begin, in earnest, because Rome leapt to the aid of an Iberian ally, it was not in defence of Saguntum. In fact, given the above, Saguntum was in reality of little concern to Rome. Her only role was in providing an escalation towards warfare, but by no means was it the catalyst. It was the preservation of northern Italian interests that began the war in earnest, at least from a Roman perspective.[31]

It is easy for historians, both modern and ancient, to retroject and exaggerate historical factors. Due to the grandeur and devastation of the Second Punic War, it is not surprising that a catalyst was sought. The theory that both parties would inevitably clash in 218 BC in hindsight may seem clear, but the reality the historical facts presents is an altogether different, if less exciting story. Rome, concerned with northern Italy and Illyria, was in no position to think of warring with Carthage. However, she was caught in a difficult political position. Fides dictated that she act when Saguntum was attacked, however she was in no position to use force. Instead of confrontation Rome gambled and engaged in a policy of containment through threats. Eventually, this policy would result in Rome over-stepping their bounds, pushing Carthage into aggression. It was only when Hannibal made himself perfectly clear that war was imminent through his movement towards the Alps that Rome began preparing for war. Thus, the beginning of the Second Punic war and the nature of Saguntum's role is illuminated – the reality was far slower than previously believed.

Danielle Meghan Poplacean

[31] Polyb. 3.40

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Manipulating Rivalry: The Creation of a Roman Identity through Contrasts and Inclusion in Vergil's *Aeneid*

The origins of Rome are shrouded in intrigue, mystery, and myth, despite the city's long historical tradition. Artists have explored and elaborated on Rome's glorious foundations in countless works from antiquity to the present. One such work is Vergil's *Aeneid* – arguably the greatest poem ever written in Latin – which became the national epic of Rome. Grounded in a Greek historical tradition, Vergil tries to reclaim the city's origins for Rome itself. As Polybius pointedly comments, "for who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means… in less than 53 years"[1] The nature of Rome's origins are therefore of an enduring significance. Whoever lays claim to the origins of Rome also lays claim to Rome's power, triumphs, and glory. Historians, poets, and modern scholars have all examined the various forms Rome's origin story has taken, and as the foremost among these narratives, Vergil's *Aeneid* requires close examination.

Modern scholars have pieced together parts of these foundations by combining archaeological evidence and literary sources. Unfortunately, there are many problems with bridging the gap between the two.[2] Archaeological data is often inconclusive and subject to cultural prejudice. Most historical literary evidence for the foundations of Rome is dependent upon the heavily Hellenocentric annalistic tradition. Although the pre-Roman tribes of Italy are essential to Rome's founding, they are often absent in the struggle between Greek and Roman claims to power. Cato harshly observed that the Italians "themselves have no memory of where they came from," as they were constantly under the Hellenizing influence of Greek historians.[3] Thus, literary accounts of pre-Roman history tell us more about the cultural climate in the time of its writing than of the actual history of Italy and Rome. Smothered by a Hellenistic influence, Vergil and other writers helped create a separate Roman literature to express a national identity.[4]

In all accounts, the Trojan arrival in Italy sparks a conflict between the Latins, led by King Latinus, and the Rutulians, led by Prince Turnus. Aeneas is said to have founded a city of Laurentines and Trojans "on the coast… facing the Tyrrhenian sea, not far from the mouth of the Tiber", and named it Lavinium after Lavinia, his wife and the daughter of King Latinus.[5] The Rutulians (also referred to as Rutuli) claimed as their center the city

[1] Polyb. 1.1.5.

[2] T.J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars.* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 34.

[3] Cato *Orig*. 2.1.

[4] Susanna Braund, *Latin Literature* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1.

[5] Dion. Hal. 1.45.1.

of Ardea, allegedly founded by Danae for settlers from Argos.[6] Although both cities are in Latium, Vergil clearly differentiates between the characteristics and morality of these two tribes by depicting the Latins as having outstanding Roman virtues. These virtues, such as *Pietas*, *Virtus*, and *Dignitas*, are used to contrast the Latins with the bloodthirsty and egotistical Rutulians.[7] But how well does the literary evidence correspond with the physical evidence, and how much do we really know about these urban centers and Italian peoples outside of literary sources?

Although the archaeology of Latium has revealed important fragments of pre-Roman history, early occupations of cities such as Ardea remain mysterious. Fragments of Apennine pottery dating from the middle Bronze Age have been recorded in Ardea (along with the Forum Boarium). However, these finds are sporadic and do not verify the presence of permanent settlements at this early stage.[8] The first definite traces of permanent habitation in Old Latium dating to 1000 BC mark the archaeological "Latial culture." Latial material includes a local variant of the Protovillanovan culture and is defined mainly by tombs and the rite of cremation. This suggests a society based on relations of kinship.[9] The ages following this pre-settlement phase in both Ardea and Lavinium are characterized mostly by the building of the city-state, as evidenced by the increase in the construction of sanctuaries.[10]

The study of early Roman history has gained momentum in the past 50 years through the discovery of important archaeological sites in Latium, especially the site of Lavinium, modern Pratica di Mare.[11] Lavinium was a major religious center and place of pilgrimage for both Latins and Romans. Even during the Imperial Age, the city claimed Aeneas as its founder. The cult of the Penates, the ancestral gods of the Roman people, was located there, but by 300 BC was also thought to house the Trojan Penates, the household gods that Aeneas rescued from burning Troy. An excavation of Lavinium by the University of Rome in the 1960s revealed a sanctuary dating to the archaic period (earliest c. 500 BC). This "sanctuary of the thirteen altars" was made of local tufa featuring prominent features of Greek design and religious ideology. Many scholars identify this as the altar of the Penates, which helps strengthen the argument that Lavinium and Aeneas were connected. This had already established by the poet Lycophron in 290 BC. Many argue this connection

[6] Virg. *Aen.* 7.436-440.

[7] Braund 10.

[8] Cornell 34.

[9] Ibid, 35.

[10] Ibid, 109.

[11] R.M. Ogilvie, *Early Rome and the Etruscans.* (Glasgow: William Collins & Sons, 1976), 10.

was built when Lavinium claimed Aeneas in an effort to compete directly with Rome's glorified origins.[12]

Recent excavations have also uncovered a 7th century BC tumulus identified as the shrine of Aeneas (adapted as a form of the local god Indiges), as described by Dionysius of Halicarnasses in the first century BC. Additionally, an inscription was found near the river Numicus five miles from Lavinium at a site called Tor Tignosa. These two items serve as evidence that Aeneas himself was worshipped at Lavinium with the cult-name "Pater Indiges" or "Aeneas Indiges". The inscription reads Lare Aienea D[ono or onum]. Both Lar and Indiges are interpreted as "deified ancestor," and thus the inscription "confirms a literary tradition that Aeneas was worshipped in the locality as Aeneas Indiges."[13] However, the evidence that this tumulus actually represents a hero shrine is still shaky since the excavated tumulus is not located on the banks of the river Numicus as described by Dionysius.14 Nevertheless, the literary tradition supports the Lavinian worship of Aeneas. Livy reconciles this bit of physical history with literary history by commenting, "was [Aeneas] man or god? However it may be, men call him Jupiter Indiges – the local Jove."[15]

The archaeological and literary evidence together evidence together reveal intriguing insights into the portrayal and role of the Italians in Roman literature. The archaeological record shows that many cultural traditions fused in the area that later evolved into Rome. The multiethnicity and integration of Italian tribes into the foundations of Rome are essential parts of Roman history and the creation of Roman identity. Since the development of a Roman identity, Roman authors have tried to forge their own literature to express it..[16] They often used myths based in Greek epics and adapted them to glorify their own uniquely Roman past. In order to fully understand the origins of this literary identity, we must explore the origins of the historiography and the sources from which identifying Roman themes develop.

The fascination with the origins of Rome began with Greek historians of the Annalistic tradition such as early third century author Timaeus of Tauromenium.[17] With the growth of Roman power in Italy, historians suddenly became interested in Roman history and its origins of power. Scholars credit Timaeus with bringing Rome into Greek

[12] Ogilvie, 98.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Dion. Hal. 1.64.5-6.

[15] Liv. 1.1-2.

[16] Braund 2.

[17] Ogilvie 13.

knowledge, because he was the first Greek historian to write in-depth accounts of Italian and Roman history, Although only fragments remain now, his writings set the stage for how the Italians would ultimately be represented in following works, and how they would view themselves.[18]

Amongst the early historiographers and following this tradition of writing history chronologically is Quintus Ennius (239-169 BC) and his work the *Annales*. This narrative poem in Latin hexameter was considered the Roman national epic before Vergil's *Aeneid* and was thus "influential in shaping Romans' view of their own past".[19] However, although the *Annales* was a history of the Roman people written by a Roman, it was still based on the Greek epic metre used by Homer. It still featured characters such as Aeneas who first appeared as minor roles in Homer's works. Although few fragments remain, it is clear that Ennius connected Latium with Saturn, thus establishing a divine lineage.[20] In the Augustan Age, Vergil drew heavily upon this work to help him build his new national epic.

The Augustan historians – mainly Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy – drew upon the rich history of these early authors. Their works are very similar as they drew upon similar sources and use the hellenocentric ideas of the annalistic tradition. While Dionysius is known for incorporating vast amounts of evidence from earlier writers, Livy's works contain a lot of new material invented by the author to hold the readers' attention.[21] Despite their similarities, these authors worked toward different goals.

Because Dionysius was a Greek from Asia Minor, his background often colored his literary perspectives. In his *Roman Antiquities*, Dionysius seeks to prove that Romans are Greeks. He supports this hellenocentric idea by linking Roman traditions in the time of Augustus to ancient Greek traditions and customs. He also connects the origins of non-Greek peoples such as the Latins, with the activities of Greek heroes.[22] For example, Dionysius tells a story of an Italian people who were under the rule of tyrants until freed by the god-hero Heracles on his passage through Italy.[23] He even suggests that the "king of the Aborigines was Latinus, who passed for the son of Faunus, but was actually the son of Hercules."[24] Aeneas and his alliance and marriage with the Latins were the origins of the foundations of Rome. Thus, by connecting the Italian lineage to a Greek god-hero,

[18] Ibid, 175.

[19] Cornell 5.

[20] Ennius fr 26.

[21] Ogilvie 175.

[22] Cornell 65.

[23] Dion. Hal. 1.41-2.

[24] Ibid. 1.44-3.

Dionysius attributes the power of Rome to the superiority of the Greeks. He also asserts that the annual Roman festival of the Argei (which involved throwing straw effigies into the Tiber) was created by Heracles during his time in Rome as a substitute for human sacrifice.[25] This assertion not only demonstrates his belief that early Italians were savages who resorted to human sacrifice and had to be "civilized" by a Greek hero, but also that the otherwise uniquely Roman traditions were based in Greek history.

Livy on the other hand, was born in Padua, and wrote *ab urbe condita*, or *The Early History of Rome.* The historical embellishment in his work means that while he loses the accuracy of Roman history, he adds to the immense history of the historians. He saw history not in political terms, but in personal and moral terms as well. This preoccupation with morality defines the Augustan Age and Augustan propaganda itself. Livy is a true Augustan historian in that he looks to reveal the Roman morality evident in historical stories and figures. Although these stories, and thus their accompanying morals, were almost completely taken from Greek origins, he works to create a Roman identity based on these morals.

"Native peoples of Italy themselves often accepted what the Greeks had to say about them and Hellenized their own traditions," writes H.H. Scullard. This partly occurred because of the cultural prestige of the Greeks, but also because for centuries, only the Greeks were systematically reconstructing prehistory in their literature.[26] However, the Roman authors embraced Greek legends and myths and made them their own for a variety of reasons. Rome is a city based on inclusion, and "absorbs contradiction" and has "only ever existed as a multiplicity." This multiplicity required Rome to be "ceaselessly founded" and gave Rome its powerful "foundational position in European history."[27] In literature, Romans are founded from the best of all cultures: they absorbed Greek thought, descended from Trojans, are sons of Sabines, and lovers of Dido.[28] But most of all, as expressed in Vergil's *Aeneid*, Romans are the offspring of the most powerful, hospitable, and divinely inspired Italians: the Latins.

In the *Aeneid*, Vergil aligns Aeneas and the Trojans with the Latins led by King Latinus, and actively contrasts their moral rectitude with the moral degradation of the Rutulians. By contrasting the noble Roman virtues and divine origins of the Latins with the animalistic and inhospitable characteristics of the Rutulians, Vergil claims for Rome

[25] H.H. Scullard, "Festivals and Ceremonies of the Roman Republic," *The Classical Journal* 78, no. 2 (1982): 171-173, 171.

[26] Cornell 65.

[27] Michel Serres, *Rome: The Book of Foundations,* Translated by Felicia McCarren. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991), 150.

[28] Ibid, 151.

a uniquely Italian and divinely inspired heritage. Vergil sets the two groups in opposition right from the Trojan introduction by showing that the Latins uphold the law of hospitality while the Rutulians only uphold the law of hostility. According to his account, upon the arrival of the Trojans, the good King Latinus extends his hand in a sacred offering of hospitality. He not only offer them land on which to found their city Lavinium, but he also offers his daughter Lavinia's hand in marriage to Aeneas.[29] This law of hospitality is an ancient tradition honored by the Romans.[30] While the Latins honor this archaic tradition, the enemies of the Latins, Trojans, and thus Rome, angrily reject the Trojan presence and live instead by the law of hostility. Turnus, king of the Rutulians, "will not suffer a stranger to be given preference over him. So he starts a war."[31]

Once the path to war is set, Vergil presents a parade of warriors from both sides. This array of characters is reminiscent of a Roman Triumph, lining up the heroes and victors of Roman conquest.[32] Latium's warriors represent the Roman male moral of *Virtus,* in which militarism, masculinity, and morality are intertwined.[33] Not only are they all handsome, brave, and pious men, they are also founders of cities, descendants of the gods, and forerunners to noble Roman families. For example, Caeculus is the founder of Praeneste and son of Vulcan, the "handsome" and "ferocious" Aventinus is the son of Hercules and princess Rhea, and Clausus is descended from "ancient Sabine blood" and an ancestor of the powerful Claudian clan.[34] These men are rooted in tradition, and contribute to the extension of the noble Roman line until Augustus.

Contrastingly, Vergil presents the Rutulian warriors as fierce, greedy, and animalistic foreigners with unsightly family histories. For example, Oebalus complains about his inheritance. Ufens is "wild beyond all other men" and his people "live by pillage". And Virbius is the son of a Hippolytus who has an unsavory ending with his murder by his step-mother.[35] Vergil also mentions witches and women amongst the Rutulian troops. The priest Umbro was sent by the King Archippus to use "sleep-bringing charms and herbs."[36] Camilla, a woman warrior and leader of the Volscians, cannot possibly possess the Roman male virtues that true warriors possess. Lastly, Vergil pointedly remarks that Turnus, the

[29] Virg. *Aen.* 7.260.

[30] Serres 141.

[31] Ibid, 140.

[32] Braund 17.

[33] Ibid, 15.

[34] Virg. *Aen.* 7.700.

[35] Virg. *Aen.* 7.770.

[36] Virg. *Aen.* 7.640-93.

leader himself, "led the manhood of Argos" and Sicanians, warriors from North Africa.[37] While Latinus leads true Italian tribes founded in tradition and morality, Turnus leads immoral foreigners who could not have possibly provided the foundations for Augustus' great city of Rome.

Vergil also champions the piety of the Latins, and stresses not only their divine parentage, but also their sacred legacy. He does this by linking Latin customs to those that would continue to have a place in Roman society until the Augustan Age. These pious people of Latium are "Saturn's kin who need no bond of law to keep them just, but are just by their own free will and hold to the way of their Ancient gods."[38] Unlike Dionysius of Halicarnasses (who claimed the Greek hero Hercules as the ancestor of King Latinus) Vergil stresses his (less-Greek) Saturnalian descent. Because King Latinus claims Saturn as his grandfather, and the Romans are descended from this line, the Romans can thus claim Saturn as part of their lineage. Not only are the Latins descended from Saturn, but they also honor and respect this divine heritage. In addition, Vergil describes the magnificent Palace of Laurentine Picus.[39] This palace shows the powerful and well-established tradition present in the Latin culture and its commitment to the gods and customs. Livy's observation that "Rome, supreme in all the world, observes today… sacred customs from Latium" shows the connection that Romans felt with their sacred Italian past.[40] This piety and respect for the gods and tradition are Roman virtues. Although the myth of Aeneas and its written history comes from a long line of Greek influence, Vergil infuses Roman virtues and divine heritage into his foundation story in order to connect Rome with good and moral Italians.

In the last part of the struggle between the Latins and Rutulians in the *Aeneid,* "the Rutuli were defeated, but the victors lost their leader Latinus."[41] When Latinus dies, Aeneas takes his place as leader of the Trojans and Latins. It falls on his shoulders to protect the Roman foundations and lineage by defeating "Turnus, the hot-headed Rutulian"[42] Although the duel between Aeneas and Turnus – the climax of the *Aeneid* – follows a Homeric format, the outcome ensures that Rome is founded from virtuous Italians and Trojans (not Greeks). In the duel, Aeneas represents the Homeric Achilles, protecting his close friend Pallas (in the role of Homeric Patroclus) against Turnus who represents Homeric Hector.[43]

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid. 7.180-3.

[39] Ibid. 7.30.

[40] Ibid. 7.595-625.

[41] Livy, 1.2.

[42] Virg. *Aen.* 7.406.

[43] Braund 13.

Like Hector, Turnus is working against fate to protect his homeland. Just as Troy was fated to fall, Aeneas was fated to marry Lavinia and found a great city in Italy. Turnus must die for a variety of reasons. Firstly, as a hot-headed warrior, he has no place in the new society founded out of the Latins and Trojans. Vergil's character of Aeneas, since his departure from Troy, has moved away from the hostilities and heroism of Homer's Greeks and Trojans. Thus Turnus would only act as a catalyst for hostility in a new world of Roman morality. Therefore, killing Turnus is an act of necessity to preserve the divinely inspired Roman line. In addition, it is also an act of duty. In book 8, Aeneas promises Evander that he will take care of Pallas as if he were his own son. However, when Turnus kills Pallas in book 10, Aeneas must fulfill an obligation to Evander, and therefore has a duty to kill Turnus.[44] Thus the Aeneid ends with the firm avowal of the Latin morals and character that Vergil emphasized throughout his work.

As soon as Rome started growing in power and interacting with foreign cultures, writers began to explore Rome's foundations. While the historical record of Rome's foundation is often infused with Greek characters and myths, the Roman writers reclaimed these Greek elements by repurposing them to fit Roman ideals. Vergil demonstrates this clearly in his *Aeneid.* According to Vergil, Romans are descended from the best, strongest, and most virtuous men in the world. He resists hellenocentric ideas by explaining that Romans are not descended from Greeks, but are instead descended from the mighty Trojans and pious Latins. He contrasts the two different Italian tribes in order to further champion the virtues of the Latins, but also exclude the Rutulians under Turnus as unworthy of Roman descent. Instead of describing a totally Greek lineage as Dionysius of Halicarnassus does, Vergil understands that the power of Roman history comes from its multiplicities.

Giulietta Fiore

[44] Ibid.

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Local Mimesis and *Plateaic Diegesis*: Distinguishing the Self-referential from the Metatheatrical in Greek Tragedy

It is difficult to speculate with certainty on the original reception of ancient theatre practice or to attempt to reconstruct it in danger of presentism. Yet, while contemporary presumptions advance and refine documentation, there is a balance to be found to avoid unnecessary anachronism. Some scholars of Greek theatre misapply theories of contemporary theatre to the Athenian stage, assuming the rules are analogues at best[1] and at worst universals of theatre. Of chief concern among these is the question of the twentieth century notion of *metatheatre*. Originally conceived by Lionel Abel as a generic distinction of modern theatre, characterized by theatrical self-awareness dating from Shakespeare onwards, metatheatre according to Abel is antithetical to traditional Greek tragic and comic forms.[2] Despite Abel's designation of metatheatre as a genre, the term has rapidly acquired several definitions all of which share the common notion of "theatrical self-referentality."[3] In his book *Spectator Politics* for example, Niall Slater appropriates another definition from Mark Ringer, by which *metatheatre* "encompasses all forms of theatre self-referentiality."[4] Slater's adoption of Ringer's definition instead of providing his own discussion of metatheatre suggests that scholars are comfortable using *metatheatre* as an all-encompassing term for any self-referentiality, avoiding critical engagement with the nature of metatheatre and ignoring its and semantic functions. Since self-referential moments saturate Greek theatre is certainly full of self-referential moments, scholars have begun to describe it as metatheatrical. They apply modern aspects of metatheatricality, such as *theatrical double-vision* and dislocation to the Athenian stage as though Athenians and modern audiences shared the same experience of theatrical self-referentiality. To combat

[1] In '"Estrangement" or "Reincarnation" Performers and Performance on the Classical Athenian Stage,*"* Ismene Lada-Richards applies the dichotomy of the modern Brechtian theatre of 'alienation' and the Stanislavskian "immersive method" to Greek drama, albeit as an extended analogy. In doing so, she applies two modernist schools of thought on drama to texts from two thousand five hundred years prior.

[2] Lionel Abel. *Metatheatre: A New View of Dramatic Form* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963) 113.

[3] Richard Hornby describes metatheatre "as drama about drama; it occurs whenever the subject of a play turns out to be, in some sense, drama itself" (31). Hornby's definition is too broad to have any real application beyond his general poststructuralist claim that "all drama is metadramatic, since its subject is always, willy-nilly, the drama/culture complex" (31), since all drama is part of a self-referring intertextual web.

[4] Slater's book details 'metatheatre' as a tool in Aristophanes' arsenal, which fosters critical thinking in its readers. Yet Slater omits to define what "metatheatre" is, thus implying that its mere presence always results in a "dislocation" effect. This broad application of twentieth century terminology is troublesome when applied without qualification to works from vastly different cultures, especially when said scholarship purports to explain that semiotic environment.

this anachronistic view of the Greek stage, let us differentiate between mere *theatrical self-reference* and *metatheatricality*. Theatrical self-referenciality can affect any number of semantic missives, but metatheatricality is limited to self-reference that produces an aesthetic "unease, dislocation of perception" in the audience and is described as "estrange" or 'alienation' by theorists."[5] Considering this distinction, let us explore why metatheatre cannot systematically function in the Athenian context despite the ample evidence of textual and theatrical self-referentiality. I will investigate the role of *mimesis* and *diegesis,* and *locus* and *platea* in creating the theatre space, and then I will attempt to recalibrate our understanding of Athenian theatrical self-reference as serving a political function rather than an aesthetic one. I thereby hope to demonstrate the merit of understanding perceptions of theatre in its own milieu, rather than study how modern productions of classical texts might make use of metatheatricality.

Mimesis & *Diegesis*: Why Greek Theatre is Predominantly Diegetic

Looking at mythical scenes painted on a Greek amphora, the untrained eye cannot differentiate a depiction of a tragedy from a regular mythic scene. Painters avoided representing scenes from the tragic stage literally, as they would have appeared.[6] The image excludes stage properties and theatrical devices. Characters are not depicted wearing masks or costumes, and women appear as women rather than male actors in drag. In many ways, this limits the amount of information we can gather from this type of monumental evidence on the staging of Greek tragedy. The vases do not indicate how the playing space was organized, or what the costumes and masks looked like. The *Pronomos vase* is a famous exception that proves the rule since it includes a few figures holding masks, and does not depict a mythic or dramatic scene, but the performers themselves either before or after a play. Nevertheless, that most vases depict mythic action rather than dramatic performance provides valuable insight on how the Greeks viewed theatricality and what relationship the actors bore to the characters they portrayed. The fact that theatrical accessories are not included suggests that the Greek audience viewed the staging as secondary to the story.[7]

[5] Richard Hornby, *Drama, Metadrama, and Perception* (Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 1986) 32. Hornby claims that "this 'seeing double' is the true source of the significance of metadrama." (32).

[6] Alan Hughes, *Performing Greek Comedy* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2011) 3.

[7] It is significant that vase paintings depicting Old Comedy (*archaia)* do include the literal trappings of theatre such as the padded costumes. In *Performing Greek Comedy,* Alan Hughes claims that this is in part due to the metatheatrical self-referentiality of Old Comedy. Yet, he agrees that depictions of comedy "called for a different convention, because neither the characters nor their story had any previous, independent existence." (3) Painters lacked the visual vocabulary for representing the scenes from *drama*. Unlike Tragedy and Satyr-play, based on familiar myths, Old Comedy featured original narratives. Therefore, painters situated their images of Old

Moreover, the narrative *diegesis* was more important to the Greeks than *mimesis*, or more precisely, Athenian theatre is more a diegetic medium than a mimetic one.

This may at first seem like an extreme statement considering both Plato and Aristotle identify theatre as mimetic. Aristotle, however, identifies not only tragedy and comedy, but also all other arts as mimetic: "ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἔτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον."[8] Therefore, we must distinguish between Aristotelian μιμήσις that refers to all "artful representations," and the μιμήσις that refers to imitation. Examining their definitions closer, it is clear that theatre carries both specific diegetic and mimetic elements. Plato, for one, explains that *all* stories are diegetic: "ἆρ' οὐ πάντα ὅσα ὑπὸ μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν λέγεται διήγησις οὖσα τυγχάνει ἢ γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ μελλόντων."[9] If all stories are diegetic then all theatre, as driven primarily by plot,[10] must also be diegetic. Plato proceeds to distinguish storytelling methods by their mimetic element: "ἆρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἁπλῇ διηγήσει ἢ διὰ μιμήσεως γιγνομένῃ ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν."[11] Plato articulates here a distinction between diegetic and mimetic storytelling meaning whether the story is told (*diegesis*) or shown (*mimesis*). His distinction is also a latent assumption in Aristotle's poetics. Like Plato, Aristotle claims that μιμεῖσθαι, "representation," can be accomplished entirely or partly through ἀπαγγέλλοντα, "narration," or through μίμησίς, "imitation." Therefore, he adopts Plato's distinction between 'showing' a story mimetically and telling a story diegetically.

> καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα, ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας †τοὺς μιμουμένους†.[12]

Comedy within the theatre so that the viewer could contextualize what they were seeing. Such a feature was unnecessary for the familiar myths depicted in tragedy and satyr-play.

[8] Aristot. *Poet*. 1447a.9. "Epic poetry then and tragic poetry and still more comedic poetry and the dithyrambic poetry and most aulos and kithera playing altogether these happen to be artful representations." All translations are the author's unless otherwise noted.

[9] Plat. *Rep*. 392d. "Is not everything that is told by storytellers or poets a *diegesis* of things that have come to pass or things that are or things that are destined?"

[10] After all Aristotle tells us that μῦθος, "plot," is the ψυχή, "soul," of tragedy. (*Poet*. 1450a).

[11] Plat. *Rep*. 392d. "Do they not then proceed by true narration [*diegesis*] or narration that is produced through imitation [*mimesis*] or through both?"

[12] Aristot. *Poet*. 1448a. "For in each of these [arts] it is possible to represent the same thing by narrating and becoming another, just as Homer does [i.e. alternating narration and voicing characters], or without adopting the manner of another [as in pure narration], or else the whole action represented as carried out by the imitated."

Therefore, diegesis and *mimesis* are not necessarily antithetically opposed, but two aspects of storytelling. All theatre is diegetic insofar as it tells a story, but is mimetic because it tells this story, at least in part by representing the characters. However, Plato must emphasize the mimetic quality of theatre in order to distinguish it from Epic, which features both narration and characterization. So how mimetic is then the Athenian theatre? And what does this have to do with metatheatre?

If it is demonstrable that the Athenian theatre is not entirely mimetic, as Plato and Aristotle believe, then it is not possible for a performer to break the verisimilitude and create a metatheatrical moment. It is precisely this breaking of the mimetic verisimilitude that creates the dislocation and double vision of metatheatre; actors certainly adopt their roles, but how much of the story is really shown to us, and how much is told? On the Athenian stage most of the story occurs offstage and is reported ἀπαγγέλλω, "to report," to the audience. This is not to say that Greek theatre is a mere recitation of the narrative, but the texts suggest an acute evasion of representing action on stage.

As far as imitation is concerned, after establishing tragedy as mimetic, Aristotle quickly distances it from his initial claim. Throughout the rest of his *Poetics,* imitation gradually loses its importance. First, Aristotle claims that Tragedy is the representation of action,[13] and that the target of tragedy is the plot.[14] Then, he suggests that character is not as necessary for tragedy as plot[15]: "ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη."[16] But if character is secondary in nature, how can theatre be essentially mimetic? If the representation of personalities on stage, the *mimesis*, is secondary to the representation of the plot, the *diegesis*, then tragedy is not *entirely* mimetic. While I am not going to suggest that it would be possible to produce theatre entirely without the representation of a personality on stage, I will argue that on the Greek stage most of the plot is told dietetically. In fact, the only parts of the *diegesis* that are routinely portrayed mimetically on the Athenian stage are the argumentative dialogues and *agon* speeches.

In the *Bacchae,* for example, Dionysus and other missive characters report most of the plot after it happens off-stage. Although they always appear in character when delivering these missive reports, the action occurs elsewhere. These narrative passages

[13] Aristot.*Poet*. 1450a "Chief among these [the six aspects of tragedy] is the arrangement of actions. For tragedy is not the representation of men but of action and life."

[14] Aristot. *Poet*.1450a. "Therefore the actions and plot are the end of tragedy, and altogether the end is most important."

[15] *Ibid*. "Yet tragedy cannot be produced without actions but it can be without characterization."

[16] Aristot. *Poet*. 1450a. "Plot then is the foundation of tragedy, the soul as it were, character on the other hand is secondary."

are also rife with visceral imagery especially when they describe deaths or other key περιπέτεια, "reversals." Key examples of this are the messenger speeches from *Hippolytos* and this one from *The Bacchae:*

> She was foaming at the mouth.
> Her dilated eyeballs rolled.
> Her mind was gone – possessed by Bacchus-
> She could not hear her son.
> Gripping his left hand and forearm
> And purchasing her foot against the doomed man's ribs,
> She dragged his arm off at the shoulder. (Eur. *Ba.*1122)

This passage is not mimetic, but pure diegetic storytelling, and rather than being theatrical it is actually quite literary. The vivid imagery typical of these missive scenes suggests the audience should listen to the language to appreciate the tragedy rather than witness the event. The Greek aversion to representing tragic action on stage is difficult to explain, and I do not believe there is any single explanation. Nonetheless, even Aristotle seems to suggest that the power of drama is not in the sight of the spectacle but in the idea of the plot. Thus, he says that a plot should be constructed so that anyone hearing it, even without seeing it, would be just as thrilled with pity and fear.[17] While this does not explain the phenomenon, it lends us insight on the Greek aesthetic sensibility and explains why the Greek stage is absent of action.

This may seem a side issue, but it is fundamental that we acknowledge the nature of Greek performance in order to ask ourselves if a metatheatre that affects audience dislocation can truly exist in the Greek diegetic realm. Or is metatheatre a uniquely modern phenomenon born out of and against the nineteenth and twentieth century traditions of immersive naturalist theatre. I for one believe that the concept of metatheatre could only have emerged as part of the response to the darkened theatre of the naturalists by the likes of Brecht, his alienating method of *Verfremdung,* and other anti-realist reactionaries. [18] Furthermore, metatheatre is only striking[19] (and it is only metatheatre if it *is* striking) if we have constructed our epistemological/semantic conception of theatre to involve a

[17] Aristot. *Poet.*1453b.

[18] It is important to acknowledge that the darkening of the theatre is a nineteenth century innovation introduced largely by Wagner in *The Art-Work of the Future* as part of his theory of *Gesamtkunstwerk*, "total –artwork," and by André Antoine in his naturalist *Théâtre Libre*. This method makes the audience less aware of their own presence and that of their fellow patrons as they lose themselves in the immersion of the piece.

[19] Metatheatre distinguishes from self-reference by being striking.

rigid separation between two worlds, the world of the theatre performance and the world of the diegesis.[20] In order for a metatheatrical theatre to exist for the Greeks, as some scholars would suggest, the Greeks would have to recognize this stark separation of the stage. Applying Richard Weimann's theoretical description of the *locus* and *platea* playing spaces to the Greek stage I will demonstrate why this stark division would have been alien to an Athenian audience.

The *Locus* and the *Platea*: Situating Theatrical Space and the Direction of the Address.

In *Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theatre,* Robert Weimann identifies two key locations on the stage, each representing a specific mode of performance and expression, and each mode carries a different relationship towards the audience, the playing space, and *mimesis*.[21] Originally, Weimann applied his theory to the dramaturgy of the early modern public stage, as it was derived from the popular traditions of medieval stagecraft. I will show, however, that his theory has far wider applications, especially in the realm of the Athenian stage. Weimann suggests, "that the Elizabethan platform stage – far from constituting a unified representational space – can itself be said to have provided two different, although not rigidly opposed, modes of authorizing dramatic discourse."[22] The first, the *locus,* is the scaffold and the playing area furthest from the audience associated with the "localizing capacities of the *represented* in the dramatic world." Namely, this is the space of fixed symbolic locations and steady mimetic verisimilitude. The other, the *platea*, is the 'un-localized' playing area closest to the audience, associated instead with the actor, the performance, "and the neutral materiality of the platform stage."[23] This is the space between the mimetically portrayed diegesis and the audience. It is also a "non-illusionistic mode of performance."[24] In the medieval and early modern theatre, this area is favoured by clown figures, but on the Greek stage it takes on a wider role.[25]

[20] Hence the *double-vision* of witnessing two worlds at once, the represented *world* of the story and the actual world of the performance, and the *dislocation* out of the mimetically represented world of the story.

[21] Erika Lin T, "Performance Practice and Theatrical Privilege: Rethinking Weimann's Concepts of *Locus* and *Platea*,"*New Theatre Quarterly* 22 (2006) 284.

[22] Robert Weimann, "Bifold Authority in Shakespeare's Theatre," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 39 (1988) 409.

[23] Weimann (1988) 409.

[24] Lin (2006) 284.

[25] *Ibid,* 286. The theatrical 'space' of the *locus* and the *platea* is not strictly speaking a space of theatrical geography. The *platea* tends to be closer to the audience, but these "spaces" are created by the mode of the

Unlike the modern proscenium stage, which often facilitates a fully *localized* performance,[26] the Greek stage, like the thrust Elizabethan stage, encourages *plateaic* performance; the actor must compete with the publicness of the circular theatre where the audience's attention is free to wander. As a result, acting in such spaces tends to engage directly with the audience and always remains partially in the *plateaic* space. A *localized* performance in such a space, with actors aloof and detached from their audience would also distance audience interest and investment. On the Greek stage, the *locus* is the space where the mimetic action occurs (or at least what little onstage mimetic action actually occurs). The *platea* is the space occupied continually by the chorus (like the medieval clown), as well as any character delivering an address toward the audience. The line between the *locus* action and the *platea* is not ridged and at any time a performer may move from one to the other.[27] Although Greek staging is still largely a mystery to us, we do know that the chorus occupied the space of the orchestra. That is, the chorus occupies the physical space *closest* to the audience. While some evidence suggests that the actors remained predominantly on the *skene*, the area furthest from the audience, we also know that the centre of the orchestra typically commands the strongest acoustic resonance.[28]

Furthermore, the *agon* tradition often included speeches that do not appear to be written as direct addresses to their interlocutor, but rather as pleas or addresses to a higher power,[29] or more often a moral proclamation to an ambiguous listener. I would propose that in terms of staging, where possible, the speaker would address any speeches to the audience from the *platea*, perhaps even from the centre of the orchestra.[30] When Hippolytos makes his rebuttal against Theseus's accusation, he quickly establishes himself on the *platea* by addressing his audience when he says: "ἐγὼ δ' ἄκομψος εἰς ὄχλον δοῦναι λόγον, / ἐς ἥλικας δὲ κὠλίγους σοφώτερος: / ἔχει δὲ μοῖραν καὶ τόδ': οἱ

performance. The actor makes the space through their performance and by their relationship with the audience.

[26] This is not to suggest that *plateaic* spaces cannot exist on the proscenium stage, but that the theatrical framing technology of the proscenium stage lends itself to illusionistic *localized* performance in a way that is more difficult to achieve on a thrust stage.

[27] It is difficult to claim that certain hubristic tragic figures such as Oedipus and Pentheus would spend as much time on the *platea* since their own hubristic insolence isolates them from the world.

[28] See Mastronarde (1990) and Pickard (1893).

[29] Hippolytos's speech at line 616 illustrates such a plea. He directs his lament immediately towards Zeus and then towards a general unspecified audience. He only addresses the Nurse again at line 651. This may, in part, represent Hippolytos's misogynistic nature, but nonetheless, many of the speeches from this play and others have an ambiguous direction of address.

[30] Weimann also discusses how those characters on the *platea* are "theatrically privileged," because of their closer and more influential relationship to the audience. (Lin 284) The *agon* tradition similarly grants temporary special theatrical privilege to the speaker and the holder of the *platea*.

γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς / φαῦλοι παρ᾽ ὄχλῳ μουσικώτεροι λέγειν."[31] But, who is the crowd that he is speaking before? The only crowd on stage is the chorus of Troezen women, but given Hippolytos's misogyny, already established in his last speech (where he refuses to even address a woman for fifty lines), it is unlikely that he would be nervous in front of a crowd of women. Additionally, given his hatred for women, it is even more unlikely that he would care to convince them of anything. Therefore, the only crowd left to address is the theatre audience itself. Some commentators may be inclined to identify this as an example of metatheatre, but Hippolytos situates his address on the *platea*. He stands in a neutral space, and while he is still caught up in his own tragic action, his address takes on a public dimension: "As a matter of course, such *platea*-directed *mimesis* could never be strictly *representational*: "there remains in bright daylight the social occasion inside the public theatre [. . .] and the awareness of the theatrical occasion in the dramatic language itself."[32] Therefore, to an audience, to whom he directly engages and one that is always aware of their 'social occasion,' the dislocation, which is imperative to metatheatre, is impossible. If the actor stepped out of character to deliver his lines, the effect may have been different, but he does not. Hippolytos remains Hippolytos even when he steps forward to engage directly with the audience. The Athenian stage is fluid and in this instant Hippolytos changes the theatrical space into the *ekklesia*, he breaks the diegetic frame of the narrative without breaking character or becoming suddenly aware of his own theatricality.

Debate Culture and the *Didascalia*: The Purpose that Self-reference *Does* Serve in Greek Theatre

If we return again to Hippolytos's speech we may find that, despite his claim to the contrary, his speech is quite well composed. He begins humbly enough by making a subtle *parrhesiastic* invocation, implies that he will speak frankly *claiming* that he is not skilled in refined speech. He has also already refuted the value of *fine words* in his first remark to Theseus: "τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμ᾽, ἔχον καλοὺς λόγους, / εἴ τις διαπτύξειεν οὐ καλὸν τόδε." [33] In this well calculated move Hippolytos has not only suggests that his father's speech is baseless, but more intricately implies that Theseus used fine rhetoric to cover a

[31] Eur. *Hipp*. 986. "I am unskilled at giving speeches before a crowd. I am more skilled amongst a few people of my own age. This is respectable. For simple men amongst the wise are more accomplished speaking before a mob."

[32] Weimann (1983) 40. Author's emphasis.

[33] Eur.*Hipp.*984. "And yet to be sure your case makes for a fine speech, though if someone were to unfold it, it would not be pretty."

weak argument, while saying Hippolytos's own speech by contrast will be unrefined and therefore truthful. What makes this manoeuvre especially impressive is that the opposite is closer to the truth. Theseus's speech is passionate and unguarded, while Hippolytos's speech is self-conscious and carefully moves from one argument to another.[34]

Hippolytos's speech is not merely a dramatic monologue but also a brilliant exercise in rhetoric. Aristotle too identifies a trend in characterization that makes the characters sound more like rhetors. "οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. "[35] As a rhetor then, in this speech Hippolytos exists on an *extra*-diegetic space and an *extra*-theatrical space. He is performing both on the Athenians stage as a tragic character and as a public figure addressing the Athenian people. Politics are endemic to the Greek theatre. Perhaps before Athens developed its democratic tradition, the characters spoke like statesmen, but by Aristotle's time the characters spoke like rhetoricians. They spoke like rhetoricians because they performed an analogous role to the rhetor in public debate. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Aristotle considers λέξις, "diction," as being one of the six elements of theatre.[36]

For the Greeks the theatre was more than a place for the representations of stories. Tragedy or comedy, it always served a political discursive purpose. It is for this reason that the theatre conventions turn the theatre space into a *plateaic* debate hall. The characters on the Greek stage speak out toward the audience moralizing on the situation they find themselves in. The convention of having *agon* speech competitions represents a uniquely Greek tradition, a tradition equally at home in the theatre and in the assembly. As Peter Arnott explains, Greek theatre *didascalia* served a duel function of entertainment and education.[37] We observe this element in Hippolytos's speech, which is at once dramatic, rhetorical, and didactic in the manner that it highlights the judicial process (and the lack of

[34] Eur. *Hipp*. 990. "Nevertheless, necessity, brought by this misfortune, forces me to release my tongue. But first, I will begin to address where you first entrapped me, since you're going to murder me without my rebuttal." Hippolytos suggests here that he will ἀφεῖναι, "release", his tongue, as though he has until now been restraining. This is another rhetorical ploy to suggest his speech will be sincere. Yet his next sentence is self-conscious of the act of argument. He lays out what he will be arguing against and draws attention to the calmness of his own ἀντιλέξοντ, "rebuttal."

[35] Aristot. *Poet*. 1450b. "Ancient writers make their characters speak politically; modern writers, rhetorically."

[36] *Ibid.* "The fourth principle then is *lexis*. By *lexis* is meant the expression through words, which holds the same effect in *both* metre and prose."
It is notable that the effect of diction is the same in both poetry and prose. Hence, Hipploytos's in-verse-pseudo-rhetorical address might have the same effect as a genuine rhetor's address in the assembly or before the courts.

[37] See Arnott (1970). Also, note that *didascalia*, the Athenian term for the tetralogy of plays that structured the city Dionysia, stems from the same root as *didaskalos*, "place of teaching."

it within the scene).[38] The theatre itself became a centre of debate within which the citizens of the city could be introduced and informed on various issues from a moral or intellectual point of view. A playwright's job therefore was to present both an argument for a certain course of action, and unlike medieval morality plays, to also allow other arguments a voice, in essence to theatricalize the debate culture of the *ekklesia*. As Blanshard points out, it is quite possible that the assembly of the jury and the audience at the theatre are identical institutions convening in different locations. This also explains the coinciding increase in the size of the theatre, from a smaller wooden theatre for the Athenian elite to the stone theatre of Dionysus, and the parallel increase in the number of jurors attending the *ekklesia* after Pericles' decree promised payment for jurors.[39]

The self-referential features of Greek tragedy serve a rhetorical function, not to create a metatheatrical experience. The Greek theatre was a centre of debate and each play an argument within a greater cultural debate, and just as the Greeks were trained to argue by citing the flaws in their antagonist's argument, the playwrights practiced citing and refuting each other's moral claims. Since the Greek stage was an open-air theatre-in-the-round where the audience member was free to talk with their neighbour, appreciate the landscape and perhaps even eat, the theatre would have required a style of acting that made frequent use of the *platea*.[40] Actors would have usually made their addresses to the audience in order to maintain a connection and to hold audience interest.

Yet, this would not be metatheatrical. Metatheatre requires the audience, immersed in the *localized mimesis*, to experience a dislocation when a performer refers to their own theatricality. On the *plateaic* stage, which, on the other hand, is already un-localized, the line between the two worlds of the play's *diegesis* and the world of the performance itself blurs.[41] Characters move seamlessly from *locus* to *platea*. There is no *metatheatricality* in the Greek theatre, only extra-theatricality, the staging and theatricalizing of the *agon* culture

[38] Eur. *Hipp*.1055. "You'll banish me from my country untried by a cross examination, without oath, without argument, without the oracle's prophecy?" This line highlights the failure of due judicial process.

[39] Alastair J. L. Blanshard, "What Counts as the demos? Some Notes on the Relationship between the Jury and "the People" in Classical Athens," *Phoenix* 58 (2004) 28-48.

[40] It is noteworthy that the Greek architecture of the *theatron* (literally the *seeing-place*) favours an expansive view of the landscape beyond the stage, unlike the Roman *auditorium*, which blocks the view with a large architectural *skene*. Therefore, the Greek audience's attention, unlike a modern darkened theatre, is free to explore the landscape in broad daylight. Beyond the actors' performance, ancient theatre has very few technologies besides direct, un-mimetic audience address to hold the audience's attention.

[41] It is important to note Slater's point on "Old Comedy [as] nonillusionary drama. It is not a theatre of illusion occasionally disrupted by primitive choral interventions [...] illusion is not "broken" and then seamlessly glued back together." There is no illusion in the first place. The audience is primarily aware of their presence in the theatre and their actions, thus the acting style would not have exhibited even an approach to naturalism."(21).

that exists beyond theatre. Metatheatre draws attention to theatrical practices themselves and how to criticize them. The theatrical self-references on the Athenian stage emphasize the political culture around the theatre and serves to train Athenians on how to criticize the performance of rhetors and other public figures. Metatheatre could not exist until theatre makers in the twentieth century questioned the conventions of their naturalist illusionistic stage. Therefore, it is inappropriate and academically improper for theatre scholars or classicists to apply *metatheatricality* anachronistically to the Greek stage.

Aaron Golish

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The Self vs. The Collective: Moral Projects behind the Heroes of the *Aeneid* and the *Iliad*

Homer's Achilles and Vergil's Aeneas, the epic heroes of Greece and Rome respectively, differ greatly in their heroic drives. While Achilles' acts are propelled by private passions, Aeneas is governed by a sense of duty to the collective. Achilles' violent individualism alienates him from society and even human identity, while self-sacrificing Aeneas stands at the centre of society, to herald in a new social order. Hence, the opposing personal conflicts and war-making motives of these characters mark great contrast between the Homeric and Vergilian heroic paradigms. Through depictions of Dido, Turnus, and the great Latin war, Vergil stresses the unity between Aeneas and Roman civilization, to announce and celebrate the superiority of each. Conversely, through Achilles' obsession with personal fame and retribution, Homer underscores with more complexity the conflict between the self and the collective. Through their relationships with society, both heroes shape the moralist and pacifist commentaries of their narratives. However, while Vergil's Aeneas overcomes passions of the self for the sake of the collective, and thereby propagates a heroic and social ideal; Homer maintains tension between the self and civilization, to generate a more critical, less celebratory view of the hero, and the social structure in which he functions.

The personal conflicts between Aeneas and Dido, and Achilles and Agamemnon each present a critique of individual passion, which is resolved in the *Aeneid*, but left to fester in the *Iliad***.** The overwrought conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon shows the hero's selfish disregard for the Greek collective. By contrast, the relationship between Aeneas and Dido impels Aeneas to forgo his passion and to piously embrace his project of civilization. Dido's fall, from her position as Aeneas' promising equal, to his passion-struck inferior, enables Vergil to present selfish desire as incompatible with stable civilization. There is, meanwhile, no clear moral superior in the conflict between Achilles and Agamemnon. Instead, readers are prompted to criticize each man's claims of personal entitlement, and consequently, to question claims of entitlement and authority in the greater conflicts of the *Iliad*.

Essential to the Vergilian heroic paradigm is Aeneas' acceptance of his responsibility to reestablish the social order. Our hero finds his mirror in Queen Dido, who is likewise engaged in a civilizing mission: we find her erecting the towers of Carthage. Vergil's initial portrait of Dido is aglow with hopeful potential; Aeneas "star(es) amazed as Carthaginian promise," and is reminded of his own great purpose (Fitzgerald 20).[1] Having mastered

[1] Vergil, *Aeneid.* Translated by Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Vintage Classics, 1990). In-text citations for this and other ancient sources are to the page numbers of the specific translations, rather than to the original line

past passions and become wizened by her wanderings, Dido is immediately embraced as Aeneas' ally, and heroic equal. However, Dido's noble aims are perverted when she falls prey to passion. Dido's weakness in love makes her both a cautionary exemplar for Aeneas, and a catalyst in his heroic development. Vergil conveys the dangerous power of love by making it an instrument of immortal agency. The goddess Venus uses love to subordinate Dido to Aeneas, against the woman's conscious will. Thus, Dido becomes enslaved, and inflamed by a passion over which she has no control. The imagery of fire that encircles the Queen at numerous instances suggests the destructive nature of unbridled emotion, with its power to smolder higher ambitions. Through Dido's suicide on a flaming pyre, Vergil cautions that a hero must extinguish selfish passions, or else become consumed by them.

Aeneas emerges as the clear superior in his relationship with Dido. This is largely because the love to which our hero succumbs is presented as the Queen's, not his, tormenting pathogen. When describing intimate moments between the lovers, such as their union in a cave, Vergil focalizes narrative perspective on Dido: "she thought no longer of a secret love, but called it marriage" (101). This focus of character creates a buffer between Aeneas and the experience of passion, allowing Vergil to downplay his hero's culpability in this transgression of heroic duty. Moments that are dramatically romanticized through Dido's perspective may be alternatively related as mere sexual encounters through Aeneas' perspective. Further, while medieval artists like Andrea Mantenga focus on the immorality of Aeneas' abandonment of Dido,[2] Vergil's use of structural opposition on the level of plot affirms Aeneas as morally superior to his lover. As Aeneas embraces his civic duty, Vergil depicts Dido as deserting her people. Dido's deteriorating heroic self-command causes the dilapidation of her city, Carthage. While Dido describes herself metaphorically as a "declining house," with its walls falling down (107), her failing city literally exhibits this pathetic condition, "towers (of Carthage), half-built, rose no farther" (98). In effect, Aeneas' departure from Dido and Carthage marks the hero's escape from civil catastrophe and his admirable recommitment to social order. Moreover, by framing Aeneas' decision as a struggle between base physical desire, and higher spiritual destiny, "...the course heaven gave him" (110), Vergil expresses Aeneas' departure from Carthage as an ascent to higher (Roman) civilization[3].

While Aeneas functions to establish and legitimize new structures of order and hierarchy, the hero of the *Iliad*, Achilles, poses an ideological threat to preexisting structures

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[2] Margaret Franklin, "Mantagna's Dido: Faithful Widow, or Abandoned Lover?" in *Artibus et Historiae* 21:41 (2000), 113.

[3] The conflict between Dido and Aeneas is an historical allegory for the age-old enmities between the Romans and Carthaginians. Through the heroic parallelism, and contrast between Dido and Aeneas, Vergil positions Rome as the superior city.

of authority. The threat emerges out of Achilles' uncompromising individualism at the expense of the collective. Achilles' conflict with Agamemnon arises out of each man's notions of entitlement. Through this conflict, Agamemnon, king of Mycenae, behaves in accordance with the accepted social hierarchy. As Agamemnon has returned his war bride out of duty to the god Apollo, he in turn is in a position to take Achilles' woman, as the hero's political superior. In response, Achilles refuses to fight for Agamemnon, for the king has assaulted his personal dignity. The dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon exposes an unsettling disunity within the Greek collective, a conflict that is mirrored on Mount Olympus. Here, Hera's defiance against Zeus, Father of Gods, parallels Achilles' defiance against the king. Although unlike Achilles, Hera is violently silenced by her superior (96-97),[4] she still manages to undermine Zeus' will through sexual deception. Because tensions between rulers and their subjects, both in the heavens and on earth, remain alive and unresolved for much of the narrative, the *Iliad*, unlike the *Aeneid,* can offer its readers no obvious moral victor and corresponding code of ethics. In the *Iliad,* morality and heroic destiny are not as aligned as they are in the *Aeneid*. While we foresee that the Greeks will defeat the Trojans, and that Achilles will achieve great fame, readers cannot so readily pick sides in the battle, or in the disputes between Achilles and Agamemnon, Zeus and Hera. For instance, we may criticize Agamemnon's hubris and his exploitations of monarchical power; however, self-serving Achilles, who refuses to assume his role as warrior even as hundreds of his comrades die, becomes equally deserving of moral condemnation. Thus, while the Roman poet Vergil is prescriptive in assigning moral superiors—always Aeneas and Rome—and inferiors—always his non-Trojan opponents—Homer's heroic paradigm sets the hero apart from, and against, his society to prompt greater criticism of both tyrannical authority and subversive individualism.

Next comes war. A comparison of Aeneas and Achilles' divergent motives and behaviors in battle reveals how Vergil and Homer craft opposing heroic models to express uniquely different pacifist attitudes. Whereas Aeneas battles dutifully, striving for peaceful social assimilation, Achilles fights with a personal wrath which threatens to efface human civilization, thereby exposing the dark underbelly of war. Aeneas enters war with the motive to quell native insurgency in Latinum and there found the new peaceful nation of Troy. Even before this hero begins battle, Vergil foreshadows Trojan victory through an image of his shield, "there the Lord of Fire…had wrought the future story of Italy, the triumphs of the Romans…" (378). These *ekphrastic* flashes of conquest dramatize the great objectives of Vergil's hero, as well as that of Vergil himself: Aeneas fights, and Vergil writes, for the glory of Rome and its peaceful conquest over inferior peoples. Vergil expresses the *Aeneid*'s pacifist stance through Aeneas' anti-war attitude. Although Aeneas

[4] Homer, *Iliad*. Translated by Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 1991)

sees justification for war, he does not relish in it, and favours negotiation over bloody combat. Books VII-XII of the *Aeneid* present Aeneas as a rational diplomat in contrast to his barbaric adversary, Turnus. In fact, Aeneas's opposition, the Rutulians, turn to support Vergil's hero when he shows stronger concern for peace than their commander, Turnus, who fights only out of personal vengeance. Through the dramatic realignment of Rutulian loyalties, Vergil celebrates the humanitarian heroism of Aeneas and Rome, while signaling the inevitable triumph of peaceful civilization over savage individualism.

Unlike Aeneas, Achilles' attitude towards war is not shaped by hopes for a future society, but rather by personal retribution for past crimes. First, Achilles removes himself from war in rage against Agamemnon for taking his female captive Briseus; later, he embraces war, in rage against Hector for the slaying of Patroclus. The passionate love between Achilles and Patroclus by no means finds its parallel between Aeneas and Lavinia, the girl whose hand Vergil's hero wins. Achilles' wish that his ashes rest together with those of Patroclus, shows his love to be deliberately isolated and severed from the Greek army, and the nation for which he fights. By contrast, Aeneas is not drawn to Lavinia, daughter of the native King Latinus, out of affection; this woman functions solely to symbolize the land that the hero will acquire for his people. The contrast between Achilles and Aeneas' romantic partnerships indicates that unlike those of Achilles, Aeneas' war motives are not founded on personal loss or vanity. Instead, Vergil's hero both figuratively and literally leaves behind the loves of his past, Creusa and Dido, to fulfill the greater epic and collective purpose of the *Aeneid*.

Aeneas' struggle against passion for the good of the collective comes under critical investigation with regards to his similarities with Achilles**.** Critic W.S Anderson argues that although the character of Turnus, Aeneas' war opponent, is modeled on Achilles, Vergil establishes *Aeneas* as the true heir to Achilles' model of heroism as the epic progresses.[5] Turnus is certainly like Achilles; he is vengeful, passion-inflamed, and personally accountable for the deaths of his allies. Thomas Van Nortwick correlates that "Turnus' fervid intensity is fed by a preoccupation with personal honour and fame akin to that of the Homeric hero."[6] Corresponding with Anderson's thesis, readers may find that through the confrontation between Aeneas and Turnus, Aeneas himself becomes irrationally Achillean, "Aeneas raged at the relic of his anguish…he sank his blade in fury in Turnus' flesh" (402). However, Anderson's notion of Aeneas as "heir" to Achilles is problematic to the ideology of the *Aeneid*, which privileges piety and restraint over gratuitous violence**.** If we

[5] W.S. Anderson "Vergil's Second Iliad" *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 88 (1957), 26.

[6] Thomas Van Nortwork, "Aeneas, Turnus, and Achilles," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 110 (1980), 307.

are to compare Aeneas and Achilles, it must therefore be argued that through his moment of fury, Aeneas eclipses the heroic qualities of both Turnus and Achilles. Unlike his heroic counterparts, Aeneas manages to *channel* his emotional intensity to confront, and eradicate a dangerous threat to the social order. Ironically, Aeneas assumes Achilles' violent heroism in order to destroy it.

While Vergil presents a promising ideal of peace through his rational and humanitarian hero Aeneas, Achilles' fury in war seems to herald the destruction of peace between civilized men. The wrath of Achilles is truly apocalyptic. In battle, Homer's hero undergoes a paradoxical process of dehumanization, whereby he both ascends to godliness and descends into animalism. Excesses in the *Iliad's* narrative form forcibly express this transformation. Homer piles simile on dramatic simile, as Achilles piles the corpses of his victims: "like inhuman fire…like a frenzied god…like oxen broad in the brow…to crush white barley heaped" (519). The multiple, and rapidly-transforming portrayals of Achilles, expressed through breathless hyperbole, show this hero bursting out of the confines of his narrative, as he likewise transcends the constraints of humanity. The threat that one man can pose to society materializes in the image of Achilles clearing the battlefield: "The Trojans fled en masse… streaming into Troy, no daring left…to wait for each other, any fighter whose racing legs could save his life" (540). While Aeneas' diplomacy unites enemies on the battlefield, the Trojan retreat from Achilles symbolizes the failure of collective action against selfish barbarity. Achilles' confrontation with Hector heightens the tragic element of such a threat. Readers sympathize with Hector for his selfless devotion to his family and his city. Conversely, Achilles fights for no living man: he symbolizes destruction, without hope of rebirth, and in this sense becomes a predecessor to the modern anti-hero. Homer's hero refuses to maintain the civility for which Hector pleads when he cries, "don't talk to me of pacts, there are no binding oaths between men and lions…." (550). In accordance with Achilles' hateful wishes, the men devolve into beasts through their combat. Homer describes Hector dashing away like a fawn from a hound (547), and next frantically swooping on Achilles like an eagle (551). Ultimately, through the dehumanizing wrath of Achilles, Homer achieves a pacifist stance. The *Iliad* does not justify war as a civilizing force in the manner of the *Aeneid*. Instead, this epic presents war and civilization as tragically incompatible states.

Achilles' selfish heroism is the microcosmic core of the greater moral critique of the *Iliad,* which exposes the futility of war. When examining the forces propelling the Trojan War, one finds that just as Achilles fights for himself**,** the Greeks fight in the name of one man's fury and the Trojans fight to defend one man's promiscuity. The petty conflict between Menelaus and Paris over Helen, which parallels the dispute between Achilles and Agamemnon, is that which has sparked ten grueling years of war. The mass destruction resulting from such personal riffs indicates that war is the terrible product and province of a few men's selfish passions. Whereas through the heroic example of Aeneas, Vergil

expresses that war may be a means of establishing just and stable social ends, the *Iliad* projects a darker, modern perspective of war by spotlighting its egocentric origins and alienating effects.

The heroic models of Aeneas and Achilles are critical to the development of the moralist and pacifist commentaries of their respective narratives. Through the *Aeneid* and *Iliad*, Vergil and Homer each grapple with the relationship between the individual and the collective. However, while Aeneas' alignment with Roman civilization molds him into the moral heroic ideal, Achilles, through his furious self-possession, exposes the unresolved tension between individual desire and social responsibility. Ultimately, as the *Aeneid* directs its readers towards a supposedly superior model of civilization, the *Iliad* invites us to reevaluate the moral foundations of existing social structures—that is, before they crumble to the ground.

Madeline Silver

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Plato on Knowledge

The analysis of knowledge attempted in the *Theaetetus* ends inconclusively. The question of why it fails is made more intriguing by the fact that Plato's analysis of knowledge given in the *Meno*—knowledge is true opinion with an account of the reason why—is not mentioned at all. In fact, the absence of Plato's earlier view may be why the inquiry in the *Theaetetus* fails. It be may that the characters in the *Theaetetus* are so far from being moved by the same considerations present in the *Meno*—for instance, the theory of recollection—that their investigation was doomed from the outset. An inspection of why the characterizations of account given in the *Theaetetus* are deficient may shine some light on the project's inevitable failure. Meanwhile, in the *Meno*, the characterization manages to survive the end of the dialogue; in addition, it is connected by Socrates with theory of recollection. Perhaps if the theory had been advanced in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates and his interlocutors would have been more successful.

I. The problem understood broadly: *Meno* 85c-e and 97a-98c.

The problem of the difference between knowledge and (mere) true belief is broached first in the *Meno*. Appropriately, the explication of this difference—exactly what is true of knowledge that is not true of mere true belief—does a good amount of work for Plato's program of recollection. Firstly, though, it must be clarified that the goal is not to specify in what way the properties of knowledge—what knowledge is like—and the properties of true belief diverge: the question is in what way the formula that some doxastic agent S knows that Socrates is a man if and only if S has a true belief that Socrates is a man fails, such that S can have a true belief that Socrates is a man without knowing that same proposition.[1] After watching the slave boy make a series of inferences without any prior instruction in geometry, Socrates believes his previous thesis that "as the soul is immortal, has been born before, and has seen all things here and in the underworld, there is nothing which it has not learned" has been vindicated (81c-d). The soul had experienced, in some capacity, mathematical objects—and, certainly, a lot more besides—before embodiment. Meno takes this claim to be one according to which "what we call learning is recollection" (81e). In the *Phaedo*, it is reported that recollection is achieved when one is "interrogated in the right manner" (73a). The relevant sort of interrogation is illustrated in the *Meno*. What is interesting for my purposes here, though, is Socrates' insistence that what is being

[1] Specifically why this analysis is defective will be articulated later. What matters now is that, in the *Meno*, Socrates proceeds as if true opinion is not identical to or sufficient for knowledge. All translations are taken from Plato, *Plato: Complete Works*, edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).

recollected—or, equivalently, learned—is not knowledge, but simply true opinion.

The upshot is that the distinction between *knowledge* and *true opinion* helps motivate the theory of recollection. In the dialogue with the slave, Socrates observes that the true opinions, already present in him, "have now just been stirred up like a dream, but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, you know that his knowledge about these things would be as accurate as anyone's" (85c-d). The question-and-answer process characteristic of Socrates *stirs up* true opinions. These "opinions were in [the slave]" even before the stirring-up (85c). The salient point is made clear when Socrates affirms that "the man who does not know has within himself true opinions about the things that he does not know" (85c). This passage is a clear statement of the status of true opinion as an insufficient condition for knowledge. Taken in conjunction with the previous two passages, it can be inferred that the true opinions, present even before birth, in the slave can be stirred up by the right sorts of questions, and then, when this interrogation is maintained and carried out from various angles, the true opinions can become knowledge.

In the *Meno*, Socrates sketches a picture of what accompanies true opinion, generating knowledge; however, his meditations on this issue do not approach the sustained inquiry seen later in the *Theaetetus*. True opinion is neither reliable nor consistent in the same way knowledge is. The fact that some true beliefs can be acquired accidentally or through luck illustrates this unreliability.[2] Socrates captures this idea with an image: just as the statues of Daedalus run away if not tied down, so do true opinions (97d-98a). The analogy continues: one can tie down the statues of Daedalus, and one can tie down true opinions, ensuring that they do not "escape from a man's mind" (98a). The general notion appears to be that true opinions can cease to be true when some salient feature of the world changes, and one who formed the true belief only accidentally is unable to track these relevant differences. Accordingly, true opinion, according to Socrates in the *Meno*, can be tied down by giving "an account of the reason why" (98a). The accompaniment of the reason why some opinion is true allows one to track changes in the world, since the possession of why some opinion is true—its truth conditions—entails that one can see now whether the opinion is true or untrue. The presence of this arrangement – truth, opinion, and an account of the reason why—are apparently jointly sufficient for knowledge, in light of Socrates' remark that when true opinions are "tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place" (98a). Such is Plato's account of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge in the *Meno*. This distinction is so crucial that Plato has Meno declare that, among the few things he takes himself to know, he would count the fact that "right opinion is a different thing from knowledge" (98b). Indeed, this distinction

[2] Importantly, this feature of true beliefs will animate a large part of the discussion surrounding why one cannot identify knowledge with true beliefs, which I shall cover soon enough.

must be so: the problem of separating true belief and knowledge (such that the former is not sufficient for the latter) is central to the Platonic program of recollection, because it is on that basis that Socrates can hold that *true opinions* are stirred up by some kinds of interrogation, and only *further* questioning produces *knowledge*.

II. The problem understood narrowly: *Theaetetus* 144e-151e.

In contrast, the local problem is the one that prompts Socrates, in the *Theaetetus*, to define knowledge. As such, the immediate goal is not even to distinguish knowledge from, say, true opinion, since before this investigation has commenced, the question whether knowledge is true opinion is still open. Only later in the inquiry is that possibility eliminated. Moreover, the problem that moves Socrates in this dialogue to consider the definition of knowledge has no obvious relationship to the theory of recollection or, more indirectly still, to the immortality of the soul that the theory of recollection is meant to support in the *Phaedo*. It is for this reason that a distinction was established between the *narrow* or *local* problem and the *wide* problem. This local problem is about expertise. It is introduced in a peculiar way. Theodorus, one of Socrates' interlocutors, has judged that Theaetetus resembles Socrates himself (144a-c). While Socrates acknowledges Theodorus' judgment, he is more interested in Theodorus' position to make this claim; he is interested in whatever makes one *qualified* as an expert. To this end, Socrates supposes that if he and Theaetetus each had a lyre, and if Theodorus "had told them that they were both similarly tuned," then, before accepting his judgment, it would be responsible to "find out if he was speaking with any expert knowledge of music" (144e). Instead of inquiring into Theodorus' body of knowledge, the discussants are going to inquire into the nature of knowledge.

However, it may not be obvious at first how to move from a discussion about expertise to a properly epistemological activity. Whether Theodorus' recognition of the similarities between Socrates and Theaetetus was about a physical resemblance or about conditions in the soul, it is agreed that Theodorus needs to be speaking from a place of expertise, otherwise "one ought not to pay much attention to him" (145a). In what sense this relates to knowledge is pointed out by Socrates rather quickly. He maintains that "to learn is to become wiser [or, to become an expert] about the thing one is learning" (145d). Subsequently, to set up clearly the problem to which he is driving, Socrates secures Theaetetus' assent to the fact that wisdom makes people wise (or, that expertise makes people experts) and that, notably, these are the same things as knowledge (145e). So, if Socrates wants to inquire into Theodorus' grounds for making some claims—specifically, those which require some expertise—then he needs to look into the nature of knowledge. The focus of the *Theaetetus* is, then, innocently offered by Socrates: "what do you think knowledge is" (146c)? Consequently, the local problem—the problem that initiates the discussion of knowledge in the dialogue—is one about expertise. It is, in this way, divorced

from considerations of recollection and the immortality of the soul. As the dialogue continues, however, the parties to the discussion come to see that the distinction between true belief and knowledge that marked the exchange in the *Meno* needs to be made here, too.

III. The nature of judgment: *Theaetetus* 187a-190b.

One constitutive ingredient of knowledge is belief, opinion or judgment. The conversation recorded in the *Theaetetus* gets off the ground in earnest only when the titular character and Socrates evaluate the entailments of the proposition that knowledge is perception. After the explosion of that definition of knowledge, the dialogue proceeds along a different trajectory: knowledge as true judgment. The attendant complications are many. Regardless, the notion of *judgment* generally stands in need of elucidation. Perhaps calling the objects of sense perception deficient or not the proper objects of knowledge, Socrates supposes that he and Theaetetus need to look for knowledge "in whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are" (187a). Judgment, as such, is some kind of activity of the soul that is completed *by itself*, whose objects are the things which are—as opposed to the objects of "sense-perception" (187a). Judgment is initially explicated this way. Socrates feels that this treatment is preliminary, though.

Concordantly, a more developed approach is taken shortly thereafter. A judgment is an answer the soul gives to itself, in a kind of internal question-and-answer exchange. It is an internal dialectic. Socrates holds that it seems to him "that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself," either making an affirmation or a denial (189e-190a). One may expect that Socrates would find it un-problematic to label *just any* affirmation a judgment; one's expectations go unmet. Somewhat mysteriously, Socrates avers that only when a soul "affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel" is this called its judgment (190a). The qualification regarding divided counsel and consistency is endorsed without question by Theaetetus (190a). Possibly thinking the qualification is inconsequential, Socrates overlooks it when he explains that "to judge is to make a statement, and a judgment is a statement which is not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself " (190a). While it is clear now that a judgment is a sort of statement by oneself to oneself internally, it is not sufficiently clear what Socrates has in mind with the divided counsel condition.

It may be that when there is discord in the soul, it does not make judgments. In the eighth book of the *Republic*, Socrates says about the oligarchic city that "of necessity

it isn't one city but two—one of the poor and one of the rich—and living in the same place and always plotting against one another" (551d). Since Socrates thinks the oligarchic city is divided (such that, in fact, it is *two* cities), and since he thinks there is a kind of arrangement in the soul analogous to it, he may believe that *these* sorts of souls make affirmations with divided counsel, preventing their statements from counting as judgments. The difficulty with this view is twofold. First, it seems that the natural response is to insist that the oligarchic soul is making judgments, but they are just the wrong sorts of judgments. This response would prompt Socrates to cast some light on why the divided counsel condition is present at all. The second difficulty is that it seems even in the oligarchic person, there is a *kind* of unity—just one concerned with money-making. The oligarchic person "makes the rational and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite, one on either side, reducing them to slaves," not allowing reason to discover anything except money-making techniques and not permitting spirit to value anything but money or aspire to be anything but rich (553b-c). The three parts of the soul appear to be united in money-making. There is no divided counsel here; if there is, then it is not obvious where it is. In any case, where there is no divided counsel, the soul can make judgments.4

IV. Knowledge is not identical to true belief: *Theaetetus* 200e-201d and *Meno* 97a-97e.

After articulating the character of judgment, Socrates and Theaetetus hone in on false judgment. Predictably, this discussion ends inconclusively, but the two interlocutors agree to suspend that investigation and look into the definition of knowledge as true belief (200e). At stake in this definition is much of what was said in the *Meno*: if knowledge turns out to be true belief in the *Theaetetus*, then there is an inconsistency between this discovery and the fact that Socrates avouched to Meno and the slave that the latter had a true belief that was not yet knowledge. If now knowledge is defined as true belief, then the Meno requires some revision. Fortunately, the argument in the *Meno*—which I have not yet presented—concludes the same way as the argument against knowledge being true belief (K=TB) in the *Theaetetus*. Socrates employs one counter-example—jurymen in a law court—in the *Theaetetus*, and he exploits various angles of it. It is not clear which objectionable features would, by themselves, be sufficient for establishing the falsity of K=TB.

The jurymen counter-example is meant to convince the reader that true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. The example begins in the aftermath or a robbery or assault, with lawyers and orators being responsible for having to persuade a jury of some conclusion (201b). Socrates is clear that these people "use their art to produce conviction not by teaching people, but by making them judge whatever they themselves choose" (201a). They cannot be *teaching* the jurors because of the limited amount of time allotted

for these speeches. Instead, it must be an instance of persuasion, defined as "causing them to judge" (201b). So far, one argument against K=TB has been disclosed: true beliefs formed by accident cannot be knowledge. The fact that the jurymen are only hearing some proposition—even if it is a true one—because the lawyers or the orators have chosen to tell it confirms that this case is one of luck. The jurymen are just lucky to form this true belief. Knowledge is not formed accidentally.

There are a few other problems with K=TB exposed by this counter-example. Socrates appears to think that it is not possible to *persuade* someone of something only an eye-witness—or, one who has experienced something firsthand—can know (201b). For reasons unclear, Socrates thinks that jury has formed, on account of the lawyers and orators' speeches, a true belief about "some matter which only an eye-witness can know, and which cannot otherwise be known" (201b-c). The jury's true belief fails to be knowledge also because it is second-hand. The suggestion that knowledge is necessarily firsthand is a high standard, though it should not be inferred from that fact that Socrates does not propound it. He may, on the other hand, hold the following: it is impossible for a belief to rise to the level of knowledge, where the belief is generated by persuasion, and where the persuaders do not have enough time in delivering their speeches to "teach adequately to people who were not eye-witnesses" to the truth (201b). The reason why the jury's true belief, accordingly, does not qualify as knowledge is because the persuaders—the lawyers and orators—did not have enough time to teach the jurymen adequately, given also that the jurymen had no firsthand experience. The takeaway of this exercise is that true belief is not identical to knowledge.

In the *Meno*, Socrates presents a counter-example to K=TB that seizes upon the character of knowledge as firsthand. The counter-example is a guide to Larissa. Someone who guides people to Larissa with a true opinion regarding how to get there will not, insofar as the judgment is true, be distinguished from someone who knows how to get there. For this reason, Socrates exclaims that "as long as he has a right opinion about that of which the other has knowledge, he will not be a worse guide than the one who knows, as he has a true opinion, though not knowledge" (97b). It is not obvious why one cannot infer from this observation that K=TB has been vindicated, and that he who Socrates takes to be a non-knower does, in truth, know. There are a few replies. First, Meno himself wonders why this move is not made when he asks why "knowledge is prized far more highly than right opinion, and why they are different" (97d). Those who would use the success of the guide to Larissa as an example *in favor* of K=TB are in the esteemed company of Meno, who thinks the guide's ability to get to Larissa blurs the line between knowledge and true opinion. So, one response to the Larissa example is to say that it just is support for K=TB.

The second and third responses to the Larissa example are more critical and situate it within a criticism of K=TB. The second response is to insist that the guide to Larissa merely has true opinion because he has never been to Larissa before, since Socrates does

design the case as one in which the guide "had not gone there" (97b). This response does some important work for the opponent of K=TB. First, now there is a reply to Meno, who wonders why there is a distinction between true judgment and knowledge. Suppose the guide forms the right opinion because he guesses correctly; in this case, it is merely luck that is responsible for the true belief. This feature of the true opinion would, in conjunction with the analysis of the jury example in the *Theaetetus*, explain why the guide's belief does not rise to the level of knowledge. However, suppose that, rather than guessing, the guide has been told the truth about how to get to Larissa by someone who has been there. Now, one can mobilize against the guide the same argument Socrates uses in *Theaetetus* against the law court example as well: the guide's true opinion does not rise to the level of knowledge because it is not firsthand experience. Knowledge of the route to Larissa is not something one can get without even having been to Larissa. This restriction does not preclude one from acquiring true opinions of the path: accurate testimony is sufficient for that. So, the second reply to the defender of K=TB is to emphasize either the accidental nature of the guide's belief, or its status as secondhand.

The third reply to the proponent of K=TB, in light of the Larissa example, was more or less covered earlier: mere true opinions never endure as true for long. Suppose that by chance, the path to Larissa changed one day—maybe a bad storm made taking the traditional road just not practical—the guide would not be able to adapt to these changes. The guide *does not even know where Larissa is*. Meanwhile, the person with knowledge is in a much stronger epistemic position. It was just these considerations that motivated the discussion of an "account of the reason why" that is meant to accompany true opinion, which would be sufficient for knowledge (98a). Without some account joined with the true opinion, one is unable to keep track of changes in the environment; this inability produces a sort of inconsistency in one's judgments, where sometimes one is right and other times, about the same issues, one is wrong, and only the environment varies. Perhaps knowledge is true opinion with an account.

V. One attempt at specifying the nature of accounts: *Theaetetus* 206c-206e.

With Theaetetus and Socrates determined as ever to identify jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge, they press on.[3] The explicit goal is to look more closely at "what

[3] I am not following the exact order of presentation in the *Theaetetus*. The march goes from the so-called dream theory of account to a criticism of this theory to meditations on three candidates for being definitions of account. The second of these candidates largely resembles the dream account. I will start by presenting the first of the three candidates. Then, I will treat the dream account and the second candidate together. I will conclude this section of the essay, fittingly, with the final candidate.

can be meant by the proposition that it is in the addition of an account to a true judgment that knowledge is perfected" (206c). The first candidate is an explication of account according to which to give an account is to make "one's thought apparent vocally by means of words and verbal expressions—when a man impresses an image of his judgment upon the stream of speech, like reflections upon water or in a mirror" (206d). To give an account, on this view, is to relate one's thought linguistically. Since judgment was an exclusively internal activity, making an account accompany a judgment is expressing this internal activity externally (or, it is at least being *able to*). Theaetetus is attracted to this explication because he has recognized that "at least, a man who does this is said to be giving an account" (201d). The datum supporting this definition, then, is that it squares with what (apparently) some speakers called giving an account. So, to give an account is to express with language the content of one's judgment.

This understanding of account is exploded rather quickly. It is too easy to achieve. However, this ease is not a problem in itself. This property implies that simply true opinion does not exist, since true opinion is sufficient for true opinion with an account (which is, by hypothesis, knowledge). Socrates exploits this defect, in saying that "everyone is able to [give an account, in this sense,] more or less readily [...] if he is not deaf or dumb to begin with" (206d). An important disclaimer is that Socrates does not consider it a desideratum of a theory of account that it holds that accounts are hard to give. The problem is not that accounts are easy to give. The flaw is that "anyone at all who makes a correct judgment will turn out to have it 'together with an account'; correct judgment without knowledge will no longer be found anywhere" (206d-e). This argument is interesting because there is a real sense in which it puts a new gloss on an old problem. True opinion is not identical to knowledge—so, K=TB is not undergoing a revival—but it is now sufficient for it, since true opinion is sufficient for having a true opinion with an account. On K=TB, knowledge was too easy to get because one could form true beliefs by accident or by testimony; on this understanding of account, knowledge is so easy to get that no one will have mere true opinion. If this explication of account really did obtain, it would naturally pose problems for the Platonic program in two ways: expertise would become too easy to get, and recollection could no longer be conceived in the same fashion. If having a true opinion is sufficient for having a true opinion with an account, and, since having a true opinion with an account is knowledge, then Socrates would have to concede that, say, the slave in the *Meno*, even just after answering a few questions, has *knowledge*. Furthermore, it would have to be conceded too that anyone can hold forth on any skill-related issue, so long as he or she is right. This theory of account is doomed.

VI. Another attempt at specifying the nature of accounts: *Theaetetus* 201e-206c and 207a-208c.

In addition, some other (similar) approaches are attempted. Both try to specify more exactly the contents of the account meant to, when accompanying true opinion, be sufficient for knowledge. The dream theory is first. The dream theory has it that there are basic constituents of a thing, and their "names may be woven together and become an account of something—an account being essentially a complex of names" (202b). Yet, these basic elements cannot have an account provided of them, so they are "not knowable" (201d). The nature of these basic elements is left unexplored, except for the following exposition: they are "primary elements [...] of which we and everything else are composed" and they "have no account" (201e). Socrates is adamant that these primary elements can have nothing predicated of them. A primary element can "only be named; it is not possible to say anything else of it, either that it is or that it is not. That would mean that we were adding being or not-being to it; whereas we must not attach anything, if we are to speak of that thing itself alone" (201e-202a). The complexes that are built out of the primary elements can be the objects of knowledge; the accounts that are added to the true opinions are the complexes of the *names* of the primary elements. In contrast, the primary elements cannot be known, because they are "unaccountable" (202b). They can only be perceived and named. The soul can, however, be "in a state of truth as regards that thing, but [the soul] does not know" the primary element (202c). The dream theorist's insistence that the primary elements are unknowable will be the theory's undoing.

Though Socrates and Theaetetus are initially confident about the dream theory and its potential, it meets its end after a relentless assault from the former. The difficulty Socrates perceives with this theory is that "the elements are unknowable and the complexes knowable" (202d-e). The consequence is that one knows some whole, but fails to *know* its parts. This problem will be illustrated by taking the primary elements to be letters—"the elements of language" (202e). Take the word 'Socrates' and its first syllable 'SO'; it is a complex composed of the letters 'S' and 'O' (203a). Since Theaetetus is acquainted with the relevant letters, and has a true judgment regarding the first syllable, it is correct to endow his belief with the status of knowledge. However, Theaetetus—as predicted by the dream theory—cannot give an account of 'S'; it is one of those unaccountable primary elements. So, he fails to know 'S'. This fact, totally consistent with the dream theory, invites the theory's first problem. The syllable 'SO' is *nothing other than* its parts: 'S' and 'O'. If there is knowledge of the whole, there must be knowledge of the parts. Socrates affirms that it cannot be that, with regard to the one syllable and the two letters, someone "is ignorant of each one, and knows the two of them without knowing either" (203d). Socrates and Theaetetus both revoke their endorsement of the dream theory, upon discovering the upshot of its central tenet: one can know a complex, without *knowing* its parts.

Even still, the dream theory is quickly revived, perhaps for the sake of charity on the part of Socrates. The way to salvage it, says Socrates, is to argue that any complex is "a single form resulting from the combination of the several elements when they fit together" (204a). From this amendment it follows that the syllable 'SO' is something above and beyond its constitutive elements. Socrates rightly points out that, if this amendment is correct, it means that 'SO' "must have no parts" (204a). This necessity is due to the fact that "when a thing has parts, the whole is necessary all the parts" (204a). Theaetetus attempts to resist the direction of Socrates' argument. He maintains that a sum is the same thing as all its parts, but that a *whole* is not (204a-204c). 'Sum' and 'whole' express different content. Socrates manages to deal with Theaetetus, and the revived dream theory, together: to do so, he switches to talk about numbers. To talk about 'two and three and one' and 'four and two' is to talk about the same thing: six. He gets Theaetetus to agree that in number-related matters, "by 'the sum' and 'all of them' we mean the same thing" (204d). The ambitious Socrates aspires to extrapolate and move into non-mathematical matters: for instance, "the number of an army is the same as the army" (204d). The amount of soldiers in the army—the number of an army—is nothing other than its parts, too. The next step in the argument is that since things which *have* parts *consist* of parts, and since all parts are the sum (because the total number is the sum), *then* the whole does not consist of parts, because then it would be the sum (204e-205a). After all, it has been claimed by Theaetetus that wholes and sums are different. Socrates concludes that Theaetetus was wrong on this front (205a). The discussants have arrived at the claim "that both the whole and its sum will be all the parts" (205a). Socrates moves in for the killing blow, with everything in place.

Now, Socrates can properly return to where the discussion stood right after the dream theory was revived. If the syllable 'SO' is not the letters that make it up, then it cannot have the letters as its part—since wholes are all the parts. Note that Socrates and Theaetetus agree there are not any other parts that *could* compose a syllable, besides letters (205a). Then, the syllable 'SO' is "an absolutely single form, indivisible into parts"— and, so, by the lights of the dream theory, it is unknowable (205c). What was once a complex—'SO'—now enjoys the same status (both ontologically and epistemically) as the primary elements, since "it has no parts and is a single form" (205d). Socrates gestures towards the end of his treatment of the dream theory, saying that "if anyone tries to tell us that the complex can be known and expressed, while the contrary is true of the element; we had better not listen to him" (205e). Socrates concludes with a disjunction: if the syllable 'SO' is a complex, then it *and* its parts are knowable; on other hand, if the syllable 'SO' is a primary element, then there are no complexes, from which it follows that *nothing* is knowable (since nothing is accountable) (205d-e). One final observation reported by Socrates is that, in education, a student often begins by learning the primary elements, and that the "elements are much more clearly known, and the knowledge of them is more decisive for the mastery of any branch of study than the knowledge of the complex" (206b). In this light, Socrates thinks

it is "tomfoolery" to endorse the dream theory, which holds that complexes are known and primary elements, are not (206b). The dream theory is finished.

Something resembling the dream theory is revisited not long after the original theory's demise. It is an understanding of an account on which possessing an account means "being able, when questioned about what a thing is, to give an answer by reference to its elements" (206e-207a). This analysis does not make any claims about unaccountable elements. It is, however, a substantive view about the content of an account: an account of φ is an enumeration of all of φ's parts. In particular, no doxastic agent has knowledge of a thing "till, in addition to his true judgment, he goes right through the thing element by element" (207b). Consider the high standards put in place for knowledge in this view. Even for such commonplace objects as a wagon, someone may be able to identify some key elements of a wagon—for instance, rails, axles, and wheels—but "it is the man who can explore its being by going through those hundred items who has made the addition which adds an account to his true judgment" (207b-c). With relevance to the appraisal of the dream theory, merely being able to go through the name 'Socrates' by enumerating each syllable is insufficient, because "going through it by 'syllables' or larger divisions falls short of being an account" (207c). There are higher standards for being an account, on this view. Such is this characterization of account.

Socrates is going to exploit one necessary condition for knowledge to which he gets Theaetetus' agreement. Theaetetus believes, with Socrates, that to have knowledge rules out believing "the same thing now to be a part of one thing and now a part of something else" and that one who *knows* cannot judge that "now one thing and now something different belongs to one and the same object" (207d). Socrates now enters into a discussion with Theaetetus regarding, familiarly, names and syllables. Theaetetus affirms that one, when learning one's letters, used to believe that one letter would appear in some syllable, and, at other times, that a different letter appeared in the same syllable. Theaetetus is willing to deny knowledge to these students (207d-e). Socrates is intrigued and relates an example: someone who takes the syllable 'THE' in 'Theaetetus', and writes down this syllable. He or she gets it right. When the same person is confronted with the first syllable in 'Theodorus', he or she writes down 'TE' mistakenly. Theaetetus is clear that this person does not know the first syllable of his name (208a). For consistency's sake, Theaetetus grants that someone could be in the same position for all the syllables in his name. He or she could write every syllable in 'Theaetetus' correctly, but fail to know (given the high standards for knowledge) each syllable. However, this example subtly yet powerfully defeats the understanding of account under consideration. Here, the letter-writer possesses "an account of ['Theaetetus'] along with his correct judgment. He was writing it, you see, with command of the way through its letters and we agreed that that is an account" (208a-b). There is an account but not knowledge. Consequently, this proposal falls short of the

goal. This letter-writer does not have knowledge.[4]

VII. A final attempt at specifying the nature of accounts: *Theaetetus* 208c-210b.

The last attempt at identifying what exactly accompanies true judgment such that it becomes knowledge does not persist for long under Socrates' careful scrutinizing. On this view, an account of φ is "being able to tell some mark by which the object you are asked about differs from all other things" (208c). So, to know φ is to have a correct judgment about φ, and also to have an account of what makes φ different from, say, ψ. To have an account of the sun, for instance, is to be able to answer "that it is the brightest of the bodies that move round the earth in the heavens" (208d). To have an account of some dog in particular, one would answer what makes this dog different from others. If one's answer captured what all dogs have in common, it would be an account of *dogs* generally (208d). This third candidate for an understanding of account is ready for evaluation.

Socrates wastes no time hurrying to the end. Let me pick up again the illustration with the dog. If, say, Theodorus does not know what makes one dog—Penny—different from other dogs, then Theodorus is merely judging Penny; if he does have in mind this mark of difference, then he knows Penny. In merely judging Penny, Theodorus fails to latch onto anything that distinguishes Penny from other dogs; if he did, then he would not be *merely* judging her. Socrates recognizes the flaw in this theory: appropriately, he asks "in Heaven's name how, if that was so, did it come about that [Penny] was the object of [Theodorus'] judgment and nobody else" (209b)? One possibility is that the impression left by Penny on Theodorus' soul may be different from the impression left by some other similar-looking dog. The idea may be to ensure that "correct judgment also must be concerned with the differentness of what it is about" (209d). One way this requirement can be parsed out is to say one is required to know the difference between Penny and other dogs, in which case knowledge is being defined by knowledge (209e-210a). In any case, it seems that this definition of account just cannot stand. In the *Theaetetus*, the idea that knowledge is identical to true judgment with an account is still tenable, but no sustainable theory of account is proffered.

[4] Interestingly, Theaetetus could have just revoked his denial of knowledge. It is apparent that he and Socrates both want to preserve the belief that knowing something entails not believing it is a part of some whole at one moment and then, at a later time, believing it to be a part of another whole instead. This understanding coheres well with the sort of consistency I mentioned earlier: that the knower is able to track relevant changes in the environment in ways that one with true judgment is not.

VIII. Why the *Theaetetus* ends inconclusively.

I contend that the *Theaetetus* ends inconclusively because it is divorced from the concerns in *Meno*. The one theory of account that is left unscathed is the one from the *Meno* that knowledge is true judgment accompanied by an account of the reason why. It is possible that Plato himself has rejected this view—especially given the status of the *Theaetetus* as a late Platonic dialogue—but it seems odd that Plato's former view is not explicitly repudiated, while a wide swath of other theses are treated. The *Theaetetus* is meant, I maintain, as a way of eliminating portraits of accounts that omit talk about recollection.[5] In the *Meno*, the close relationship that obtains between an account and recollection is made clear, when Socrates says that one ties down "true opinions by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed" (98a). Presumably, Socrates is thinking of the conversation with the slave, and how Meno agreed that though Socrates' questions at first stirred up true opinions (in a moment of recollection), that more questions from various angles would have produced knowledge. So, an account of the reason why involves recollection.

There is more textual support of this thesis in the *Theaetetus*. Socrates advances around a dozen arguments against an identity relation between knowledge and perception, but it is perhaps the final argument that is the most interesting. Knowledge is not perception, because there are things that the soul grasps not "through the bodily powers [... but] which it considers alone and through itself" (185e). Some unclear examples include "being [,...] beautiful and ugly, good and bad" (186a). The establishment of strict identity between knowledge and perception is made impossible by the existence of objects of knowledge that are not picked up by the senses. Yet, the Socratic claim here is stronger than that: it is the claim that "perception and knowledge could never be the same thing," not just that the general concepts are not identical (186e). The quality of some object—the brownness of a brown table, say—is reported by the sense of touch, but the question of its being is not (186b). While working with the senses is something anyone can do even at birth, calculating and determining something's *being* comes "only as the result of a long and arduous development, involving a good deal of trouble and education" (186c). The last relevant statement here is that "knowledge is to be found not in the experiences but in the process of reasoning about them" (186d). All these claims together can be understood in a manner consonant with the *Meno*. An investigation into the nature of knowledge and accounts that does not feature the soul and how it works by itself will necessarily be

[5] Note that the scope is not limited to the failure of defining account. Socrates and Theaetetus also fail at defining false judgment, and the discussion of true judgment only happens at all because they bracket the question of false judgment, in light of how consistently they failed. Perhaps, without a discussion of recollection, false judgment cannot be analyzed either, but I do want to limit this discussion.

deficient.

One question may be why the content of the reason why cannot be something uncovered by the senses. There are a few responses. The first is that Socrates, in the *Meno*, is clear that the account is given in recollection (prompted by a long and varied question-and- answering session), and recollection is meant to be a stirring-up of beliefs formed before embodiment. So, they cannot be about the objects of sense perception. Another reply is to emphasize that a reason why is a sort of explanation. An explanation that features the objects of sense perception—not something else—will be the sort of explanation given by Anaxagoras and his ilk. These sorts of material explanations are made problematic by Socrates in the *Phaedo* (96e-97b). Accordingly, it does not seem likely that Plato has in mind material explanations. A final reply is to consider the reason why to be about truth-makers: the reason why some true opinion is true is its truth-maker. Socrates says, in the *Theaetetus*, that someone who "does not even get at being" cannot get at truth (186c). A little earlier, he agreed with Theaetetus that being is "among the things which the soul itself reaches out after by itself," as opposed to through sense perception (186a). One cannot get at truth without getting at being, and one cannot get at being with sense perception. So, one cannot get at the *reason why* through sense perception. The investigation in the *Theaetetus* ends inconclusively because the discussants do not take into consideration the theory of recollection, which is at the heart of the program of distinguishing true opinion from knowledge, as I brought to light at the beginning of this essay. Plato may have made Socrates and company fail in order to illustrate this fact. If he had meant to demonstrate something else—for instance, that knowledge or account cannot be analyzed—then he should have also eliminated his own claims proposed in the *Meno*. These theses remain plausible alternatives to the ones introduced in the *Theaetetus*.

IX. Conclusion.

The *Theaetetus*, though ostensibly about an attempt to define knowledge, is more subtly seen as an attempt to refute accounts of knowledge that do not adequately attend to matters of recollection and objects not disclosed by the senses. Socrates rejects the identity between knowledge and perception on just these grounds, after all. Although many possible understandings of an account—that which, when added to true opinion, makes it knowledge—are entertained, all are dismissed. One curious exception is the characterization of account made in the *Meno*, which is related by Socrates in that dialogue to the theory of recollection. The failure of the discussants in the *Theaetetus* to adequately address matters of recollection and the objects disclosed by the soul working by itself produces the failure to analyze knowledge and account.

Douglas Campbell

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The Pharaoh's Sun-Disc: The Religious Reforms of Akhenaten and the Cult of the Aten

The 18th Dynasty Pharaoh Akhenaten, known to many as the "Heretic King," made significant changes to the religious institutions of Ancient Egypt during his reign in the 14th century BCE. The traditional view long maintained that these reforms, focused on the promotion of a single solar god known as the Aten, constituted an early form of monotheism foreshadowing the rise of Western Biblical tradition. However, this simplification ignores the earlier henotheistic tendency of Egyptian polytheism and the role of Atenism in strengthening the Pharaoh's authority in the face of the powerful Amun-Ra priesthood, as well as distinctions between Mosaic monotheism and Akhenaten's cult. Instead, the religion of Akhenaten, which developed from earlier ideas surrounding the solar deity motif, can be seen as an instance of monotheistic practice in form but not in function, characterized by a lack of conviction outside the new capital of Akhetaten as well as an ultimate goal of establishing not one god but one ruling power in Egypt: the Pharaoh. This will become clear through an analysis of the background to Akhenaten's reign, the nature of his reforms and possible motivations, and the reality of Atenism vis-à-vis later Mosaic tradition.

The "revolution" of Akhenaten, born Amenhotep IV,[1] evidently had significant implications both during and after his reign. The radical nature of his reforms is clearly visible in the later elimination of his name and those of his immediate successors from the official list of rulers.[2] However, it is possible to see the roots of these changes, and perhaps of the Pharaoh's motivations, in earlier developments in the importance and form of the solar deity. For one, the prominence of the sun in Egyptian religion was not a new feature of Akhenaten's time, instead having been associated with kingship since the Old Kingdom period.[3] Several scholars have also noted the emergence of a "New Solar Theology" in the years preceding his rule, described as a growing emphasis on the sun and its daily cycle as a driving force in the universe.[4] In addition, we have clear evidence that the conception of the Aten as "sun-disc" already existed in some form before Akhenaten, seeming at its earliest as an aspect of Ra in the Twelfth Dynasty and increasingly mentioned throughout the reigns of Thutmose IV

[1] In Greek *Amennophis IV*. For convenience, this paper will refer to "Akhenaten" before and after the name change in the fifth year of his reign.

[2] C.N. Reeves, *Akhenaten, Egypt's False Prophet* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2001), 193. Akhenaten's probable tomb and coffin also show signs of deliberate vandalism.

[3] Cyril Aldred, *Akhenaten, King of Egypt* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1988), 238-239. The pharaoh generally came to be viewed as the progeny of the sun god Ra.

[4] Erik Hornung, "The Rediscovery of Akhenaten and His Place in Religion," *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* vol. 29 (1992), 47.

and Amenhotep III.[5] Certainly, it acquired the status of a unique, anthropomorphic deity in the latter. From this progression it is clear that Akhenaten was not solely responsible for the "discovery" of the Aten as divinity, or even the first ruler to show interest in its symbolism, although his positioning of the god would be entirely unique.

This general rise in popularity of the solar image may help to explain the increase in prestige of the sun god Amun-Ra throughout the 18th Dynasty, a trend accompanied by a loss of pharaonic power to the god's increasingly wealthy, united, and ambitious priesthood.[6] Amun-Ra eventually developed beyond the limits of a singular sun god into the deity of highest import in Egypt, with earlier gods becoming mere extensions of his divine essence; this has been cited as evidence of the henotheistic tendency of many polytheistic religious systems.[7] From this we might understand the trend of the 18th Dynasty as already moving towards the consolidation of power and worship in a single solar god who brought increasing power and influence to his priests, despite apparent attempts by Amenhotep III and others to restrict their power and elevate the status of the pharaoh.[8]

It is probable that these developments in the religious and political spheres had a significant influence on Akhenaten's own thinking. In fact, upon ascending to the throne, one of his earliest acts was to commission a temple to the Aten in Thebes, the principle center of the Amun-Ra priesthood.[9] This would be followed by a "considered and gradual" series of reforms that established the Aten as the only official deity in Egypt by the sixth year of Akhenaten's reign and the icon of the royal family, making the majority of the state's institutions subservient to this new god.[1010] The general timeline of this development is relatively constant among scholarly narratives, beginning with the elaborate building projects at Thebes; followed by a shift in depiction of the Aten to a hieroglyphic disc-icon and the enclosure of its name in royal cartouches. Soon after came the pharaoh's name change to Akhenaten and his move to the newly constructed capital of *Akhetaten*, meaning the "Horizon of the Aten." This was followed by the increasing persecution of Amun-Ra

[5] Aldred 1988, 239. Thutmose's palace was proclaimed "Mansion of the Aten," and Amenhotep's royal barge "Radiance of the Aten," among other references.

[6] Reeves 2001, 44-45. Amun's rise began in the Middle Kingdom period, later merging with Ra to form a unifying deity of Upper and Lower Egypt.

[7] Aldred 1988, 239-240. Amun-Ra gained the additional names of other gods including Atum, Geb and Nut, as well as the epithet, "The sole god who made himself for eternity."

[8] Ibid.

[9] Erik Hornung, *Akhenaten and the Religion of Light*, translated by David Lorton (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999), 34. The Aten continued to be represented as an anthropomorphic, falcon-headed deity in these initial depictions.

[10] Hornung 1992, 49. These constituted a restructuring of Egyptian life in religion, art, language, literature and probably administration, potentially with the aid of the military.

and other deities, including the chiseling out of their names and images from inscriptions, and finally even the erasure of the plural form of "gods" wherever it was found.[11] Few modern accounts accept this process as reflective of true revelation or belief on the part of Akhenaten, but the extent to which it may have been pre-meditated or self-serving is debated; while it seems unlikely that Akhenaten was the sole architect of all the developments of his seventeen-year reign, the pragmatism of many of his acts seems clear, and it is possible to see Atenism largely as an instrument of political control.[12] For example, the persecution of other divine cults may have provided an opportunity to seize the economic resources of their temples, and the opening up of Atenist temples to the sky and the installation of the "living" sun image reduced the need for cult statues and much of the traditional religious routine, thus limiting the size and influence of the Aten's priesthood.[13] Some have argued for Akhenaten's sincere belief based on the devotional language of "The Great Hymn to the Aten," probably of his authorship, but here the imitation of form and motif of earlier works has been well documented and provides evidence against this theory.[14]

Likely, then, the Pharaoh sought to create a new deity and priesthood that he could control, largely by establishing himself as the sole human intermediary between the Aten and the people, and demanding loyalty from his subjects in this regard. In fact, his new name translates to "He who is effective on the Aten's behalf."[15] This notion of privilege was probably abetted by the lack of devotional statuary and the oral nature of Atenist doctrine, with its teachings coming exclusively from the mouth of the Pharaoh himself. But while Akhenaten has been likened to a "high priest" in this role, he was probably imagined in discourse as closer to a divine figure himself.[1616] This is implied by the new iconography of worship that emerged in the period, which depicted a "triad" of the Aten, Akhenaten and his queen Nefertiti in official art that reflects, consciously or not, the ancient Egyptian inclination to arrange deities to arrange in groups of three, often along familial lines.[17] It appears, then, that while Akhenaten held the exclusive right to communicate with the Aten,

[11] Reeves 2001, 100. "Amun" was even erased from the name of Akhenaten's father, Amunhotep III, possibly while he was still alive.

[12] Ibid., 29. Reeves sees the Pharaoh as a "false prophet," with all of his actions as pre-meditated and politically-motivated.

[13] Ibid., 95. See below for the elevated role of Akhenaten in the new religion.

[14] Aldred 1988, 243. This includes parallels with earlier coffin texts and other hymns.

[15] Hornung 1999, 56.

[16] Donald B. Redford, "Akhenaten: New Theories and Old Facts," *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* no. 369 (May 2013), 28.

[17] Aldred 1988, 241. For example, Osiris, Isis and Horus. There is also evidence of prayers addressed to the Aten, the pharaoh and the queen collectively.

his family held the right of its worship: the object of personal devotion for the common person thus became this icon of the royal-divine household that apparently dominated life in the new capital.[18] In this way, Atenism may have attempted to establish a new divinity not only in the form of the sun-disc, but also in the form of the ruling power of the Pharaoh and his exclusive relationship with god.

When considering the question of monotheism, the gradual, rather than immediate, increase in the status of the Aten should be emphasized: for example, Amun-Ra seems to have remained dominant in the divine hierarchy before the move to the new capital of Akhetaten, and Akhenaten is initially depicted worshipping other gods at Thebes.[19] Here there are at least some parallels to the earlier henotheistic development of Amun-Ra, as inscriptions over time began to equate these other deities more and more with the Aten, a trend eventually escalating to the outright suppression of their cults.[2020] This process is evident in the contrast between early inscriptions of the Aten's epithet, "No other like him," and later, "No other but him."[21] While some scholars have advanced the more radical idea that we should not even consider Akhenaten's program a religion at all, from the above it is generally accepted that Atenism developed into a form of monotheism in stages, from what was early on a kind of henotheism or perhaps monolatry.[2222] It seems we can safely speak of the religion as "monotheistic," at least following the move to Akhetaten and the elimination of the plural "gods" from monuments.[23]

However, we must still consider the reality of worship in Akhetaten in contrast to the rest of Egypt, as well as the true extent of Akhenaten's "faith" and its relationship to the later Biblical monotheism with which it has so often been associated? As we have seen, Akhenaten's motivations in establishing the new religion appear far from being purely devotional in nature, and Atenism's adoption by court officials may have been equally pragmatic, a combination of yielding to the Pharaoh's authority and seeking his favour. It is also likely that the worship of the Aten was not well enforced beyond the new capital, with many commoners perhaps retaining their traditional gods in some form, since

[18] Reeves 2001, 146-147. This included frequent public processions as well as sculptural images of the family found in domestic settings.

[19] Redford 2013, 12-14. This includes Amun-Ra, Atum, Osiris and others.

[20] Aldred 1998, 243-4. As an example, Ra is equated with the Aten in, "The Great Hymn to the Aten."

[21] Hornung 1999, 93.

[22] Redford 2013, 26. Redford suggests that, by disposing of traditional religious institutions, Akhenaten's cult abandoned humankind's bond with the divine and rejected elements vital to the definition of a "religion." It is within such a view that Akhenaten is occasionally framed as a "literal atheist."

[23] Jan Assman, *The Price of Monotheism* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2010), 32. Here the differentiation between a single "true" god and other "false" ones is indicative of monotheistic belief.

images of "illicit" deities were even discovered within Akhetaten itself.[24] This absence of "monotheistic conviction" supports the idea that the goal of Atenism was not to produce a religion for the people, so much as one for the Pharaoh. This likely contributed to the lack of popular appreciation for the austere sun-disc, with its predictable daily cycle far from satisfying the spiritual needs of the masses.[25] This suggests that while Akhenaten may have established a model of monotheistic practice, it did not necessarily function as such throughout all of Egypt at any given moment during his reign.

Lastly, Atenism's form of monotheism differed significantly from that of Mosaic tradition. Akhenaten's religion can be viewed as a "monotheism of knowledge," based on a worldview that made all of existence dependent on the new sun god and, by its final stages, denied other deities any role in the universe at all, since here belief in another god constituted a mistaken understanding of the nature of reality.[26] In contrast, Moses, as lawgiver-figure in the Judeo-Christian tradition, promoted a "legalistic monotheism," which did not claim that there were no other gods but rather that there should be no other god for believers but Yahweh. This *forbade* rather than *denied* other deities as a method of binding people together, and as such was also different from the supremely "political" nature of Akhenaten's motivations, which had the goal of strengthening pharaonic power.[2727] In this way, Atenism can in fact be viewed as an even stricter form of monotheism than early Judaism, which initially did not deny the existence of other gods. This knowledge-based form of Atenism, with only Akhenaten holding access to the divine, has also been largely credited for the rapid decline of the religion following the Pharaoh's death, as he established no real successors or disciples, no program of outreach, and no official scriptures by which to disseminate his ideas, and thus greatly restricted a movement that perhaps could have been more greatly popularized, or even used as a tool for unification.[28] Instead, the worship of the Aten fell into decline, the capital Akhetaten was abandoned, and the earlier temples, priests, and gods were restored. This near complete reversal seems the final proof of the shallow rooting of the Pharaoh's religion.[29]

[24] Reeves 2001, 139. Archaeological evidence.

[25] Hornung 1999, 93. Hornung suggests that by elevating the Aten, Akhenaten committed himself spiritually to what was "visible" in the light of the sun, losing the more mystical aspects of darkness, the afterlife and deities such as Amun, the "Hidden One."

[26] Assmann 2010, 37.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Hornung, 1992, 49. Hornung notes the "universal" nature of the Aten in contrast to limited national deities such as Amun-Ra, even suggesting that Atenism constitutes the first "world religion" in its vision, if not its dissemination.

[29] Aldred 1998, 244.

Thus, closer examination of the nature of Akhenaten's reforms appears to refute the thesis of the Pharaoh as an early reformer figure along Biblical lines, both in his likely motivations and particularly in the structure of the new religion itself. The picture that begins to emerge in place of this view is of a king attempting, more or less consciously, to combat the growing influence of a priesthood that threatened his own position through the centralization his power as the all-knowing representative of the silent Aten, the only true god. This process constituted a significant break from Egyptian religious tradition, but was not immediately realized upon Akhenaten's ascension, developing only gradually into what we can call "monotheism," from what began as an accelerated example of the earlier henotheistic model. Yet despite the apparently universal nature of this ideology, it was not shared by many (or even the majority) of the people of Egypt, and its superficial nature was markedly evident in the decline of Atenism before the posthumous reaction against Akhenaten even began. With this, we may in fact be forced to return to the question of definition: for if a system of belief is without the belief, can we call it a religion after all?

Erin Sobat

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Resurrecting Ancient America: The Use of Antiquity in Eighteenth-Century American Culture and the Founding of the Modern Republic

On June 21, 1788 the Constitution of the United States of American was adopted after a long fight for ratification. The modern republic founded on western shores looked strikingly similar to its ancient counterparts, yet promised to surpass them as the leader of civilization and inheritor of the *translatio imperii,* the movement of civilization. These similarities arose because classical antiquity was a major source of inspiration for the new government. The political elite used Greek and Roman antiquity to ignite political sentiments in favor of adopting the Constitution. Constitutional support grew with the distribution of newspaper articles written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, known as the *Federalist Papers*[1]*;* these articles were strongly influenced by classical texts and precepts. The elites utilized the ancient texts to connect with average Americans as knowledge of antiquity was well-established in eighteenth-century American society. Forms of print, coupled with high literacy rates, worked to disseminate classical knowledge throughout colonial America. By the time of ratification, the majority of the population already had basic knowledge of classical antiquity. Therefore, it was this classical culture in America that the elites used in order to form a modern republic and push the ratification of the Constitution.

Thomas Jefferson once stated that "American Farmers are the only farmers who can read Homer." Although the expression may now seem hyperbolic, Jefferson was, in a way, accurately expressing how educated the average colonist was in the eighteenth-century. By the time of the American Revolution, schooling was uniform and standardized across the majority of the American colonies.[2] This resulted because of the "substantial increase in private and public schooling after about 1750, as all kinds of schools were being opened across the American provinces."[3] The increase in schooling was coupled with the view that the Classics were "a partner rather than a servant of theology."[4] This equalization of the Classics and theology brought about a greater appreciation for antiquity, as it was taught as its own entity and apart from religious studies. Antiquity was becoming its own educational force, which showed in the educational curriculum of colonial public

[1] Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*. Edited by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961).

[2] Gummere, Richard M. *The American Colonial Mind and the Classical Tradition*. Cambridge: Harvard UP (1963), 55.

[3] Eran Shalev. *Rome Reborn on Western Shores* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009), 12.

[4] Gummere, 56.

schools. Public schools focused primarily on reading, writing, arithmetic, and rhetoric. It was in these public schools which were "much less well off" that "even basic reading instruction had a strongly rhetorical flavor"[5] as they were from Latin primers. It was through the subjects of reading and rhetoric that antiquity first influenced young colonists, as students studied Quintilian's *Institutio* to learn the art of rhetoric.[6] Accordingly, schools held "Readings and Recitations" to train youths in the art of speaking. The classically inspired rhetoric emphasized oratory and outward expression. This gave educated colonists the ability to move, sway, and control a crowd, all things that would become essential in shaping the American public's sentiments towards ratification. The public schooling system would create one of the most well educated peoples in the world. Richard Gummere maintains that "in well settled regions the proportion of those who could read and write was as high as 90 percent: on the frontier it was much lower."[7] Nonetheless, on the frontier there were those who could read and spread knowledge, something that would become vital to spreading knowledge of the Constitution. The public education system created a solid foundation of literacy and classically inspired rhetoric as it lay the foundations for a modern culture of antiquity.

While the public education system had traces of classical influence, the schooling of the upper class created an elite group of classical scholars. The elite schooling system mirrored that of the British as both placed a heavy emphasis on classical learning. The classical education produced civil servants for the growing British Empire. That being said, it was only natural that the Americans, who were former British subjects, would replicate the elite schooling system on the new shores. In the elite system, "school rooms [were] dominated by the speaking of Latin and Greek in exercises originally designed by classical rhetoricians."[8] By the time of the American Revolution, the Boston Latin School's curriculum was the standard for any school producing college bound students. At graduation, pupils would have studied "Cicero's orations, Justinian, the Latin and Greek New Testaments, Isocrates, Homer, Hesiod, Virgil, Horace, Juvenal, and dialogues in Godwin's *Roman Antiquities*, as well as turning the Psalms into Latin verse."[9] This was appropriate knowledge as entrance requirements for colleges demanded a fortitude of classical knowledge. By 1775, there were nine colleges in the colonies: Harvard, William and Mary, Yale, Brown, Rutgers, Dartmouth, and what would become Princeton, University

[5] Joy Connolly, "Classical Education and the early American Democratic Style", in *Classics and National Cultures,* ed. Susan A. Stephens and Phiroze Vasunia (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010), 89.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Gummere 62.

[8] Connolly 83.

[9] Gummere 57.

of Pennsylvania, and Columbia.[10] They all followed Oxbridge entrance requirements of classical knowledge, with Harvard setting the example in 1655, Yale in 1745, Columbia in 1755, and the rest following shortly.[11] In order to apply to Harvard a student had to "understand Tully, Virgil, or any such classical authors, and readily speak or write true Latin in prose and have skill in making Latin verse, and be completely grounded in the Greek language."[12] Likewise at Columbia, John Jay recounts he had to give a "Rational account of Cicero and three books of the *Aeneid*, and translate the first ten chapters of the Gospel of John into Latin."[13] Such entrance requirements are prime examples of how classically trained the elites were at the time of the American Revolution (1765-1783).

While the elite did have a schooling system which helped create classically trained persons, it must be noted that not all of the Founding Fathers were formally educated. Yet this did not stop men from learning of antiquity. As Eran Shalev points out:

> [E]ven Americans who were not privileged enough to enjoy the benefit of years of rigid classical studies could still develop formidable knowledge and a sense of familiarity with the world of antiquity. Men such as George Washington and Patrick Henry never learned Latin or Greek. Nonetheless, they and many like them were able to make the classics meaningful to their private and public lives to a remarkable degree.[14]

The most famous Founding Father never learned Latin or Greek, yet later was closely tied with antiquity by being hailed as the American Cincinnatus. While every colonist may not have been a classical scholar, the public and elite schooling systems nevertheless created an educated population that was open to spreading and receiving classical antiquity.

By the mid eighteenth-century, the American colonies had a firm educational base upon which knowledge of the classics was easily received. The vehicle that spread the most classical knowledge was print. By coupling a large print culture with high literacy rates, authors quickly disseminated classical knowledge through cities and even frontier regions. This was so effective that antiquity "[could] be found in all circles, high and low, from

[10] Meyer Reinhold, *Classica Americana: The Greek and Roman heritage in the United States*. (Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1984), 26.

[11] Reinhold 27.

[12] Gummere 56.

[13] Ibid, 57.

[14] Shalev 11.

farmer who notes the weather, or a shopkeeper who wishes to impress his clientele, to the scholar-politician in search of precedents for the founding of a nation."[15] Through the use of various print mediums during the mid-eighteenth century, antiquity spread through the colonies like wildfire.

Moreover, the almanac was one of the most popular printed forms that spread knowledge of antiquity to all social classes. Frontier farmers as well as plantation owners and those in between read the traditional almanac. Not only did almanacs offer astrological and lunar dates, planting suggestions, and weather predictions, they also offered classical histories and myths; so, for instance, when editors had extra pages to fill they would often turn to histories of the Roman Empire.[16] This could be due to the fact that forty-one out of forty-seven issues before 1687 were edited by Harvard graduates schooled in classical knowledge, a tradition which carried into the 1700s.[17] Favorite page fillers included "Ovid, Cato, Virgil, Cicero, Seneca…the *Astronomica* of Manlius…the fables of Aesop and Publius Syrus."[18] In the lead-up to the Revolution, the extra pages of almanacs printed by the Ames family from 1725-1775 became filled with classically inspired patriotic propaganda.[19] The widespread use of the almanac ensured that farmers and tradesmen were acting as agents of classical knowledge. Accordingly, Thomas Jefferson's assertion about American farmers reading Homer was accurate.

Books became increasingly important as primary and secondary sources of classical learning. Reprints of classical texts made up a significant percentage of growing public libraries. Furthermore, a significant portion of the knowledge being spread at the time was through secondary sources, which may not have always included the most accurate translations; nevertheless, the translations acted as strong transmitters of classical knowledge. For example, the eighteenth-century Thomas Gordon's translations of Tacitus and Sallust became a "best seller" and "were required reading for American libertarians."[20] The spread of classical knowledge was not just for American libertarians, but also for more common folk like John Smith of Burlington, Vermont. He created a collection of books including "English and French translations of Plato, Middleton's Cicero, Seneca, and Epictetus, Gordon's Tacitus, Savage's *Select Collection of Letters of the Ancients*,

[15] Gummere 18.

[16] Ibid. 5.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid. 6.

[19] Ibid. 7.

[20] Meyer Reinhold. "Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, " in *Classical Influences on Western Thought: AD 1650-1870,* ed. RR Bolger (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979), 224.

Dacier's life of Pythagoras, Whiston's *Josephus*, and Kennett's *Antiquities of Rome*."[21] He also wrote essays in the *Pennsylvania Chronicle* under the name Atticus and his work was so well liked that he wrote seventy stories between 1767 and 1770, all of which were laden with heavy classical references.[22] This clearly demonstrates the growing culture of antiquity throughout America.

Out of all the different print forms, the newspaper played the largest role in spreading knowledge of antiquity. By 1770, newspapers "provided eager Americans with a new abundance of printed matter, as prints of all kinds became cheaper and more widely available."[23] As newspapers became cheaper to print and buy, production and circulation increased exponentially. The printed matter embodied the biases of the middle and upper classes, something that would help the Constitution because the majority of printers were Federalists and shared these views with the elite.[24] It was these views which would influence the public to push for ratification. Series of articles, essays, etc., laden with classical parallels, parables, histories, and allusions often filled newspapers. John Smith's articles in the *Pennsylvania Chronicle*, for example, would have helped the common colonist learn about antiquity. Likewise, in the *Virginia Gazette* between February and March 1776, readers could find the Earl of Chesterfield's *Letters* which dealt mainly with classical history and mythology.[25] From north to south, the classics were filling newspapers and reaching all parts of the colonies. Even on the frontier, classics spread through the use of newspapers coupled with the rhetoric learned in public schools. On the frontier where few could read, the oratory skills learned in school became particularly important as Benjamin Franklin claimed that "were there but one good reader in the neighborhood a public orator might be heard throughout the nation with the same advantages, and have the same effect on his audience, as if they stood within the reach of his voice."[26] The orator became important as an agent of classical knowledge which he or she gained through the printed forms reaching the frontier. This would be essential for ratification as the *Federalist Papers* were read on frontiers and inspired voters to cast their ballots in favor of the Constitution.

Indeed, a majority of the colonial populations were familiarized with antiquity created by high literacy and education rates, as well as ubiquitous printed forms. These worked in conjunction with "salons, coffeehouses, literary societies and clubs, theaters,

[21] Gummere 11.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Shalev 12.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid. 18.

[26] As quoted in Connolly, 91.

and public orations" to create a culture of antiquity throughout colonial America.[27] With antiquity so immersed in colonial culture and education, it would be used as the political base for the Constitution and then in the *Federalist Papers*.

As the Articles of Confederation continued to fail America, the need for a new government became apparent. The colonial elites saw this as their golden opportunity to create a modern republic that hailed from classical antiquity because America saw itself as the successor to the *translatio imperii*. This was the notion that validated the transfer of "political and cultural legitimacy from one civilization to another, passed down from classical antiquity to the dominant forces of Western Europe."[28] The essence of civilization had passed from Greece, to Rome, to Britain, and the American elites believed it now rested on their shores. As William Hooper said in 1774, America would "build an empire upon the ruins of Great Britain."[29] After defeating the British and with the ability to create a new government, America saw itself as the heirs to civilization.

Perhaps it was with the *translatio imperii* in mind that "the young boasted that they were treading upon the Republican ground of Greece and Rome" as they walked into the Constitutional Convention in 1787 with the knowledge of the ancients to back their new government.[30] It was to the ancients that the Framers of the Constitution looked for guidance in their endeavors. The Framers were "obliged to study Greece and Rome" because "there were no precedents in English history of a league of states."[31] Indeed, the Framers looked at antiquity as their guide so that they could perform political pathology. This was important as it allowed Framers to perform "autopsies on the dead republics with a view to discovering how to retard the process of inevitable decay through proper safeguards for the first modern republic."[32] With a treasure trove of classical examples before them, the Framers explored history in order to create a modern republic which surpassed that of the ancients and continued civilization.

As the framers sought to create a modern republic, they looked back and performed the autopsies on dead republics, taking from them elements which showed promise in the modern era. The Framers turned first to the political writings read in their school years, falling back upon Aristotle, Cicero, and Polybius as their main examples. From Aristotle's *Politics*, a favoritism towards group governance, democracies, and state partnership was

[27] Shalev 13.

[28] Ibid. 29.

[29] Ibid. 30.

[30] Gummere 18.

[31] Reinhold 231.

[32] Ibid.

taken away.[33] From Cicero, the Framers found "a reasonably blended combination of the three forms – kingship, aristocracy, and democracy."[34] And from Polybius the ideals of checks and balances between governmental branches because "any aggressive impulse is sure to be checked" creating "an equilibrium."[35] All of these elements were combined with historical examples as the Framers continued their political pathology.

The Framers looked towards the governmental forms of Rome, Sparta, Athens, and the Greek leagues to act as an historical template for their modern republic. Polybian Rome was a heavy influence on the Constitution. Republican Rome was admired for "its pluralistic culture, its perdurability, flexibility in policy, balanced constitution, agricultural economy, religious toleration, the vaunted purity of its great men, and its Roman virtues (especially patriotism, self-sacrifice, and frugality)."[36] But it was from the Greek Leagues that the Framers learned how a federal government should be set up in order to create a strongly united coalition of states. One of the main issues with the Articles of Confederation was that it created a loose agreement between states to unite under a federal government. The states were significantly more powerful than the federal government who was in charge of repaying the war debt. With no way of forcing the states into paying taxes to get rid of the national debt, the fledgling country would not be able to find investors from Europe. Those investors would create much needed capital to get the newfound country on its feet. A stronger federal government was needed but one of the main fears of a strong government was a loss of independence among the states. Framers looked to the Amphictyonic and the Achaean League as examples of how to strike a balance between state and federal sovereignty. James Madison explained how the Amphictyonic League was able to strike a balance between state and federal as the state was allowed to keep certain rights:

> The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and executive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded their armies and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not

[33] Aristot. *Pol.*, 1288a, 1286a, 1295b, 1252a, 1302a, 1297a. Translated by Gummere.

[34] Cic. *Rep.* 2.41 Translated by Gummere.

[35] Plb. 6, esp. ch. 18, 11, 2-5, 9-10, 43-51. Translated by Gummere.

[36] Reinhold 98.

> only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled.[37]

This is clearly reflected in the Constitution, as states are able to maintain their own jurisdiction within their borders, are all seen as equals, and have the ability to appoint officers of the law on state levels. The US Senate is able to grant treaties, declare and end a war, and enter into alliances. The President, praetor, is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and has his Cabinet. These are major parts of the Constitution, directly from classical examples. Once these elements were ingrained in the Constitution, the document needed to be ratified by two-thirds of the thirteen colonies adopting it.

In order to gain support for ratification, the Founding Fathers Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote a series of newspaper articles known as the *Federalist Papers*. These men sought to dispel fears created by the Anti-Federalists in order to gain the public support needed to push eligible voters into ratifying the Constitution. They ingeniously turned towards the widespread newspaper to disseminate articles in favor of ratification in the state of New York. Between 1787 and 1788, eight-five articles appeared not only in New York newspapers, but all across the colonies as they became increasingly popular. While these papers stood out, they were only a few of the many articles being written using the classical pseudonyms recognized by the highly educated population. The usage of classical pseudonyms was common in American newspapers of the eighteenth century. They were especially prevalent during the era of ratification. During the Constitutional debate in Massachusetts, there were twenty-nine writers using classical pseudonyms; twelve were anti-federalist and seventeen were federalist.[38] During the same time in New York, there were eleven anti-federalists and fifteen federalist writers using pseudonyms from antiquity.[39] Classical pseudonyms were drawn from histories and mythologies for a specific reason.

By signing "Cato" at the bottom of an article, a writer, not matter whether he or she was a farmer, a merchant, a politician, or a housewife, would suddenly assume the connotations of the name. Americans were familiar enough with history to understand the historical reasons for picking the name Publius over Caesar as a pseudonym. The anti-federalists would often attack federalist by addressing them as Caesar.[40] This represented their fears that the strong federal government created by the Constitution imposed its

[37] Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 125.

[38] Shalev 170.

[39] Ibid. 173.

[40] Ibid. 170.

tyrannical will on the subjugated states, such as did Caesar, Nero, etc. The anti-federalists wished for the states to maintain their powers and not be burdened by a stronger federal government. The federalists responded in the *Federalist Papers* to these worries by ensuring the people that a balance of state and federal powers was needed to create a more perfect union. Without a stronger union, the country would be "wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other."[41] This was in reference to the Athenian League whose loose bonds created divisions that outsiders like Philip of Macedonia would eventually use to conquer it. The loose bonds created by the Articles of Confederation would only lead to the destruction of all the Americans had worked for during the Revolution. In the ninth Federalist Paper, classical examples are used to argue for a stronger union. Hamilton writes:

> A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.[42]

The classical example would have been understood by the educated public as it would have illustrated the need for a stronger centralized government that would unite divided states in order to prevent the union's dissolution.

Under a stronger federal government, the states would follow the examples of those in the Amphictyonic League from the mid-seventh century BC. The states, mirroring the cities of old, would retain their "municipal jurisdiction, [appoint] their own officers, and [enjoy] a perfect equality."[43] With this, the *Papers* make the argument that states would maintain their sovereignty while being held in check by the federal government so that one state did not see itself as above another; it would be a union of equals. The states in turn, would hold the federal government back from getting too large and becoming tyrannical.

[41] Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, 54.

[42] Ibid. 71.

[43] Ibid. 125.

All of these reassurances in the *Federalist Papers* came from Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, but to the public they were given from the writer Publius, as the authors used this pseudonym to sign their papers. By using the name of Publius, they invoked the history of Publius Valerius Publicola from the sixth-century BC. Publius represented federalist ideals as he helped overthrow the Roman monarchy and set up the first Republic. Hamiton, Madison, and Jay evoked this historical figure because he would stand out in the minds of the public as a parallel for what had just occurred. These writers successfully created papers where the writer was a modern day Publius who had just overthrown the British and sought to create a new modern republic that needed the support of its people. By using newspapers to spread their ideas under the name Publius, they won the support of a people in order to build a republic which would surpass those of ancient times. Through their use of Publius's name and classical examples of what would happen if the states did not unite, the *Federalist Papers* were able to muster enough support not only in New York, but across the states to ratify the Constitution.

With ratification completed in June 1788, the Constitution came into effect in September of that year. The classical fervor surrounding the document began to change once it was accepted as the law. Towards the end of the ratification period, there was an upswing in criticism about the use of antiquity as inspiration for the Constitution. The validity of ancient republics came in question: could ancient governments and thinkers act as examples for a modern republic, since historically, all those governments failed? The Greece fell to Philip and the Macedonians; Rome was corrupted, taken over by emperors, and then crumbled at the hands of barbarians; and the Greek Leagues fell into discord and disbanded or feel like the rest of Greece to Philip. Critics could legitimately raise the question of whether or not America should be modelling itself after such behavior. Marylander William Vans Murray, a law student tin London at the time, was able to encompass all these worries when he wrote:

> It is impossible to say that ancient republics were models…the picture of ancient governments, except freedom, could furnish but a slight resemblance to the American democracies…. From such precedents Americans can learn little more than the contagion of enthusiasm. From antiquity they could gain little.[44]

To men such as Vans Murray, who claimed that America could learn little from civilizations which held no weight in modern societies, John Adams would point out

[44] Reinhold 241.

that "there is one eternal, unchangeable truth – that all men are the same everywhere, and that therefore antiquity is relevant to modern problems."[45] When looking back at the ancients for examples, the Founders performed political pathology in order to take theories and elements of republics that would be relevant to the modern era. The Framers understood that in order to create something quite modern, they needed to pay homage to their ancient forefathers by learning from their mistakes. This was due to their conceptions surrounding the *translatio imperii*. As they believed themselves to be the new bearers of society, they inherited the ideals of civilization that came before them; a major part of this was the governments of Greece and Rome. In order to add to the *translatio imperii*, the Founders created a modernized republic which would surpass its ancient counterparts' contributions to civilization. The *translatio imperii* was always about innovating, updating, and amending the idea of civilization so that humankind would continue to flourish. Greece, Rome, and Britain had set standards; it was time for America to raise them.

The adoption of the Constitution of the United States of America was a long process overflowing with the presence of antiquity. The high literacy rates and the American educational system joined with printed forms to create an intelligent population aware of classical civilizations. The classical education of Americans, especially of the elite, played heavily in the creation of the Constitution. It was to antiquity that the Founders looked for the best examples of governments which, although from ancient times, held theories and examples which could be worked into a modern republic. The *Federalist Papers* further used classical examples to gain support for the Constitution. The use of the newspapers brilliantly ensured that the Federalist opinions would gain traction across the states, even into the frontier regions were the articles could be read aloud. Due to antiquity's ubiquity in American life and culture, the Founders were able to create a government for the people and by the people which would add to the *translatio imperii* and create a better civilization for the future.

Elizabeth DeBlock

[45] Ibid. 242.

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Back Matter

The Stars: An Aristophanic Comedy

By Daniel Galef

The stage is slightly inclined to the left. The main curtain is blue with white stars, the second a light yellow. Others might include a light blue, for a sunny outdoor sky on Earth, possibly with clouds, and a crater-pocked moon set. Otherwise, the stage is bare.

Prologue. The **Koryphaios of Stars***, Sirius, enters stage left to center and addresses the audience. He is dressed as all the other stars are dressed, in a pseudo-Greek robe or wrap, with a golden spiky halo. The Koryphaios's robe is white. His halo is slightly larger than all of the others. He wears theatrical boots, and, all in all, resembles Aristophanes in appearance.*

Koryphaios: Good evening. It is our delight tonight to present this rediscovered treasure of Aristophanic Old Comedy. As a special treat, to add to the production authenticity, tonight's performance will be delivered entirely in the original Greek.

He bows and walks off left, only to pause just behind the wall, barely visible, whispering frantically with someone just off, perhaps another star. He is angry or frustrated, but, wheeling around and returning to center, he beams through gritted teeth.

Koryphaios: Excuse me: It seems that none of the cast knows any Greek. I hope English will suffice.

He walks off left.

Curtain. A series of tubes and ropes dangles across the stage from the eaves down across and off right. A series of loud clomps emanates from off right, and, with each, the catenary is disturbed and moves in. As Didi walks on, it is wound in, so that it does not ever become looser or dangle low.

Xanthias *sprints out from off right, stops center right and catches his breath, hands on knees, panting. He recovers, turns and shouts off as the clomping continues.*

Clomp. Clomp. Clomp. Clomp. Clomp.

Xanthias: I doubt you'll get too far in something quite
so cumbersome, why, just the other night,

you slept in that contraption just to prove
you found that thing so loathsome to remove.

Clomp. Clomp. Clomp.

Xanthias: I really think we might proceed with haste
a little better if you didn't waste
so long in trying to see where you were going
and took that damned thing off

Didi *clomps on. He is in full standard diving dress, waving his arms wildly out in front of him and stumbling as if blind. His initial speech is inaudible, but he doesn't realize this until Xanthy's frantic motions make it apparent.*

Didi: Mmm Hmm Hm Hmfmm Fmm-Hmm Hm Hm-Hm!

Xanthias: . . . Your arse is showing. [*Indeed it is, as his overlarge diving-trousers are invisible and inaccessible from the front, and he waves about a bit before giving up and removing his helmet. He looks like Dionysos.*]

Didi: Cut out the poetry nonsense. This isn't glee club. We'll never get up into space if I'm locked in this strongbox of a suit. Now help me out of this thing.

Xanthias obliges, and Didi is comically wrestled out of the contraption, falling down at least twice in the process, getting angry at Xanthias and hitting him at least twice, one of the times falling down because of hitting Xanthias, and possibly even once Didi hitting Xanthias, who, lifting arms in defense, drops beach-ball-sized iron diving helmet on Didi's toe, causing Didi to bulge eyes and hop on one foot while still with canvas or oilcloth trousers around his ankles, quickly catching foot and falling comically forward on face. Or not. Note: All above occurs in first half of undressing phase. After climax of falling on face, farce ends and he is further undressed with Xanthias' aid. It becomes slowly apparent as the diving outfit is removed that underneath it Didi is wearing his familiar getup from The Frogs *— cumbersome theatrical boots and a fur piece over a light yellow robe.* Xanthias expresses surprise.

Xanthias: *[removing something while convoluted so that his head is under D's arm]* O Zeus, an *ozeus*!

Didi: Well I've hardly had time to *bathe* since this all began.

Xanthias: *[as the full costume is finally revealed]* This all looks a bit familiar. What are you dressed like that for? I thought we were going up to space, to see the stars and meet the gods.

Didi: We *are*. Don't you know anything? What's the most important thing about space for the tourist to know?

Xanthias: Which way's up?

Didi: No! There ain't no air way up in space. *[Knocks on the side of the resounding helmet twice]* It would all float away, you see?

Xanthias: What? You mean there's no atmosphere? Like at Gert's? But then, what does the sun burn in?

Didi: I don't know, probably ether or something. Don't you get it? Think, why don't you! It would all just dissipate in a second, *whoooooosh!* So, if ever there was air in space, it's gone now. And if there is any now, there won't be ere long! And the gravity ain't much either, hence the weighted boots. They came free with the rest of the deep-sea stuff.

Xanthias: *[grudgingly accepting the explanation, but uncertain, unconvinced, and suspicious]* Alright, but then what's the rest of that getup for? What's with that fur piece?

Didi: *[not believing his ears at the ignorance of his fellow]* Have you any idea of how *cold* it is in space?

Xanthias: *[not defeated, but being convinced]* Okay, I guess. And the sheik's robe, in buttercup?

Didi: *[in precisely the same tone and pacing]* Have you any idea of how hot it is near a star? You've got to take a tip from desert folk—they know how to deal with real heat, wear long light flowing robes to deal with the temperatures. You gotta pick a color that'll reflect what the thing put out, and what color is the sun?

Didi *[pedantically and condescendingly]* cum Xanthias *[grudgingly]: Yellow*.

Xanthias: So why don't I have any of that stuff?

Didi: Once we're up in space, there won't be any gravity to the situation, so I reckon I won't really be needing you to carry my stuff.

Xanthias: But how are we going to get to space, anyhow?

Didi: *[beaming: he's been waiting for this question to be asked]* Up! We go up, up, and further up! Where are the stars in the heavens? Where do the gods live? Up in the sky!

Xanthias: *[knowingly and contradictorily]* No, the gods live on Olympus. It's a mountain. I read about it once.

Didi: *[adjectivally and adverbially]* And what is a mountain but *up*? I tell you, I've been places you haven't, talked to *real* clever boffins and eggheads in the best academies and lyceums around.

Xanthias: *[with genuine curiosity]* And?

Didi: Oh, they're bonkers, every one. But I did meet a star-gazer, Roman chap, who pointed out Jupiter, and Venus, and Mars, and Mercury, and they were all stars in the sky. The way I figure, find a tall enough mountain and just walk up. None of that shooting yourself up in a flying bomb nonsense. After all, the higher you go, the closer you are to space, and that's all there really is to it, isn't it?

Xanthias: I guess . . . . *[unsure, trying to find some fault]*

Didi: He told me, *"ad astra, per aspera." [He mimics the astronomer in badly faked Cockney.]*

Xanthias: I thought you said there weren't any air.

Didi: Eh, he couldn't know everything. Highly specialized field, you know. Anyway, I asked, and he told me where to find the highest mountain around, and that's why we're here. See, there it is, right over that way.

Xanthias: Where? I don't see anything.

Didi: *[pointing] There*.

Xanthias: Oh, I see now. It was behind a bush.

They begin walking in place to the left "up" the incline, while stage lights of varying spot sizes and colors continually sweep right at roughly walking pace or a bit quicker. If the entire stage has been set up on jacks, gradually raise the left side to increase the incline and "get higher up the mountain." Of course, it probably isn't on jacks, so don't.

There is some silence for perhaps a minute, as the audience becomes accustomed with the characters' manners through their gait. Didi is stupid, headstrong, overconfident, pedantic, and oafish, while Xanthias is subservient, defiant, thick, surprisingly astute on occasion, low, base, logical, and vulgar. Neither is exactly intelligent, but Didi seems likely to know more, yet make assumptions on little knowledge, and Xanthias seems likely to be generally ignorant, yet think linearly, not jump to conclusions, and (extremely thickheadedly) follow a statement to a conclusion. There may also be some visual or physical humor during the walk up the mountain.

Presently, they tire, and the lights slow as they do.

Xanthias: So why are we going to space at all?

Didi: Terrible thing. Terrible, terrible thing. They don't want me here. I've been banished.

Xanthias: Banished? Really? What did you do?

Didi: Oh, who even remembers anymore! It was so long ago, and she had another sister . . . .

Xanthias: So what happened?

Didi: It's all a bit fuzzy, now. Everyone wrote my name on a fur hat, and then I was kicked out. And that was that.

Xanthias: A fur hat?

Didi: That's right. Everyone wrote my name on an astrakhan.

Xanthias: You could go somewhere else. Sparta. Thebes. Montreal.

Didi: No, you don't under*stand*! *Everyone* voted me out. I'm exiled from everywhere! From Earth! I've been shrunk to the size of an ostrich!

Xanthias: You've wh —

Didi: I've been ostrich-sized! I can no longer stay here on Earth! And she was such a nice Gaia, too! Now my only hope is to go and plead with the gods in person. I'll go to the heavens, hop from star to star, planet to asteroid, until I can return home! I'll start by visiting the Sun.

Xanthias: You can't visit the sun! Canary dressing gown or no, it's far too hot and bright to get anywhere near!

Didi: Oh, so now you're an astrophysicist, are you? What, do you think I'm some sort of idiot? I'll go at night.

Didi sulks and keeps walking. Suddenly, the two come upon a stone fortification or city wall, with guard-house atop. I.e., it comes upon them, as it is slid toward them at the rate they walk "up" the "mountain." It is probably Styrofoam, or some such rot. Perched on top of it is an **Owl** *with a helmet and pike.*

Didi: Hullo! What's this?

Owl: Whooo?!

Didi: I'm Dionysus, and this is Xanthias.

Owl: Whooo?! Whooo?!

Didi: I've been exiled from the Earth, and we're off to see the stars and meet the gods, or vice-versa. Sort of a weekend holiday.

Owl: Whooo cooks for yoouuu?! Whooo?! Whooo?! Whooo cooks for yoouuu?!

Didi: Funny sort of question, if you ask me. Well, I guess you did ask me. He does. [*pointing at Xanthias*] He's my valet.

Owl: A valet in the mountains? Don't be ridiculous!

Didi: Oho what a stroke come you not to the rescue! So, you can speak, after all! That whoo whoo whoo business was all Greek to me.

Owl: What business have you at the gates of the City of the Birds?

Didi: I say, we've left the earth behind and climbed right through the clouds! But City of Birds?

Owl: *[who is joined as he speaks by a* **Loon** *on the battlements]* Yes, this is our City. And of you can't state your business or move along, I'll have the buzzards peck out your liver. And don't for a second think I won't! We've done it to Titans, so it would be child's play to do it to a man like you!

Didi: I may not look like it, but in fact [*pulling himself up to a slightly fuller height and puffing out his chest, revealing a not-invisible gut*] I am the god of this entire Festival. I am Dionysos, god of wine.

Owl: Do you care much for usque?

Didi: Not particularly, no.

Owl: No wonder. In Rome, Bacchus just adores the stuff. Of course, in Rome, everyone loves usque. Have you been to one of their orgies?

Loon: [*looking out at audience*] I say, no wonder everyone's so drunk! This is *your* festival? I wouldn't watch this rubbish for a second if I weren't in it! They must be too plastered to notice that Dionysos and his festival have nothing at all to do with space or planets.

Xanthias: I don't know about that. I was stumbling around last night after that Monty Python flick, and I fell into a krater.

Owl: Enough! Depart, or your death will be slow and painful to you, painfully

boring to onlookers.

Xanthias: Say, here's a thought, couldn't the birds take us up further? You know, they've got those wings and all . . . .

Didi: Shut up, you turkey, you booby, you tit, you rat bustard! Do you want to get us killed? Do you want to — say, that *is* a good idea. Could you do it?

Owl: [*thinking*] Well . . . no, no, sorry. [*to Xanthias*] You, perhaps, but the heavy one [*Didi once again sucks in his gut*], it would have to be a job for the tube-nosed sea birds. And we just don't have the fuel for them.

Didi: You mean . . . .

Owl: That's right: We're all out of petrel. And you can't just fly up there on a lark.

Didi: Well there's no use crowing about it.

Xanthias: There's no use grousing about it, either.

Didi: [*annoyed he hadn't though of that one*] Um, or, um, or . . . rantin' and raven about it?

Xanthias, Owl, and Loon pretend not to hear and embarrassedly look away so as not to be seen with bad poker faces; Didi himself immediately regrets the pun and looks at his feet, hunched. Owl, remembering himself, regains his lost verve.

Owl: Is that it, then, or should I call for the joy buzzards?

Didi: Oh no, please, carrion without us.

Everyone nods, satisfied. Didi has redeemed himself. He beams, once again enthusiastic and resolute.

Didi: Listen: We're no bother to you. We've come far too far to turn about, and killing us would only give your noble buzzards indigestion. Trust me. Give us safe passage through your city and above, and we'll put in a

good word for you with the Big Guy.

Owl: [*interested, but trying not to appear so*] You don't mean . . . Zeus? Here in the clouds, we're more than a little bit at his mercy. . .

A triple flash or strobe of white light and a deep rumble.

Didi: I meant Silenus, but Zeus is fine, too. To be fair, I'm much more familiar with Ol' Silly, and he is a *much* "bigger" guy that Thunderbolts-up-the-Wazoo in the fancy throne.

Owl: [*absently*] Is *that* where he keeps them . . . .

Didi: So: How about it?

Owl: Why can't you just get to space in the normal way? You know: With a launch pad and technicians and boosters and a big ol' interplanetary rowboat.

Didi: Rowboat? You mean rocket?

Owl: Of course not! You'd fall in.

A pause.

Didi: Oh please, let us through! They'll kill me if I went back to Athens! Plus, why would I want to go back there, where the politicians spend all their time kissing hands and shaking babies, where the War has been going on for so long that the Spartan mothers have run clean out of shields for their sons to come home on, where the judges at the Dionysia are so corrupt or tasteless that Galephion hasn't won once—why would I want all thatwhen I could live in the sky, and be among such heroes as Orion and that broad keeping the lion away from those scales he's trying to get at.

Everyone looks at him as if he suddenly sprouted a second of something most people probably should have only one of.

Didi: What? The astronomer chap told me. "Just follow the arc to Arcturus,

then speed on to Spica." [*Didi employs the same over-the-top Cockney as before*]

Owl: The Auk? Well, why didn't you *say* so!? He's right over here. Here, come inside, why don't you!

The gates are opened, and the two walk through. The scene changes to the City of the Birds. It looks like a city. Everyone is a bird. Simple stuff.

The Owl and the Loon (to right) are introducing Didi and Xanthias (center) to the Head of the Castle Guard, a **Rook** *(left). He is in similar guardly costume as they, with a helmet and pike, with the exception being that his helmet has a single feather plume. He is flanked by two more guards, a* **Kiwi** *and a* **Cuckoo**.

Rook: *What*!? Humans!? Are you a cuckoo!?

Cuckoo: Hey!

Rook: I apologize—are you a loon!?

Loon: Excuse me!

Rook: Sorry, sorry—don't you remember what happened *last* time? Why did you let them in here?

Owl: They were pestering us. Being very annoying.

Rook: Why didn't you let the buzzards on them?

Owl: I had, ah, a hunch. That they would just give them indigestion.

Rook: [*looking over the two*] Yes, perhaps you're right. But that's still no reason to let them into the city. Who are they?

Didi: *[stepping forward]* Dionysos and Xanthias. With, uh, the Hellenic Space Program. We merely request safe passage through your city, Your Flightiness.

Rook: [*sighing*] Listen, I'm just a rank and file guy, okay, but I'll see if I can put

you through to the Mayor. You'll have to talk to him.

Didi: *[relieved that he's finally met with someone reasonable] Thank* you!

Rook: Meanwhile, of course, I'll have to keep you here in the jail. Can't have you wandering about the city. I'll put you in cell number five if it's free. You'll have some nice newspaper and a perch attached to the wall. At seven, the guard will come around with a cuttlebone. In fact, I'll have you escorted there now. [*over his shoulder*] Toucan, take the prisoners to number five!

As the **Toucan** *steps on from left, Didi becomes speechless with despair and betrayal and outrage. He opens and shuts his mouth a few times, then calls frantically and incoherently after the Rook as he leaves left. Meanwhile, as the Toucan crosses center to cuff them and take thme away off right, and the Owl and the Loon file out left behind the other two guards, a respectful distance behind their supervisor, without so much as a look at the two humans. Only Xanthias retains his wits about him.*

Xanthias: [*nervously babbling and oblivious to the pun*] Don't be silly: We're no threat! Why, even *one* of you, with your saber beaks and meat-hook talons, is *more* than a match for we two measly humans.

Toucan: Very funny, but I'll have you know we tropicals don't take as kindly as the temperates to rude remarks. I'm a bird of paradise, you know.

Didi: [*recovering, and perking up at this*]: Really? Do you have them on you? I'll roll you for our freedom.

Toucan: Graaaaaaaaawwwwwxx!

They are led off right in chains. Fade out, and then in on a cell. A wall of bars is in front of the two humans. The Toucan's gone. Didi and Xanthias are sitting on the ground, not looking at each other, but not actually away either. Just listless. Finally, Didi speaks up.

Didi: Well, I don't know about you, but I'm not staying in this coop for one second longer than I have to!

Xanthias: [*looking at the bars*] You mean we don't have to stay?

Didi: Of course not! The birdcage hasn't been built that can hold Dionysos, Lord of Bibblers, and Xanthias, his plucky human sidekick.

Xanthias: I ain't your sidekick, I'm your valitt!

Didi: You're *in*valitt, is what you are. Come on, then! I think I see a sawbill approaching!

The **Sawbill** *comes on from left and crosses right. The stage is level, but the two call* down *to him, as if he is on the street and they above at a barred gaol window. He speaks* up *to them, and both project as if the other is maybe twenty feet off. The effect can be aided with a little initial squinting and pointing to see the passerby.*

Didi: Hey! Hey you! That's right, you!

Sawbill: Hmmmf?

Didi: I couldn't help but notice that wonderfully attractive beak you've got there.

Sawbill: Why, thank you!

Didi: And I was wondering if perhaps you could come a bit closer, so we could see it more clearly.

Sawbill: Well, I don't see why not — wait a minute! You're *jail*birds! You could be murderers or vandals or thieves!

Didi: I assure you we won't be robin anything of yours; we're here for check kiting.

Sawbill: I knew a kite once, but he was a Slovak.

Didi: Besides, we've been so kind, and complimented that unfathomably ugly schnozz of yours!

Sawbill: Yes, well, I suppose one good tern deserves another.

He approaches the bars. As he does so, Didi leaps over Xanthias and to the edge, thrusting

his arms out the bars to the shoulder and grabbing hold of the sawbill's neck.

Didi: *[to Xanthias] Duck!*

He files through the bars in no time, and tosses the Sawbill aside to regain his composure, clutching his beak and moaning.

Sawbill: [*still clutching his beak, and speaking as if with his nose shut]* J u z d *loog* ad da dabbage you've gauzed! Ad id'll all go od *by* bill!

Xanthias: [*clambering out after Didi*] Why, we're as free as a —

Didi: [*hastily*] *Don't* say it! Now, let's fly!

They dash off left, i.e., the bars and the sawbill are slid off right as the two dash, and the stage lights sweep right at the same speed. They soon come upon a **Pigeon** *with a tablet and stylus. He is raggedy-looking, and has a cup set out before him for change. He marks their approach, but is clearly blind. He has a big beard. The set is a city street, with doorways and a tall iron lamppost.*

Pigeon: You there! You look like tasteful folk! Wanna hear some Great Litcher?

Xanthias: We're over here.

Pigeon: Of course you are, of course you are! Anyway, how about it?

Didi: Actually, we're just coming here from the Dionysian mysteries, so —

Pigeon: Pah! Well, it's all the same with that rot, so I can tell you right now: The butler did it.

Didi looks at Xanthias accusingly.

Pigeon: Anywho! *[Didi and Xanthias look frantically around for the owl]* Allow me to introduce myself! I am Homer . . . a pigeon, you know. *[sticking out his wing to shake hands, but in the wrong place entirely]*

Xanthias: Still over here.

Pigeon: [*groping for Didi's face, and feeling it over roughly, then moving onto his arm*] Right, right! Right over . . . *here*, and just itching to hear the fodder of the Western Canon! Hm, funny sort of wing that is . . . .

Didi: That's my neck. I'm an ostrich. Well, I'm size of one, anyway . . . . And I don't care if you've got the mutter *and* fodder of the Western Canon, I'm not about to be shot out of it by some two-bit bard.

Pigeon: [*taken aback; gravely insulted, but spiteful*] I'll have you know, a poet *never* mutters! And if you're looking for someone barred, talk to an owl.

Didi: We've already *been* barred from the entire planet! And that Owl was no use at all!

Xanthias: [*interjecting in hopes of restoring some sense*] We're looking for the Auk. He's going to take us into space.

Didi: [*as if remembering for the first time*] Oh, is *that* what we're doing . . . . I'd forgotten.

Pigeon: Certainly, certainly! Just follow me! [*He walks into a lamppost, stumbles back, and touches his forelock before moving on*] Pardon me, madame! My deepest apologies!

Didi and Xanthias look at each other, shrug, and follow, each in turn ploughing into the lamppost and walking on, to the left. The post slides away, and soon one of the doors is stopped at. Suddenly, a **red thing** *with feathers all about its feet comes crashing out one of the doorways with a bottle in hand, shouts back into the doorway:* So's yer mother! *and stumbles off right.*

Didi: *What* was *that*!?

Pigeon: That? Why, that's just a martlet. You get them a lot around these academic quarters. Little red things, like swallows. Spend most of their time drinking and sleeping through lectures. Anyway, here we are: the office of Professor C. P. Auk, BS, PhD, QED, Most Honorable Lecturer in Aeronautics and Ballooning and Chair Emeritus of the Department of Astronomy. The learn'd astronomer hisself.

He holds out his hand, as if for change. Didi grasps it and shakes vigorously, before striding through the doorway without a look back. Xanthias shrugs and follows close behind. Fade. Unfade. A study, with all sorts of brass instruments laying about. Telescopes, astrolabes, etc., atop unruly heaping piles of charts and calculations. Sitting on the largest pile of papers is the Auk. Didi and Xanthias have already sat down upon smaller stacks. A conversation is obviously already underway.

Auk: Impossible! Absolutely impossible!

Didi: [*desperately*]: But —

Auk: No! Simply can't be done, and that's all there is to it! Virgo is out of your league and she knows it! [*Didi looks crestfallen*] Of course, I can get you up into space as easy as pie.

Didi: Really?

Auk: Of course! I can get you as far as the moon in my balloon, and you can make your own way from there to the sun. Now, normally, this would be quite undoable, because the moon and the sun are about 150,000,000 kilometers away from each other.

Didi: [*to Xanthias*] Quick, how many stadia is that?

Auk: *[ignoring or not hearing the interruption]* However, today, there's an eclipse, which means they'll be right on top of each other! A stroke of luck, what! Naturally, we'll have to pile into the balloon immediately or risk missing the eclipse. The next total solar eclipse visible from Greece isn't for . . . let's see. Ever. This is the last one. Or maybe my chart just ends.

They all scramble to prepare to blast off: Xanthias begins frantically gathering his bindles and bundles from where they're scattered, Didi is welsh-combing his hair into the polished brass surface of the sun in a small clockwork orrery, and Auk is getting together armfuls of trajectories and figures and instruments. Presently, they all pile into the balloon basket that descends from the eaves at the hauling down of a robe by Auk. With the release of a catch, they're off, up and away from the stage by deus ex machina, and fade. Unfade on the basket dangling about center stage and about five feet off the stage. The lights are gently gliding continuously downward, indicating an ascent, and, as the scene goes on, the base

lights gradually transition from a sky blue to a midnight, as they escape the atmosphere. If a fog machine is possible, it is recommended. A gauzy girl, **Koryphaios of Clouds,** *floats down on harness, and greets our balloonists.*

Koryphaios: [*airily*] Can I help you?

Didi: No, you cannot, and I'll tell you what's more: You're in the wrong play!

Koryphaios: Well, I never . . . ! [*Floats off*]

Auk: Ah, look! The stars are coming out!

And indeed they are. **The Chorus,** *including the Koryphaios of Stars, emerges from either side on the platform above the stage, the lights dim overall (though they should be fairly starry-nightish by now, anyway), and the spots open onto them, and the three mortals look up at them as the Parabasis begins.*

The Chorus of Stars' dress varies, but maintains the same overall effect: theatrical boots, a floor-length, pseudo-Greek robe, and a golden spiky halo of light behind the head. The robes vary in colors as the colors of stars, e.g., blue, yellow, white, red, but not bright primary colors—rather light tints. The robes are either iridescent of their own right or are covered in little sequins that catch the spots.

Koryphaios: THE PARABASIS!

Chorus: *[ponderously, with harmonizing]* I went out to the theater at Epidermis;
I despised it: it really got under my skin,
and as soon as the goats wandered out for the Chorus,
I decided I'd leave before it could begin.

What's become of the theater since it was made,
that it stinks to Olympus with every new show?
What's with every new "hit" that, as soon as it's played,
just makes the whole audience get up and go?

They'll see tragedy (if it's got buckets of blood),
and some comedy's fine (just as long as there's sex),
but what is it with lit'ture, whose name is still mud,
that means no one will bother to stick out their necks?

What is drawing the Romans to their colosseum,
and what's dragging the Greeks to Olympics and sports?
If rich playwrights still live, I for one cannot see 'em.
I'll take *one* decent writer: in a storm, any port.

The Chorus files off to either side, the spots close, and the lights return to normal dark night. Didi dares to open one eye and take his hands off his ears.

Didi: O Zeus, is it over? I think it's finally over.

Xanthias: Those stars certainly seemed to have strong opinions about the theater.

Didi: Probably movie stars. Did you see those sequined gowns? Typical.

Auk: Here we are! The moon!

The basket alights, and Didi and Xanthias deballoon.

Didi: *That's one small step for man* . . . but I'm a god, so it really isn't a big deal.

Xanthias: I think I'll just stay in the landing module. What's this balloon called?

Auk: The *Eagle*.

Didi: Nonsense! If you don't come with me, who will carry all my stuff? You think I'm going to spend the rest of my life in the heavens without my things?

Xanthias: They say you can't take it with you.

Didi: I know that, which is why *I* won't; *you* will.

He hauls Xanthias out of the basket.

The basket rises again, and the heroes wave as Auk, also waving a handkerchief, floats up and away above the stage and is hauled into the eaves.

Didi: Thank you very much, Professor! I can sincerely say that I have never

seen such a quantity of hot air in my entire life!

Auk: Naturally, naturally!

He is gone.

Didi: Alright, it's nearly time. We'd better make our way over that ridge before the eclipse begins. We're on the dark side. And let's try not to run into Artemis, shall we?

They go left, up the ridge. Once over, the lights are up, white, and steadily get brighter and yellower as the sun approaches. Finally, the eclipse begins, which apparently means the sun and moon are next to each other. A yellow curtain is slowly pulled on from left, and now, only the right half of the stage is white, starry, and lunar, while the left half is yellow, solid, and solar. They cross over. Again, as they walk, the curtain resumes its motion and pulls until it is the background, and the moon is behind.

Didi: Well, I told you it'd be hot. *[He throws the fur piece out into the audience, dons a pair of large black sunglasses, and draws a stripe of opaque, white sun-block down his nose.]* Look! Over there! *[Off left]* I think I see someone!

The Sun *glides gracefully and elegantly on from left. Her robe is yellow, and she possesses a delicate and radiant beauty, as well as impeccable manners.*

The Sun: I am Sol, Lady of this System, and of the nine — sorry, eight planets. Wherefore disturbest thou my divine serenity?

A noise.

Sun: Ex*cuse* me! [*She blushes.*] Solar wind.

Didi: What about the gods? I thought they ruled everything. Are you saying those spheres [*gestures to the eaves*] are the gods?

Sun: Sort of. They're planets, and while, on Earth, Hermes, Aphrodite, and Ares are all children of Zeus, and Poseidon and Hades are his brothers, Kronos his father, Gaia and Ouranos *his* parents, and Apollo and Artemis, or sometimes Hyperion and Selene, various cousins, on the grand scale,

it's not quite so complicated. I'm not Apollo or Hyperion: I'm a star. And all of those others, Gaia included, are equal and under my governance.

Didi: I can see, all up there running little circles forever. Seem a bit boring. They don't look anything like their statues. Why, just look at Venus. Not particularly attractive at all, if you ask me.

Xanthias: I think that's Jupiter. He looks a little gassy.

Didi: So *he's* the same. What about all his lovers, going about him like that? Do they always do that?

Sun: Yup. And always will. The planets don't have quite so many . . . *antics* as the gods they're named after. Not that they aren't plenty interesting in their own right.

Didi: What about Earth? Where are we? When we're not here, I mean.

Sun: See over there, that little dot? That's it. Earth. The Big Blue Marble.

Xanthias: Not much of a marble, really. I used to have a bully-taw ten times better, and it didn't bulge out in the middle like that.

Didi: Yes, she's really letting the old equator get a bit loose, isn't she?

Sun: I have heard that you wish to meet the assembled stars.

Didi: Yes, I did, but then I heard them sing.

Sun: They probably won't do that again. But if you ever want to get back home, to be released from exile, they're the only ones that can make that happen.

Didi: But what about the gods? I could make a sacrifice . . . .

Sun: And when was the last time you heard about a sacrifice being answered at all, let alone promptly and efficiently, before you froze to death or starved to death in the vastness of space?

Didi: How could I freeze to death here on the sun?

Sun: What about nighttime?

Didi: All right, I'll grant you that. And I also probably should have brought along some food. But what can you stars do to help me?

As they speak, the Chorus, looking just as before, file onto the raised shelf and begin chanting inaudibly until their dialogue.

Sol: You forget: Besides governing the gods themselves, the stars command mankind directly: When was the last time you heard someone say that some desired outcome was or wasn't "in the stars"? What does every person do, first thing in the morning as they pick up the newspaper?

Didi: Why, they read their horoscope!

Sun: Precisely! And when the moon is in the seventh house, and Jupiter's passed through Orion and come into conjunction with Mars, they think nothing at all of taking as law the instruction to avoid long journeys over water. After all, who would know better about that than we stars?

Didi: Brilliant!

Sun: So it would be child's play to arrange for the citizens of Athens to realize, due to the arrangement of the heavens, that exiled . . . what did you do?

Didi whispers to her. Her eyes slowly widen.

Sun: *Really*? Well, it might not be easy . . . but we'll try. That exiles . . . like yourself must be recalled immediately and forgiven, in order to avoid some vague astronomical peril or natural disaster. Hmm. How do meteors sound?

Didi: Ex*quis*itely threatening, yet unpredictable.

Sun: [*satisfied*] Good. Ah, it looks like everyone's arrived. [*to the Chorus*] This is Dionysos and Xanthias. They are two humans who seek a favor of the Stars.

Koryphaios: *[stepping slightly forward; he is in the center of the ridge]* Greetings, mortals. I am Sirius.

Xanthias: Well I can see *that*. One could hardly believe you're kidding around with a mug like yours.

Didi: [*hitting Xanthias*] Don't mind him, Your Shininess! Feel free to maroon him on some remote asteroid. But please, help me, I beg of you!

Koryphaios: Watch your tongue, the both of you. Now: What have you to ask of the Council of Stars?

Didi: I wish a recall from ostrich-siz — from ostricissiz — a recall from exile, Your Twinkliness, and the forgiveness of my people.

Xanthias: Wait a minute! I thought you said you didn't like it back in Athens one bit!

Didi: Yes, well, that was before I found out it was possible to get back. Sour apples, you know. Now I just want that silly exile lifted.

Koryphaios: What is your offense?

Sol whispers to him. His eyes slowly widen.

Koryphaios: That may take . . . some doing. Some might say your actions are unforgivable.

Polaris: Oi! As if debauchery of that kind is anything new to you, you old Dog Star!

Koryphaios: Shut up, Polaris!

Polaris: Oh, like you don't remember that summer three billion years ago. Here: I'll give you a hint. You. Andromeda. *And* Qoppa Ceti B. At the beach.

Several titters, hastily covered with coughing, can be heard from various corners of the Chorus.

Koryphaios: Can't you see I'm doing the big fiery judge bit for the humans?

Xanthias: Oh, don't mind me! I think the whole thing's very impressive!

Koryphaios: *Thank* you.

Xanthias: Especially the bit about you and Andromeda!

Koryphaios: Wuaaaugh! If I grant your request, will you leave as quickly as possible?

Didi and Xanthias look at each other.

Didi *cum* Xanthias: Sure!

Agon. **Alpha Centauri A** *and* **Alpha Centauri B** *are identical twins, yet male and female. (It's a play.)*

Alpha Centauri A: What? You can't seriously be considering granting these humans' wishes! What happened to the clockwork heavens, to the inescapability of fate? Now can every two-bit hero with two bits for the auk come up here like it's bloody Hades and make demands? *You* saw what happened to the underworld as soon as people realized that it was just over the river and through the woods! Now Herakles goes there on his morning constitutional, and poor Charon has installed a separate ferry for living stiffs on some spirit journey or other nonsense to rescue a dead lover or complete a trial of bravery or just win a bet or do a triple-dog dare with some chums at Corinth Prep. It's chaos, Sirius, and that'll happen here, too, if you start listening to the townies.

Alpha Centauri B: Don't pay any attention to my idiot brother. I'm sure that bit about Hades is a gross exaggeration.

A: They've had to put in turnstiles!

B: Anyway, where would we be if we ignored those over whom we rule? If we don't listen to humans' pleas and respond, are we any better than the gods that take sacrifice after sacrifice, then send down lightning and floods and bad playwrights because they weren't frequent enough? Plus,

it's not like we have any other interesting life in this area. Earth's may not be too clever and stop being so amusing after a hundred years or so, but, compared to those little squiggly things on Europa, they're fairly worthwhile things. I say we send them back, with word about the mercy and compassion of the universe. Maybe it would be nice if we got some sacrifices of our own!

Proxima Centauri: You mean those little golden phonograph disc things? They tasted terrible!

A: Perhaps you're forgetting, but we *do* get involved with the proles. We tell them when not to trust strangers and when a relative is coming for an unexpected visit and when it would be a good idea to be nice to people.

B: But we never tell them the right thing.

A: How does that matter? The plebs have their own lives to lead. If we were always truthful, they would start to rely on us, and we wouldn't want that, now, would we?

B: Ugh! You're beginning to sound just like *them*! All it really boils down to is this: You can leave them back on Earth in the care of Sol, here, or you can have them gallivanting around the galaxy and pestering all of us. I think I know the solution. Just lift the exile and forget about them.

Koryphaios: [*clapping his hands together and turning to the rest of the Chorus; as he speaks, the lights are dimming again . . .*] Well! That's decided, then! And it seems like a fairly significant plot point, too, rather neatly bisecting the second act, don't you think. And you know what that means . . . .

Didi: [suddenly realizing just what Sirius's at] Oh gods no —

Koryphaios: THE SECOND PARABASIS!

Didi: TO HELL WITH THE SECOND PARABASIS!

Koryphaios: [*shrugs*] Well all right then. Forget it.

The lights go back up.

Didi: *Phew*. Please, I just want to go home. Athens isn't much, but I'd grown quite fond of some of the less extreme stenches. Also, I have a considerable running bet on the outcome of the War.

Koryphaios: How much?

Didi: Everything. I deserted the second it broke out.

Koryphaios: Then you'll be pleased to hear some good news: You've had the power to go home all along. Just knock together the heels of your buskins and say, "There's no place like Rome!"

Didi: *[excited] Really?*

Koryphaios: No. Give the Council of Stars a moment to convene, to deliberate whether your request is to be granted or not.

Didi: I thought my request was already granted.

Koryphaios: Sort of. Your exile is lifted. But you didn't leave. And we don't know how to make you go. Frankly, I was kind of hoping that if we went away and didn't come back, you would just forget the request and go away.

Didi: I'm not really sure I *can* go back, now. The eclipse that let us walk over is finished now, and our balloon left without us.

Koryphaios: [*disgusted*] You flew to the *moon* in a *balloon*? That's preposterous! And anyway, I'm sure I heard it in a popular song once. By any chance was it June, and did you spoon anyone?

Didi: Not that I recall. Did I, Xanthias?

Xanthias: *[fluttering his eyelashes] Well . . . .*

Didi: [*interrupting*] No, I'm sure I didn't. [*Despairing*] So how am I to get back?

Betelgeuse: [*coughing politely and attempting to interject in a small voice*] Well, if

I'm not interrupting, sir, it may be—

Koryphaios: [*barking*] Speak up, will you, Betelgeuse!

Betelgeuse: I don't perhaps think that maybe we aren't in fact possibly using just at this exact mo . . . [*with import*] The *Argo*.

Collective gasps and whispers from the Chorus of Stars.

Regulus: He is right, Sirius. The *Argo Navis* has been obsolete for over a quarter of a millennium, and is unlikely to be used again. It would only fall into disrepair, its sails shred into tatters, its hull fall to shipworms, its masts topple like the cedars of Lebanon when they built the condominium complex The Cedars of Lebanon. It would be no great loss to turn the vessel over to these travelers for one last voyage.

Didi: So it's ridiculous to balloon into space, but perfectly rational to sail back out of it?

Koryphaios: Yes, Regulus has a point. This isn't exactly a starship but it is a *star* ship.

Didi: [*stubbornly*] No. No, I'm sorry, but I just don't believe it.

Koryphaios: Well, it is generally acknowledged that it is easier to submit to gravity than escape it. All reentry is is falling, ideally as slowly as possible. And the entire method is only a slight variation of the usual method of getting around space: the interplanetary rowboat.

Didi: You mean —

Koryphaios: [*cutting him off and not hearing the end*] No, of course not, it would tip over. Anyway, take good care of her. [*Tosses Didi a set of shiny metal jangly things*] Here're the keys.

Didi catches them.

Didi: Thanks. I'll be seeing you around, I suppose, at night, mostly.

Sol clears her throat.

Didi: Or during the daytime. That's fine, too. Thanks again. Oh, I just can't wait to see what they're playing tomorrow. What about you, Xanthias? Do you think they'll do another one of those . . . .

Dialogue fades as Didi and Xanthias walk off right, Sol off left, and the chorus empty off in either direction. Only a small half-chorus remains, immediately flanking Sirius, still in the center of the Chorus platform. The lights dim as before, and the spots open on them.

Chorus: Of any work, whether play or a book,
one word always lurks, if you know where to look.
It is written before the author can even begin,
and, spoken or not, it always ends:

Koryphaios: FIN.

Lights. Curtain. Exeunt omnes.

Glimpses of Antiquity: A Photo Essay

By Gemma Israelson

The following photographs are from a series taken on my gap year in 2012/2013. They were shot on 35 mm film using a Pentax point and shoot camera. They are part of a larger body of shots tied into the classical world found in Brussels, Bruges, Antwerp, Paris, Verona , Venice, Florence, Rome, Edinburgh, London, Croatia, Barcelona and Tangier.

Romulus and Remus

This photo was taken in Rome in May 2013. The image of Romulus and Remus being suckled by a she-wolf is displayed throughout the Eternal City even today, and is emblematic of the city's mythical foundation. I found this emblem covered in modern graffiti, and thought the comparison of ancient myth and culture to modern forms of anti-establishment vocalization was striking. It is duly noted that in the 21st century, Romans still identify as Romans, then Italians, then Europeans, and the constant repetition of the she-wolf thorough out the city reiterates this. It also serves as a symbol of the Roman Empire's former persona, as life-giving but fierce and powerful at the same time. Overall, this image functions as a link between the ancient and modern world.

Pluto and Proserpina

This is a photograph of a bronze cast statue of *Pluto and Prosperina* from approximately 1565-1570. It was made in Italy and is accredited to the sculptor Vincenzo de Rossi and now resides in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London as part of their permanent collection. It depicts the rape of Proserpina at the moment of her abduction by Pluto. The grey-green light that was coming through the skylights on this typical London day seemed to emulate the greenish tinge that the statue has taken on as the bronze oxidized. The figures are perfectly anatomically rendered and their bodies reveal a high degree of emotion, which is contrasted with the two seated people in the lower right corner, who sedately admire the works in the courtyard. Overall, this image evokes both high emotion from the work balanced with a calm sense of serenity in the museum setting.