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Hirundo is the Latin word for martlet, a mythical bird without legs, always shown in flight, unceasing in its quest for knowledge. The McGill coat-of-arms has three martlets.

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Introduction and Summary

I am proud and honoured to introduce the fifth edition of Hirundo.

In this edition, Aleksander Filemonowicz immerses us in the enticing world of Thucydides through his analysis of the historiographic methods of the historian, as well as to his approach to the Peloponnesian War. Next, David Bowles enlightens us on the true reasons behind Socrates' execution with a discussion on the accusations against him. Following this, McGill alumna Janka Dowding presents a fascinating historiographic debate on the origins of the Etruscan civilization and the recent revival in Etruscology. Afterwards, Michael Da Cruz brings to light the nature of Roman garrisons during the Middle Republic and its importance in the political and social context of the Republic. Further along, Rachel McQuiggan analyzes the Roman concept of geography and the role that spatial representations played in the Roman concept of both geography and ethnography. Next, Emma Johnson presents an analysis of the real role of the *paterfamilias*, as well as the powers that such an institution possessed. Following this, Andrew Swidzinski presents a captivating overview of the origins and implications of the First Social War of 87-82BC. Next, Robert Eisenberg delves into the origins of the Great Jewish Revolt against Rome and the

social divide behind the complex rebellion. Finally, Anna Dysert presents a marvelous discussion on Caelius Aurelianus' *Celerum Passionum* or "On Acute Diseases".

I would like to thank my marvellous and devoted editorial board who worked so hard and tirelessly. I will be forever grateful for your comments and support; without you this project would have never materialized, and it is your commitment that led to the completion of such a wonderful work. Thank you to the layout editors as well who have made miracles for the journal, and who have been of great help to me.

On behalf of the editorial board, I would like to thank Professor Michael P. Fronda for endless guidance, advice, wisdom, support, but most of all patience. I would also like to thank the Professors of the Classics Programme for their support and interest in our project; we received wonderful advice from them over the year.

Furthermore, we would like to thank all the donors without whom Hirundo would have never been a reality. Funding was graciously provided by the History Department, the Arts Undergraduate Society, the Principal's Office, the Dean of Arts, the Students Society of McGill University, and the History Students Association.

Sarah Limoges
Editor-in-Chief

Thucydides: "*Ktema Es Aei"*

Aleksander Filemonowicz

Thucydides the Athenian, chronicler of the Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404 BC, is widely regarded as a pioneer of the historical method. Thucydides has been traditionally compared with his generational predecessor, Herodotus of Halicarnassus. He himself alluded to the inadequacies of Herodotus, the acclaimed "father of history," while establishing his own purposes and methods. Thucydides praises his own work for its truthfulness, accuracy, and professionalism vis-à-vis previous works, which he considered to have been embellished for the consumption of a vulgar public, and filled with stories within which human and divine deeds were intertwined, and events were embroidered to make a better impression. His own work is meant to be an analytical treatise exclusively concerned with the factual course of Peloponnesian War and its origins.

As such, Thucydides' work merits study. This paper will focus upon his explanation of the origins of the Hellenic civil war; examining not only the conclusions that he drew, but the concept of undertaking the analysis in the first place. Of particular interest is the author's premise that Sparta, out of fear and jealousy, chose to undertake a pre-emptive war in order to stem

the tide of Athenian power and expansion. Thucydides' first book, in its methods of inquiry and presentation can be considered to be generally reflective of the work as a whole and will thus serve as the focal point of discussion. The interpretations of his work by modern scholars and political theorists will also be discussed.

The *History of the Peloponnesian War* is perhaps the only instance in which the actual *history* is as central a matter, if not more so, than the *war* itself. As M.I. Finley notes, the Peloponnesian War, "lives on not so much for anything that happened […], but because of the man who wrote its history. […] No other war, or for that matter other historical subject, is so much the product of its reporter."[1] Finley's praise is for the novel historiographic principles that Thucydides employed in his coverage of the war; particularly the extent to which he concentrated on factual occurrence and dispensed with the use of legendary embellishments. No divine interplay, no myths or mentions of the supernatural play a role his documentation of events. The result is perhaps the first purely historical treatise. The lack of any mythological or romantic elements is a conscious sacrifice, and Thucydides himself proudly acknowledges their omission. His undertaking is specifically meant to serve as a break from the traditions of oral poets and mythmakers intent on satisfying an immediate audience. His words are meant to be "judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past. [His] work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the needs of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever" (1.22).[*] As such, the historian dedicated himself to a new level of historical study, concerned not only with inquiry, but with transmitting information as accurately as possible, and pre-

senting an analytical interpretation of events. Thucydides refers to his thoroughness, emphasizes his factual reporting and cites his efforts to preserve good judgment and avoid personal biases, either from his own experiences or from those of the eyewitnesses whom he questions.

He was, however, limited by the constraints of the world in which he lived: lack of documentation, limited mobility and limited access to resources. As a result, he was forced to rely on common sense, deduction and the assumption of motive as intrinsic tools in his narration of the Peloponnesian War.[2] This method is particularly obvious in his frequent use of speeches. The orations composed by Thucydides offer a convenient 'inner' perspective on particular events, both by providing a second-person narrative, and by giving the allusion of credibility. Thucydides himself, however, confesses that owing to the passage of time and degree of difference in interpretation and allegiance, his method had been, "while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words used, to make the speakers say what […] was called for by each situation" (22.1). The result, however, is that they reflect not only Thucydides' interpretation of the war, but his construction of it. Consequently, it is presumed that the war will unfold along rational lines- something that cannot always be expected in human affairs. Ignoring or overlooking the illogical, his account then becomes a rationalistic documentation. This is an inherently desirable trait; but one that may lack accuracy- a professed trademark of his undertaking. As Finley further observes, if the speakers "did not always say what was called for, then, insofar as Thucydides attributed such sentiments to them, he could not have been 'keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words

used'."[3] He goes on to note that as ambitious and difficult as the task of recording the speeches may have been, Thucydides became progressively less concerned with their accuracy. Instead, he was focused on:

> "his search for the mainsprings of political behaviour, his struggle to escape from the tyranny of the concrete and the unique, to understand and then to communicate the real and the universal, [this] would have been the driving force in the direction that he took."[4]

One may presume that this open declaration of his methods is evidence of his intended precision, yet even without an intentional bias, the chances of misrepresentation are high. There is no significant evidence, however, that could be used to cross-reference Thucydides, who effectively holds a monopoly over our understanding of the events of the Peloponnesian conflict. Few documents or physical evidence are available, and Thucydides, unlike Herodotus, did not name his informants and witnesses. Nevertheless, despite some suspicion, there appears to be no substantial evidence to disprove his account to any large extent, and so he remains, as the only source available, innocent until proven guilty.

Compared with his predecessor Herodotus, Thucydides' achievements are significant. His was the first truly scholarly text, intended for such purposes. While both historians wrote for the preservation of deeds and events, their products varied considerably. Herodotus' narrative was divergent, offering ample information on geography, cultures, ethnography, and

other points of interest throughout his account of the Persian Wars. His account, although groundbreaking in itself, has been as often linked to Homer as Thucydides, and thus, he correctly stands as an evolutionary median between the two. With the former, he shares above all the calling of an oral entertainer, exhibited in a fascination with gods and heroes, and of a moralistic theme of moderation meant to forestall divine jealousy of human deeds.

As a historian, Herodotus painted the history of the Persian invasion with thick strokes, going to great lengths in an effort to gather information and offer an instructive glimpse of foreign lands and peoples. Despite his broad interests, which many see in a negative light, he presented a relatively unbiased account of the achievements of both Greeks and barbarians,[‹] and demonstrated considerable perseverance in his pursuit of information, the sources of which he duly recorded in passing. Herodotus clearly possessed a sense of objectivity, often presenting multiple versions of events (often highlighting the improbability of a particular claim) in an effort to allow the reader to arrive at his own conclusions. This vagueness is particularly criticized by Thucydides, whose own history is a focused product of his study, researched and processed into a final form.

Thucydides thus confined himself to a strict chronological description of the war between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies, as well as the political implications that the war may have carried. His was a sober account of events, a rare instance in the written tradition up until the Enlightenment. “Like the best Hippocratic writings, Thucydides’ *History* unfolds without gods or oracles or omens. This was perhaps his greatest

break from Herodotus."[5]

A further distinguishing feature is the chronological limitations placed upon each of the two historians. Herodotus' inquiry is into past events, where possibilities of reference and research were increasingly limited and skewed by the failings of human memory and interpretation. Thucydides, on the other hand, "was a contemporary of, and for a time, a direct participant in, his war."[6] If Vietnam was the first television war, then Thucydides' *Histories* were the first contemporary, journalistic account.

The narrative of the Peloponnesian War established a broader conception of realist power politics and of human nature. Thucydides' grasp of not only the historical method, but also of the role and nature of power in international relations, has led many to consider him a founder of the realist school of politics. His method fits the theory, propounded by Michael Howard, that in the majority of instances, the causes of wars lie in the "perceptions of statesmen of the growth of hostile power and fears for the restriction, if not extinction, of their own."[7]Although it is perhaps anachronistic to project such general patterns onto Thucydides' understanding of the war, a similar model of elite anxiety is definitely present in his account. If not exhibited by the Spartan leadership, it is at least shown by the Corinthians. Thucydides had "uncovered the general law of the dynamics of international relations […] provided by the differential growth of power among states. This fundamental idea […] can be identified as the theory of hegemonic war."[8]

Hegemonic wars occur in the event of a disruption to the balance of the international system by economic and technological changes, which af-

fect the vital interests of states, upsetting the existent political hierarchy. The subsequent alteration to the international structure because of conflict is a common phenomenon, frequently jeopardizing the position of the great powers involved and allowing the possibility of systemic change, as indeed occurred with the mutual exhaustion of both Athens and Sparta by the end of the conflict. Robert Gilpin argues that Thucydides' greatness as an analyst lies in his grasp of the power struggle between the belligerents. The disproportionate growth of one state led to the instability of the state system, disrupting the status quo and eventually resulting in hegemonic confrontation between the two powers and their growing alliances. This expanded bipolarization and the resulting political zero-sum game allowed minute events to trigger a major conflict.[9] As Joseph Nye Jr. points out, however, Gilpin's theory does "not specify whether the nation in decline or the challenger is likely to start the war, nor what the consequences will be," a point central to the ongoing effort to establish if not a particular cause, then at least a main aggressor in the Peloponnesian War. [10]

Herodotus and Thucydides alike concerned themselves with the causes of the wars. Herodotus examined in a broad sense the nature of the conflict between the East and the West, accentuating the cultural and ideological struggle of tyrannical Persia and democratic Hellas (read Athens). Thucydides' history, however, was a more thorough examination of the origins of the war. Beyond simple description, there is an analytical process evident in the first book of Thucydides' *History*, which reflects his method throughout the entirety of the work. "Thucydides was the man who first attempted a serious analysis […], not only for the Peloponnesian War, but for

any war." He "sorted out the essential from the causal, the primary causes from the more immediate grievances and pretexts."[11] The affairs of Epidamnus, Corcyra and Corinth, Potidaea, and Megara all influenced the escalation of tensions between the opposing camps of the Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues. Thucydides concludes, however, that what ultimately "made the war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta" (1.23). Such a conclusion, although not exceptionally sophisticated from a modern perspective, expresses the earlier mentioned understanding of the roles of power and politics that the historian exhibited in his work.

Thucydides' comprehension of power and foreign relations and their manifestation in the outbreak of the Hellenic civil war is important to the evolution of the study of history. His emphasis on causation is central to any understanding of the history of the Peloponnesian War. As with many other conflicts, the start of the war was apparent, but its origins were more ambiguous. Here too, although they cannot be entirely dismissed as insignificant, the motives Thucydides presents have sometimes been considered to be misleading or disproportionate in scale and meaning. As demonstrated by Thucydides himself in his discussion of the debate at Sparta (1.66-88), the Spartans did not appear fearful of the supposed rapid growth of Athenian power. They were, on the contrary, criticized for their passivity and encouraged to go to war by and on behalf of their allies. The Spartans pushed for military action only after being persuaded by their allies of Athenian aggression. Even still, "the Spartan King Archidamus, a man who had a reputation for both intelligence and moderation" advised patience and caution; seem-

ingly unlikely responses in the face of overwhelmingly powerful adversaries. Although Archidamus did advocate the pursuit of new allies and a gradual mobilization in an effort to match those of the Athenians, he postulated that time would be on the side of the Spartans in their attempts to restore the balance of power.

There is no further mention of a direct threat to Sparta either, as Archidamus states that despite delaying war, Sparta should not "calmly allow [the Athenians] to injure [their] allies" (1.82). His opponent in the debate, and an advocate for immediate action, Sthenelaidas, although equating Athenian conflicts with Spartan allies as an attack on Sparta itself, also appeals not to "allow any aggression against [their] allies" (1.86), rather than expressing any fear for the existence of Sparta in the shadows of an increasingly powerful Athenian hegemon. Thucydides, however, sums up the debates by concluding, nevertheless, that the Spartans opted for war not out of consideration for their allies but because "they were afraid of the further growth of Athenian power, seeing as they did, that already the greater part of Hellas was under the control of Athens" (1.88). This assurance comes despite contradictory accusations made by the Corinthians against Sparta earlier in the debate:[12]

> "you do nothing in the early stages to prevent an enemy's expansion; you wait until your enemy has doubled his strength. […] The Persians […] came from the ends of the earth and got as far as the Peloponnese before you were able to put up a proper force into the field to meet them. The Athenians, unlike the Persians, live close

to you, yet you still appear not to notice them" (1.69).

These words are certainly not those of a supposedly fearful and jealous Sparta, eager and prepared to strike down Athenian imperialism.

Upon considering the theory that Thucydides had revised his work later and inserted the theory of Spartan fears of Athenian dominance in Greece Finley remarks that, in any case, "Spartan fear of Athens is notably absent" prior to the beginning of the war.[13] Donald Kagan explores the issue further. He decisively refutes the view held by other historians that the root of the war lay in economic issues such as the maritime trade rivalries between Corinth and Athens, or the possibility of racial and ideological causes, such as the enmity between Dorians and Ionians or the political rivalry between oligarchs and democrats. Like Thucydides, he concludes that the cause was simply one of power politics, although the effects of chance played an important part. Yet he challenges the conclusions of Thucydides. Thucydides gave consideration to both the remote and immediate causes of the war, ultimately favouring the former; the Spartan fear of Athenian power.

Kagan disputes this. He argues that Athenian power in fact did not grow between the years 445 and 435. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the Spartans gave no indication of being fearful of Athens. Kagan thus maintains that it must have been the episodes of the relatively minor disputes over Corcyra and Potidaea that were the prime catalysts for war although, as he remarks, the Corinthians could not have succeeded in persuading the Spartans to go to war had there been no history of conflict between the two

poleis.. Although tensions had always existed in the diplomatic relations between the two great powers, there was no particular instability.

> "On the contrary, the settlement of 466/5, which was carefully adhered to by both sides, promised a greater stability than had been possible before. One may believe that the growing power of Athens and Sparta's fear of it made the First Peloponnesian War [478-460] inevitable, but hardly the second [431-404]."[14]

Instead, Kagan highlights the conflict between Athens and Corinth, drawing particularly on the Corcyrean dispute, whereupon the interests of both states, and the poor decisions made by their leaders allowed tensions to escalate and their respective allies to become involved. He treads carefully, however, and admits that a "perfectly ordinary civil war in a remote and unimportant town on the fringes of the civilized world could hardly have led to a great war *ex nihilo*."[15] Amongst other factors, there had been a great degree of distrust between Athens and Sparta, "the organizational weakness of the Spartan alliance, which permitted a power of the second magnitude to drag the hegemonal power into a dangerous war for its own interests," and "the machinery of diplomacy too rudimentary to preserve peace in times of crisis."[16] Ultimately, Kagan places the greatest degree of responsibility on the shoulders of Corinth for its handling of the Corcyran dispute, its willingness to risk war because of presumed Athenian neutrality, and its confidence in the strength of the Spartan alliance in the event of war. The Spartans, in turn, were guilty of succumbing to Corinthian blackmail, and refusing to

seek arbitration. Finally, the Athenians must be blamed for their arrogance and harshness towards Potidaea and Megara, inspiring further opposition to their imperialistic policies.

Unlike Kagan, Terry Buckley is inclined to persist in the traditional notion that responsibility should be assigned to the two great powers. Among those who hold this view, there are two major schools of thought. The first, represented by scholars such as P.J. Rhodes and Simon Hornblower, hold the Athenians responsible, blaming the war on the aggressive Athenian imperialism evident in the alliance with Corcyra, the treatment of Potidaea, and the Megarian Decree.± The opposing school, represented by G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, considers Sparta to be the aggressor, fearful and envious of the Athenian Empire and intent on destroying it and restoring its own primacy in Hellas.[17] Ultimately, however, the statesmen of both powers exhibited poor judgment and a lack of foresight, failing to anticipate both the length and scale of the war, as well as its disastrous effects on all of Greece.[18]

Thucydides' presentation of the origins of the war between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians provides an excellent example of his analytical methods, his understanding of political dialogue, and his emphasis on the machinations of inter-state politics. If Herodotus was the first to create the art of the historian, Thucydides was the first to employ a rational historical method, and to establish history as a discipline and a science in its own right.

Endnotes

[1] M.I Finley, 'Introduction' to *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides. Trans. Rex Warner. (London: Penguin, 1972), 9.

[*] Citations from Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (translated by Rex Warner), will be referenced directly in the text in brackets.

[2] Terry Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History 750-323 B.C.; A Source-Based Approach*. (London: Routledge, 1996), 26.

[3] Finely, 'Introduction' to *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides, 26.

[4] Finley, 'Introduction' to *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides, 28.

〈 Although clearly maintaining an admiration for the principles of Athenian democracy vis-à-vis Persian dictatorship.

[5] Finley, 'Introduction' to *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides, 20.

[6] Finley, 'Introduction' to *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides, 16.

[7] Michael Howard, *The Causes of Wars*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 18.

[8] Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*;*"The Origin and Prevention of Major War".* vol. 18, no. 4, Spring, 1988.

[9] Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," 592-596.

[10] Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Old Wars and Future Wars: Causation and Prevention**,**"

Journal of Interdisciplinary History; *"The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars"* vol. 18, no. 4, (Spring, 1988), 586.

[11] Finley, 'Introduction' to *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides, 23.

[12] Gregory Crane, "The Fear and Pursuit of Risk: Corinth on Athens, Sparta and the Peloponnesians," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. 122. (1992), 230.

[13] Finley, 'Introduction' to *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides, 23.

[14] Donald Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), 346.

[15] Kagan, *Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, 353.

[16] *Ibid*.

[±] In the first two cases, Athens involved herself in military action against the Corinthian colonies, and in the third, placing economic sanctions against Megara- a Spartan ally. Although each situation may be considered as an act of self-interest if not self-defense, its rashness, harshness and tactlessness instigated the Peloponnesian League and certainly produced opposition to Athenian imperial transgressions, had they not already been present beforehand.

[17] Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History*, 311-331.

[18] Kagan, *Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, 354-356.

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Wrongfully Accused: The Political Motivations behind Socrates' Execution

David Bowles

In 399 B.C.E., Socrates was executed by the Athenian court on charges of impiety and corrupting the youth. The controversial decision lingers atop the great legacy of Athens, a city praised for its intellectual and political liberty. However, the reasons behind Socrates' execution are themselves questionable. Firstly, the charge of impiety is a vague accusation which would have been unlikely to produce a conviction on its own. Similarly, the second charge of corrupting the youth is ambiguous and lacks any substantial evidence in support of it. Instead, a primary cause of the execution is Socrates' relationship with two violent oligarchic tyrants. Moreover, Socrates' constant criticism of Athens' civic structure and the city's prominent citizens leads to growing animosity towards his public presence. Finally, the instability of Athens in the wake of the oligarchic coup of 404 B.C.E. amplifies the desire to eliminate sources of dissent, such as Socrates. Thus, Socrates' execution by the Athenians is not caused by the explicit charges of impiety and corrupting the youth, but rather by implicit political motivations which come to a head in 399 B.C.E.

Plato's *Apology* is a major source for the trial of Socrates although it

comes with its own problems. Historians such as J. Burnet have argued that Platonic sources express Plato's own fictitious version of the trial and particularly Socrates' defence, and should thus not be considered as a reliable study of Socrates' execution.[1] Although Plato undoubtedly possesses a bias in favour of his mentor and friend, there are several reasons for asserting that Plato's *Apology* is a valid and accurate source. Firstly, Plato is an eyewitness of the trial; his presence being noted by Socrates during the defence speech.[2] Secondly, Plato wrote his account shortly after the trial, perhaps within a few years of 399 B.C.E, when the event was still fresh in both his and Athens' collective memory. Additionally, Plato's account would have been read by others present at the trial. As such, any substantial deviation from the trial's events would have been widely criticized. Therefore, although the *Apology* is unlikely to be a verbatim account of Socrates' speech, it possesses the general ideas and arguments presented at the trial.

However, despite the usefulness of Plato's account, the explicit charge of impiety is not the cause of Socrates' execution. The first portion of Socrates' indictment reads, "Socrates is guilty of not recognizing the gods recognized by the city, and of introducing other new divinities."[3] Such an accusation would have been easily understood in a society with a clearly defined state religion, such as that found in medieval Europe. However, classical Greece possessed a vast array of gods and goddesses that changed throughout antiquity. For example, within the city of Athens, foreigners, non-citizens, and slaves continued to practice different religions and worshiped unsanctioned gods even after gaining Athenian citizenship.[4] Indeed, foreign religions are easily found and often accepted by the city's populace.

Consider the reaction of citizens after successive bouts of plague during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Citizens were so desperate to escape from what they presumed to be the anger of the gods that they openly engaged in acts of impiety such as following the "ventriloquist prophets".[5] These ventriloquists became quite popular in the period preceding Socrates' trial, and contributed to the overall ambiguity of what piety was. Indeed, by 399 B.C.E., not even Meletus, the prosecutor of Socrates, had a clear idea of what impiety really meant.[6] Clearly Athens' religious culture was tolerant of foreign deities and open to new ideas of religion.

Apart from the vague definition of piety, a popular practice in the fifth century B.C.E was criticizing Athenian deities. This practice is evident through the denigration of gods in poetry and comic plays. For example, Aeschylus presents a derogatory depiction of the Greek god Zeus in his Oresteian trilogy.[7] Poets such as Euripides and Pindar denied Greek myths without fear of reprisal. Evidently, it was common practice in this period to mock the gods in the most public venues of the Athenian polis, and the playwrights and poets behind such sacrilege were not charged with impiety. Thus, the charge of impiety was not one which was enforced in Athenian law. Consequently it was unlikely to be a legitimate accusation against Socrates.

A final opposition to the charge of impiety is that Socrates often had traditional pious views. In addition, his more foreign practices were well within the limits of Athenian religious practices. Socrates' expressions of uncertainty about death, that "it is either a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul

from this world to another" are prime examples of his comparability with traditional Greek religious views.[8] The debate between these polar views of death, an unconscious state versus the existence of a distinct world, is similarly described by Cephalus, a traditionally pious figure who appears in Plato's *Republic*.[9] The similar views presented by Socrates, a philosopher, and Cephalus, a pious Athenian, illustrate that Socrates' outlook on a subject as important as death was reconcilable with popular Athenian belief. This belief is corroborated by Xenophon's *Defence of Socrates*, wherein he states Socrates "was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who believe in augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices."[10] Indeed, Athens' religion was so varied in its sources and practices that any seemingly "strange" practice of Socrates fitted well into the Athenian traditional concept of piety. Consequently, the ambiguity and high tolerance of the state religion of Athens, the public criticisms of the Greek pantheon by poets and playwrights, and the similarities between Socrates' religious practices and those of pious men demonstrate that the charge of impiety was both irrelevant and fictitious. Thus, it was an unjustifiable reason for Socrates' execution.

Similar to the accusation of impiety, the charge of corrupting the youth is a vague and uncorroborated attack on Socrates, which could not have resulted in his execution by the Athenians in 399 B.C.E. This second charge asserts that Socrates had turned the youth away from showing respect to their parents and in some way directed them towards dishonourable behaviour. This charge rests primarily on the belief that Socrates was a sophist; a teacher who educated students for a fee mainly in the art of rheto-

ric. The sophists are generally disliked for their deceitful use of language to "make the weaker argument seem the stronger."[11] However, Socrates does not possess any of the characteristics that define a sophist. Firstly he teaches in public, unlike the sophists who had private schools. Xenophon, a former student, explains that "Socrates lived ever in the open, for early in the morning he went to the public promenades and training grounds, in the forenoon he was seen in the market, and the rest of the day he passed just where most people were to be met."[12] Socrates spends his entire day in the Athenian agora, speaking to anyone who was willing to listen; "young or old, he is not excluded."[13] Moreover, these public discussions imply that Socrates did not charge any fee, unlike the sophists who admitted only wealthy students that could afford the costs. Socrates even states that "not even the impudence of [his] accusers dares to say that [he] ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; of that they have no witness."[14] A final disparity between Socrates and the sophists was that he practiced without a specific teaching curriculum. Whereas the sophists offered a formal education that provided the student with a degree, Socrates merely questioned those he wished to instruct. His subjects and methods varied based on the responses of each individual and was inherently informal and ever-changing. Thus, Socrates' teaching method was fundamentally different to the sophist system.

Moreover, Socrates counters the charge of corrupting the youth by revealing that the prosecution had no witnesses. He invites, "those who are now grown up and realize that [he] gave them bad advice in their youth to come forward as accusers and take their revenge. Or if they do not wish to

come themselves, some of their relatives[…]."[15] Despite naming numerous of his former students and their relatives who are present at the trial, no witness comes forward to speak against Socrates. One can argue that no former student or relative present believed he was guilty of corrupting the youth. Hence, the disparity between Socrates and the sophists as well as the failure of the prosecution to produce a single witness to support their charge, makes it evident that Socrates was not guilty of corrupting the youth. Therefore this accusation could not have been the cause of his conviction.

As such, the explicit charges of not following religious practics and corrupting the youth are not reasonable causes for Socrates execution. The following will suggest that that ulterior political motives prompted Socrates' death. A primary political motivation for Socrates' execution was his close relationship with two important oligarchic figures and a famous traitor who joined the Spartan cause during the Peloponnesian War. In 404 B.C.E., a group of oligarchic politicians took over Athens and instituted a government commonly known as the 'Thirty Tyrants' or simply, the 'Thirty'. Two key leaders of this oligarchic movement, Critias and Charmides, were students of Socrates before taking up a life of politics. When Athens reasserted itself as a democracy in 403 B.C.E, the oligarchs were overthrown and a general amnesty was proclaimed to protect all except the most senior oligarchic leaders from prosecution. However, this amnesty did not imply that the violent rule of the Thirty was forgotten. The exiled democrats for one who returned to the city were unlikely to forget their bitter treatment and material losses so quickly. It is likely that they would look for retribution against any oligarchic supporters. Socrates' position as the teacher of these key oli-

garchic figures certainly made it appear that he supported the rule of the Thirty. Furthermore, Socrates remained in Athens unharmed during the turmoil while as many as 1500 wealthy citizens were killed and thousands more were exiled from the city.[16]

During this period, Socrates was in contact with the Thirty. For example, he states that "they [the oligarchs] sent for [him] and four others to the council chamber and ordered [them] to bring Leon the Salamian…since they wanted to put him to death."[17] Socrates refused to kill Leon, however the Athenians viewed the request as evidence to suggest that not only was he trusted by the Tyrants, yet he supported their illegitimate rule. Additionally, Socrates admits that he did not oppose the Thirty's decision to kill Leon, an innocent man, but instead just "went quietly home."[18] Many democratic Athenians assumed that Socrates was partial to the rule of his former students, and did little to defend Athens against their criminal activity. For instance, the crimes of Critias and Alcibiades were linked to Socrates and it essentially became what historian Coleman Phillipson calls a case of "like pupil, like master."[19] Hence, Socrates' relationship with the tyrannical oligarchs Critias and Charmides caused the Athenian populace to consider Socrates an oligarch who conspired against the Athenian democracy.

Secondly, Socrates' incessant criticism of politicians and the practices of the Athenian government caused further suspicion of his oligarchic inclinations as well as inciting anger from prominent citizens. Socrates' non-democratic views included his belief that private deliberation was better than public, as well as a "disdain [for] the institutional practices that maintained the constitutional life of the Athenian *polis*.[20] Moreover, he dis-

proved of a system where officials were elected. In Xenephon's *Defence of Socrates*. "… [Socrates] taught his companions to despise the established laws by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder of flutist by lot, nor any other craftsman for work in which mistakes ate far less disastrous than mistakes in statecraft."[21] Thus, Socrates argues that if less important occupations were chosen based on talent then so should the election of Athenian politicians. In other words, Athens' politicians should be selected on a basis of merit in comparison to the public vote. Xenophon makes no effort to deny that Socrates often spoke on this subject and it can therefore be concluded that Socrates did regularly make statements contrary to democratic policy.

Furthermore, Socrates uses his *techne*, or method, of cross-examination to demonstrate the foolishness and false reasoning of those with whom he conversed. For example, Socrates effectively cross-examines Anytus until he comes to the conclusion that the great democratic politician Pericles was actually unable to improve the virtue of Athens.[22] This attack on a key figure of Athenian democracy provokes an outburst from Anytus: "I would warn you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than do them good, and this is certainly true at Athens."[23] Anytus' threat is not the only account of resentment against Socrates. While conversing with Callicles, an Athenian statesman, Socrates claims that he himself is the only true politician of his time.[24] Callicles predicts that Socrates will be brought into court for this blatant criticism of all contemporary politicians. Indeed, Socrates notes that "this inquisition has brought [him] many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind."[25] Thus,

Socrates' consistent criticism of the Athenian political structure and its politicians caused prominent citizens to distrust Socrates and consider him politically dangerous.

The aforementioned oligarchic associates of Socrates and his criticism of Athenian government are amplified by the instability of Athens in the wake of the Peloponnesian War and the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. The Peloponnesian War (432-404 B.C.E.) brought with it annual invasions and territorial losses to Athens. These hardships were amplified by the epidemics from poor nutrition and overcrowding. Outbreaks of plague between 430 and 426 B.C.E. resulted in the death of up to one third of the Athenian populace, and a great many more were incapacitated.[26] In addition, the aforementioned violent rule of the Thirty Tyrants prompted the deaths and exiles of many wealthy and important citizens who were considered enemies of the oligarchic state. The government was overthrown in 403 B.C.E. by a forceful coup orchestrated by democratic supporters. This is the context of Socrates' trial. Athens was a fragile city-state at the end of the fifth century B.C.E. The newly recreated democracy was relatively weak and unstable, and the Athenian democrats were wary of the potential for civil conflict. A prime example of this caution is found in the amnesty of 403 B.C.E., which can be seen as an explicit attempt by the democratic leaders to stabilize their society and prevent any backlash against citizens who remained in Athens during the reign of the Thirty. Under such conditions, a figure who possessed a very close relationship to the Tyrants and was constantly criticizing the Athenian government and its officials, was perceived as a threat to peace and stability. Socrates possessed all of these

characteristics and as a result his voice of dissent needed to be silenced. He is a self-described "gadfly" of the state and by 399 B.C.E., the delicate political conditions of Athens have reached a climax, and the 'gadfly' must be swatted.[27] Hence, Socrates' oligarchic associates, his critiques of democracy and cross-examination of key political figures, as well as the instability of the democratic *polis* in the year 399 B.C.E. are factors that portrayed Socrates as a political threat that must be removed.

Although the political motives behind the trial are compelling, some historians assert that Socrates was actually brought to trial because he offended the sophists of Athens. This recent argument by Kenneth Blanchard claims that Socrates' criticism of sophist practices and incites these teachers of rhetoric to indict and execute him.[28] However, accusing Socrates of impiety and corrupting the youth would have only served to increase the public dislike for these teachers themselves, who "make the weaker argument seem the stronger." This is so because Socrates was often grouped into the field of sophism whether before his trial, such as in Aristophanes' comic play *The Clouds*, and well after the execution when the orator Aeschines refers to the trial of "Socrates the sophist".[29] As such, even though the sophists considered Socrates an enemy, prosecuting him would have been self-destructive since some of the public viewed him as one of them. Therefore, political goals behind Socrates' execution are more reasonable explanations than the sophist-based thesis expressed by Blanchard.

In brief, the overtly stated charges of impiety and corrupting the youth as expressed in the indictment against Socrates cannot be considered the cause of his execution. Instead, the true motivation behind the trial is a

political one; Socrates comes to be seen as a symbol of civil defiance and must be silenced. The first explicit charge of not submitting to state religion is essentially a meaningless accusation because of the vast array of gods and religious practices which existed in the fifth century B.C.E. Moreover, the very public denigration of gods in poetry and theatre and the fact that Socrates possessed some traditional pious beliefs also disprove this charge. The second charge of corrupting the youth is also false for two reasons: firstly, it relies largely on the fictitious notion that Socrates is a sophist, and secondly, the prosecution fails to bring a single witness to corroborate this claim despite Socrates' repeated requests. In contrast to these accusations, the implicit political motivations for the trial are extremely likely to have brought about Socrates' execution. Primarily, Socrates' association with two key actors from the Thirty gave the perception that he was an oligarch himself. Additionally, Socrates constantly criticizes the democracy in terms of its processes, institutions and statesmen. Finally, the political turmoil preceding the trial of Socrates leaves the Athenian government in a weakened position, creating a need to suppress Socrates' opposition to the state in order to preserve political stability. Consequently, Socrates happened to be in the wrong era to express his political thoughts.

Endnotes

[1] J. Burnet., *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1924), 63-6.

[2] Plato. *Apol*, trans. Benjamin Jowett. 38b; Socrates states that Plato and several other supporters who are present have offered to pay a fine of thirty minas on his behalf in lieu of

the death penalty.

[3] DiogLaert. 2.40 (cf. Plato. *Apol.* 24b and Xen. *Mem.* I.i.1).

[4] Coleman Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates* (London, Stephen and Sons, 1928), 10.

[5] Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, 10.

[6] A.E. Taylor, *Socrates* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953) 108-9.

[7] Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates*, 217.

[8] Plato. *Apol*, 40c.

[9] Plato. *Rep.* (Project Gutenberg, 1994), trans. Benjamin Jowett, 150, Cephalus states, in part, "that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and cares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a laughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may be true." Socrates' similar doubts of the nature of the afterlife are found in sections 40-42 of the *Apology*.

[10] Xen. *Mem.* in *The Question of Socrates*, ed. Richard Levin, 124-162 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World), I.i.3

[11] Kenneth Blanchard, "The Enemies of Socrates: Piety and Sophism in the Socratic Drama," *The Review of Politics* 62:3 (Summer 2000): 426-427.

[12] Xen. *Mem.* I.i.10.

[13] Plato. *Apol.* 33b.

[14] Ibid, 31c.

[15] Plato. *Apol.* 32d.

[16] Anytus, one of the prosecutors of Socrates, was himself one of the citizens forced to flee Athens during the Tyrants' purging of the city (see Paul Millet, "The Trial of Socrates Revisited," In European Review of History 12:1 (March 2005): 32).

[17] Plato. *Apol.* 32c.

[18] Plato. *Apol.* 32d.

[19] Phillipson, *The Trial of Socrates,* 210.

[20] J.R. Wallach, "Socratic Citizenship" in *Socrates: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, ed. William J. Prior (London: Routledge, 1996), 83.

[21] Xen. *Mem.* I.i.9.

[22] Plato, *Meno*, 93-94.

[23] Plato. *Meno*, 94-95a.

[24] Plato. *Gorgias*, 521.

[25] Plato. *Apol.* 30e.

[26] Millet, "The Trial of Socrates Revisited," 32.

[27] Plato. *Apol.* 30e.

[28] Blanchard, "The Enemies of Socrates: Piety and Sophism in the Socratic Drama," 421-449.

[29] Aristophanes, *The Clouds*; Millet, "The Trial of Socrates Revisited," 23-24.

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The Elusive Etruscans: The Quest for the Origins of the Etruscan Civilization

Janka Dowding

The Romans prided themselves on their ability to embrace the very best aspects of each culture that they encountered. There was one culture in particular, however, that held their fascination: the Etruscans. Strabo in his *Geography* acknowledges many Roman debts to Etruria, from religion to public displays to music.[1] But just who were these great Etruscans? Where did they come from? These questions have long been the source of great interest and contention. Even the Romans disagreed on the origins of Etruscan culture. Centuries later, Etruscology experienced a rich and erudite "prehistory," which lasted from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth. It was during this critical time that archaeology became recognized as a valid method of research and the interest in Etruscan artifacts ushered in a new era of speculation surrounding Etruscan origins. By the twentieth century, interest surrounding the Etruscans exploded as more and more sites and artifacts were found. There is a plethora of scholarship from this period, all of which seeks to make its place in Etruscology. However, this early blossoming of scholarship often succeeded only in emphasizing the ephemeral quality of the Etruscans. Scholarly uncertainties and

polemics on the interpretation of Etruscan inscriptions, the classification of the language and the problem of Etruscan origins gave birth to the notion of an "Etruscan mystery."[2] Scholars have since developed many theories to help solve this mystery.

Theories surrounding Etruscan origins fall into three categories: the "eastern" hypothesis, which posits that the Etruscans were a people who came from the east and settled in Etruria; the "northern" hypothesis, which argues that the Etruscans were a part of a folk movement from the Balkans; and finally the "autochthonous" hypothesis which refutes all of the previous scholarship and states that the Etruscans developed locally without any large influx of new people. Scholars mainly use three main different methodologies to study Etruscan origins: historical, linguistic, or archaeological. Historical tradition was the primary form of discourse for hundreds of years, until archaeology became a more systematic and attainable mode of inquiry. Starting in the 19th century, linguistic studies also advanced greatly, making it possible to decipher the unique Etruscan language. In order to produce persuasive scholarship on the topic, it has become critical to use a symbiosis of all three methodologies. As scholarship and methodologies have developed and advanced, scholars have finally begun to remove the veil of mystery surrounding the origins of the Etruscans.

The first reference in ancient literature referring to the Tyrrhenoi, or the Etruscans, comes from Hesiod's *Theogony*: "And Circe, daughter of Helios, Hyperion's son, bore in love to steadfast Odysseus, Agrios and Latinus, noble and strong, who far away in the remote holy islands ruled over the famous Tyrsenians."[3] In the fifth century BC, Herodotus was the first author to

attempt to trace the origins of the Etruscans. Herodotus explains that the Tyrrhenoi were originally Lydians who were afflicted by a disastrous famine during the reign of Atys, son of Manes. For some time they endured the famine, but when it showed no sign of abating, they decided to look for a more fertile land. What they found was the abundant land of Etruria on the Italian peninsula. The Lydians then changed their names to Tyrrhenians in honor of prince Tyrrhenos, who had led them to safety.

This assessment of the Etruscans held for many years and was echoed by most Greek and Roman writers. Virgil, Ovid, and Horace often called the Etruscans "Lydians" in their poems.[4] However, in the Age of Augustus a challenger emerged. Dionysus of Halicarnassus argued a new theory: "I do not think that the Tyrrhenians were emigrants from Lydia. In fact they do not have the same language as the Lydians…They do not worship the same gods as the Lydians; [and] they do not have the same laws." Dionysus thus concluded that "the Etruscans [were] not a people who came from abroad, but [were] an indigenous race."[5] Thus, since the first century BC these two opposing views dominated the debate surrounding the origins of the Etruscans.

The issue of Etruscan origins arose again in earnest during the nineteenth century with the unification of Italy. At first only classical texts were used to prove the origins of the Etruscans. Unfortunately, due to the lack of source material, these arguments failed to advance any new theories, and often degenerated into polemics based on the preconceived theses from classical times.[6] The subsequent rise of archaeology changed the Etruscan debate dramatically. This movement was defined primarily by the works of

N. Fréret, B.G. Niebuhr, and K.O. Müller. These authors rejected the Asia Minor tradition of Herodotus, using Dionysus's negative arguments to refute it.[7] Yet they did not accept Dionysus's "autochthonous" theory entirely. These scholars, especially Müller, focused on Dionysus's name for the Etrurians, which was "Rasena." They compared this name to that of the Alpine Raetians, and formed the "northern" hypothesis; they believed that the Etruscans had in fact descended from the Alps into central Italy. This argument dominated debates for many years, until the rise of the study of comparative linguistics and archaeological studies became more advanced.

The development of Indo-European comparative linguistics changed the face of the Etruscan question. Questions arose as to whether or not Etruscan belonged to the Indo-European group of languages, and more specifically, the Italic sub-group. Linguistic research was used initially to support the "northern" thesis of Müller and the others. At that time, however, linguistic studies were such that they could be used to advance practically any theory of Etruscan origins. In the fervor of trying to ascertain the origin of Etruscan language, some scholars made irresponsible, if not laughable, comparisons with anything from Celtic, to Gothic, to Ugric.[8] As a result, linguistics was often abandoned in favor of archaeology.

As archaeology became more systematized, more Etruscan sites were found and studied. Archaeologists revealed an Etruscan civilization which spanned from Etruria to Campania, and even into the eastern part of the Po valley. In addition, more was discovered about the people who lived in the area before the Etruscans. Archaeologists uncovered the earliest recognizable phase of the Etruscan civilization, known as the Orientalizing pe-

riod. This development was quickly followed by the discovery of an earlier civilization, which was named the Villanovan culture of the Iron Age. Delving even deeper, archaeologists identified another group of people known as the Protovillanovans. This discovery came about through the recognition and identification of different funerary customs in the same site. The funerary culture of the prehistoric period in Etruria consisted exclusively of inhumation. In the Protovillanovan period, however, cremation became the primary funerary rite, and it dominated into the early stages of the Villanovan period as well. The later Villanovan and Orientalizing periods witnessed a return to inhumation in southern and coastal Etruria.[9]

Upon combining these threads of literary evidence, linguistic comparison, and archaeological findings, scholars put forth three main theories concerning Etruscan origins: the first advocates and develops the original thesis of Herodotus and ascribes an eastern origin to the Etruscans; the second follows the teachings of Niebuhr and Müller and argues that the Etruscans came into Italy from the north; and the final theory attempts to uphold Dionysus's theory of an autochthonous people and seeks the origin of the Etruscans in the prehistoric peoples of Italy.[10]

The "northern" theory is based primarily upon archaeological and linguistic evidence, with some historical support from Livy. Adherents to the "northern" thesis hold that Italy's cultural development was affected at an early stage by a decisive ethnic movement of transalpine origin.[11] The Terramara peoples of the Balkans and northern Italy spread down the peninsula, bringing with them their tradition of cremation. The main advocate of this theory was Hugh Hencken. Hencken argued for the similarities between

central European urn fields and the urn fields in Etruria: "It seems to me that true Villanovan contains some rather fundamental elements traceable to the central Balkans."[12] He sees the break in funerary practice between inhumation and cremation as evidence of an intervening culture in Etruria. Hencken also allows the possibility that eastern influences played a role in shaping later Etruscan culture.

Linguists such as W. Corssen and E. Lattes supported the "northern" theory based on their shared opinion that Etruscan was an Indo-European Italic language. They argued that word Rasena (the Etruscan name for themselves) came from the Raeti, an Alpine tribe.[13] Livy seemed to confirm this when he wrote that "even the Alpine populations have the same origin as the Etruscans, particularly the Raetians."[14] Thus the Raetians moved down the peninsula, and the Villanovans adopted their language and funerary practices. The" northern" thesis carried some weight initially, but during the twentieth century, it came under increasing attack. New scholars tended to reaffirm the importance of the early prehistoric peoples and cultures in the Italian peninsula, as opposed to that of the presumed Northern invaders.[15] This argument was later abandoned completely as more archaeological and linguistic evidence came to light. By Raymond Bloch's era, the "northern" theory was nearly debunked: "At present this thesis, although it has not been abandoned completely, has very few adherents."[16] Bloch addresses the problems of this thesis, which he says used correct facts "to arrive at wrong conclusions."[17] For example, the presence of Etruscans in Raetia is certain, but the chronology is very different from what the "northern" theorists posited. It was not until the fourth century BC that the Etruscans reached the Alpine

foothills, which was the result of a Celtic invasion that forced Etruscans to flee north. Thus the movement was a movement *out* of Etruria, not into it. As a result, the "northern" thesis retreated into the fringes of Etruscology, while the debate between the "eastern" and "autochthonous" theses increased.

By the mid-twentieth century, the "eastern" theory was the best known and most widely accepted.[18] The greatest amount of scholarship supporting the "eastern" thesis was written during this time. The scholarship that appeared in the 1960s was heavily based in literary sources with a complement of archaeological evidence. Raymond Bloch was the primary proponent of the "eastern" thesis. He begins his argument by citing the passage from Herodotus explaining the Lydian movement into Italy. He also cites Virgil, Ovid and Horace who all use the terms "Etruscan" and "Lydian" interchangeably. Another piece of historical evidence Bloch uses is from Tacitus's *Annals*, which states that the Lydian town of Sardes preserved the memory of their Etruscan origin and the Lydians considered themselves to be brothers of the Etruscans.[19] Classical writers then, Bloch argues, "did not seem to doubt the correctness of the ancient tradition."[20] He treats Dionysus's refutation of traditional sources as an anomaly, but concedes that it sparked the Etruscan debate.

After offering a refutation of the "northern" thesis, Bloch offers his own analysis of the Etruscan name Rasena and other linguistic findings.[21] He argues that the national name of Rasena "is found in various similar forms in different dialects of Asia Minor."[22] The Hellenized name of Tyrrhenoi also appears to have eastern origins. For example, there is a place

in Lydia which is called *Tyrra*. The root *tarch* is of particular importance in the Etruscan language. In literary tradition, the brother of Tyrrhenos is Tarchon. The name of the sacred city of Tarquinia has similar origins. Bloch states that names derived from the root *tarch* are also numerous in Asia Minor, and they are usually given to gods or princes, which would be consistent with literary tradition.

Bloch also attributes much importance to the Kaminia stele, which was discovered in 1885 on Lemnos. The monument dates from the seventh century BC, which is much earlier than the subsequent Greek conquest in 510 BC. The alphabet of the inscription is Greek, but the language is not. Bloch states that the Kaminia stele was later found to be written in an Etruscoid language. Other inscriptions in the same language were found, which led scholars to believe that it was not just one Etruscan individual, but a community. Bloch argues that if the Tyrrhenians indeed came from the east, they could have easily stopped in the Aegean islands and left behind small groups. Thus, Bloch states, "the Kaminia stele, which is more or less contemporary with the birth of the Etruscan civilization in Tuscany, is easily explicable within the framework of the Oriental hypothesis."[23]

Bloch does not rely solely on linguistic and historical evidence. He also examines elements of Etruscan culture and their similarity to eastern cultures. He focuses primarily on the status of women and religious practices. Women enjoyed a distinctive position in Etruscan society: "The position occupied by the woman was a privileged one and had nothing in common with the humble and subordinate condition of the Greek woman."[24] Women took part in banquets with their husbands and children often took

the names of both parents, instead of the Roman practice of solely using the patronymic. There is evidence of the use of the matronymic in Anatolia, particularly in Lydia. Bloch uses this is as proof of an eastern tradition of matriarchy that Etruscans continued when they arrived in Italy.

Etruscan religion was also unique within Italy. Etruscans emphasized the art of divination and the reading of signs, particularly haruspicy, a method of interpreting signs from the liver and entrails of birds. Bloch finds compelling comparisons with other eastern peoples, particularly the Babylonians, who used lightning bolts to predict the future.[25] In addition, archaeological excavations in Asia Minor and Babylonia discovered terra-cotta models of livers, thus providing further evidence of Etruscan kinship with eastern tradition.[26] As a result, this "converging series of well-established facts" in Bloch's mind reinforces his conviction and support for the "eastern" thesis.[27] He rejects the "autochthonous" theory because it cannot account for the marked change of culture and the vast evidence of eastern influence that he found in his research.

Emeline Richardson also adhered to the "eastern" theory with minor modifications. Richardson wrote extensively on the various literary traditions and how they fit into archeological findings. Scholars had focused primarily on the conflicting Greek traditions of the origins of the Etruscans and often downplayed Roman sources in their evaluation of the sources. Richardson, however, favored Pliny's thesis that there were in fact two migrations of foreigners from the east to Central Italy, who in time blended with the original inhabitants.[28] Richardson states that she did not come to this conclusion lightly. She began as a Herodotean, and tried to convert to

the "autochthonous" theory, but in the end she observed too much of a marked difference between the Villanovans and the Etruscans to be convinced of a completely indigenous culture.[29] She emphasizes the tradition of Pliny the Elder: The Umbrians were expelled from Etruria in ancient times by the Pelasgians, and these in turn by the Lydians who took the name of Tyrrheni from their king.[30] She paints the Villanovans as "a cremating people with many cultural connections with northern Europe" and states that they arrived from the sea between 1000 and 900 BC. Before their arrival, Richardson believes that Etruria was already settled by Bronze Age tribes similar to the pastoral Apenninic peoples of the mountainous spine of Italy, who were probably the first Indo-European speaking peoples in the peninsula.[31] She argues that the Bronze Age tribes could be Pliny's Umbrians, and that the Pliny's Pelasgians were the Villanovan cremating people. Richardson's thesis is a melding of both the "eastern" "northern" theses, which is somewhat surprising as Pliny does not mention a continental movement. Yet her fundamental argument essentially fits the broader thesis that Etruscan culture originated from elsewhere. While many scholars supported this thesis, there were others who vehemently held to the "autochthonous" theory.

Massimo Pallottino was the first to address the "autochthonous" theory in depth. Using unprecedented amounts of archaeological evidence, Pallottino was the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of the civilizations of Etruria, especially Tarquinia.[32] Pallottino begins his discussion of the origins of Etruscan culture by casting doubt on the validity of source tradition. Pallottino argues that before Dionysus, opinions about the origin of the Etruscans did not seem to have been based on serious discussion. Like most

ancient writings on the origins of peoples and cities of the Greek and Italic world, they lay on the border between history and myth, and at best they sought confirmation in etymological and onomastic similarities.[33] Once he has portrayed source tradition as suspect, Pallottino turns to his preferred method of inquiry: archaeology.

Pallottino rejects the idea that the introduction of cremation and the subsequent re-adoption of inhumation in funerary practices had to do with arrivals of foreign cultures. He argues that in Republican Rome, both rites existed side by side, and that the matter was strongly linked to family traditions. The prevalence of cremation at the end of the Republic and during the first century of the Empire was followed in the second century AD by the general adoption of inhumation, though no ethnic transformation accompanied the change.[34] Pallottino's comparison may be problematic due to the unique circumstances of the time. Christianity was becoming more popular, which advocated inhumation because of the belief that Christ would raise the dead and bring them to the Eternal kingdom. Despite the problem with his analogy, Pallottino also cites research that demonstrates that cremation and inhumation existed in different areas of Etruria simultaneously during the Villanovan era, which shows continuity, rather than a break, between the two cultures.

During the resurgence of enthusiasm for the "autochthonous" theory, Bloch offered a rebuttal to Pallottino's opinions. Bloch rejects Pallottino's thesis on the grounds that if the theory of "autochthony were to be carried to its logical conclusion it would be difficult to understand the sudden appearance of industrial and artistic activity, as well as of religious beliefs and

rites of which there was no previous indication on Tuscan soil."[35] Despite Bloch's objections, the "autochthonous" theory steadily gained popularity. Pallottino's writings dominated Etruscology and influenced many subsequent authors.

The "autochthonous" theory is almost completely based in archaeology. There is little room for literary sources, and soon Herodotus himself came under attack. Dominique Briquel did extensive work on the source tradition that Herodotus drew from to write his histories. The Lydian theory, Briquel argues, is not Herodotus's own. The first words of his paragraph on Etruscan origins are "□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□"[3] which emphasizes the idea that these were not necessarily Herodotus's views. Briquel argues that the Lydian legend was created in the court at Sardis in the early sixth century BC for reasons surrounding Lydian foreign policy at the time. Such deliberate political fabrication deprives the story of any claim to truth or foundation in earlier tradition.[37] Briquel concludes that "no discussion of Etruscan origins must omit to mention this point in the future." As a result of Briquel's work, many scholars have eliminated historical tradition as a viable means to ascertain the truth behind Etruscan origins.

By the 1990s, archaeology became the primary modus operandi in the search for the Etruscans. Virtually all archaeologists agreed that the evidence was overwhelmingly in favor of the "autochthonous" theory of Etruscan origins. Barker and Rasmussen's joint project on the Etruscans reflects this emphasis on archaeology and the contempt for source tradition. According to Barker and Rasmussen, "the development of Etruscan culture has to be understood within an evolutionary sequence of social elaboration

in Etruria."[38] They continue by stating that "there is no evidence for the kind of cultural break at the Villanovan/Etruscan transition envisaged by either of the 'plantation' models from the eastern Mediterranean, or for a folk movement of either kind from continental Europe in the Late Bronze Age."[39] As more sites were found and studied, a pattern of continuity between the different civilizations arose. According to their research, the overwhelming evidence of the archaeological record is that the origins of Etruscan society lie fundamentally in the later prehistoric communities of Etruria. This does not mean, however, that the culture of the Etruscans arose without any outside influences. Many scholars who have accepted the general thrust of the indigenous argument still prefer to use the evidence of external contact to explain the critical transition from Villanovan to Etruscan society in the eighth century BC. Contact with the outside world, particularly with the Greeks and the Phoenicians, was certainly an important factor within the final stages of this process, but scholars disagree about the extent to which such contact was a cause of increasing cultural complexity in Etruria, or a result.[40] Regardless of the degree of influence, the Etruscan culture developed on Italian soil.

Until very recently, Villanovan cemeteries and their associated rite of cremation had been considered as evidence for the arrival of a new people in Italy from north of the Alps. This was archaeological proof of the continental theory of Etruscan origins, which was essentially Hencken's. The consensus now is that the rite of cremation was adopted in late Bronze Age and Iron Age Italy, as elsewhere in Europe, in much the same way that it was in Britain or the United States in the twentieth century.[41] Thus the

change in practice occurred locally and within the confines of Etruria. This lends credence to Pallottino's argument that cremation was not without precedent in Etruria and that Romans often followed one practice or the other according to their particular family tradition. The two customs, then, coexisted within the same society.

Other recent archaeological works accept the "autochthonous" theory without debate and instead seek to answer questions about other socio-economic concerns surrounding the development of the Etruscan city-state. Mario Torelli in his article "The Etruscan City-State" addresses the history of the Etruscans without delving too deeply into the debate about origins. For Torelli, the "autochthonous" theory of the Etruscans is the accepted point of view. Torelli focuses instead on the continuities between the Protovillanovan, Villanovan, and Etruscan townscape. Torelli argues that the emergence of a distinct Etruscan culture was "the product of the beginning of segmentation process of the earlier tribal groups."[42] The Protovillanovan settlement marked a change in local cultures, which led to the Villanovan settlement prevalent in Etruria.

The Villanovans in Etruria were, according to Torelli, "backward" compared to other Italic groups, which is why there are many Latin names of gods in Etruscan religion.[43] Thus, the emergence of the Etruscans was a gradual development of native Italic people who adopted culture from other Italic peoples. Since the spread of the Villanovan culture overlaps almost perfectly with the historical diffusion of the Etruscans, "the obvious conclusion seems to be that the cultural background of Etruscan urban civilization was the rise of the Villanovan culture."[44] Torelli depicts the Villanovans as a

colonizing force, who placed colonies among the Protovillanovans. Etruscan city-states arose from a synoecism of these Villanovan villages and this culminated in the creation of the dodecapolis of the Etruscan League.[45]

Robert Leighton's case study of Tarquinia echoes Torelli's summation of events. Leighton favors the "autochthonous" theory, though he allows for outside influences from Greek and Phoenician merchants. Leighton argues that increased interaction between these groups most likely occurred in the eighth century BC. "It is unfortunate that the date is not fixed more precisely," Leighton laments, "because if it did occur earlier it would strengthen the case for viewing this early stage in the development of the Etruscan city in terms of an endogenous process, peculiar to the Villanovan culture." This would then weaken the idea that external influences provided the main impetus for local change in the eighth century.[46] Leighton echoes the work of Barker and Rasmussen, who questioned whether it was the arrival of Greek traders that prompted the emergence of powerful chiefs, or whether the previous existence of powerful chiefs in southern Etruria had been the cause of the Greeks' choice to trade with them.[47] Thus the argument can be looked at from a variety of perspectives, depending upon which theory the particular scholar accepts.

Thus it seemed to many scholars that the Etruscan mystery was no more. They were clearly an autochthonous people who developed on Italic soil with minor influences from Greek and Phoenician merchants. Most literature from the 1990s reflects this confident attitude. But there are a few who are not completely convinced that the "autochthonous" theory answers all the questions surrounding the Etruscans.

The primary obstacle to the "autochthonous" theory is the apparent uniqueness of the Etruscan language, and its failure to fit into the Indo-European paradigm. Larissa Bonfante once wrote that "the problem of Etruscan origins is encapsulated in the peculiarity of their language."[48] Writers like Hencken and Bloch relied heavily upon linguistic evidence to prove the idea that Etruscan language had originated elsewhere. Subsequent scholars have downplayed the importance of the linguistic approach. Pallottino summarized a long history of attempts to relate Etruscan to countless other languages, often with disastrous results. Barker and Rasmussen go a step further and dismiss foreign influence on Etruscan language entirely: "But certainly we must assume that people were speaking a version of the language at least during the Villanovan period."[49] They give no reason for this assertion, which demonstrates the fundamental weakness of the autochthonists' argument: they have yet to deal satisfactorily with the issue of Etruscan language.

In recent years, scholars like John H. Cooper have resurrected etymology and have reaffirmed, it seems, the "eastern" hypothesis. In a series of articles, Cooper argues that Etruscan can in fact fit into the Indo-European family of languages if it is seen as a Creole form of Greek. Cooper also uses the Kaminia Stele on Lemnos to further his argument. He sees many striking similarities between the inscriptions in Etruria and on Lemnos. Both these languages have apparent borrowings from eastern languages, like Lydian and Hittite. While Pallottino states that the only resemblances between the Etruscan and Lydian languages is the use of certain characters and the enclitic "c," Cooper argues that there are other similarities, particularly in

religious vocabulary.[50] Cooper also demonstrates Etruscan borrowing from the Anatolian language of Hittite, thus reinforcing the eastern origin of Etruscan. Cooper brings up an important component to the argument which is not addressed in any previous scholarship. He argues that there is a crucial "absence of clear dialectical distinctions between the Etruscan inscriptions scattered throughout their wide territory in northern and central Italy." This uniformity suggests that the language had been introduced only a short time before it was first written down in 700 BC. This argument is critical when one thinks of the implications for the "autochthonous" theory. If the Etruscans were indeed completely autochthonous, then there would be more variety in the development of their language and dialects.

Cooper's subsequent research has found that Etruscan and Lemnian, in addition to being very similar to each other, are in fact part of the Anatolian-Indic branch of the Indo-European family. Lemnian and Etruscan most likely came from the same Pelasgian source, though they began to develop independently by 800 BC, when the Etruscans had settled in Italy.[51] Barker and Rasmussen argue that while the "Lemnos inscription has provided invaluable grist to the mill for those looking for Etruscan origins in the eastern Mediterranean," the inscription dates over a century later than the first Etruscan inscriptions in Etruria. They argue that it could logically be used to argue that Etruscans did the colonizing, not the other way around![52] Yet this does not negate the idea that the Etruscans shared an original language with the Lemnians that came from the east. Linguistic evidence has thus resuscitated the debate between the "autochthonous" and "eastern" theses once more, and archaeologists have yet to adequately address this weakness in

their argument.

In addition to linguistic evidence, historical evidence continues to be used to support the "eastern" thesis. Many articles, including many for public consumption, still propagate the Herodotean idea of the Etruscans coming from Lydia. Annie Dillard, in her article about Etruscan lost culture, states rather flippantly that the Etruscans "rolled in from Lydia in Asia Minor and built up a culture 2,700 years ago."[53] She goes on to list the traditional misrepresentations of Etruscan language and its supposed indecipherability, which Pallottino debunked nearly thirty years before her article! It seems that Etruscology still has the difficult task of removing the veil of mystery from the Etruscan civilization. Countless discarded articles and moth-eaten monographs demonstrate the dangers in employing only one method of research to such a varied and nuanced topic. As technology improves, new methodologies will assist greatly in the search to illuminate the Etruscans.

The most recent advancements in Etruscology have been in the field of genetics. John Bryan Ward-Perkins, in his commentary on the problem of Etruscan origins, suggested the use of genealogy as a means to determine the origins of the Etruscans, but no extensive work was done until many years later.[54] Analysis of genetic data in modern populations arose as a powerful tool for reconstructing crucial aspects of human evolutionary history and tracing the origins of ancient peoples.[55] In 1993, a preliminary study of the mitochondrial DNA pattern of modern Tuscans in the region of Siena was performed. The results indicated a long history of similarity with other Caucasian populations rather than unusual genetic patterning.[56] In addition,

there was a lack of evidence in skeletal material for significant differences between Etruscans and the people living in Etruria before them, or between Etruscans and their neighbors, or even between Etruscans and their successors in this part of Italy. Thus Barker and Rasmussen used this evidence to support the "autochthonous" theory.

However, genealogical evidence has since challenged the tenets of the autochthonists. Despite the confidence archaeologists have in the theory, paleoanthropological studies have shown only broad similarities between the Etruscans and their Iron Age neighbors.[57] Archaeological evidence suggests that Etruscan culture developed locally, with some Eastern influences. However, it is not clear that this influence reflects only trading and cultural exchange or a shared biological ancestry.[58] Just last year, Christiano Vernesi along with several colleagues sought genealogical answers to this question. They performed the first large-scale investigation into the DNA of the ancient Etruscans: "This is the first large-scale study of a pre-Roman European population in which all the strictest criteria for the validation of ancient DNA sequences have been followed."[59] Scientists tested eighty skeletons from ten different Etruscan necropoleis. These samples were then compared to different ethnic groups. They found that while the Etruscans are similar to modern Italian populations, "they show closer relationships both to North Africans and to Turks than any contemporary population."[60] They go on to say that the Etruscan gene pool "contains an excess of haplotypes suggesting evolutionary ties with the populations of the southern and eastern Mediterranean shores.[61] It appears that the "eastern" thesis does have more firepower left, and it will be interesting to see how new developments

in science affect the accepted thesis of the Etruscans as an autochthonous people.

The question of the origins of the Etruscans is not an easy one. In order to answer the question fully, one must employ a wide range of methods, from linguistics to archaeology to genealogy. Despite the recent attacks on Herodotus, the source tradition should still serve at least as a complement to other research. While the "autochthonous" theory is the most widely accepted today, there are still many problems that need to be worked out before it can be completely accepted and applied to Etruscan culture. At the same time, however, one must not get caught up in the apparent mystery of the Etruscans and get lost in the seeming fruitless search to find their origins. David Ridgway, in his preface to Pallottino's work, summed up the search for the origins of the Etruscans in an unconventional way: "The general public," he argues, "wants the Etruscans to be mysterious," and the past literature has largely given the people what they want. Library shelves are filled with books about the "death-worshipping Etruscans bringing their indecipherable language from the notoriously mysterious East."[62] While this may have been the attitude of the past, there are several ongoing investigations seeking to truly unravel the riddles surrounding the Etruscan people.

The Etruscans are not as mysterious as they once were. Few scholars would dispute that, whatever the origins of the Etruscan people or the Etruscan language, "the historical Etruscan civilization as we know it took shape on Italian soil" even if the people responsible for its formation came from elsewhere. The Etruscans did not arrive "ready-made."[63] New archaeological finds, new interpretations of evidence, and new methodologies have

all contributed to our deeper understanding of the Etruscans, and they will continue to do so. The Etruscans cannot remain mysterious forever, and with continued study, scholars may finally discover the true origins of this elusive people.

Endnotes

[1] Strabo 5.2.2.

[2] Pallottino, Massimo. *The Etruscans*, 7th ed. Trans. J. Cremona, English 2nd ed. Edited by David Ridgway. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975, 32.

[3] Hesiod, *Theogony*, 1011-16.

[4] Bloch, Raymond. *The Etruscans* (Ancient Peoples and Places, ed. Glyn Daniel, vol.7). London: Thames and Hudson, 1958, 53.

[5] Quoted in Bloch, 53.

[6] Pallottino, 65.

[7] Pallottino, 65.

[8] Taylor, Isaac. *Etruscan Researches*. London: Macmillan and Co., 1874, 3.

[9] Pallottino, 66.

[10] Pallottino, 66.

[11] Pallottino, 39.

[12] Hencken, Hugh. *Tarquinia and Etruscan Origins* (Ancient Peoples and Places, ed. Glyn Daniel, vol. 62). New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, 158.

[13] Bloch, 54.

[14] Quoted in Bloch, 54.

[15] Pallottino, 32.

[16] Bloch, 53.

[17] Bloch, 54.

[18] Pallottino, 66.

[19] Bloch, Raymond, 53.

[20] Bloch, 53.

[21] The following discussion surrounding the similarities between Lydian and Etruscan can be found in Bloch, 55-56.

[22] Bloch, 55.

[23] Bloch, 56.

[24] Bloch, 58.

[25] Bloch, 60.

[26] Bloch, 60.

[27] Bloch,61.

[28] Richardson, Emeline. *The Etruscans: Their Art and Civilization*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964, 5.

[29] Richardson, 5.

[30] Pliny the Elder 3.5.50.

[31] Richardson, 5.

[32] Leighton, Robert. *Tarquinia: An Etruscan City* (Duckworth Archeological Histories, ed. Thomas Harrison) London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 2004, 25.

[33] Pallottino, 64.

[34] Pallottino, 66.

[35] Bloch, 64.

[36] "But they declared themselves to be Lydians." Herodotus seems to be separating himself from this statement by using the third person plural as opposed to his declarative first person singular.

[37] Quoted in Ridgway, David. "The "Lydian Origins" of the Etruscans." Review of *L'Origine Lydienne des Etrusques*: *Histoire de la Doctrine dans l'Antiquite*, by Dominique Briquel. *The Classical Review*, New Series, Vol. 43, No.1 (1993): 109-110, 109.

[38] Barker, Graeme and Tom Rasmussen. *The Etruscans*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998, 44.

[39] Barker and Rasmussen, 83.

[40] Barker and Rasmussen, 44.

[41] Barker and Rasmussen, 60.

[42] Torelli, Mario. "The Etruscan City-State." In *A Comparative Study of Thirty City-Sate Cultures: An Investigation*. Ed. Mogens Herman Hansen. Copenhagen: Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 2000: 189-208, 190.

[43] Torelli, 190-1.

[44] Torelli, 192.

[45] Torelli, 195.

[46] Leighton, 44.

[47] Barker and Rasmussen, 83.

[48] Quoted in Barker and Rasmussen, 81.

[49] Barker and Rasmussen, 81.

[50] Cooper, "Etruscan Viewed as a Greek Creole Language." *Mankind Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Fall 1999): 79-94, 90.

[51] Cooper, John H. "Etruscan and Lemnian Appear to be Twigs of the Pelasgian Branch of the Indo-European Language Tree." *Mankind Quarterly*. Vol. 40, Issue 4 (Summer 2000): 421-433, 11.

[52] Barker and Rasmussen, 81.

[53] Dillard, Annie. "Etruscans, Losing Their Edge." *The American Scholar*. Vol. 73, Issue 2

(Spring 2004): 59-62.

[54] Ward-Perkins, John Bryan. "The Problem of Etruscan Origins: Some Thoughts on Historical Method." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. 64 (1959): 1-26, 7.

[55] Vernesi, Christiano et al. "The Etruscans: A Population Genetic Study." *American Journal of Human Genetics*. Vol. 74 (2004): 694-704, 694.

[56] Cenetti, Quoted in Barker and Rasmussen, 82-83.

[57] Vernesi et al. "The Etruscans: A Population-Genetic Study." *American Journal of Human Genetics*. Vol. 74 (2004): 694-704, 694.

[58] Vernesi, 694.

[59] Vernesi, 703.

[60] Vernesi, 701.

[61] Vernesi, 71.

[62] Ridgway, David. Quoted in the preface to the second English edition of Pallottino, 20.

[63] Ward-Perkins, 9.

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Roman Garrisoning in the Middle Republic

Michael da Cruz

Much has been written about the nature of the pre-Marian army, and a similar amount of scholarship has been devoted to describing the mechanisms and methods of imperial control under the Roman Republican system. The use of the Roman army as a tool of control has received less attention. More specifically, the use of Roman armies as garrisons and occupying forces seems to be highly underappreciated in scholarly research on the nature of the army and of the empire during the Middle Republic. While the Greek *poleis*, during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, amply demonstrated the difficulties of attempting to control an empire with a citizen army, Rome was able to avoid a similar experience in the 3rd and 2nd centuries, and control a territory far larger than any city-state before it. There are many reasons why the Romans were able to move beyond the limitations of the city-state and build a transcontinental empire, but the manner in which the Romans overcame the challenges of using citizen-soldiers as garrison troops is an important and rarely considered one. The Roman use of garrisons may be able to shed some light on the way in which Rome was able to turn the model of the city state defended by a citizen army into a successful and sustainable empire.

That garrisons were widely deployed by the Romans during the Middle Republic is not hard to believe; Rome's Hellenistic competitors certainly made extensive use of garrisons in maintaining their own empires and enforcing their rule. Unfortunately, the generally bland nature of garrison duty ensures that it is rarely mentioned by classical authors, who only discuss them in extraordinary circumstances. Fortunately, there are enough passing references to insure that, along with a few narratives involving garrison forces, a limited understanding of this mundane but essential practice can be achieved. The textual evidence seems to allow for at least a partial understanding of the usual practices of a Roman garrison, the extent to which garrisons were employed during the Middle Republic and, perhaps most importantly, the role the Romans expected them to play. As always one must be careful; there are potential concerns within the ancient literary sources which must be considered. The sources that provide the most information on the nature of Roman garrisons are the histories of Livy and Appian. Both of these authors are suspect, as they may well have attributed the military techniques of their own time, the Late Republic and early Empire, to the very different armies of the Middle Republic. However, it is possible to somewhat allay these fears through reliance upon the account of Polybius, which was written well before both the Marian and Augustan reorganizations of the Roman army, and contains scattered references to mid Republican garrisons. Polybius can thus provide us with the evidence needed to affirm or reject what is presented in the accounts of Appian and Livy.

The Roman use of garrisons must be understood both in practical terns—the manner in which they were physically deployed, and in broader

strategic terms— the purpose that garrisons were meant to serve within the context of Roman political, diplomatic, and military strategy. It seems most convenient to begin with a discussion of how Roman garrisons were expected to operate in the cities in which they were stationed. The starting point for any such attempt must be the narrative of the capture of the city of Tarentum by Hannibal during the 2nd Punic War, which provides far more detail about garrison practices than any other account of an event during the Middle Republic. Polybius and Livy both preserve detailed accounts of this event, including a number of striking details about the Roman garrison in Tarentum. Appian's *The Hannibalic War* contains a much less detailed account but preserves a few 'facts' that are not present in either Livy or Polybius.

The exact nature of the garrison in Tarentum is somewhat unclear, as the sources suggest the existence of a large population of non-military Roman citizens living within the city. Polybius and Livy both describe an incident in which houses occupied by Romans are looted,[1] but seem to be in disagreement as to whom the houses actually belonged. Polybius simply refers to □ωναιων ο□κ□ας, which seems to leave little doubt about the ownership of the houses, and leads to speculation about some sort of Roman citizen diaspora in Tarentum in addition to the military garrison. Livy on the other hand states that the Romans were occupying vacant houses, which would imply that Romans were simply being quartered in Tarentine homes that were not otherwise inhabited. Polybius tends to be a more reliable source than Livy, and as such his description should be privileged, especially as the idea of pillaging the houses of Romans makes far more sense if Roman property and Roman goods are being pillaged, rather than Tarentine property in Roman use.

However, another event preserved in both narratives undermines this interpretation. The sounding of Roman bugles by the revolting Tarentines during the course of a battle[2] is reported to have seen "the Romans responding in arms to the summons."[3] This would be the logical reaction of a military garrison quartered within the city. The possibility of a Roman citizen diaspora responding in such a manner seems significantly less likely. In theory, any Roman citizens resident in Tarentum, given the manpower strains of the 2nd Punic War, would likely be well past military age as those still fit for military service would have been drawn upon by the army to replace the troops lost in the disaster at Cannae. Further, the large numbers of Romans who responded to the call makes it likely that, even if a few of those who rushed to arms were dutiful Romans not technically under arms, the majority of those who would have to have been regular soldiers. As such, it seems that the weight of the evidence supports Livy's claim that these "Roman houses" were, at least in the majority, merely occupied by garrison troops[4] and that the reader should thus understand Polybius' □ωναιων ο□κ□ας in the same manner—and one could certainly interpret the Greek term in this fashion. This reading offers an interesting insight, as it implies that Roman troops were quartered in private homes (in this case unoccupied ones) rather than, or in addition to, in a central barracks. Such a practice cannot be discounted, and is similar those which were common in pre-modern times and continued in the western world well into the 19th century.

Appian, in his short discussion of the revolt of Tarentum, claims that the Roman garrison numbered 5000.[5] This seems to be a rather large figure for a garrison, considering that it would represent the equivalent of a full legion

of soldiers. It seems even more so given that he presents it as the number of Romans who held the citadel after the rest of the city had been taken. Considering the violence of the struggle during the initial seizure of the city, described in both the narratives of Livy and Polybius, one would expect that a substantial portion of the Roman forces would have been killed or captured by the Carthaginians before even reaching the citadel. As such, Appian's number creates the somewhat dubious impression that there were as many two or three legions of troops stationed in Tarentum. It is therefore important to put this claim into perspective. First, it is possible to read the account in a manner that would make the figure of 5000 seem to be that the number of men in the citadel after reinforcements had arrived from Metapontum. While the number 5000 still seems large with even half of the Metapontum garrison included it is certainly more believable. A force of that size also makes the notion that Roman troops would be quartered in Tarentine houses seem less surprising; if there were a legion or two worth of troops stationed in the city it would have presumably been difficult to quarter them effectively in any other way. Comparisons to other, similar garrisons also make Appian's figure more believable. For example, Livy refers to a garrison of 2000 Carthaginian troops on Malta,[6] a location of less strategic importance than Tarentum during the 2nd Punic War. He also mentions a sally made from the citadel at Tarentum by a portion of the garrison which amounted to 2500 men,[7] which would support both Appian's figure, and the idea of a legion sized force holding the citadel at Tarentum. Whether or not one accepts Appian's figure, and one must always be wary of numbers in texts preserved through a manuscript tradition, it is clear from all three accounts that the garrison at Tarentum was large in

size. It may well have been an unusually large garrison, as Silius Italicus describes it as having been "close-packed".[8] Still, it should make the possibility that legions of Roman garrison troops were sometimes deployed throughout Roman territory seem far less surprising.

The revolt of Capua from the Romans also sheds light on practices within Roman garrisons. Livy tells us that when the city rose up "the population suddenly seized the prefects of the allies and other Roman citizens, some employed in a military duty, some engaged in private business."[9] Here Livy makes explicit mention of both Roman civilians and soldiers in Capua in 216. Of course there is no explicit mention of these troops serving as a garrison, but Vibius Virrius, the initiator of the revolt, later reminds his fellow Campanians that "with torture and as an insult [we] put to death a garrison which we might have let go."[10] Virrius' speech removes any doubt as to whether at least some of the men "employed in a military duty" were garrison troops. Further, those "engaged in private business" are not referred to as permanent or even semi-permanent residents of Capua. It would be unwise to assume that they were without more substantial evidence. This account provides us with useful information; the fact that the Roman garrison could be seized and put to death without a serious struggle or a siege supports the contention that they were not centrally quartered in a defensible position, and lends credence to the idea that Roman garrison troops were often quartered in private homes throughout the city in which they were stationed.

However, this does not seem to have been universally the case. Polybius tells us that during the revolt of Tarentum the Romans (including their commander) who had survived the initial seizure of the city "retired to the

citadel where they had always had a garrison."[11] It seems likely that even with some portion of the garrison quartered in the city proper the Romans would maintain at least some force in the tactically important citadel with its commanding position over both the city and harbor. The stationing of troops in the citadel of a city or a dominating strong point in the surrounding area is a well attested Hellenistic practice, and the logic of this method had evidently been discovered by the Romans by at least 196, with the maintenance of the garrison in the Acrocornith[12] and possibly much earlier. Livy preserves, in rather unique circumstances, the occupation of a citadel by a Roman garrison in 205 as well.[13] Perhaps the failure to hold a citadel or a strong point at Capua was a result of its flat topography and the a lack of such a position, or it may simply have been a case of the Roman forces being even less prepared than those at Tarentum.[14]

Regrettably, both of these cases outline only the behavior of garrisons in a time of war. This is to be expected due to the nature of the sources, but it is frustrating nevertheless. Fortunately Livy's report of a rather ugly event in Boeotia in 196 provides some insight into the behaviour of Roman troops in times of peace. After the conclusion of the 2nd Macedonian War, a desire to avenge the murder of Brachyllas led the Boeotians to employ what can roughly be characterized as guerilla tactics against the Romans. The passage describing this ad-hoc revolt is interesting with respect to the present discussion not because of the actions of the Boeotians, but because it is a rare example of how Roman soldiers lived when not on active campaign. Livy's description is rather lacking in detail, but it does paint what might be a rather unexpected, if entirely reasonable, picture. Livy reports that the Boeotians,

"had neither army nor leader for a rebellion; [and turned]…to brigandage."[15] Roman soldiers are reported to have been cut down in taverns, on highways, in deserted inns, and "as they traveled about on various errands during the winter season."[16] These peacetime activities, travel and drink essentially, do not seem at all unreasonable; it would be far stranger if soldiers, quartered in a peaceful place for a period of time longer than a few days did not sample whatever pleasures local civilian life offered. While it must be kept in mind that these soldiers were part of a field army, not a garrison, and were quartered in an army camp not a city it would seem strange for more rigorous restrictions to be placed on the actions of garrison troops than those serving in an army in the field. As such it seems likely that along with often living as neighbors to the people of the city they were garrisoning, soldiers on garrison duty would also patronized local taverns, and travel as individuals or in small groups on local roads. Thus the Roman garrison that the textual evidence reports seems to be one that is rather integrated with the city it was garrisoning, rather than one sharply divided between dour soldiers lurking in a citadel high above the city and an intimidated populace cowering below that might come to mind when reading about the presence of a garrison.

Outlined above is an admittedly rough picture of what life in a Roman garrison during the Middle Republic might have been like. It is a picture significantly less militaristic and threatening than might be supposed, but it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the garrison was, at heart, a military institution used to enforce Roman control and protect Roman interests. The purpose of Roman garrisons will be addressed below, after a discussion of the macro-side of garrison practice. The textual sources dealing with the late 3rd

and early to middle 2nd centuries are rife with mentions of the garrison forces of Hellenistic states, but there are comparatively very few mentions of Roman garrisons. Without giving the subject much thought the obvious response to this would be the assumption that Romans utilized garrisons far less frequently than their Hellenistic competitors, which may very well be the case, but examination of some key passages indicates a wider usage than is immediately evident.

A particularly illuminating passage comes from Livy in his report of the aftermath of the disastrous defeats of the Roman forces in Iberia in 212/211 and the deaths of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus and his brother Publius. After the terrible defeats it "seemed that the armies had been wiped out and all Spain lost,"[17] but according to Livy[18] a Roman eques, one Lucius Marcius managed to reverse Rome's fortunes in Iberia. What is interesting for our purposes is not the heroism of Marcius which Livy and so many Roman authors are fixated on, but where he procured the soldiers needed to renew the war with the Carthagians and prevent them from following up their double victory by pushing the Romans completely out of Iberia. According to Livy "the man made an army that was not be despised out of the soldiers gather up from the flight and in part withdrawn from the garrison towns."[19] Now up to this point in his narrative Livy has made almost no mention of Roman garrisons in Iberia, but Livy's narrative leaves little doubt that these were Roman (or at least Latin) troops. He certainly makes no mention of local troops fighting in Marcius' army, and as the defeats of the Scipios' armies was apparently very much a result of the betrayal of local Spanish allied forces[20] it would be surprising to see Marcius making use of such troops so soon after their treachery.

Most important here though is that the numbers of garrison troops in Iberia must have been considerable to make up even a significant amount of the heavy losses suffered by the Scipios especially as Livy seems to imply that only a portion of the garrison troops were called upon.

A passage of Polybius also supports the idea that the Romans were engaged in widespread garrisoning by the late 3rd century. He declares that in the aftermath of the First Illyrian War (228), "Postumius, with whom forty ships were left, *enrolled a legion from the cities and neighbourhood* and wintered at Epidamnus…"[21] (emphasis mine). The idea of Romans enrolling Illyrians or Greeks into a legion in this period flies in the face of nearly every orthodox belief about Roman military practice in the Middle Republic. Fortunately, a careful examination of the Greek and an adjustment to Paton's translation renders this bewildering passage both intelligible and enlightening. The word Paton translates as "enroll" is□αθροί ζω which can sometimes be translated as "enroll" in the sense of enrolling a legion, but more precisely means "to muster" or "to gather together." Reading□αθροίζω as "to gather together" not only provides a much less problematic translation from a historical perspective, it also provides a situation similar to the one reported by Livy above. The force Postumius mustered does indeed to seem to have been a proper Roman legion, στρατ□α being the normal, nearly technical, Polybian term for legion. As such it is implied that there were least 4200 Roman (or at least Latin) soldiers on garrison duty in Illyria at the close of the first Illyrian War. This is particularly interesting as even if Appian's number for the size of Tarentum garrison is taken at face value the lack of major urban areas in north-western Illyria along with the verb□αθροίζω implies that these forces were deployed in least

a handful of separate sites.

Taken together these two passages imply garrisoning on a scale much larger than would be assumed from the infrequent mentions of garrisons in the texts and place the occasional passing mentions to garrisons in a context which makes them far less enigmatic. Appian's account of the mutiny of a portion of Scipio's army in Iberia also lends credence to the idea of rather widespread garrisoning, as he notes that along with a number of troops of the field army, "many from the garrisons joined them,"[22] in seceding from Marcius' command. Livy's mention of the recovery of Roman and Latin captives by Cato after his defeat of a revolt in Iberia in 195[23] may also imply that there were a substantial number of soldiers scattered throughout Roman possessions in Iberia, although there are certainly other possible explanations for the presence of Romans and Latins in Iberia in 195.

The perception that wide spread garrisoning was common at least during times of crisis is further bolstered by a few other mentions of garrisons during the 2nd Punic War. At the outset of the war Polybius reports that one of the steps the Romans took in preparing for Hannibal's invasion of Italy after his success at Trebia was "sending garrisons to Tarentum and other suitable places".[24] Although Polybius does not mention where these other suitable places are, garrisons that are likely to have resulted from this action are mention in a number of places.[25]

Moreover, the garrisons mentioned during the 2nd Punic War narratives are not necessarily related to the senatorial actions mentioned in Polybius 3.75 and it is possible that the Romans may have had garrisons in place throughout Italy long before Hannibal's invasion. The garrison at Clastid-

ium[26] which is mentioned before the events leading up the actions recorded in Polybius 3.75 certainly seems to imply something of that sort, even though the garrison at Clastidium seems to have been made up of non-Roman troops under a Brundisian commander. Still, it does seem that the use of garrisons in Italy was, at most, limited before Hannibal's success at Trebia, and that it was the threat of the Italian allies changing sides that prompted the Romans to deploy garrisons in ostensibly allied cities throughout Italy. The deployment of a garrison to the old Carthaginian stronghold of Lilybaeum was only prompted by the fear of a Carthaginian bid to recapture the city.[27] While this event predates the senatorial actions mentioned in Polybius 3.75 it is obviously driven by the same motives and exhibits the same perception of the role of the garrison. This fear was well founded, as a number of Sicilian towns, including Syracuse, went over to the Carthaginian side during the conflict and the island did not return to full Roman control until 211 at the earliest possible dating. The placement of a garrison on the island of Cossyrus[28] by Gnaeus Servilius was likely driven by a similar motive, as the 'African' island of Cossyrus was likely too close to Carthage to remain loyal without the bolstering presence of armed Romans equally ready to stiffen the resolve and maintain the loyalty of the populace as to repeal Carthagians advances.

With the fact of fairly widespread, at least relative to textual mentions, garrisoning established and a vague but recognizable pattern of garrison practice emerging from the texts it becomes possible to gain a better, if still very limited, idea of the motivations and reasoning behind Roman garrison practices, as well as the understanding the Romans themselves had of the use of garrisons during the Middle Republic. The Roman garrisons mentioned pre-

viously were mostly used as a tool in the war against Hannibal in Italy. In this context it is clear that their purpose was to intimidate rebellious populations (or at least those perceived to be rebellious by Roman leadership) and prevent those populations from siding with the Carthaginians. Similar motivations are to be found in the early use of garrisons in Iberia, such as Scipio's garrisoning of Castax[29] in 206 and most probably in his father's garrisoning of Tarraco[30] twelve years before. Yet while such a blunt form of control was often necessary from the Roman point of view, it does not seem to have been a strategy that the Romans pursued if they felt it could be avoided. The perceived rebelliousness of Tarentum was almost a fixation amongst the Roman elite, but a garrison does not seem to have been stationed there until after Hannibal had invaded Italy *and* defeated the Romans badly at Trebia. The events in Greece following the 2nd Macedonian War are particularly useful to any attempt to discover the motivations of the Romans, especially as they occurred in times of peace, when long term and hypothetically indefinite use of garrisons might be required.

After the defeat of Philip V, Flamininus and the ten commissioners appointed by the Roman senate set out to reshape the political landscape of Greece into a form that suited Roman interests. At the Isthmian games of 196 Flamininus, to almost lethal elation,[31] announced that the Romans would not seek to dominate Greece the way Philip and his predecessors had, but would leave the Greeks "free, without garrisons, and subject to no tribute and governed by their own countries' laws."[32]However, the Romans decided that Chalcis, Demetrias, and Acrocornith should remain garrisoned – supposedly until the danger posed by Antiochus was dealt with.[33] Of course it is possible to dis-

miss this appeal to the danger posed by Antiochus as a cynical Roman excuse to keep soldiers in Greece and maintain their dominance while appearing to be liberators. Whether or not one agrees with such an analysis it is possible to see these actions as the result of a simple cost-benefit analysis on the part of the Romans, who realized, as had the kings of Macedon before them, that maintaining control over the "fetters of Greece" was much more efficient than garrisoning every individual *polis*, and almost as effective. That the Romans would want to avoid garrisoning Greece on the scale of the Macedonian kings seems logical for a number of reasons, including the requirement for troops to be deployed elsewhere in the burgeoning empire, a desire not to engender the hostility of the Greeks by appearing to dominate them in the same way the hated Macedonians had, and a discomfort with the fact that setting up garrisons for the long term inherently implied stationing Roman citizens far from Rome, under arms, for extended periods of times even during times of peace.

The Aetolians certainly took a more cynical view of the Roman decision to keep garrisons in Greece as well as a field army at Elatia, and they were not reserved when it came to voicing their discontent.[34] The evidence for the Roman use of garrisons seems to provide the Romans with some defense, at least against the charges of the Aetolians. The accounts of the 2nd Punic War mentioned above point to the placement of garrisons as being a practice the Romans only used during times of perceived danger that were out of the ordinary. Tarentum was evidently not garrisoned before Trebia, and at least a few other cities were garrisoned at the same time – which would imply that they too were free of garrisons before Trebia. Thus is appears that there were no garrisons in much of urban Italy for at least a significant period of time

prior to Hannibal's victory. This strongly supports the contention that the Romans preferred not to use garrisons as a method of control except when an outside force threatened and allied or subject peoples might rebel in support of that force.[35] As such, from the perspective of what seems to be normal Roman practice, the maintenance of garrisons in Greece after Flamininus' proclamation can be understood not as a cynical action that flies in the face of the promise of Greek freedom (which in any case certainly never meant the right to disagree with Rome), or even as a method of maintaining control of the Greeks, but rather as a way of ensuring Greek support in the event of a war with Antiochus.

Whatever the reason for the maintenance of Roman garrisons in Chalcis, Demetrias and Acrocornith, the discourse surrounding the 'freeing of the Greeks' does much to illuminate both Greek and Roman ideas of freedom and, more importantly for the purposes of the present discussion, Greek and Roman ideas of what being garrisoned by a foreign power meant. Flamininus' proclamation was structured along formal lines, and interestingly appears in similar form in the Roman treaty with Carthage that ended the 2nd Punic War.[36] That the conditions which ended the 2nd Punic War are nearly identical to those that led the "freedom of the Greeks" to be proclaimed says a great deal about what freedom meant in the context of Roman treaties and declarations. Both Carthage and the Greek cities were 'free' of direct Roman control, but it is abundantly clear that the Romans did not see that 'freedom' as giving either people anything even remotely resembling complete autonomy. By accepting the treaties the Romans saw both peoples as agreeing, at a bare minimum, to follow Roman direction in foreign affairs and provide the Romans with both

materiel and manpower when called upon to do so. The absence of a garrison did not, from the Roman perspective, make these conditions any less binding.

Such an understanding of the Roman view of "freedom" and the role of subject and allied peoples closely corresponds to the manner in which garrisons were used by the Romans in the 2nd Punic War, the wars in Iberia, and the wars in Greece. The Greeks seemed to have had a rather different perception; freedom to them seemed to mean that they were not bound to do anything at the direction of a foreign power and were free to act with complete autonomy. The difficulties suffered by the Greeks as a result of this perception in 2nd century were enormous and do not need to be discussed here, but the relation between the Greek perception of the role of the garrison and the Greek understanding of freedom is worth discussing.

To the Greeks, after generations of being garrisoned by the forces of various Hellenistic Kings, the garrison was the symbol of foreign domination, and an ungarrisoned city was in large part considered to be free from the foreign domination which a garrison symbolized. Polybius describes exactly this perception at an Acarnanian assembly in which a pro-Roman party appealed for the deployment of garrisons in Acarnanian cities. Diogenes argued, successfully, that garrisoning "was the procedure in the case of peoples who had been enemies of the Romans, and who had been subdued."[37] The use of garrisons which Diogenes describes is very much in keeping with the Hellenistic practice of placing garrisons in the cities of subdued people as a method of control. The Romans on the other hand preferred to refrain from placing garrisons in the cities of subdued enemies, only to brutally repress them if they made the mistake of acting too independently.[38] This is probably the most es-

sential distinction between the Roman view of the purpose of the garrison and that of Rome's Hellenistic rivals. The Hellenistic powers saw the garrison as the primary method of controlling subject and allied peoples. The Romans on the other hand saw the garrison as a method of ensuring loyalty in trying circumstances when fear of Roman reprisals, lack of a viable alternative to Roman domination, and friendly relations between Roman and allied elites would not serve to ensure loyalty on their own.

This understanding of the role of the garrison seems to have been rather unique to the Romans. Whether or not the practice (in the broadest terms) outlined above was a conscious reaction to the strengths and weakness of the Roman military machine and the social system that supported it, it certainly seems to have been spectacularly well suited to the needs of that system. The mild aversion to the sort large-scale, long-term use of garrisons practiced by the Hellenistic kingdoms was rather effective at avoiding the problems that would have beset an army made up of citizens who, at least theoretically, were expected to return to Rome every year to take part in the public and civic life of the *res publica*, be it in the form of ceremonies, religious festivals, elections or any other event in the expansive public sphere. Long term deployment of garrisons on the Hellenistic model would have created the same sort of strains on Roman political life that the long term deployment of field armies to Iberia did on a significantly wider scale. In order to prevent such tensions in a manner that would have allowed the continued large scale placement of garrisons made up of citizen soldiers would have required a level of logistical organization that would have been beyond the capabilities of the Roman state in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. Intentionally or not, the method of deploy-

ment favored by the Romans in the Middle Republic seems to have very well adapted to both the military strengths and social needs of the Republic. It is important to note that this does not mean that the use of garrisons by the Romans can be ignored in considerations of the Republican military and imperial systems as they have to often been in past scholarship. Despite the fact that, compared to their Hellenistic rivals, the Romans preferred to garrison lightly and infrequently, they still did so on a scale far greater than has been generally understood in scholarship on the Republican period. As such, the nature and use of Roman garrisons deserves further exploration.

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Endnotes

[1] Polyb. 8.31, Liv. 25.10

[2] Polyb. 8.30, Liv. 25.10

[3] Polyb. 8.30

[4] This is no way implies that they were unworthy of plunder, the Roman soldiers would likely have at least a fair amount of supplies, personal goods and military equipment in a house that they, or at least some Roman soldiers, according to Polybius (3.75), had been occupying for four or five years.

[5] Appian 7.33

[6] Liv. 21.51

[7] Liv. 26.39

[8] Silius. 12.434-36

[9] Liv. 23.7

[10] Liv. 26.16

[11] Polyb. 8.31

[12] Liv. 33.31

[13] Liv. 29.6

[14] Something which seems unlikely on the heels of Cannae and without the elaborate preparations taken by Hannibal and his Tarentine allies to catch the Romans off guard

[15] Liv. 33.29

[16] Ibid.

[17] Liv. 25.37

[18] And in a number of other sources, Marcius became something of a folk hero

[19] Ibid.

[20] Liv. 25.33

[21] Polyb. 2.12

[22] Appian 7.34

[23] Liv. 34.16

[24] Polyb. 3.75

[25] For example at Metapontum, Appian 7,33, Polyb. 8.34, Liv. 25.11, 25.15, At Heraclea, Appian 7.34, at Thurii, Liv. 25.15, at Galatia, Liv. 26.5, and of course at Capua as mentioned above.

[26] Liv. 21.48

[27] Liv. 21.49

[28] Polyb. 3.96

[29] Appian 7.32

[30] Liv. 21.61

[31] Liv. 33.33

[32] Polyb. 18.46

[33] Polyb. 18.45, Liv. 33.31

[34] Liv. 34.23

[35] Of course this was likely simply because the Romans felt confident that they could crush isolated revolts

[36] Polyb. 15.18

[37] Polyb. 28.5

[38] Cato's treatment Bergistani as recorded in Liv. 34.16 is a good example of this methodology

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Roman Geography and Spatial Perception ins the Republic

Rachel McQuiggan

Roman geography was based on a series of spatial representations; as a culture the Romans did not seem to be concerned with accurate quantitative descriptions of the world. Was this due to a lack of ability on their part, or did they simply not need to communicate geographic intervals through representation? If we analyze the structure of Roman texts using comparisons between opposite environments (extreme African temperatures versus the temperate climate of central Italy) and opposite cultures ("uncivilized" societies versus "civilized" Rome) we can gain insight into what can be labeled as "ethno-geography." The Romans created distinct associations between an environment and its inhabitants. These associations were generally coupled, with the Romans evaluating another culture against their own self-worth. This dual contrast of ethnicity fits into a linear writing model, illustrated by geographic writings by Roman authors such as Sallust, Cicero, Pliny the Elder, and Pliny the Younger. Geographic and ethnographic descriptions were combined in narration, and while territory was outlined in linear itineraries, populations and cultures were outlined in the same style. Maps were not in demand during the Roman Republic, and consequently,

only military or municipal itineraries were created.

While the Romans accepted the concept of territorial and landscape variance, they did not have the same geographic perceptions that were prevalent in Greek culture, nor did they practice the art of map making. Classical Greek historians like Thucydides (460-400BC) traveled across many states and regions surrounding the Mediterranean and included climatic and environmental accounts within their historical narratives. These geographic descriptions encouraged others, such as Ptolemy (87-150AD) and Strabo (64BC-24AD), to continue in this branch of research. Lengthy reports on different topographic zones and their inhabiting cultures offered insights into societies that ordinary citizens would have otherwise never had the chance to encounter for themselves.[1] The skills associated with illustrating a different land through literature became a trend in Roman science only at the end of the first century BC. In 44BC, for example, Julius Caesar and Marcus Antonius hired three Greek geographers to create an itinerary of Roman municipal structures- a task that lasted 32 years.[2] During the reign of the Emperor Augustus (27BC-14AD), and while Rome was pushing to expand its borders, geographers were hired to write accounts of the territories they came across. Historians also looked to their earlier Greek counterparts for geographic descriptions and evidence of the societies linked with these regions.

Geographic and topographic details dating to the Republic are scarce. References to new overseas territories and foreign societies seem to be dropped into narratives at random and are often only there to provide sufficient background material for the story.[3] Were Romans simply not con-

cerned with the idea of geographic exploration during the Republic? There is a likely parallel between Roman territorial growth and the emergence of a desire to not only know foreign lands, but to also describe and map them. Although these territories had native peoples, the Romans saw themselves as making a new "discovery" by documenting the landscape in an official account. In a sense, they were conquering the land. As Rome's cultural and territorial boundaries expanded, so too did their model of geographic settings.

Ethno-geographic descriptions before the mid-first century BC differed greatly in style from those written in the late-first century AD. Spatial representation was conveyed through indefinite categories of position. Geographic descriptions did not include any sort of global direction and read much like an inventory of space.[4] The organizational structure used by the Romans in their descriptions can be defined as internal, rather than wide ranging, meaning that they tended to omit external reference points and focus on directions ranging only from the original location to the final target. In this sense, the Roman method of recording geography can be described as linear. Pliny the Younger (63-113AD) includes a description of two of his countryside villas, one of which was in Tuscany and the other in Laurentinum, in separate letters to his friends.[5] Pliny uses the same linear method in his descriptions, and focuses on certain aspects of his villas. He also mentions the surrounding countryside, but only in relation to certain landmarks. In doing so, Pliny knows that his reader will be able to create a mental image of the villas in their settings. The interior is not only represented linearly in writing, but also in architecture. Rooms are situated on an

axis that is built with specific relation to the outside scenery and favourable climactic elements.[6] For example, "a second [drawing-room] of a smaller size, which has one window to the rising, and another to the setting sun."[7] Corresponding with this linear construction, personal and municipal spaces were also sequential or track-based.

Another Roman author writing at the early beginnings of the Empire was Pliny the Elder (23-79AD). In his *Natural History*, he describes a number of topographic regions and their indigenous inhabitants. The goal in his writing is not to explain to the reader *how* to get somewhere, it is to show his reader what he, himself, found at those locations. In this sense, Pliny's *Natural History* is an example of primitive Roman mapping skills. Geographic and topographic trends are commonly expressed in maps and modern interpretations require a mathematical approach to measures of distance and space. *Natural History* does include some numerical distances but these are again centered on one common focal point. The spatial descriptions of the early Roman Republic did not include a standard set of calculations but often used a qualitative commentary instead. Perhaps this subjective, and even slightly anecdotal, geography was modeled after the Greek historian Herodotus, whose fifth century BC writings provided little in the way of cartographic details.

Both Pliny the Elder and his nephew Pliny the Younger lived and wrote during the early Empire. They should, however, be included when discussing the representation of physical geography during the Republic. Contextually, their writing style differs from Republican writers, however not in the construction of the individual letters. Using examples from these

early Empire authors shows both a transition period in Roman ideals as well as uniformity in spatial awareness during the Republic and several decades after Caesar. Pliny the Elder's writing style is certainly linear, especially illustrated in his description of Rome and the Italian provinces, in which he can only describe the provinces in relation to a physical landmark, here it is the sea-line.

> "We will now describe its extent and its different cities; in doing which, it is necessary to premise, that we shall follow the arrangement of the late Emperor Augustus, and adopt the division which he made of the whole of Italy into eleven districts; taking them, however, according to their order on the sea-line, as in so hurried a detail it would not be possible otherwise to describe each city in juxtaposition with the others in its vicinity."[8]

Pliny the Younger also employs a linear method in his descriptions. Each scene is organized into a sequence of the settings that one would see when looking down a straight line of sight.

> "…from the back you see the middle court, the portico, and the area; and from another point you look through the portico into the courtyard, and out upon the woods and distant mountains beyond."[9]

As Rome expanded her territories, and Augustus set a new cultural tone, geographic and ethnographic writings began to reflect this change and show Rome at the centre of a new world. Previous histories always included this element, although to a smaller extent.[10] The linear constructs that shape both Plinys' writings endure both geographic and political changes. Therefore, to see both the stability and the evolution between time periods, we can and should include both Plinys, as well as other authors writing at the beginning of the Empire (>c. 27BC), when analyzing the structural and ethnographic associations with the physical geography of the Roman Republic.

This change in technique was accompanied by a change in motivation. Although the annexation of territory following a successful battle suggests a great deal of geographic attention, it is doubtful that the Romans were actually seeking new territory for any other reasons than those of a political nature. It is clear that international travel for either exploration or pleasure was uncommon. We see this illustrated in a cultural aside in his historical narration, when Sallust reminds us that he can only speak of countries with which Rome has had political or military relations. The second line of his geographic digression claims that countries with climates that were extreme in comparison to central Italy "have been but little visited."[11] This also suggests an indistinctness of convention surrounding a city or province's boundaries. Maps of political territories divide a space into definitive parts, using a line to graphically represent a boundary, with no "grey area." Perhaps these borders were not as clear as suggested by modern maps or even those drawn up in the later Roman Empire.

It is important to keep in mind that Romans did not have a modern sense of geography or mapping skills. Prominent topographic settings served as territorial landmarks. For example, a common Roman judgment surrounding Germanic tribes was that a wider expanse of land surrounding a tribe's core position indicated a position of military dominance.[12] Vacant land signified the degree of fear that other tribes held of inciting a confrontation with the dominant tribe. Hence a dominant community status was achieved through aggressive tactics which developed into a defensive strategy. This is merely a Roman perspective and reasoning to account for the vacant land.

The particular location of the Roman urban centre was topographically unattractive, and provided few means of protection. Flat plains surrounded the eastern and southern borders, and the west was adjacent to the sea. All these conditions made it less difficult for neighbouring populations to attack the city, and easier to force Rome into a defensive position. Perhaps this played a part in the drastic increase in expansionist actions in the late Republic. Military and political figures realized that if they could not impart a defensive authority over the territory that they controlled, then they would have to take an offensive approach. Instead of securing their land, Rome put their soldiers into the field and aggressively proved their strength. However, looking further into territorial description during and after the progression into the Roman Empire, there is a lasting spatial element as evidence that Rome was still politically defensive. Looking back at the Roman notion of Germanic tribes, the aggressive tactics are developing into a defensive strategy, and "proving" their strength can be changed to "defending"

their strength. Maps were still drawn up as itineraries for the purpose of civic or military routes. The association between a physical territory and its inhabitants did not undergo any transformations from the early to the late Republic, or into the early Empire. Harsh environments still yielded rough peoples. If there was no change in these beliefs, it is possible that Rome was still acting defensively in the early first century BC. Perhaps on a smaller military scale, particular battles were executed in an offensive fashion, but politically Rome wanted to hold onto her dominance and actions were made to defend this self-imposed status.

The Romans had two principally acknowledged categories of geography; one which dealt with civilizing factors and the other with natural factors. The former included aspects of the environment that affected, or were affected by, the spread of human population. Thus, fertile land reflected an applied civilization factor. Agriculture and the Roman economy were closely linked to this type of geography because of the desirability of fertile land. Agriculturally productive land was in demand for the Romans and this terrain was looked at through a strictly economic perspective.[13] Territory that was economically convenient for inter-state relations also fell into this category of human, or community-based, geography.

The second type of geography recognized by the Romans was physical or environmental geography. This included climactic conditions, natural landscapes and harsh or burdensome terrain. From a Roman perspective, environmental factors had undeniable bearing on the morals and nature of the peoples in a region.[14] From Pliny's letters, we see that geographical setting and climate acted as a positive stimulant in daily Roman life.[15] He

makes it quite clear, for example, that his villas were places of relaxation from a hectic day in the urban centre of Rome. When compared to various other Roman historians' references to the association of leisure with weakness, this shows Roman confidence that they were above the enervating features of living in a moderate climate. Pliny also makes certain to note that his villa was at a reasonable distance from the sea. He describes a drawing-room which had "a prospect of the sea, but being at a greater distance, is less incommoded by it."[16] This villa is a refuge from any harmful influence the sea might have.

During the Republic, the Romans believed that the environment had a much greater impact on its inhabitants rather than the other way around. This fact indicates how Romans really saw the geography-civilization relationship. They considered civilized Rome itself to be above the negative influences of the environment and saw barbarian societies as being unable to gain enough control to rise above their surroundings.[17] They were thus left under the corrupting influences of the environment and unable to become civilized. It is important to note that the status of "civilized" bestowed by the Romans on certain cultures did have an impact on the way they treated its members, whether indigenous or immigrants. Civilized societies were certainly seen as "better" from the Roman position but there were also particular reputations which corresponded to the more hostile and war-like populations.[18]

Extreme environments and climates impart a more bellicose quality on its inhabitants. If this is analyzed in the same way as the Roman definition of civilization, then these aggressive peoples were a product of being

able to overcome their harsh condition of life. If they could conquer the severe terrain, then they could easily conquer an opposing tribe or community.

Most Republican ethnographers agreed that cultural bonds existed between human character and physical geography. Mediterranean and North African lands encompass a large variety of topography and climates. The geographic provinces defined by the Romans included desert, forest, mountainous, lowlands or plains, and communities established in coastal settings. The physical world was also divided into zones based on temperature and typical weather. This tradition of a laterally segmented Earth dates back to early Greek mythological models adapted by Ovid to fit into verse in his *Metamorphoses*.[19] Although more divisions were allocated in later models, the Roman Republic was aware of severe heat along the Earth's equator and severe cold at the poles.[20] These two antithetical temperature ranges allegedly yielded more hostile men than a more temperate climate. This paradigm is prominently displayed in Sallust, who gives a short history of the existing races in Africa.[21] Through all of the intermarriages between the African tribes and outside races, a hierarchy of civilization was established. Roman knowledge of African ethos began with two tribes, the Getulians and the Libyans, who were both seen as uncivilized because of their lack of political structure and economy. Both of these tribes were also nomadic and, although unrestricted by physical geography, remained in dry, desert regions in middle latitudes. As Persians migrated into Africa, they took up territory closer to the ocean, yet rejected the economy and travel benefits that a coastal life could offer. Once in Africa, the Persians flipped their ships upside down, turning them into crude houses.[22] Many of them united with the

Getulians and formed the race of Numidians, named for their nomadic lifestyle. The Persian factions in Africa slowly declined and took the customs and name of the Numidian population.[23] These Persian settlers could not adapt to the African climate and terrain and were accordingly portrayed as an inherently weak culture.

Authors could use the connection between geography and ethnography against a rival nation. By showing a foreign society's inability to overcome territorial adversity, they could promulgate Roman nationality to a Roman audience. The geographic model was modified on an accommodating basis, especially concerning Roman foreign affairs. In this way, ethnographic descriptions were like the dynamic Roman Republic religious system. If the correlation between the nature of a foreign society and their inhabiting territory was inconsistent with previous "patterns" this society became a new example of one that was unable to adapt to outside components in the environment. New settlements, immigration and neighbouring communities were among the deterring external influences.

During the time when Sallust was writing his *Jugurthine War* the Parthian Empire ruled over Persia, and this power clashed with Rome, provoking battles and sieges between the two powers. From the subtly reproachful language that he chooses whenever he mentions the Persians in his ethnographic digression, Sallust cannot help but instill contemporary political feelings into his writing. He makes clear the uneasy relationship between Rome and Persia and hints at showing what the Romans thought to be a fundamental weakness from the time the Persians were introduced into his history.

The language that Sallust uses throughout the *Jugurthine War* reflects Roman attitudes towards foreign geography. When he is referring to particular topographic locations the tone is that of possession. In the beginning of his ethnographic digression on the tribes in Africa, Sallust describes the division of the continents. He points out that while many include Africa as a third division, a geographic entity in itself, they are incorrect in this classification. Africa is indeed a part of Europe ("sed Africam in Europa").[24] Several times throughout the description, Sallust encounters a territory that he relates in some way back to Rome. A coastal territory is still associated with Roman land because it is bounded on one or more sides by "nostro mari" (*our* sea). Sallust obtained much of his historical resources while holding magistracy in Africa, and he makes his satisfaction for Roman jurisdiction over Africa clear through this narrative. The period in which he is writing also influences his foreign preconceptions. Sallust was a supporter of Caesar, and although he did not live to see the formation of the second triumvirate, he participated in political affairs during the waning Republic.

Concerning coastal geography, the Romans believed the sea played a strong influence on the moral character of the inhabitants living off of maritime resources. The sea had potential to bring luxury and leisure, and submission to such extravagances would weaken a population. Not every coastal city allowed itself to be weakened and abate an honourable status. Cicero makes certain that despite Rome's coastal location in central Italy, the enervating physical features of the land were used to their advantage. For religious impact, he cites the city's celebrated founder, Romulus: "Romulus was admirably successful in achieving all the benefits that could be-

long to maritime cities, without incurring the dangers to which they are exposed."[25] The paragraph preceding this sentence presents a scrutiny of Greek culture, and the ways in which it had become weakened by overindulging in maritime vices. Both international sea commerce and a worthy naval force were the methods by which luxury was brought into Greek society. In accordance with what Cicero is describing, these maritime luxuries were bought to Greece from the interaction between other populations.

Cicero uses the word "barbarian" in reference to the Carthaginians and the Etruscans. These two nations are mentioned as the only barbarian cultures that had a position in the maritime world. He claims that all other barbarians were not sea-faring people and were unconcerned with this aspect of culture.[26] "Barbarian" in this context can be taken to mean uncivilized, because civilization is the status given to a society with an economy and some form of political management. If barbarian equates to savagery, then one would expect this comparison to apply to the model of extreme climates yielding savagery (aggressive behaviour). The Getulians, living in the African desert, were savage and barbarous and uncivilized. Conversely, a second African tribe, the Libyans, resettled along the coastal areas. After settling and establishing social and commercial order, they became more civilized as they began to value the comfort of an agreeable and indulgent coastal lifestyle. A unified identification of "barbarian" cannot be drawn on from all ancient sources; many authors do not utilize this word with consistency, even within their own works.

Moral degeneracy was a common theme in Roman Republican de-

scriptions of coastal impact on Greek societies. Strabo assesses the balance of cultures of the civilized, uncivilized and Greek Mediterranean world in his *Geography.* Although born a Greek, Strabo gained Roman citizenship later in life, and therefore straddles both geographic traditions. Both Rome and Greece are civilized cultures but have taken diametrically opposite roles in their respective environments. A population can either profit from its natural surroundings and essentially develop the inner-workings of civilization through exploitation of the land, or it can let the environment exploit the inner-workings of civilization and lose control. Rome was able to succeed in the former, and Greece ceded to the latter. Strabo advocates that it is not the will to overcome the environment so much as strength of character. Instead of the environment as an obstacle to overcome, it is something to tame and to cultivate. It is the basic quality of humans that can "navigate" the geography. This ideal of the moral character of man fundamentally governing all human affairs is a very Greek thought. Strabo is preserving some of the basic historiographic analysis methods of Greek predecessors, such as Herodotus.

Religious philosophies played a large part in Strabo's notion of a civilizational dichotomy. Uncivilized people, who are characterized by a similar judgment that civilization requires economic communication and an overall set of governing rules, lived high in the mountains. According to Strabo, these mountain people represented a lower evolutionary stage of human development.[27] He draws on human emotion, fear, for the reason that early isolated villages remained at higher or rugged territories. The undeveloped locations of these secluded worlds paralleled the undeveloped moral

character and the consequently undeveloped civilizing character of the inhabitants. The somewhat distorted Roman spatial awareness gave rise to the notion that mountains and other uninviting territories were on the outskirts of the world. It is not so difficult to understand why a Roman might believe this; the city was centered on a flat and level landscape, and their instinctive world-view was based on Rome as the political focus. Since civilized peoples settled in communities within an urban nucleus, those living in regions unlike that of Rome were seen as being of an opposite character. Once again, this follows the idea that a population could overcome its adversarial environment. In the case of small groups migrating from the "outskirts" and merging into villages or tribes, overcoming the environment meant having the moral strength to leave a poor situation and create a better one.

Van der Vliet sees the pattern of civilized versus non-civilized cultures, with respect to the Roman urban nucleus, as "circles of identity."[28] Given Strabo's Greek background and rhetorical reasoning, it is possible that he defined people and places in a way that Romans had not done before. Although the events that he described are rooted in Herodotean measures of human nature, this does not carry into his geographic narration. Populations are identified between distinct dichotomies, some with varying levels of separation in between.[29] There is a scale of human evolution from the mountains to the Roman centre of civilization, and there seems to be no clear evidence for a circular model. Van der Vliet's model seems to put too modern a perspective on a science that, at this time in Rome (the turn of the first century AD), was not advanced. Strabo's Geography comes only a few

decades after Julius Caesar employed three Greeks, Polyclitus, Theodotus and Zenodoxus, in 44BC on a land survey.[30] Each man plotted a section of the city's roads and municipal structures for military and commercial purposes. However a map did not develop from this exploration, it became an "itinerary."[31] Since Strabo had begun his geographic inquiry by the time the Roman road itinerary had been completed, it is unlikely that his approach to spatial representation was much more advanced than the existing style. Using this knowledge and the assumption that Strabo applied a Herodotean cause-and-effect style to his writing, a circular configuration of human and physical geography is flawed. The idea of a community living a certain distance from a central focus of civilization can be described as radial, rather than rotational, or concentric, as Van der Vliet proposes.[32] The same idea corresponds to the physical geography related to the population geography model; it is a radial relationship between harsh, distant mountainous regions and the favourable coastal or plain territories that civilized populations have later settled in.

In Strabo's description, he mostly employs only dual comparisons between two groups of people, typically choosing groups of contrasting character.[33] This is still a linear construction of geography and the associated ethnography- from pole to pole, one tribe to another. Strabo is similar to Pliny the Younger in this way, comparing a smaller set of people or places within a larger scheme. They are internal relationships represented on a scale that is independent of all features except what exists on each end of the scale. This can be used to demonstrate how his level of spatial rationalization is equal to other contemporary Roman geographers. It is only in his

writing style that Strabo differs, as a geographer, from historians of the Roman Republic.

Romans still saw themselves as above the troubling influences of the sea, and still believed themselves to have overcome their physical geography. Greek societies had allowed maritime luxury to weaken their culture, and the Romans wanted to prove, more to themselves than anyone else, that they were still strong and able to resist enervating forces in their environment. Around 58BC, the start of the Gallic Wars, the Romans were just beginning to take offensive military action. It is at this point, with the emergence of the titles triumvir and princeps that imperialistic ideology allowed for offensive military behaviour. These leaders kept a defensive political scene as they defended their legitimacy. Geographic motivation changed in the first century AD as powerful figures such as Augustus hired geographers to survey foreign lands. Moreover, their desire to map new territories proposes an offensive military approach. In the *Gallic Wars*, Caesar documented his own military actions in Gaul. He describes many battles and attacks, but the Roman perception of space in physical geography reveals a defensive burden on his troops. One tribe used their environment to their advantage and fashioned trees into a barrier, both from passage and vision.[34] This was a defensive tactic on the part of the Gallic tribe, and Caesar's troops could not seem to advance and defeat this obstacle.[35] It may seem as though they could not defeat this new environment, however the actual barrier was a man-made fortification. Here we see the Roman army fighting offensively as the Gauls defend themselves. Thus, Rome continued to be politically defensive in the late Republic and early Empire, yet there

was a change to offensive military behaviour.

As the Roman political landscape changed, so too did their views concerning the physical landscape. Perceived associations between territory and populations were communicated through geographic constructs and a notably linear writing style. Spatial representation in geographic texts played a significant role in interpreting the Roman understanding of geography as well as ethnographic biases. The physical attributes of a territory could affect the character of its inhabitants, either in a positive or harmful way. Moreover, the people living in a particular region could use the terrain to their advantage and establish civilizing aspects of society. A belief that they had taken control of their natural surroundings was the Romans' way to justify their expanding boundaries. Geographic descriptions were written in a manner that indicated a defensive military and political scene in the Republic as well as the division of an offensive military approach from a defensive political approach in the later Republic.

Endnotes

[1] Grime, 1923

[2] Smith, 1870

[3] Sallust begins a digression to his history of the *Jugarthine War* with the line, "My subject seems to require of me, in this place, a brief account of the situation in Africa, and of those nations in it with whom we have had war or alliances." and only continues his ethnographic aside for a few paragraphs.

[4] Riggsby finds fault with previous scholar's attempts to justify spatial representation in Pliny the Younger's writing, claiming that they model the ancient descriptions to a quantitative approach. However, the ancient narratives are, themselves, qualitative, therefore we should analyze them based on qualitative variations.

[5] Plin. *Ep*. 2.17, 5.6

[6] Riggsby, 2003
[7] Plin. *Ep*. 2.17
[8] Plin. *NH*. 3.6.5
[9] Plin. *Ep*. 2.17
[10] Cic. *Rep*. Bk.2
[11] Sall. *Iug*. 17.2-4
[12] Caes. *BGall*. 6.23 "They consider this the real evidence of their prowess, that their neighbors shall be driven out of their lands and abandon them, and that no one dare settle near them; at the same time they think that they shall be on that account the more secure, because they have removed the apprehension of a sudden incursion."
[13] In the case of territory acquisitioned in a military victory, the land was typically taken and distributed to the citizens who had fought in the army. "These towns, which were remarkable for their wealth and fine lands and houses, they intended to allocate to the army, complete with lands and houses, like a substitute for plunder taken on enemy soil." Appian. *BCiv*. 4.3.
[14] Pol. 34.8 "In Lusitania both animals and man are extraordinarily productive, owing to the excellent temperature of the air."
[15] Plin. *Ep*. 2.17 "The angle which the projection of the hall forms with this drawing-room, retains and increases the warmth of the sun, and this forms a retreat in the winter and a family gymnasium; it is sheltered from all winds except those which are generally attended with clouds, so that nothing can render this place useless,..."
[16] Ibid
[17] "Control" over the land would be the ability to cultivate the land.
[18] Morstein-Marx, 2001
[19] Ovid. *Met*. Bk.1
[20] The Greek geographer Ptolemy created a global "grid" with latitude and longitude divisions c.150AD, Ptolemy *Geographica*
[21] Sallust only mentions the tribes known in Rome at the time; Sall. *Iug*. 17-19
[22] Sall. *Iug*. 18
[23] Morstein-Marx, 2001
[24] Sall. *Iug.* 17.6-7; Morstein-Marx, 2001
[25] Cic. *Rep*. 2.24-25

[26] Cic. *Rep.* 1.16-19

[27] Strab. 3.3.8 "The quality of intractability and wildness in these peoples has not resulted solely from their engaging in warfare, but also from their remoteness; for the trip to their country, whether by sea or by land, is long, and since they are difficult to communicate with, they have lost the instinct of sociability and humanity… it is likely that those who live in the mountains are still more outlandish."

[28] Van der Vliet, 2003

[29] Strabo describes three towns, Pisa, Tyrrhenia and Liguria, situated in a line. He then compares the inhabitants of Tyrrhenia and Liguria to those living in Pisa, "for they were, to begin with, more warlike than the Tyrrheni, and their warlike spirit was sharpened by the Ligures, bad neighbours living at their flank." Strab. 5.2.5

[30] Smith, 1870

[31] Riggsby, 2003

[32] Van der Vliet, 2003, p.270

[33] Strab. 5.2.5

[34] Caes. *BGall.* 2.17-19

[35] Caes. *BGall.* 2.17.10-11 "had made these hedges present a fortification like a wall, through which it was not only impossible to enter, but even to penetrate with the eye."

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Patriarchal Power in the Roman Republic: Ideologies and Realites of the *Paterfamilias*

Emma Johnson

In the third century AD, Gaius recognized the *paterfamilias* as an institution unique to Roman society[1]. The eldest male in the family possessed this role which gave him *potestas*, or power, over the subsequent generations of his family; the *paterfamilias* was the only one who could own property, manage financial affairs, permit marriage, and perhaps most shockingly, he held the *vitae necisque potestas*, the power of life and death, over everyone under his *manus*. Theoretically, his power was complete and total until his death, at which point his sons would become the *paterfamiliae* of their own families. Despite such legal extremes, some contemporary scholars are of the opinion that our initial reactions to the *paterfamilias* have been incorrect and maintain that the reality was quite different than assumed. The law of the *paterfamilias* was indeed sharply constrained by social and cultural barriers and its role represents in effect, an ideology rather than a legally-enforced patriarchy.

One should be careful however not to diminish the power of the *paterfamilias* simply because not all statues were employed frequently in daily life. In many cases, Roman fathers were required to balance social norms

against the legal and ideological aspects of their *potestas*, for example, in the way a father interacted with his children who had reached adulthood, a situation which challenged the practicality of paterfamilial authority.

The Roman family has only recently become a subject studied in its own right. The majority of writers in the nineteenth century used the Roman family and its patriarchal ideologies in particular as evidence of a linear progression in history leading either to enlightenment or decline. Used in an evolutionary context, the attributes of the *paterfamilias* reflected the scholar's particular argument, influenced by contemporary political, social, and religious movements. Recent scholarship, although marked with its own set of biases and influences, has sought to remove the Roman family from the rhetoric of progression and place it back within its ancient context.

Early studies of the *paterfamilias* looked primarily at the legal definition of the father's powers as laid out by third century AD jurists such as Gaius and Ulpian, and interpreted these as accurate and trustworthy descriptions of Republican reality. This emphasis on legal powers and legendary examples of virtuous father-figures inspired many early scholars to either praise or condemn the seemingly extreme nature of the *pater potestas*. L.H. Morgan, in his 1877 anthropological work *Ancient Society*, defined the *paterfamilias* as a patriarch with complete power, and claimed "the modern family is an unquestionable improvement upon that of the Greeks and Romans."[2] He saw the Roman system as being significantly superior to earlier matrilineal organization, but also as deeply flawed. For Morgan, creation of an equal monogamous relationship was the culminating achievement of human social history[3]. Alternatively, other scholars like Marx and Engels

interpreted the fall of the *paterfamilias* within the pattern of moral decline, a process of erosion that bolstered their arguments about the status of modern-day society. In other words, scholars created narratives that sought to emphasize either social evolution or the present moral decline,[4] ignoring much of the ancient context.

The next phase in the study of the Roman family also followed this evolutionary rhetoric, though perhaps not as clearly as its predecessors. In 1967 James Crook was one of the first to attempt a synthesis between the legal definition of *potestas* and its social realities, but saw it as a simple matter of keeping "law sharply apart from religion and morals."[5] Thus, for example, *vitae necique potestas*, the right to kill any child under one's *potestas*, is simply a way to conceptualize relationships and had no bearing on everyday life. This assumes a strict segregation of private and public realms in Roman society, perhaps projecting our own conceptions of family life into the past. W.K. Lacey, a contemporary of Crook, saw the family as its own entity, separate from the public sphere with its own master/slave relationships. In Lacey's case, the evolutionary rhetoric remained: Lacey believed that the family became privatized with the rise of the *polis*, a progression that led to the creation of the nation-state and the truly private sphere of the family. His argument however ignores the blending of spheres in Roman society and the public and private functions of the family.

More recent publications have disavowed this evolutionary trend and sought to look at the Roman family as a separate entity, not a step on a progressive scale that ends with the present. Suzanne Dixon emphasizes the continuity between modern family life and that of the Romans, suggesting

that the disjoint between ideology and reality is found both in other aspects of Roman life and in our own society; such a contrast is also found in other areas of Roman life where they regularly employed a moralizing narrative that glorified the past[6]. She discusses in detail the lack of linear evolution in family life, stating that "there is not a linear development within which…the family moves towards a more "civilized" or isolated mode"; instead, "[s]uch developments can take place and then change again."[7] In addition, she notes that the disparity between the legal and social realities of the *paterfamilias* can easily be interpreted as a change over time. After all, our earliest sources from the second century BC present a different picture than the Twelve Tables supposedly written at the founding of the Republic.[8] To explain this seemingly evolutionary progression, she cites anthropologist Jack Goody remarking that "it is possible to interpret a gap between 'law' and 'practice' as the result of a change over time, as many authorities have done. But such a gap often exists as a matter of course, especially when 'codes' are initially written down."[9] In other words, this gap may simply be a matter of the law catching up to a reality that it had not sufficiently described when first composed. This suggests, unlike earlier theories by Crook and Lacey, that the *potestas* of the Roman father may not have changed as drastically over the course of the Republic as once thought.

While Dixon's theories successfully challenge evolutionism – both in the larger context of European history and within the history of Rome itself - she does fall prey to several traditional patterns. Despite citing Goody's theories on the disjoint between law and social reality, she believes that "[i]n a generalized way, the history of marriage and the family seems to

be characterized by a very slow erosion of the powers of the *paterfamilias*, both as father and as husband."[10] She also assumes a separation of public and private spheres, stating that the *paterfamilias* "was, in a sense, the public representative of the family unit."[11] These arguments contradict her other statements that such a progression cannot realistically exist, and that the Roman family did not change drastically over the course of the Republic.

Richard Saller has focused specifically on the realities of Roman life and how they made the ideological extremes of the *paterfamilias* impossible. He uses computer simulations and the limited data from the time to calculate the average lifespan of a Roman citizen. He found that by the age of 25, only 32 percent of the senatorial class had a living father, with the figure dropping to 19 percent for "ordinary Romans."[12] He concludes that the ideal three-generation Roman family with an elderly *paterfamilias* was relatively unfeasible in most cases, and that most men by the time they married were under their own *potestas*. As an alternative to traditional views of Roman patriarchy, Saller feels that the "moral value of *pietas* offers the historian a better insight into Roman family life than the legal rules of *potestas*."[13] With the *paterfamilias* "based on legal powers and…associated with a legendary past,"[14] it is better to view it as a reciprocal relationship. The legal and ideological evidence simply emphasizes the "steep hierarchy and fundamental distinctions of status" that are present in all aspects of Roman society[15].

While Saller's estimates of Roman life expectancy clearly show that a three-generational pattern was not feasible, they are misleading and do not

solve the problem of a Roman adult living under the *potestas* of his or her father. He does concede that the longer a Roman lived, the longer he or she was expected to survive – by the age of thirty, for example, an individual could expect to live another twenty-six years[16]; however, he fails to discuss the connotations of such a calculation. Members of the senatorial class generally lived longer, and therefore a higher percentage of them must have reached adulthood with a living father. We can understand Roman estimates of the life expectancy for senators in the age limits of various magistracies: surely the late age of 40 for the consulship would not have been established if a significant number of senators were not expected to reach it. For the grown man who had to marry, raise children, establish his own estate, command troops, or become an active magistrate in the Senate, the problem of the extreme rights of his father's *potestas* is not solved by Saller's calculations. There were still those individuals – many in important positions in the Republic – who had to deal with the realities of the *paterfamilias*. Therefore, there must have been other constraints on the relationship, other established mechanisms that led to an amenable and stable family life. Political and military institutions would require an independence not permitted by the statutes of *potestas* in order to function properly. What were those constraints? What boundaries existed where the power of the state, the power of the individual, and the power of the *paterfamilias* clashed? While the comparison between the two features of the *paterfamilias* – the legal or ideological, and the realistic – is an important one to make, it still sets up a system that suggests these aspects of a father's *potestas* never interacted, conflicted, or challenged each other. To move beyond this false dichotomy,

historians must look at the exceptions to the rules, and find examples of situations where the norm does not apply. Only then can we test the boundaries of the *paterfamilias* and truly see where social constraints clashed with legal doctrine and ideological values.

To further examine the exceptions to Saller's population model, we must look at several situations where life expectancy is surpassed and family members interact under the father's *potestas* for an extended period of time. Due to the present lack of evidence, we must limit ourselves to late Republican senators, and study their understanding of the ideal and common family situation. This evidence, though limited, gives us examples of the *paterfamilias* as it influenced grown men and women still under the *potestas* of their fathers. For this, we can look not only at the everyday interactions and realities of family life, but also at the extremes which arose during times of crisis in the Republic. It is not by looking at general trends that we will better our understanding of the *paterfamilias*. It is only through exceptional circumstances and moments in history when the boundaries have been pressed that we can understand the extent to which *potestas* was taken literally and in what situations it was used.

Despite the life expectancy of the average Roman, some fathers did live long enough to see their children reach adulthood, and their experiences will shed some light on their actual conceptions of *potestas*. There were many ideological examples of good Roman fathers, most of them famous for being both severe and attentive. For example, Cicero often speaks of Appius Claudius the Blind, an old man who had four sons, five daughters, and a large household staff. He maintained "absolute command over his

household", and "the customs and discipline of his forefathers flourished beneath his roof"[17]; for this, he was loved by all his children. Another figure prominent in the literature on fatherhood is Cato the Elder, a stern and conservative man who also carefully organized the education of his son[18]. Clearly this narrative allowed Roman men in the Late Republic to glorify the past, believing that fathers used to deal with their *domus*[19] "severely [and] solemnly" as opposed to "mildly, gently, and in a modern way."[20]

However, despite Cicero's constant attempts to prefer the more austere and commanding fatherly role, his letters tell a different story. The most important goal for an adult woman under the *manus* of her father was marriage, as is evident in most of his letters that mention his daughter Tullia's various engagements, marriages, and divorces. Most interesting is Tullia's engagement to Dolabella in 50BC, which was arranged while Cicero was out of Rome. Apparently this betrothal was established "without [his] knowledge", since Cicero "had told [his family] not to consult [him] since [he] should be so far away."[21] He writes to his friend Atticus that "it was the last thing [he] had expected", which suggests that despite giving his permission to make plans without his involvement, he is surprised that this is taken literally[22]. It seems that he was so convinced that his advice would be needed that he "had even sent trusted agents to [his wife] Terentia and Tullia about the suit of Ti. Nero, who had made proposals."[23] It also seems his concerns about the engagement stem from political troubles in his province, a conflict of interest in which he backed the opponent of his new son-in-law.[24] This is definitely a strange proceeding if Cicero has unquestionable power within his family. While it is easy to see that logistically he could not

have been in control of his *domus* while away from Rome, it is interesting to note that he does not force the dissolution of the engagement or the marriage, and supports his family in their decision. The majority of women at this time stayed under the *potestas* of their fathers after marriage, and do not pass under the *manus* of their new husbands, therefore Cicero had the right to break the engagement. If he truly believed in the ideals that he so often cites in his political speeches – the examples of Appius Claudius and Cato the Elder – would he not have done so? His political situation in his province has been compromised by this arrangement, yet he does nothing. Clearly, while certainly involved in the lives of their adult daughters, fathers did not have absolute control over some of the most important familial issues; in fact, it seems that Cicero in this example is out of touch with his family, and trusts the judgment of his wife in his absence.

The second example that can help us understand one of the major logistical problems of the *paterfamilias* is financial support. How do fathers deal with the finances of their adult sons who live elsewhere and do not legally own their own estates? Again, Cicero provides us with evidence that although he is financially in control of his son, he is fairly indulgent and gives him the *peculium* (allowance) he needs for a vast amount of independence. This seems to be the norm: sons generally were given enough money to live an almost extravagant life because they were needed to reflect their father's social standing[25]. In Cicero's letter to Atticus in 46BC, he complains that his son wants a "liberal allowance," and although he insists that he is unwilling to support him in this manner, he nevertheless "gave him permission…for [he] saw that [Atticus] did not really dislike the idea."[26]

This supports Dixon's claim that this was meant to be a reflection of the *paterfamilias*' wealth and glory: Cicero claims that "[i]t would be a disgrace to me that my son should run short of money in his first year, whatever he may deserve. Afterwards we will restrict him more carefully."[27] In fact, he seems unusually concerned when his son does not ask him for more money, and wonders why he has not complained about his allowance once his financial year is over[28]. It is clear, then, that despite the legal authority of the *paterfamilias*, he was not unwilling to bow to his son's wishes, and give him more money than he perhaps needed or deserved. In keeping with the ideal of a strict and conservative *potestas*, Cicero refuses to accept that he is to blame for his son's behaviour. The glorification of past fathers does not seem to conflict with contemporary reality to the Roman mind.

These relationships of a father to his son and daughter are therefore significantly opposed to the legal and ideological views of the *paterfamilias*, although this did not seem to trouble Cicero. We must, of course, be careful of the bias that Cicero naturally includes in his letters: he is writing to his good friend, but still wishes to preserve his reputation, and does not want to be held responsible for any faults his son might have; he also, while admitting that his wife and daughter arranged a marriage without his consent, does not want to be viewed as either uncaring or unnecessary in the affairs of Tullia, and quickly forgives their independence in order to establish his control of the household. We cannot know whether the ideal *paterfamilias* of the past actually existed, as Cicero's letters are one of the earliest reliable sources. It is, nevertheless, safe to say that even though many Romans never had to deal with the reality of a grown son still under the *potestas* of

his father, a clear and well-established system that balanced the realities of the day and the ideologies of the past existed in the event of such a situation.

There is, of course, a more extreme example of the power of the *paterfamilias* that can help us understand the way this role interacted with other institutions and aspects of Roman society. The famous *vitae necisque potestas* is perhaps the most difficult power for the modern mind to grasp. Many scholars claim that later developments, such as the third century AD requirement that a family *consilium* was necessary before any action was taken[29], prevented fathers from indiscriminately killing their children. Legendary fathers who supposedly killed their sons were regularly idealized in later Roman literature, again suggesting the common Roman narrative of a glorious past and a moral decline in the present. However, "this very admiration is based on the assumption that parents would normally favor their children and that such patriotism was exceptional."[30] It is also interesting to note that the few examples we have of either legendary or real uses of the *vitae necisque potestas* involve a serious crime against the Roman state, and not simply a feud among family members. This narrative serves to underline certain aspects of Roman society, and again helps us understand how the *paterfamilias* functioned in the cases where fathers lived to see their sons come of age.

Many ancient sources describe the ideological and most likely mythological story of consul T. Manlius Torquatus in 340 BC. His son, serving in the army of his father, charged into battle without first being given the order. For this infringement, his father organized a military trib-

une and, stating that he "held in reverence neither consular authority nor a father's dignity," ordered his execution.[31] According to Livy, the assembly was shocked at his decision, and consequently the "orders of Manlius" were given greater authority and prestige, and after this act "the soldiers [were] more obedient to their general."[32] It is not clear if this story is meant to illustrate paternal severity or military and political strategy, since the final outcome was not only one of shock – a father was assumed to care primarily for the wellbeing of his children – but also one of obedience to both the state and the general. It is difficult to know if Torquatus was acting as a father using his *potestas* or a consul and general using his *imperium*, and thus we cannot know to what extent Romans would have perceived this as normal behaviour for a *paterfamilias*. It is clear, though, that this was not considered the norm in the Early Republic or at the time Livy was writing his history of Rome. It is equally possible that this story was invented simply to display the morality and patriotism of brave and honourable Romans, and reflect Livy's position that the Late Republic and Early Empire represented a severe moral decline. Significantly, there are no examples in Livy of fathers using this right as private citizens, but only as political and military leaders; there are also no examples of fathers putting their daughters to death. The story of Torquatus not only displays the loyalty of the father, but also the bravery of the son: Sallust says that "the gallant young man paid the penalty for too great valour with his life,"[33] reminding us that both men acted as they did out of their love of Rome.

Sallust is the only primary source[34] that gives us an example of the *vitae necique potestas*. Writing about the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63BC,

he briefly mentions Fulvius, "a senator's son, who was…put to death by the order of his father" after leaving Rome in the hopes of joining Catiline's forces.[35] Again, we must be aware of how this story is used in Sallust's narrative: he frequently mentions fathers and sons being disrespectful of each other in order to emphasize the decline in morality of the Late Republic, and to further establish the danger and importance of the crises that took place at this time. Cassius Dio, writing several centuries later, retells the story using the name Aulus Fulvius, though his source for this extended name is still unknown, calling into question the accuracy of the story itself. Dio states that Fulvius "was not the only private individual, as some think, who ever acted thus", and that "[t]here were many others, that is to say, not only consuls, but private individuals, who slew their sons…[t]his was the course of affairs at the time."[36] It is unclear how Dio knows this information, especially since it is never mentioned by Sallust that private citizens used the *vitae necisque potestas*, and Livy never provides us with earlier examples or legendary acts of this nature. All we know of Aulus Fulvius is derived from this one story, as told by Sallust, Cassius Dio, and Valerius Maximus[37]. It is very possible that Dio uses this to display the chaos and moral depravity of the time, since there is no first-hand knowledge of this behaviour. The fact that it is emphasized in Sallust and Dio is certainly evidence that it was not normal behaviour by the first century BC, and a reflection of "the value of placing loyalty to the *patria* ahead of loyalty to the *familia* – a value as relevant to sons as to fathers."[38] It is, again, difficult to know how Romans themselves perceived Fulvius' story: was it considered an invocation of the power of the *paterfamilias* or the rights of a magistrate

to institute justice? It certainly seems that this was considered an unusually severe act for a father, especially considering Cicero's claim that one places the nuclear family at the top of one's loyalties and obligations[39]. Polybius himself, writing before the Catilinarian conspiracy, states that examples of "men in office who have put their own sons to death" go against "every law or custom, because they valued the interest of their country more dearly than their natural ties."[40] Even in the second century BC, Polybius was aware that these stories are not examples of a father using his *potestas*, but rather exceptions to the rule that forced the *paterfamilias* to test his role in unusual circumstances that involved political crisis and treasonous adult sons.

The lack of sufficient evidence makes the study of Republican family life especially difficult for social historians. The majority of our information is second-hand, and written with a very specific ideological bias. Even our few primary sources should be studied and used with care, for they too cannot be taken literally. However, the family is not only useful for our understanding of everyday Roman life and its social organization, but can also tell us something about the ideals and values that were considered the most important. The significant gap between the ideological and realistic uses of the *patria potestas*, both in everyday interactions within the family and in times of crisis, is consistent with similar gaps in other aspects of Roman society; the constant glorification of the past and a rhetoric of moral decline are common in ancient literature of all subjects. Ultimately, the attempt to balance the gap between ideology and reality is seen as one of the hallmarks of the Republic, and the shifting boundaries between the two help us to better understand the Roman thought process.

Endnotes

[1] Inst. 1.55.

[2] L.H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (Calcutta: K.P.Bagchi & Co., 1982), 399.

[3] Similarly, Henry Maine, Morgan's contemporary, saw the *paterfamilias* as a denial of individual rights and identity, and saw the rise of the individual during the Enlightenment as inevitable (Cynthia B. Patterson, *The Family in Greek History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 19.)

[4] Suzanne Dixon, "Continuity and Change in Roman Social History: Retrieving 'Family Feeling(s)' in Roman Law and Literature" from *Inventing Ancient Culture: Historicism, Periodization, and the Ancient World*, Eds. Mark Golden and Peter Toohey (London: Routledge, 1997), 80.

[5] James Crook, "*Patria Potestas*", *The Classical Quarterly* 17.1 (1967), 116.

[6] Suzanne Dixon, *The Roman Family* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 42

[7] Ibid., 18.

[8] The Twelve Tables, specifically Table IV, outlines the powers of the father over his family (A.C. Johnson et al., *Ancient Roman Statues* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 10).

[9] Dixon 1997: 86; Jack Goody, *The Oriental, The Ancient and The Primitive: Systems of marriage and the family in pre-industrial societies of Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 410.

[10] Dixon 1992: 77.

[11] Ibid., 138.

[12] Richard P. Saller, "Roman Heirship Strategies in Principle and in Practice" in *The Family in Italy from Antiquity to the Present*, Eds. David I. Kertzer and Richard P. Saller (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 37; See also Chapter 3 of Saller's 1994 book *Patriarchy, property and death in the Roman family* for a more detailed discussion of these figures. There are several different models used, and each generated slightly different numbers that could alter our understanding of life and death in Roman society.

[13] Richard P. Saller*, Patriarchy, property and death in the Roman family* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 226. Saller posits a strict dichotomy between *pietas* and *patria potestas*, believing that this difference is highly influential in our comprehension of the reciprocal relationship between father and child (130-2).

[14] Ibid., 103.

[15] Ibid., 72.

[16] Ibid., 24.

[17] Cic. *Sen*. 37 (Trans. W.A. Falconer, 1923).

[18] Plut. *Cat*. *Mai*. 20 (Trans. R. Waterfield, 1999).

[19] There is, as with most Latin terminology, great debate as to the exact definition of *domus* as opposed to *familia*. Here, I use *domus* to mean the household, family members and all other individuals living under the same roof (see Saller 1994, Chapter 4). Saller also warns against using our own definitions of words as a reflection of Roman conceptions: "historians are not required to use Latin terms in the same way as ancient authors used them, but it is necessary to be aware of the differences between ancient and modern usage" (Richard P. Saller, "Pater Familias, Mater Familias, and the Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household", *Classical Philology* 94.2. (1999), 197).

[20] Cic. *Cael*. 14 (Trans. R. Gardner, 1958).

[21] Cic. *Fam*. 3.12 (Trans. D.R. Shackelton Bailey, 2001).

[22] Cic. *Att*. 6.6 (Trans. E.O. Winstedt, 1912).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Dixon 1992: 110.

[26] Cic. *Att*. 12.7.

[27] Ibid., 12.32.

[28] Ibid., 15.15.

[29] Dixon 1992: 47

[30] Dixon 1992: 118

[31] Liv. 8.7 (Trans. B.O. Foster, 1924)

[32] Ibid.

[33] Sall *Cat*. 52 (Trans. J.C. Rolfe, 1920).

[34] It is important to remember that many of what we consider to be "primary sources", such as Livy and Cassius Dio, are in fact ancient secondary sources written by historians; we must therefore be careful when using their information.

[35] Sall. *Cat*. 39.

[36] Cass. Dio 37 (Trans. E. Cary, 1909).

[37] T. Robert S. Broughton. *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* Vol. 2. (New York: American Philological Association. 1952), 491.

[38] Saller 1994: 115.

[39] Ibid., 227; Cic. Off. 1.54 (Trans. Walter Miller, 1913).

[40] Pol. 6.55 (Trans. I. Scott-Kilvert, 1979).

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Italian Aims in the First Civil War 87-82 BC

Andrew Swidzinski

The Social War of 91 BC was a turning point in the development of the Roman state and citizenship. During the course of this conflict, half of Rome's Italian allies rebelled against Roman rule and established a full fledged counter-state, possessing a Senate, a capital and a patriotic notion of Italia, perhaps best symbolized by their minting of coins depicting an Italian bull goring a Roman wolf[1]. It was a desperate struggle, in which the Romans were driven so close to defeat that they were forced to conscript former slaves to defend their coasts.[2] Both sides initially fielded armies in excess of 100,000 men.[3] Because the Italian troops had themselves contributed massively to the Roman armies of the past decades, they undoubtedly enjoyed similar training and abilities as the legions.[4]The result was that, equally matched, both sides suffered horrendous casualties.[5] Yet rather than being a long and drawn out conflict, the Social War ended after only three years with the Romans victorious. As the war progressed, rather than imposing more stringent conditions upon their enemies, the Romans steadily granted the rights of Roman citizenship to the whole of Italy. Moreover, in the civil war that immediately ensued, the Italians played a role that

seemed radically different from that of a conquered population. They deployed enormous armies to support both sides in the conflict, and by the end of the war their political rights had been significantly enhanced.

Several important questions have arisen as to the causes and the nature of this conflict. The ancient sources, of which there are few for the period in question, viewed it largely as a response on the part of the Italian allies to the refusal of the Romans to grant them the citizenship, and thus allow them to share in the benefits of the empire which had been created in great part due to the efforts of their own soldiers. This is the view taken by Appian, an Alexandrian Greek who composed a history of Rome's civil wars during the reign of the Emperor Antoninus Pius, and Velleius Paterculus, a Roman knight who wrote during the principate of Tiberius and was himself descended from participants in the conflict.[6] Their view has been defended by many modern scholars, notably Sherwin White (1971), Brunt (1988) and Keaveney (2004). Yet both Appian and Velleius lived in periods in which the idea of universal citizenship had become common among the Romans, and Italy and Rome had come to be viewed as one and the same, and so they may have reshaped the narrative in accordance with their own inherent biases.[7] Another tradition is preserved by the historian Diodorus of Sicily who wrote in the 1st century BC. He describes a revolt of the "nations of Italy against Rome's domination" and describes the newly established Italian state[8] in a manner that has led some historians, notably Mouritsen (1998) to conclude that the revolt was motivated by a desire to overthrow Roman hegemony and establish a state more in keeping with the diverse cul-

tural traditions of non-Roman Italy.

Many of Mouritsen's arguments are convincing. It is unlikely, as he has demonstrated, that the Italians had become culturally assimilated to the Romans in the 2nd century BC,[9] or that all allied communities felt Roman citizenship to be more desirable than their existing privileges.[10] But it remains, however, difficult to ignore the widespread movement among both the Italian aristocracy and the common people to obtain both Roman citizenship and greater influence in the Roman voting assemblies. This movement manifested itself not only in the years prior to the Social War, but most notably in the period after it had been concluded. Mouritsen largely ignores the period between 87 and 83 BC., and in doing so neglects what is likely the strongest case in favour of an Italian desire for the Roman citizenship.[11] With the exception of the Samnites, Italian resistance had quickly collapsed after the passage of laws granting citizenship. Once that citizenship had been shown to include what amounted to second class status in the voting assemblies, the Italians put massive political and military support behind Roman politicians willing to equalize the situation. As a result they succeeded in gaining all of the concessions they had asked for at the beginning of the Social War while even their most bitter ideological opponents were forced to accept their newfound political status. This paper will focus upon the role of the newly enfranchised citizens in the period between the conclusion of the Social War and their influence upon the Civil War between the factions of Cinna and Sulla.

The Social War can broadly be divided into three phases. In the first

phase, from 91 to early 90 BC, the Italians enjoyed the initiative, winning multiple victories over their Roman opponents and killing two Roman consuls in battle.[12] During this period they established a capital city at Corfinium, in the territory of the Paeligni, and established a Senate made up of the leading men of the various nations who had joined the revolt[13] In the second phase, beginning in 90 BC, the Romans granted citizenship to all Latin and allied communities not yet in revolt. According to Appian, this had the effect of making "the enemy under arms less hostile out of hope to win something similar"[14] The tide of the war then turned decisively in favour of the Romans, as the Consul Pompeius and the legate Sulla, they began to regain territory from the Samnites and the Marsi.[15] The third phase began with the passage in 89 of the Lex Plautia Papiria, which allowed for the enrollment of all Italians who submitted within 60 days and presented themselves before a Praetor.[16] By this time most resistance had ended[17], with only the Samnites retaining a serious military presence in south Italy.[18]

Yet despite their apparent defeat, the Italians would soon afterwards reassert their presence in Roman politics. Mouritsen argues that the defeat in the Social War had been entirely military in nature and had been decided by superior Roman numbers[19]. If this were correct, one would not expect the Italians to have involved themselves extensively in the political debates then going on in Rome, to have sought an expansion of their civic rights or to have fielded massive armies in a civil war that followed only a few years after their defeat. It is far more likely that the Romans recognized the extent to which their victory had depended upon the enfranchisement of the new citizens and were prepared to act accordingly. The grants of citizenship be-

tween 90 and 89 BC had given the Italians the citizenship but had placed them in eight newly created voting tribes which would vote after the 35 tribes of original Roman citizens, an arrangement that would make their votes meaningless.[20] Ambitious Roman politicians, viewing the new citizens as a massive political constituency to employ in support of their own ambitions, immediately began to appeal to their desire for an equal redistribution. In 88 BC the tribune Sulpicius, perhaps in a bid to advance his own political career, promised to redistribute the new citizens over the whole of the existing 35 tribes. In this he enjoyed the support of Gaius Marius, who hoped to revive his own career by attaching himself to the cause of redistribution, and thus gain the support of the now decisive Italian voters in his quest for a new military command.[21] Marius and Sulpicius were able to bring in sufficient support from among the Italians to push the measure through the assembly, and forced the Consuls Sulla and Pompeius to attempt to suspend public business in order to prevent the chaos that ensued when a mob made of new citizens attacked the old citizens who did not wish to wish to see the weight of their votes diluted.

The Marian mob succeeded in passing both the redistributions, and handing over command of the coming war against Mithridates of Pontus to Marius. The consul Lucius Sulla was able to restore the status quo by marching on Rome at the head of a private army, but his supporters were unable to maintain his settlement once he had departed to deal with Mithridates in Asia. Within months of Sulla's departure, the newly elected consul Lucius Cornelius Cinna reintroduced the legislation of Sulpicius[22], when he was unsuccessful in doing so and was ejected from Rome by partisans of

Lucius Cornelius Sulla, he immediately appealed to the Italian communities on the grounds that it was "on their account that he had incurred disaster"[23], and was able to raise an army numbering 30 legions.[24] Marius was able to raise another large force in Etruria with promises to change, in the words of Appian, "the method of voting, which concerned them passionately".[25] Together they marched on Rome at the head of mostly Italian troops. That they were able to involve the new citizens in their struggle with such ease is testament to the degree to which Italians were concerned with the nature of their citizenship. This concern is made even more evident when one considers that they were being appealed to on the grounds of their ability to participate in elections and legislative assemblies, the political institutions of the Republic, rather than simply enjoying the legal privileges of Citizenship. Moreover it is notable that they were, in the next few years, able to put even larger forces into the field based upon pledges of this nature. Appian (BC. 1.79, 1.82) claims that they raised over 100,000 to fight Sulla in 83. Velleius (2.24.4.) estimates a Cinnnan army of 200,000. Plutarch (Sulla 27) estimates that the Cinnan army later raised to fight Sulla numbered 450 cohorts, which would meant an army of over 200 000 , if we assume that each legion included between 6 and 10 cohorts and that each legion numbered around 4,000 men. Florus (2.18.) estimates that they numbered 8 legions and 500 cohorts, or roughly 282, 000. Even if we accept the more conservative figure provided by Appian, the armies raised by the Cinnans are still remarkable. The very fact that they were able to put such forces into the field in itself suggests that the Social War had not had as damaging an effect upon the Italian population as was supposed and that they could likely have kept

on the conflict for longer, if the citizenship had not been offered them.

After the initial chaos that followed the immediate return of Marius, the Cinnans proceeded to govern and kept their promise by to redistribute the new citizens in the census of 86 BC. It is generally accepted that such a census did take place.[26] Some scholars, notably Wiseman (1969) and Keaveney (2004), have denied that the census of 86 carried out the proposed equal redistribution throughout the 35 tribes[27]. Their argument rests upon two pieces of evidence. The first is that Livy mentions a decree of the Senate to give the new citizens the right to vote in 85 or 84 BC. This would suggest that Cinna had not done so until it became necessary to insure their support in the coming struggle with Sulla.[28] The second is that the number of adult male citizens recorded in the census numbered only 463,000 according to the Christian scholar Saint Jerome, as opposed to the 394, 000 citizens recorded by Livy for the year 115 BC.[29] These figures would suggest that, if one accounts for population growth, few if any new citizens had been added to the rolls. That the number of adult males registered in the census of 70 BC nearly doubled to 900, 000 would serve to confirm that only then had the new citizens been enfranchised.[30]

Both of these arguments, however, can be dismissed. The Livian epitome indicates that the new citizens were given the right to vote, something that they would have possessed already under the Lex Julia, thus casting doubt upon the accuracy of the source.[31] To assume, as Keaveney does,[32] that the decree meant a genuine redistribution of the citizens would also be excessive, given that such a measure could only have been implemented through one of the legislative assemblies[33]. Moreover, there is significant

enough evidence that the Cinnans did keep their promise beforehand. Had they, as Keaveney contends, refused to implement the redistributions until 84, there would surely be some indication of it in the sources. Appian traces the issue of citizenship obsessively throughout his narrative, and given his tone of general hostility towards Cinna, it is doubtful that he would have passed up an opportunity to demonstrate that the Consul had broken his promise and that the redistributions had only been made at a moment in which it was convenient to his conduct of the war. Yet he mentions nothing of the kind. What he does indicate is that the laws made during the first consulship of Sulla were repealed— which presumably would have meant that the redistributions passed by Sulpicius would be back in force[34]— and that the Cinnans were able to use the recent measures as a recruiting tactic among the Italians, something which even Keaveney admits would have been difficult had they been seen to have been reluctant in implementing their original pledge.[35]

Moreover, given the behaviour of the Italians in the past, it is highly unlikely that they would have meekly accepted a census in which they were not redistributed[36]or the censorial meddling posited by Brunt.[37] Italians had been prepared to show up on masse to declare themselves as citizens in the census of 97 BC.[38] Only recently, they had come to Rome in sufficiently large numbers to ram Sulpicius' redistributive legislation through the Plebeian Assembly and engage in large scale mob violence against those who opposed the measure.[39] More importantly they had, despite the recent experience of the Social War, been willing to field massive armies to support

Cinna and Marius in their march on Rome, and would do so again within a few years. It is difficult, therefore, to conceive that they would have accepted anything less than a rapid fulfillment of the promised redistribution, especially if a census, the method by which citizenship could be formalized, were being held. It is indeed more likely that at least some of them would have gone so far as to resume active warfare against the Romans.

Other explanations may be furnished for the Senatorial decree recorded by Livy. The epitome within which it is to be found largely deals with assertions of Senatorial authority in the months leading up to the war. The Senate had launched a determined peace initiative and had even convinced the Cinnans to endorse a proposal for all armies to be disbanded. They were unsuccessful however, in convincing Carbo to come to terms with Sulla.[40] They had also begun to object to the high handed manner of the new Consul, demonstrated by his delay in conducting an election for his successor.[41] In taking stances designed to appease the Italians, the core constituency of the Cinnans, such as opposition to the taking of hostages from Italian cities and a confirmation of existing voting privileges, the Senate may have been trying to make its own bid for support among the citizens whom Sulla and Cinna were now making equally determined efforts to court.

The figures provided by Jerome are equally suspect. The registration of only 463,000 citizens would indicate not only a failure to redistribute the Italians through the full 35 tribes. It would signify that they had not been accepted by the censors as being citizens to begin with, something which none

of the ancient sources accept. It is certainly conceivable, as Frank has argued, that the requirements of travel to Rome to obtain registration would have dissuaded many Italians from doing so.[42] Yet given the enthusiasm demonstrated for the cause of the Cinnans such a short time before, it is difficult to accept an increase over the previous census that could be explained by population growth alone. The most credible hypothesis concerning the nature of the figures is that of Beloch, who argues that a corruption in the manuscript distorted the original number of 963,000.[43] This would seem logical in light of the slightly lower figures recorded in 70BC.[44]

Moreover, the argument most neglected by those who would argue that the promises of Cinna and the Census of 86 were a sham is the potential benefits to be derived by the Cinnans from the mass enfranchisement and redistribution of the new citizens. Keaveney argues that Cinna's motivation for refusing to redistribute the new citizens was a desire to appease conservative senators. Aside from the lack of any indication that conservative senators were then interested in preventing a redistribution or proof that their support superceded others in importance to the Cinnans[45] it is arguable that the support of the new citizens would have been far more useful to Cinna than that of the Senate. An equalization of the voting structure would have allowed the votes of the Italians, when they bothered to show up for votes on important legislation, to outweigh the old. The enfranchisement of the Italian aristocracy, who did have the means to travel frequently to Rome and presumably would have had a decisive vote in the property based centuriate assembly, could well have guaranteed continuous re-election for Cinna and

his allies to the consulship. That Cinna would have needed such support is highly likely, when one considers the extent to which his so called regime continued to function within the norms of traditional Roman politics.

The three year period between 87 and 84 BC during which Lucius Cornelius Cinna held consecutive consulships in conjunction with like minded colleagues has often been referred to as the *Cinnae Dominatio*, with Cinna himself being portrayed as a skilled manipulator who ruled through the use of military force enjoyed near absolute power over the Roman state[46]. Yet this interpretation ignores the extent to which Cinna was compelled to seek the support of various constituencies within the Roman polity, as well as the relatively smooth functioning of Republican institutions in the period of his ascendancy[47]. Cicero described the period as three years in which the city was "free from the threat of arms", and refers to the leading orators of the period in a manner which strongly suggests that the courts continued to function normally.[48] The Senate also seems to have preserved its importance, with its members enjoying considerable freedom of action. Between 87 and 83 BC, it had been able to take the initiative to enter into negotiations with Sulla,[49] and exact a promise from Cinna not to raise additional troops.[50] It was further able to prevent Carbo, who had taken over the leadership of the Cinnan faction after the death of its namesake, from extracting hostages from Italian communities.[51] The epitomes of Livy also show a considerable exercise of Senatorial authority even in the months immediately preceding the Sullan invasion of Italy. The Senate is said, during this period, to have passed the decree "giving the right to vote" to newly en-

franchised citizens and to have carried out a redistribution of freedmen among the 35 tribes. It also took a lead role in attempting to negotiate a peace between the warring factions[52]. Most notably it was able to pass a decree, despite the eagerness of Carbo and his party for war, which called for all armies to be disbanded[53]. Several prominent Consulars remained in Rome during the period and continued to contribute to its function.[54] There seems to have been a reasonable degree of normalcy in the conduct of the voting assemblies.[55] Appian's contradictory account also suggests that elections continued to be taken seriously enough for a sitting consul to be threatened with removal if he failed to conduct them.[56]

It can therefore be concluded that the political situation in Rome remained free enough to allow dissent against the Cinnans and the relative freedom of the Senate. Because the sources do not describe the specific natures of the elections during this period—aside from the ambiguous statement of Appian that Cinna and Carbo had proclaimed themselves to the position in 84 BC[57]—to give us a clear picture of whether or not they were conducted as they had been prior to the civil war, it would be plausible to assume that the Cinnans may have relied more on the electoral support of the newly enfranchised citizens than on intimidation or coercion. Given that such a substantial number of Italians had been willing to fight for Cinna during the civil wars, he might naturally have assumed that these same individuals would be willing to show up once a year to vote in bloc for Cinnan candidates, and that, considering the relatively small size of the voting sites, they could have crowded out their competition as effectively as Sulpicius'

mob had guaranteed the passage of the initial redistributions.[58] The large number of *equites* proscribed by Sulla[59] would also suggest that Cinna enjoyed considerable electoral support among this class, and most likely from among newly enfranchised Italian aristocrats. This support, rather than coercion, may have been the underlying factor behind his repeated election to the post of Consul.

Despite the death of Marius, their ablest military leader, and the later death of Cinna himself, the Cinnan/Marian faction were remarkably successful during the three years in which they were "continuously the masters of Italy"[60]. They had marshaled massive Italian support for their political aims and had succeeded in enfranchising the new citizens in a formal census[61]. They had successfully implemented a radical economic programme that involved both a partial cancellation of debts and a reassertion of the value of the currency[62]. They had established control over the whole of the Italian peninsula and raised an enormous army to defend Italy against the Sullans[63] Perhaps more surprisingly, they had managed to convince a significant portion of the senatorial aristocracy to accept, if not enthusiastically embrace their agenda. Blue blooded aristocrats like Scipio Asiagenes and Mucius Scaevola remained in Rome during the entire period, some of whom served in the armies raised to fight Sulla upon his return to Italy.[64] That Sulla eventually chose to proscribe such a large number of senators and equites is indicative of the support enjoyed by the Cinnan regime.[65] Given this support, and the massive numerical advantage which they enjoyed over the Sullans during the initial phase of the civil war in Italy[66], the

Cinnans would have had good reason to expect that they would emerge victorious from the coming struggle. Within three years, however, Sulla was the undisputed master of Italy, and his army had more than doubled to include a full 23 legions[67]. This reversal of fortunes may be in large part attributed to the nature of Italian support for the regime, which depended less on any sense of personal loyalty, than on the ability of those in authority to meet the demand for citizenship and increased political rights.

The support which the Italians provided seems to have been conditional upon the ability of Cinna and his heirs to satisfy their political demands. Like the equally sophisticated Roman electorate that had backed the measures of the Gracchi when these had appeared beneficial to themselves only to abandon their self proclaimed champions when an opposing faction offered something better, a large segment of the new citizens seemed to have been perfectly willing to ignore past loyalties in favour of more immediate interests. Once the redistribution of their votes had been carried out and no longer seemed to be under threat of being repealed, they were much less willing to support the political ambitions of their benefactors, or participate in a civil war.

According to Velleius, Cinna had initially been able to raise a force amounting to nearly thirty legions.[68] Once he had gained mastery of Rome and delivered upon his political promises, however, this force seems to have been disbanded and, as has been suggested previously"[69]were not used as an occupying force in the same manner as Sulla's *Cornelii* or the veterans he garrisoned at strategic locations throughout the Italian peninsula[70] . Appian

indicates that when Sulla sent a list of demands to the Senate after defeating Mithridates, the political position of the Cinnans was weak enough that, where they had previously been able to arrange for the Senate to condemn Sulla as a public enemy[71], they were now powerless to prevent it from sending emissaries to negotiate with him and offer guarantees for his personal safety, while they themselves were made to promise not to levy troops until he had replied[72]. Cinna was then forced, despite his agreement with the Senate, to go "hurriedly around Italy to raise an army", suggesting that the previous one was no longer in existence and that he could not permanently rely on Italian troops to further his short term political aims or prevent the Senate from continuing to act as a free agent.[73]

Further, the Cinnans were never able to adequately deal with Sulla during the three years he spent campaigning against Mithridates in Greece, despite the large armies they had been able to raise in Italy. The army they dispatched to Asia in 86 B.C. under the command of the Consular Valerius Flaccus consisted of only two legions[74] and readily deserted to Sulla when given the opportunity to do so.[75] If the objective of Cinna in sending another army into the East had been make war on Sulla or to relieve him of his command he would undoubtedly have sent the largest force he could muster. If he had instead sought to either reinforce Sulla in the hopes that some reconciliation could be arrived at, or else was acting upon the assumption that the proconsul would meekly accept the authority of Flaccus, it would still have been in his interests to send the largest army possible so as to be able to make arrangements from a position of strength. He could not do so. A simi-

lar situation seems to have characterized the relations of the Cinnan regime with the other provinces of the Empire. The Sullan loyalist Crassus was able to raise an army in Spain, attack local cities and finally make his way with this force to Greece, joined by Metellus Pius, who was able to raise "a considerable army" in Africa, and briefly retain hold of that province prior to 84 BC.[76] The Cinnans were able to raise large armies to fight for them in Italy, but they lacked the military strength to enforce their will in the provinces of the Empire, where the newly raised troops would not go, and where the interests of their Italian backers were not at stake.

The limitations of the military support for Cinna and his faction become even more obvious in light of the events which led to his death. In 84 B.C. he attempted to transport his army across the Adriatic in the hopes of "proceeding against Sulla from there". Despite the sensible nature of this move, which would have allowed him to take the war to his enemy and forestall any attempt to invade Italy, he was thwarted by the refusal of his own troops to cross to Dalmatia and fight against "fellow Romans". When Cinna attempted to reassert his authority, he was murdered. His successor Carbo was compelled to call off the entire operation, and restrict himself to the defence of Italy.[77]

If Italian support for the Cinnans had been conditional during the three years in which Sulla had been occupied with the war against Mithridates, it became even more so upon his return to Italy. For the victorious proconsul had dispatched to the Senate a letter outlining his intention to seek retribution against his political enemies. In it, however, he made a critical

pledge: other citizens "including those recently enfranchised" would not be held to blame for anything".[78] This statement, when considered in light of his later unwillingness to alter the new voting divisions as dictator, [79] suggests that Sulla was now prepared to maintain the very measure which he had so recently fought against: an equal distribution of the newly enfranchised Italians throughout the 35 tribes.[80]

The promise of Sulla altered the character of the war. Where previously the Italians may have viewed it as a struggle for political rights against an enemy who sought to roll back their recent gains, it had now become a fight between two rival factions of Roman aristocrats, each of which was prepared to actively campaign for their support[81] The Cinnans still possessed a stronger claim upon the goodwill of the new citizens. They could still recruit troops by reminding recently enfranchised communities of past services and emphasizing that it was "on their account that they were in such danger"[82] It is likely for this reason that they were able to raise enough troops to enjoy a massive numerical advantage over the Sullans at the outset of the war. The Sullan promise seems to have had an effect, however in that the Cinnans no longer seemed as confident in the loyalty of the Italians. Unwilling to risk further mutinies in his absence, Carbo refused to return to Rome to elect a suffect Consul to replace Cinna.[83] Immediately before the Sullan invasion he went so far as to try to exact hostages from the Italian communities.[84]

As the Cinnan and Sullan factions began to compete for the loyalty of the Italians in the coming conflict, the Senate itself seems to have made

an attempt to do so as well. In the time since the march on Rome, the Senate had repeatedly attempted to reassert its authority, attempting unsuccessfully to restrain the military activities of Cinna and broker a peace with Sulla. Now they actively opposed Carbo's plan to take hostages from the Italian communities and passed a decree giving "the right to vote…to the new citizens."[85] As mentioned previously, the new citizens would doubtless have been automatically enfranchised beginning as far back as the Lex Julia of 90 BC and redistributed among the 35 tribes by the census of 86 BC. The likeliest explanation for this anomaly is that the Senate had chosen to reaffirm its support for the existing status of the Italians, as a bid for their political support, whatever the outcome of the conflict.

Over time with both sides making similar offers to the Italians, other factors came to influence their decision as to which side to support. Sulla was a highly capable commander leading an army of loyal, veteran troops.[86] While the Roman treasury had been so thoroughly emptied as to force the Cinnans to melt down temple statues to pay their troops, Sulla could rely upon the massive revenues derived from the Eastern provinces, including the indemnity paid by the defeated Mithridates,[87] and was even able to turn down the offer of his troops to help pay for the campaign out of their own pockets.[88]

Moreover, during the initial phase of his campaign in Italy, he seems to have made a conscious effort to win support through acceptance of Italian voting rights and equitable treatment of the Italian communities. He "came to terms with the people of Italy, to preclude his being regarded as a threat to

their recently gained status as citizens with the right to vote".[89] His troops were made to swear "to do no damage in Italy, except by his orders."[90] Cities that had been friendly towards his troops were treated favourably, as in the case of the port of Brundusium, which was exempted from paying the harbour tax. [91] Sulla's conduct led Velleius to write that "One would think that Sulla came to Italy, not as the champion of war but as the establisher of peace, so quietly did he lead his army through Calabria and Apulia into Campania taking unusual care not to inflict any damage on crops, fields men or cities and such efforts did he make to end the war on just terms and fair conditions."[92] He also made determined attempt to recruit Italian troops to his side negotiating with "as many of the Italians as he could, raising troops by offering friendship, threats, money and hope of reward."[93] These incentives would undoubtedly have included reliable pay from the Asian war chest and likely the promise of land for his veterans, to be taken from the communities who supported his opponents.[94] The Cinnans would have been unlikely to make such a pledge, given their limited resources, and their position as defenders of the status quo in Italy. With these advantages, and with the question of citizenship off the table Sulla was able to overcome his deficiencies in numbers so that, by 81 BC he was able to capture Rome and drive the remnants of the Cinnan force into Northern Italy.

By all accounts the last phase of the civil war was grim and bloody, particularly for the Italian communities who had chosen to back the wrong side, the most notable example being the city of Praeneste, in which the entire adult male population was massacred.[95] The Sullan victory was made

complete by the capture of Rome in 82 BC. It was in front of the city, however, that the Sulla was forced to the largest and most hard fought battle of the conflict against a large army of Samnites and Lucanians. This force was led by Pontius Telesinus who had commanded Italian troops during the Social War. On this occasion however, he had joined with the Cinnan commanders Carrinas, Marcius and Brutus Damasippus[96]. Velleius describes the Cinnan army as if it was a hostile invading force, and compares the threat it presented to that posed by Hannibal. He further chooses to place within the mouth of Telesinus a call for his troops to destroy the city as it was the forest which had given succour to the Roman wolf.[97] Unsurprisingly this quote has been seized upon as an indication that, even it this late stage, the Italians continued to resist Roman hegemony and desired its destruction rather than its citizenship.[98] Yet the fact that this Samnite army was operating in conjunction with that of the Cinnans, and had chosen to intervene at a moment in the conflict when Sulla seemed in the ascendant rather than doing so when both sides in the civil war were at greater disadvantage and the resulting opportunity might be greater, militates against this. It is also likely that the accounts of the battle provided by Plutarch, Appian and Velleius were derived from the memoirs of Sulla, who would have had a clear interest in depicting his enemies as a foreign invader, and thus justify his own massacre of some 8,000 prisoners taken from among their ranks.[99]

Once the conflict had been brought to an end, Sulla too kept his promise to the newly enfranchised Italians. He did not seek to revoke their citizenship or alter the redistribution through the 35 tribes.[100] Indeed many

Italian aristocrats who had sided with his forces during the course of the war were likely brought into his expanded Senate,[101] A decade after the beginning of the Social War, the Roman response to the Italian question had undergone a radical transformation. Whereas it had previously been possible to court the support of the masses by promising to punish those who even advocated for an extension of citizen rights[102], the leading political factions of the Republic, the Populares in the Cinnan camp, the ultra-conservative Optimates who fought for Sulla and the moderates who remained in the Senate were now united in their willingness to extend full equality to the Italian citizens. The willingness of the Italians to participate, both politically and militarily in the events of the civil war was largely responsible for this transformation of events. This in itself is indicative of their eagerness to obtain the citizenship. Had they been fighting exclusively for the independence cited by Mouritsen, then it is likely that the vast armies recruited by Cinna from among their ranks would have been turned towards a continued fight for an Italian state, which would have been made easier by the absence of Sulla in the East and the weakness of his lieutenants in Rome. Instead they chose to participate fully alongside their fellow citizens, and in doing so were able to obtain all of the privileges they had initially desired. In the years to come, they exercised an important influence over Roman politics, and obtaining their support became essential to the success of any Roman politician. Where willingness to seek an Italian constituency had led to defeat and death for Drusus and the Gracchi, within a few decades the staunchly conservative Marcus Tullius Cicero would be urged to campaign for their support, and ensure that his appeals were made to them even within

their own communities.[103]

Endnotes:

[1] Diod. 37.2.2-9.

[2] App. BC. 1.49.

[3] Ibid. 1.39. Brunt (1971 ; p.438-439) estimates that the Romans had 150,000 soldiers under arms against some 130,000 Italians.

[4] Vell. 2.15.2. ;

[5] Velleius estimates 300,000 casualties during the course of the conflict (2.15.3.). Although this number seems unusually high, the extent of the carnage is evidenced by the decrees of both the Roman Senate and the Italian rebels to bury the dead where they died so as to not to discourage the rest of the population from military service.(App. BC. 1.43.)

[6] Vell. 2.16.

[7] Mouritsen (1998) p.10-22

[8] Diod. 37.1-2.

[9] Mouritsen (1998) p.59-87

[10] Ibid. p.44-48.

[11] Ibid. p.168-169.

[12] Vell. 2.16.4. ; App. BC. 39-44

[13] Diod 37.2.

[14] App. BC. 1.49.

[15] Ibid. 1.50-52

[16] Keaveney (2004) p.170-172

[17] Vell 2.17.

[18] App. BC. 1.68. Samnite resistance was “all that was left of the social war” and Marius evidently felt them to be important enough as a military force to justify a peace on their terms.

[19] Mouritsen p.153.

[20] Appian 1.53.

[21] App. BC. 1.55.

[22] Ibid. 1.65.

[23] Ibid. 1.66.

[24] Vell. 2.21-22.

[25] App. BC 1.67.

[26] Brunt p.90-93; Cic Arch 11. suggests that one of his clients a certain Archias could not be registered in the census because he was serving under the quaestor Lucullus in Asia, which would have meant that it was contemporaneous with the so called *Cinnae Dominatio* in Rome.

[27] Keaveney (2004) p.184-185 ; Wiseman p.59-75 (1969)

[28] Ibid. (2004)

[29] Jerome Chr. ad ann. 85 ; Liv. Per. 63.

[30] Liv. Per. 98.

[31] Sherwin White p.130-133

[32] Keaveney (2004) p.185

[33] Liv. 38.36.5-7 records a precedent in which a tribune proposed that Campanian citizens *sine suffragio* should receiving voting privileges. When other tribunes attempted to prevent the law from passing on the grounds that it had not been proposed by the Senate, they were informed that such decisions lay exclusively in the hands of the people.

[34] App. BC. 1.73.

[35] Keaveney (2004) p.186-187

[36] Wiseman op. cit.

[37] Brunt (1971) p.93 argues that the Optimate Censors Philipus and Perpena likely tampered with the results to prevent rural Italians from being registered.

[38] Asconius 67C in Cic. Pro. Cornelio

[39] App. BC. 1.55.

[40] Liv Per 84

[41] App. BC. 1.78.

[42] Frank p.233.

[43] Brunt p.92 cites this argument and accepts the figures as reasonable, but does not necessarily accept them.

[44] Liv Per. 98. The diminution in population can likely be explained by the casualties of the first civil war (Florus 2.8. claims that 70,000 citizens were massacred in the battles of the Colline Gate and the Sacriportum alone), the Sertorian war, the slave uprisings, continued conflict against Mithdridates, as well as the normal movements of population that must have resulted from the return of stability to the Roman empire.

[45] His refusal to keep the promise made to the Senate not to raise a new army in 84 (App. BC. 1.77-79) would suggest otherwise.

[46] Lovano p.10

[47] Ibid.

[48] Cic. Brut. 308-311

[49] App BC 1.73. ; Livy (Per. 83) specifies that this embassy was sent after a persuasive speech made by Flaccus, the Princeps Senatus in its favour. This incident in itself suggests the continuance of open debate within the Senate between 87 and 83 BC.

[50] Ibid. 1.77.

[51] Liv. Per. 84.

[52] Whether or not we accept its accuracy, the mention of such an incident suggests that it was believed to be possible for the Senate to do so.

[53] Ibid. 83-85.

[54] Lovano p.55.

[55] ibid. 68-69

[56] App BC 77-78. asserts that Cinna and Carbo had proclaimed themselves Consuls for the year 84, but soon after indicates that Carbo was summoned to Rome by the Tribunes to elect a successor to Cinna, and that he returned to Rome and fixed a date for elections only when the tributes threatened to depose him. That they could credibly make that threat indicates that the institutions of the Republic continued to function, and casts doubt upon the possibility of a self declared consulship in 84

[57] App. BC. 1.77.

[58] Mouritsen p.30-35

[59] App. BC 1.95. estimates them at 1,600

[60] Vell. 2.24.4.

[61] Lovano p.61

[62] Lovano 70-73.

[63] App. BC 1.82. Plut. Sulla 27. Vell. 2.24.3. Cicero Brut 308-311.

[64] App. BC 1.82.

[65] Ibid. 1.95-96. Plut. Sulla 31. Keaveney (1982) p.155 Lovano p.53-56. estimates as to the number of Senators and Equites put to death vary but it is generally accepted that between 70 and 90 Senators in total, perhaps more than a third of the already depleted Senate, were put to death, along with some 1,600 Equites, figures which suggest that acceptance of the

Cinnan programme was higher than the literary tradition would suggest.

[66] Appian (BC. 1.79. 1.82) claims that Sulla's forces numbered 40,000 against the over 100,000 raised by the Consuls. Velleius (2.24.4.) estimates Sulla's numbers at 30,000 against a Cinnnan army of 200,000. Plutarch (Sulla 27.) estimates that the Cinnans numbered 450 cohorts, which would meant an army of over 200 00 , if we assume that each legion included between 6 and 10 cohorts and that each legion numbered around 4,000 men. Florus (2.18.) estimates that they numbered 8 legions and 500 cohorts, or roughly 282, 000. Even if we accept the more conservative figure provided by Appian, the size of the Cinnan army is still remarkable.

[67] App. BC. 1.100.

[68] Vell 2.20.4. ; App BC. 1.69. suggests a smaller initial figure, with Pompeius, Crassus and Octavius still enjoying slight numerical superiority when the rival armies first encamped before Rome.

[69] Cicero Brutus 308

[70] cf; App. BC 95; 100.

[71] App. BC. 1.73.

[72] Ibid. 1.77.

[73] Ibid.

[74] App. BM. 51.

[75] Plut Sulla 25; Keaveney (1982) p.100, 110.

[76] Plut. Cras. 6.

[77] App. BC. 1.78.

[78] Ibid. 1.77.

[79] Lovano p.63; Sherwin White (1973) p.156-157.

[80] App. BC. 159.

[81] Keaveney (2005) p.186-187.

[82] App. BC. 1.76.

[83] App. BC. 1.78

[84] Liv. Per. 84.

[85] ibid

[86] App. BC. 1.76.

[87] Lovano p.122.

[88] Plut. Sulla 27.

[89] Liv. Per. 86.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Keaveney (1982) p.129

[92] Vell. 2.25.1.

[93] App. BC. 1.86.

[94] Ibid. 1.95. Sulla furnished land to his veterans at the expense of communities that had sided with the Cinnans.

[95] Ibid. 1.91.

[96] Ibid. 1.92.

[97] Vell. 2.27.2.

[98] Mouritsen (1998) p.10

[99] Lovano p.129; Plut Sulla 29.

[100] Lovano p.63.

[101] Wiseman 1971 p.6-7.

[102] App. BC. 1.37-38.

[103] cf. Cic. Com Pet. 29-31 ; Cicero emphasizes the importance of meeting with the Italian citizens, even visiting them in their own communities.

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Divided We Fall: The Roots of the Great Jewish Revolt against Rome

Robert Eisenberg

During the Roman occupation of Judea, lasting from 6-638 CE,[1] the well-being of the Jewish population was hardly guaranteed. For the early part of this period, the Judean Jews were given a large degree of autonomy over their own affairs, and Rome allowed them considerable religious freedom. However, between 66-73 CE (and again in 132-135 CE), the province of Judea engaged in active revolt against Roman rule. During this time, Judean society was factionalized, therefore the decision to revolt was not unanimous, but it was instead divided into three camps. A small minority, called the *Kanaim* (Zealots), was composed of radicals who actively campaigned for revolt from the outset of hostilities. The second group was the old aristocratic, *Tzdokim* (Sadducees), who wanted peace at all costs, and the last group was composed of the mainstream *Prushim* (Pharisees), who initially did not favor revolt, but who became active participants once the rebellion was underway.

The major divide between the advocates and opponents of the war can be drawn along the line of class and religious belief. In general, it was the lower-class, faced with severe economic and religious oppression by

both the upper-class Jews and by the Romans, who turned to the dangerous belief of imminent messianism and supported revolt. Conversely, the entrenched aristocracy preferred to maintain the status quo, either because they saw revolt as futile, or more likely in order to protect their wealth and social standing.

In the early first century CE, Judea was an economic backwater of the Roman Empire, and the Judeans relied heavily on small scale subsistence agriculture. However, with the coming of direct Roman rule, the Judean economy became integrated into the wider Mediterranean market system. This new system helped to bring about the decline of the small landowner class, resulting in a small number of wealthy Jewish landowners. Many of these ex-farmers were forced into wage labour due to the loss of their land and the financial obligations imposed by both the Roman Imperial taxes and the Temple tithes.[2] The onerous tax burden compelled the individual farmer to borrow money from the wealthy in order to work his own land. The failure to repay a loan resulted in the confiscation of land by the landowner and the creation of a "landless proletarian ripe for revolution."[3]

The loss of private land and the ensuing economic dependency was a direct result of the taxes imposed on the peasantry by the Judean upper class and by the Romans. Historical records do not show that the Jews were forced to pay a higher tax than any other people in the Empire during the period in question. However, it seems likely that the increase in Jewish animosity towards these taxes can be attributed to two factors. The Judeans had always paid their taxes through local officials; however, once the Romans changed their policy, the Jews were forced to pay their taxes directly

to Rome. This caused Jewish animosity towards Rome, since they had not been required to pay taxes directly to a foreign power since the Hasmonean liberation in 140 BCE.[4] This tax burden was compounded by the Temple tithes, which were required of every Jew to maintain the upkeep and operation of the Temple. This resulted in a greater dependence of small farmers on loans from the Sadducees and their subsequent indebtedness and loss of land.

While resentment over paying high double taxes led to enmity of the peasant class towards the Romans and upper class, the taxes alone did not drive the Jews to revolt. Both the Romans and the Sadducees oppressed the lower class, albeit through different means. While the Romans embarked on a policy of religious intolerance and injustice exacerbated by inept procurators, the Sadducees began to exploit the lower class, leading to a class struggle that bred bitterness and violence.

As oppressive as the Roman Empire was in later years, originally, it granted the Jews significant religious freedom. The *Edict of Augustus on Jewish Rights* (1 BCE) states that "the Jews shall use their own customs in accordance with their ancestral law…and their sacred offerings shall be inviolable and shall be sent to Jerusalem."[5] This attitude of religious tolerance was repeated in the *Edict of Claudius on Jewish Rights* (41 CE), whereby it was stated that "it is right that also the Jews, who are in all the world under us, shall maintain their ancestral customs without hindrance and to them I now also command…to observe their own laws."[6] The liberal attitude shown by Rome towards the Jews went a long way towards ensuring Judean compliance and loyalty during early Roman rule. However,

these affirmations of Jewish rights were not representative of the period immediately preceding the Great Revolt (66-73 CE).

After the failure of the ethnarch, Herod Archelaus, to properly govern the land, Emperor Augustus made Judea a Roman province in 6 CE and instituted a series of procurators.[7] In fact, it was precisely these procurators who aggravated the situation between Romans and Jews in Judea. These procurators often had low status in Rome and showed a lack of respect towards Jewish religious practices and even met Jewish disturbances with excessively brutal force.[8] The Roman historian Tacitus provides a vivid example of how Jews were perceived at this time, when he claimed, "Jewish ritual is preposterous and morbid."[9] The procurators were tasked with maintaining order in their province, and more importantly, collecting taxes. They were obligated to collect a fixed sum for Rome, and any money collected above that figure they were allowed to keep. This led many procurators to extract heavier taxes from the populace in order to enrich themselves. Moreover, procurators did not generally undertake public projects, yet when they did, they often embezzled public money.[10] An example of such extraction can be found in the case of the procurator Pontius Pilate. During his governance (26-36 CE), there arose concern over Jerusalem's water supply. Pilate decided to build an aqueduct to supply the city, and in order to finance his project, he confiscated funds from the Temple treasury.[11] The result was a protest that resulted in the slaughter of the defiant Jews. As abhorrent as Pilate's actions were to the Jews, they only resulted in minor disturbances. The final sting that pushed the Judeans to war was the appointment of Gessius Florus as procurator of Judea.

Florus was appointed procurator of Judea in 64 CE and served until the outbreak of the Great Revolt two years later. Florus continually ruled unfairly against the Jews, in favour of the Greek population, and consistently accepted bribes as a means of resolving conflicts. As Josephus writes, "Gessius Florus…filled Judea with an abundance of miseries…Florus was so wicked, and so violent in the use of his authority…as though he had been sent on purpose to show his crimes to everybody…he was not moved by pity, and never was satisfied with any degree of gain."[12] Furthermore, it has been argued that Florus intentionally provoked the Jews to defy Rome, thereby hoping to conceal his own unjustified cruelty and ineptness in governance.[13] Additionally, Florus had accepted a bribe from the Jews to hear one of their complaints. Yet, after taking the money, he refused to hear their argument and ruled arbitrarily in favour of the Greeks.[14] In fact, Florus' governance was deemed unfit by Rome and he was removed from his post shortly after the war began.

While Jewish displeasure with Rome was at a level hitherto unseen, there was also animosity directed against the Sadducee upper class. Since the time of the Hasmonean Dynasty (140-37 BCE), there had been a transition of the ruling class of Judea from one of a legitimate, peasant supported priesthood, to one of Hellenized aristocrats, owing their status directly to the rulers.[15] Moreover, since the time of King Herod (37-4 BCE), the prestigious positions in the Temple had been filled by foreign Jews from Babylon and Egypt, rather than by local Jews who might undermine the Judean ruler's authority. When the Romans came to power, they left the old Jewish aristocracy in place, knowing that they were politically impotent and could

only maintain power through continued Roman support.[16] The elites thus needed to maintain the role entrusted to them by the Romans, namely to collect taxes and maintain order. Over time, the Sadducees became more rapacious and built extravagant homes while maneuvering the Judean peasants into indebtedness so that they could exploit their labour and produce.[17] This extortion grew to such a point that the elites sent "their servants into the threshing-floors, to take away those tithes that were due to the priests, insomuch that it fell out that the poorest sort of priests died for want."[18]

Once it became apparent that war was imminent, the tensions between rich and poor were exacerbated. After the carnage brought by Florus, the Sadducees attempted to calm the peasants, and pleaded with Roman authorities to intervene.[19] As tensions rose, each Jewish group attempted to gain influence over the others. However, according to Josephus, "the Sadducees are able to persuade none but the rich, and have not the populace obsequious, while the Pharisees have the multitude on their side."[20] When hostilities actually broke out, the Hellenized Sadducees were as much of a target as the Romans, and there are numerous instances of attacks against them. As claimed by Josephus, the rebels

> carried the fire to the place where the archives were reposited, and made haste to burn the contracts belonging to their creditors, and thereby to dissolve their obligations for paying their debts; and this was done in order to gain the multitude of those who had been debtors, and that they might persuade the poorer sort to join in their insurrection with safety against the more

wealthy.21

Such actions possibly served to further alienate the Sadducees from their fellow Jews and only pushed them to further depend on Rome. In fact, after this incident, there was no recording of any Judean elites becoming actively involved in the revolt, and, in fact, some of the High Priests (of the Sadducee sect) attempted to betray Jerusalem to the Romans, but were only prevented from doing so by the arrival of rebel fighters from the countryside.[22] Furthermore, there are instances where certain Judeans attempted to surrender to the Romans "which they did out of the desire they had of peace, and for saving their effects, because many of the citizens of Gadara were rich men."[23] The Sadducees and Pharisees were weakened by their conflict with each other and as a result, the Zealots were able to initiate the uprising by ending the Temple sacrifices on behalf of the Roman Emperor.

Another point of conflict between the classes was the possibility of victory against the Roman Empire. One leader who articulated the futility of fighting against Rome was Herod Agrippa II (r.48-100 CE). Agrippa elaborated at length the perceived senselessness of engaging Rome in warfare while also criticizing the state of Judea's military.[24] He continued by illustrating that since the Romans had never lost in battle, it was clear that God had decided to favour them over the Jews, and so the Judeans could not depend on God's help in battle. He concluded by pleading with the Jews to stay at peace and thereby save Jerusalem and the Temple from destruction by a vastly superior and apparently invincible foe.[25]

While the probability of victory seemed remote, the Jews did indeed

decide to rebel. A driving force which gave courage and justification to the entire uprising may have been the belief that the coming of the promised messiah was imminent and that God would lead His chosen people to victory as He had done throughout history. The Jewish people have a history dating back to the biblical period of trusting in God to deliver them from their foes. In fact, it was references to such events from biblical times, coupled with a resounding military success at Beth-Horon that convinced most Jews to support the extremist cause of war.

The chaotic events in Jerusalem during the period leading up to the revolt, included the protests against Roman authority and the violence of the radical *sicarii*, an extremist group of Jews who assassinated those accused of collaborating with the Romans by stabbing them in crowds. These events convinced many of the peasant Jews that the End of Days and subsequent Messianic Age were imminent, that Rome would soon be overthrown, and that Israel would be reunited and live under a Davidic king.[26] Furthermore, the Jews looked back into their own recent history, by equating the revolt of the Maccabees (167-164 BCE) with their current predicament. They believed that God would guide them to victory against Rome just as He had against the Seleucids. Additionally, the Jews followed "an ambiguous oracle that was also found in their sacred writings, how, 'about that time, one from their country should become governor of the habitable earth.' The Jews took this prediction to belong to themselves in particular."[27] The Roman historian Tacitus also commented on this oracle, yet he believed that "this enigmatic prophecy really applied to Vespasian and Titus. But men are blinded by their hopes. The Jews took to themselves the promised destiny,

and even defeat could not convince them of the truth."[28] Moreover, once the revolt had begun and the Jews were told that the Temple would be spared if they surrendered, one of the rebel leaders replied to the offer saying that "he did never fear the taking of the city, because it was God's own city."[29] Clearly, history and religious beliefs played important roles in facilitating the revolt.

As convincing as prophecy and faith may have been for some Jews, they did not persuade the majority to support the rebellion. In fact, the majority of Jews remained skeptical as to the divine promise of victory. It was only after October of 66 CE that the majority of moderate Jews were convinced to participate in the revolt. It was during this month that the Romans sent out an expeditionary force under the governor of Syria, Cestius Gallus, to capture Jerusalem and end the insurrection. However, Gallus's professional army of 36,000 men met with unexpected defeat at the hands of 14,000 Jewish skirmishers and light infantry at the pass of Beth-Horon. This resounding military success, in which a Roman Legion's eagle standard was captured, drew many of the heretofore ambivalent moderate Jews into active support for rebellion, as it affirmed their belief that they could defeat Rome, and that God was on their side.[30] It was not that the Judeans had won a battle that convinced most moderate Jews, but rather it was the location of this victory. In fact, it was at the very site of Beth-Horon that Judah the Maccabee achieved one of his greatest victories over the Syrian general Seron. As it is written in the Book of Maccabees,

> And when [Seron] came near to the going up of Beth-

> Horon, Judah went forth to meet him with a small company…Now as soon as [Judah] had left off speaking, he leapt suddenly upon them, and so Seron and his host was overthrown before him. And [Judah] pursued them from the going down of Beth-Horon unto the plain, where were slain about eight hundred men of them.[31]

It was only because of the history associated with Beth-Horon that the extremists were able to attach religious significance to their victory, and thereby convince the majority of Jews to join their cause. However, it is relevant to note that not all scholars are in agreement as to the role that messianism played in the Great Revolt. Historian Tessa Rajak believes that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that the revolutionaries were motivated by messianic hopes.[32] Interestingly, Josephus also does not mention messianism as a cause for rebellion, possibly because he did not wish his readers to believe that the Jews had any noble or religious reasons to revolt.[33]

The Great Revolt was not the result of a single event, but was rather the culmination of events over a longer period of time that had turned Judea into a powder keg, ready to ignite at any moment. The support for the rebellion came from lower class Jews, who had little to lose, and who were keen to throw off the oppressive yoke of both their Roman and Sadducee masters, while maintaining the belief in divine aid. The Jews who opposed the revolt came instead from the upper class. They saw revolt against Rome as futile, and furthermore, did not wish to lose their wealth and social status,

which were dependent on Roman patronage. However, the majority of Jews did not fall into either of these two camps, but instead remained indifferent until the success of the Battle of Beth-Horon convinced them that victory was possible and would come with the aid of God. While historians have often inquired as to what caused the revolt, or who supported it, a more interesting thought might be whether the Jews could have succeeded in their revolt had all the factions acted together from the outset in trying to achieve the common goal of national freedom.

Endnotes

[1] This span includes both the rule of the Roman Empire and that of the Byzantine Empire which succeeded Roman rule in Judea/Palestine.

[2] Jack Pastor, *Land and Economy in Ancient Palestine* (London, 1997), 136.

[3] *Ibid*., 139.

[4] *Ibid*., 138.

[5] Joseph. *AJ*. 16.6.2.

[6] *Ibid*., 19.5.3.

[7] Pastor, 136.

[8] Sean Freyne, "The Revolt From a Regional Perspective," in *The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology*¸ ed. Andrea M. Berlin & J. Andrew Overman (London: 2002), 45.

[9] Tac. *Hist*. 5.5

[10] Pastor, 141.

[11] F.J. Foakes-Jackson, *Josephus and the Jews: The Religion and History of the Jews as Explained by Flavius Josephus* (New York, 1930), 163.

[12] Joseph. *AJ*, 20.1.1.

[13] Foakes-Jackson, 182.

[14] Abba Eban, *My People: The Story of the Jews* (New York, 1968), 91.

[15] Martin Goodman, *The Ruling Class of Judaea: The Origins of the Jewish Revolt Against*

Rome A.D. 66-70 (Cambridge, 1987), 31.
[16] *Ibid*., 41-45.
[17] Richard A. Horsley, "Power Vacuum and Power Struggle in 66-7 C.E.," in *The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology*, ed. Andrea M. Berlin & J. Andrew Overman (London: 2002), 103.
[18] Joseph. *AJ*, 20.8.8.
[19] Horsley, 104.
[20] Joseph. *AJ*, 13.10.7.
[21] Joseph. *BJ*, 2.17.6.
[22] Horsley, 104-05.
[23] Joseph. *BJ*. 4.7.3.
[24] Foakes-Jackson, 184
[25] *Ibid*., 183-84.
[26] Thomas A. Idinopulos, "Israel's War with Rome," *Jewish Civilization in the Hellenistic-Roman Period*, ed. Shemaryahu Talmon, (Sheffield, England: 1991), 59.
[27] Joseph. *BJ.* 6.5.4.
[28] Tac. *Hist*. 5.12.
[29] Joseph. *BJ.* 6.2.1.
[30] Paul K. Davis, *100 Decisive Battles from Ancient Times to the Present*, (Oxford: 1999), 71-78.
[31] 1Macc. 3:16-24.
[32] Tessa Rajak, "Jewish Millenarian Expectations," in *The First Jewish Revolt: Archaeology, History, and Ideology*¸ ed. Andrea M. Berlin & J. Andrew Overman (London: 2002), 182.
[33] Idinopulos, 59.

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Capturing Medical Tradition: Caelius Aurelianus' *On Acute Diseases*

Anna Dysert

The translations of Caelius Aurelianus serve as an important historical link in the transmission of Greek medical practice and thought throughout the later Roman Empire and Middle Ages. Notably, Caelius' Latin translation *Celerum vel Acutarum Passionum*,[1] "On Swift or Acute Diseases," from the work of Soranus of Ephesus, codifies many Methodist tenets and treatments for transmittance to the Latin-speaking West. As such, the historical text figures prominently into the tradition of medical development from the perspective of modern scholarship, particularly in considering the transferal of Greek medical learning. In addition to this, the text self-consciously engages in the medical conversations of its time. Caelius' consideration and refutation of other therapies and philosophies of disease provide clues as to how the Methodists defined themselves and their practice in light of contemporary sectarianism in medicine.

Soranus of Ephesus, among the most famous physicians of the Methodist sect, practiced medicine during the time of Trajan and Hadrian, according to the Byzantine Suda.[2] Tradition holds that he was educated in Alexandria, which, as Vivian Nutton notes, would have been appropriate for

a young man from Asia Minor and would indeed have accounted for his anatomical knowledge.[3] Soranus of Ephesus was arguably the third leading Methodist after Themison of Laodicea and Thessalus of Tralles. Themison first posited the theory of κοινότητες, "general states," or "communities" based on the principals of his Asclepiades, who taught that the body was composed of atoms moving through pores.[4] According to Themison, the diseased body is one where this movement is too tense and restricted (what Caelius translates as *strictura*), too relaxed and fluid (*solutio*), or some combination of both (*complexio*).

Thessalus succeeded Themison, practicing medicine in Rome under Nero. He is credited with developing the system of restorative and metasyncretic treatments used according to intervals of time.[5] Soranus followed Thessalus, although his system was less radical than that of Thessalus. Methodism itself rose as a reaction to the competing sects of Dogmatism and Epiricism in medicine, but Soranus' writings indicate broad historical, philosophical, and medical interests, plus a great familiarity with other schools of medical thought. While Soranus in *On Acute Diseases* does emphasize aspects of practice and theory that are specifically Methodist, for example, the sharp distinction between acute and chronic disease, the relative unimportance of anatomy, and a holistic view of disease, he is not averse to entertaining other theories and explaining them.

What little scholars know about the circumstances of Caelius Aurelianus' life comes largely from the information he divulges in his writing. Indeed, scholars do not even know his correct dates, but situate him in the fifth century AD based on linguistic and stylistic comparison with Cassius

Felix,[6] a mid-fifth century Latin translator of Greek medical texts.[7] Caelius Aurelianus calls himself *methodici Siccensis*, "methodist of Sicca," a Roman colony in Numidia. Beyond this, however, no details of his life are known.

Caelius has left four extant texts, two of which are the translations *On Acute Diseases* and *On Chronic Diseases* from works of the same name by Soranus of Ephesus. His third extant work is fragments of a Latin translation of Soranus' *Gynaecia* and fourth is his own original treatise entitled *Medicinales responsiones*.[8]

The question of translation practices complicates any analysis of *On Acute Diseases*. Indeed, Caelius' name seems often to overshadow that of Soranus in scholarship of the text—an odd phenomenon considering that we ourselves would never claim to be reading a translator when what we are in fact reading is the author's translated text.[9] Caelius himself frequently reminds us that he is merely the translator and Soranus, the author. An example of this attestation occurs as Caelius ends the section *Quomodo Curandi sunt Cardiaci*, "the way to care for cardiac disease," by writing, *haec est secundum Soranum cardiacorum methodica curatio* ("this ends Soranus' treatment of cardiac disease according to the Methodists.)"[10]

Yet the relationship of translator to text is more complicated and less transparent than Caelius claims. Examination of the textual history does lead us to believe that Caelius is, as he states, truly just humbly seeking to translate Soranus' work into Latin.[11] However subtle manipulations of tone and presentation of information cause him to sound more distinctly authorial. This too, though, must be reconciled with an Antique view of transla-

tion and textual transmission very different from modern standards.

No manuscript copies of *On Acute Diseases* or *On Chronic Diseases* are extant and critical analysis of these Caelian texts must rest upon the earliest printed editions of the sixteenth century. *On Chronic Diseases* was first published in 1529 by Johannes Sichart for Heinrich Petri in Basle and *On Acute Diseases* was first published four years later by Winter von Arndernach for Simon de Colinis in Paris. The manuscript or manuscripts these printed editions are based upon disappeared shortly later.[12] Scholars are able to compare these editions with the fragments of Soranus' extant *Gynaecia* and fragments of Caelius' Latin translation of the work, along with Caelius' extant *Medicinales responsiones*, as well as other Latin translations of Greek medical texts to ascertain that Caelius most likely rendered Soranus' original faithfully.[13] However, it is impossible to know what sort of omissions he may have made. Other scholars tend to agree that Caelius' translation is a redaction and they allow for "certain degree of independent thought."[14] Vivian Nutton writes that "Caelius was avowedly drawing on a large work of the same name by Soranus [*On Acute and Chronic Diseases*], for he cites him frequently and in a manner that shows that he was consulting him in the Greek original."[15] This paper does not seek to engage in the controversy regarding how closely Caelius Aurelianus followed Soranus' work in the *Celerum Passionum*. Instead, as Caelius considered himself the translator, so shall we consider him. Though we do not know all the specific editorial decisions that Caelius made, we do see Caelius the translator manipulating the text with authorial intent in the way he presents Soranus and his views.

Caelius Aurelianus chooses to insert references to Soranus at very

curious and telling times throughout the text. The text itself includes frequent debates regarding the causes of diseases and particularly, proper therapies. At these times, Caelius is most likely to assert Soranus' authority in a way that changes him from being the author of the text to being one of "characters" in the medical argument. In the reply *Ad Asclepiadem et Themisonem et Herclidem Tarentum*, Caelius rejects Themison's method of treating lethargy patients by forcing liquids on them by claiming that Soranus would have said that this potion is harmful.[16] Caelius' displaces Soranus as author of the text at this moment by bringing Soranus into his own text and setting him within the debate. In instances such as this, Caelius actually takes authorial predominance away from Soranus instead constructing an authorial persona for himself. While we do not know how authorial Caelius truly was in editing or adapting Soranus' work, this example complicates Caelius' claim to being merely Soranus' translator.

These sorts of frequent medical debates are common throughout the text, reflecting not only Soranus' distinct historical and philosophical interests, but also the inclinations of his readership. As I.E. Drabkin writes, "Soranus' broad philosophical and historical interests…serve to distinguish his treatises on acute and chronic diseases from mere handbooks of medical practice."[17] Soranus clearly had a historical interest in medical tradition and its implications for contemporary medicine. As mentioned previously, he describes the ideas and treatments of other physicians and medical traditions, occasionally even tracing the history of a disease back to its references in Homer.[18]

From this, we may surmise that his readership was a coterie of

learned doctors and intellectuals. It is highly likely that even doctors of different sects would have read Caelius' translation; we know for certain, at least, that Galen was familiar with Soranus' work (likely in its original Greek) because he praised Soranus even though he could not stand Methodists in general.[19] In his article on Caelius Aurelianus' contemporary Cassius Felix, G. Sabbah contrasts the readerships of the two writers. The Latin translations prepared by Cassius Felix would have been destined

> non pas à un public cultivé… comme celui de Celse, voire celui de Caelius, mais à un public de professionnels, de practiciens, le contenu et la méthode d'un cours professoral.[20]

The works of Cassius Felix have more of a practical application than do the works of Caelius Aurelianus, intended instead for a "cultivated" readership. Indeed, *Celerum Passionum* does contain methods of therapy, but the author's interest is largely concentrated in discussing the ideas behind and history of the practical treatments.

The consistent format which the author uses to describe each disease also reflects the interest in historicism. The text discusses the acute diseases *a capite ad calcem* using an entry format that begins with the etymology of the word, followed by the definition of the diseases, its symptoms, the method of discerning the particular disease from other ones similar in appearance, the disease's treatment according to the Methodist, and finally a discussion and refutation of the disease's treatment according to other physicians.[21] Caelius' description of hydrophobia (or rabies) nicely illustrates all

the entry components.

First, Caelius relates the origins of the word hydrophobia, *nam Graeci timorem phobon vocant, aquam hydor appellant*, "for the Greeks call 'fear' '*phobon*,' and call 'water,' '*hydor*.'"[22] He continues to outline different names which the disease has been called, *hygrophobia*, *phobodipsos*, *cynolyssos*. Next he gives the *antecedens causa* as the bite of a mad dog, although he admits that other animals may transfer the diseases, and also that the diseases may arise spontaneously when the body is in an extreme state of *strictura* as a result of poison.[23] Here, Caelius begins to subtly introduce the cause of the disease according to the Methodists.

In his next section, he lists an irrational fear of water as the symptom of hydrophobia and mentions other physical ailments which will accompany the disease, including anxiety, irascibility, and heaviness in the esophagus, among others. His account is not only clinical as he punctuates his description of the symptoms with a variety of anecdotes, for example, the baby with hydrophobia who was terrified by its mother's milk.[24] The great care and attention he pays to this section of the entry indicates the great importance of symptoms to the Methodist system of medicine. J. Pigeaud notes that "*dans cette description des symptômes, toute l'attention que le médecin prête au malade… l'essentiel pour le médecin méthodiste, comme le dit Caelius lui-même, devrait être la maladie*."[25] For the Methodists, defining the disease is second to understanding its array of symptoms. Following this, he details the physiological causes of hydrophobia: inflammation and lack of moisture which cause a state of stricture in the sufferer.[26]

In the section on distinguishing hydrophobia from similar diseases, the author supplies a distinction based on anatomy—a contrast to his usual feeling of disdain towards physicians who are overly concerned with anatomy. He writes that mania and phrenitis, the diseases most closely resembling hydrophobia, are different in that they affect the head principally while hydrophobia affects the esophagus.[27]

In the next section on which part of the body is affected by hydrophobia, Caelius has a much more customarily Methodist statement to make. He describes various other physicians' theories about what part of the body hydrophobia actually diseases, but concludes by saying that the disease affects the entire body.[28] This is a traditionally Methodist idea that Caelius sets up against other sects' views many times, as we shall see.

Lastly, in his section on therapeutics, Caelius posits his treatment according to the Methodist system, and then details treatments from other medical traditions. In comparisons such as these (which Caelius makes for all of the diseases he discusses), we may observe how the Methodists define their medical practice against the other medical sects and we may determine what is uniquely Methodist about many of the practices he describes.

The Methodist therapies Caelius describes involve attempting to loosen the state of stricture by having the patient's body massaged, covered with a gentle heat (warmed olive oil prepared without the patient's being able to see it), and above all attempting to get the patient to drink voluntarily.[29] The Methodist theory of stricture and relaxation is demonstrated in a contrast Caelius make with another method of treatment from Artorius. According to him, doctors should force their patients to drink by putting them

in sacks or vessels filled with cold water. According to Methodist thought, however, this is not only ineffectual but dangerous as the patient becoming cold would make the body even tighter, more restricted, and liable to have seizures.[30] Caelius criticizes doctors who provide treatments such as evacuation, venesection, cupping, and other treatments the Methodists would consider metasyncretic, or designed to disrupt the disease and shock the body into health, because again, these measurements do not procure relaxation in the body, which is the ultimate cure for hydrophobia's state of stricture. Thus does the particular style and focus of the disease entries in *Celerum Passionum* reflect some of the concerns and theories of Methodist practice, with its large concentration on analysis of symptoms and in the telling refutations of other physicians' treatments.

Elsewhere in the text, Caelius Aurelianus describes other preoccupations that are particularly Methodist, such as in the example of the importance of symptoms. One peculiarity of Methodism that Caelius relates is the interest in anatomy, but the ultimate rejection that diseases lie in parts rather than in the body as a whole. Although there may be debates regarding specific terminology of the Methodist philosophy (Nutton gives the example of 'fluid,' writing, "did it refer to the fluid state of the whole body or of a part?"),[31] Caelius remarks in the text that Soranus considered the whole body to be affected by disease, rather than just a part. In the section regarding the part affected in attacks of phrenitis, the author writes, *nos autem sive locorum sive vicinitatis eorum cause generalem curationem non mutamus. Non est enim sub eodem genere iacens locorum necessaria differentia*.[32] This quote disparages leaders of other sects who, as Caelius claims, need to

discover which part is affected by the disease in order to apply their treatments. The superior method practiced by Methodists does not require an alteration of treatment because of a more holistic view of the body and disease. For the Methodists, the "commonality of symptoms"[33] dictates the treatment, not the nature of the individual part. On the other hand, the interpretation of symptoms operates within this framework of the body as atoms and pores liable to too much opening or closing, if the reliance on symptoms does not approach the Empiricist sort of conception.

The definition of disease is less important for the Methodists, according to Soranus, precisely because the symptoms of disease are the basis of treatment. At the very beginning of the section on defining pneumonia, Caelius warns that *diffinire Methodici iuxta Sorani iudicium declinant*, "Methodists, in the manner of Soranus, turn away from judgement [definition]."[34] Categorization is not of the utmost concern for Methodists because again, treatment is not based upon it.

As one of the only extant documents on Methodism, Caelius Aurelianus' *On Acute Diseases* is crucial for reconstructing the transmission of Greek medicine learning to the Latin West. It provides modern scholars with a great deal of information on earlier doctor's theories and treatments preserved in the refutation of methods apart from the ones advocated by Soranus. In this way, the text has a unique internal and external historicity. The contemporary medical debates that Caelius records from Soranus also illuminate Methodist thought and application, including such particularities as the opinion and usage of anatomy, the importance of the symptom, and the resistance to defining and categorizing disease, through the way it de-

fines itself against others.

Endnotes

[1] I use the common abbreviation of the Latin title, *Celerum Passionum*, interchangeably with the modern translation of the title *On Acute Diseases*.
[2] Vivian Nutton, *Ancient Medicine* (New York, 2004) 195.
[3] Nutton 195.
[4] I.E. Drabkin, "Introduction" to On Acute Diseases and On Chronic Diseases, ed. and trans. I.E. Drabkin (Chicago, 1950) xvii.
[5] Drabkin (1950) vxiii.
[6] G. Sabbah, "Noms et descriptions de maladies chez Cassius Felix," in *Maladie et maladies dans les textes latins antiques et médiévaux*, Actes du Ve Colloque international 'Textes médicaux latins,' 295-312, ed. Carl Deroux (Bruxelles, 1998).
[7] Drabkin (1950) xiv.
[8] Ibid.
[9] For the purposes of this paper, I will generally use "Caelius" and "the author" interchangeably while using "Soranus" at points when it seems appropriate to assume Caelius is accurately reflecting Soranus' text.
[10] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. XXXVII: 217. All quotes from *Celerum Passionum* are taken from the edition *On Acute Diseases and On Chronic Diseases*, ed. and trans. I.E. Drabkin (Chicago 1950). English translations in the text are my own.
[11] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. X: 65: *Soranus vero cuius haec sunt quae nostra mediocritas latinizanda existimavit*, "Soranus, whose very work is here translated into our Latin."
[12] Drabkin (1950) xiii.
[13] I.E. Drabkin, "Notes on the Text of Caelius Aurelianus," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. 76 (1945) 299.
[14] Nutton 195.
[15] Nutton 195.
[16] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. IX: 46, *Soranus vero, qui normarum regulis methodum restituit, noxiam esse inquit istius modi potionem*, "Soranus who restituted Methodism by rules of standards,

claims a potion of this measure to be poisonous."

[17] Drabkin (1950) xviii.

[18] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. XV: 122. In discussing whether or not hydrophobia existed during former times, the author writes, *passionis etenim causam prompte Homerus memoravit*, "for truly, Homer clearly recounted the cause of the disease."

[19] Nutton 195; Drabkin (1950) xviii.

[20] Sabbah 303 ("not to a cultivated public… like that of Celsus, or even that of Caelius, but to a public of professionals, of practitioners [as] the content and the method of a professional course."

[21] Drabkin (1950) xii.

[22] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. IX: 98.

[23] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. IX: 99.

[2] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. X: 102.

[2] J. Pigeaud, "La 'phrénitis' dans l'oeuvre de Caelius Aurélien," in *Maladie et maladies dans les textes latins antiques et médiévaux*, Actes du Ve Colloque international 'Textes médicaux latins,' 330-341, ed. Carl Deroux (Bruxelles 1998) 335. ("In this description of the symptoms, all the attention that the doctor readies for the patient... the essence should be, for the Methodist doctor, like Caelius himself says, the disease.")

[26] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. XI: 106.

[27] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. XII. 107.

[28] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. XIV: 117.

[29] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. XVI: 126-133.

[30] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. XVI: 133.

[31] Nutton 192.

[32] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. VIII: 53. "We [the Methodists], however, do not alter our general therapy on the basis of these places or the regions about them. For in a given general type of disease a difference in the parts affected is not an essential difference." Trans. I.E. Drabkin.

[33] Nutton 193.

[34] Cael. Aur. *Acut*. I.XXVI: 142.

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Useful Online Resources for Classical Studies

AAH The Association of Ancient Historians
www.trentu.ca/academic/ahc/aah/welcome.shtml

AIA The Archaeological Institute of America
www.archaeological.org

AJA The American Journal of Archaeology
www.ajaonline.org/

Ancient World Mapping Center
www.unc.edu/awmc//

APA The American Philological Association
www.apaclassics.org

APh L'Année Philologique
www.annee-philologique.com/aph/

Bryn Mawr Classical Review
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/bmcr/

Classical Association of Canada (English and French)
http://cac-scec.ca/

Gnomon Online (German)
www.gnomon.ku-eichstaett.de/Gnomon/Gnomon.html

JSTOR
www.jstor.org

McGill Classics
www.arts.mcgill.ca/programs/Classics

Perseus
www.perseus.tufts.edu