HIRUNDO

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VOLUME ONE

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Hirundo is the Latin word for martlet, a mythical bird without legs, always shown in flight, unceasing in its quest for knowledge. The McGill coat-of-arms has three martlets.

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Hirundo accepts essay contributions, from students of McGill University, between 1,000 and 8,000 words in length, which relate to ancient Europe and the Mediterranean world, including the Near East and Egypt, from prehistoric to late antique times. An abstract of not more than 75 words should accompany a submission. Since *Hirundo* has a policy of "blind review," information identifying the author should appear separate from the essay text. Students wishing to write a book review should contact the Editor-in-Chief. It is journal policy that the copyright to the contents of each issue belongs to *Hirundo*. Essays in either English or French are welcome and may be sent to:

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Prefatory Note

Funding for *Hirundo, the McGill Journal of Classical Studies*, is generously provided by the History Students' Association of McGill University, the Department of History and Classics Program, the Department of English, the Department of Philosophy, the Department of English Students' Association, the Arts Undergraduate Society, the Faculty of Arts, and the Office of the Principal and Provost.

On behalf of the editors, I wish to express thanks to Georgii Mikula, Jodi Anderson, Joanne McAlpine, James Warne, Prof. Torrance Kirby, Prof. Suzanne Morton, Prof. Maggie Kilgour, Prof. Philip Buckley, Prof. Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, and their colleagues for help in preparing the volume. A very warm thanks to Prof. T. Wade Richardson for his guidance.

The task of editing *Hirundo* has been exceptionally rewarding. It has been my privilege to work with talented editors and gifted contributors. I am deeply grateful to everyone who made this journal possible.

André Nance
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,
HIRUNDO 2001

Introduction and Summary

Classics is the study of the ancient civilisations of the Greeks and the Romans. It therefore involves not only the literature of the ancient Mediterranean world, but almost every other aspect of ancient culture, from art to philosophy, political intrigue to military disaster, education to salvation, magic spells to the edge of the known world, constitution of government to philology. Indeed, one of the advantages of Classics is that it offers great opportunities for interdisciplinary study. McGill University, an institution well-known for its strength in interdisciplinary studies, now has a Journal of Classical Studies, *Hirundo*.

One would think it difficult to establish such a journal where there is no Department of Classics. Yet McGill has a strong tradition in Classics and vitality remains. The McGill coat-of-arms features the 'martlet,' a mythical bird without legs, always shown in flight, unceasing in its quest for knowledge. The title of the McGill Journal of Classical Studies, *Hirundo*, is simply that: the Latin word for 'martlet.' The editorial board publishes *Hirundo* in order to reflect upon and promote the McGill Classics tradition through the work of its students.

This issue features six research articles. We start with a comparison of Greek and Roman literature, an essay on ekphrasis—the verbal description of artwork—in the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid*. Then we continue with a technical analysis of participation relation in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Parmenides*. Next we evaluate suspects behind the murder of Philip II of Macedon. After that, we look at the causes of the third war between the ancient Roman Republic and the kingdom of Macedon. After that, we reconstruct the positive relationship between Emperor Constantine and Athens. And last, we enter a discussion concerning Neoplatonic influence upon Saint Augustine, the bishop of Hippo Regius.

Joshua Kotin argues that the shield ekphrases in the *Iliad* and in the *Aeneid* conflate verbal narrative and visual art, producing unique commentaries on each epic's themes and objectives. Both contain long descriptions of shields wrought by the god of fire. In the *Iliad*, Hephaestus forges an intricate shield for Achilles, bearing scenes of Greek life. In the *Aeneid*, the shield Vulcan produces for Aeneas foreshadows the glories of Rome. Moreover, a comparison of the parallel passages illuminates the relationship between them, casting Virgil's drastic revision as a critique of the Homeric original.

Jenny Pelletier makes a case that the participation relation in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Parmenides* is nothing more than an explanatory relation that involves the logical definition and structure of forms. Sensible particulars can only be said to "participate" in a logical definition insofar as a sensible particular happens to be predicable by a set of predicates that are entailed in a specific logical definition. The forms provide a supersensible system of categorization that permits the intelligibility of the material world without being themselves causes of objects in that world.

Ada-Maria Kuskowski remarks that the murder of Philip II of Macedon (359-336 BC) in 336 has been a whodunit since ancient times. The list of suspect conspirators runs the gamut from simply the murderer Pausanias, to the Lyncestian brothers, to the Persian King, to Philip's wife Olympias, to his son Alexander the Great, and to Amyntas IV. Reviewing the evidence, Kuskowski argues that Pausanias had a valid motive for killing Philip, that perhaps he acted with the help of the Lyncestian brothers or in a situation masterminded by Persia, but seemingly without the help or suggestion of Olympias, Alexander or Amyntas.

Greg Fisher argues that the Third Macedonian War (171-168 BC), which ended the Antigonid dynasty, came about by an atmosphere of mutual distrust which had arisen between Philip V of Macedon and the Senate of the Roman Republic after the hostilities with Antiochus. Upon the accession of Perseus, the Senate immediately regarded him with suspicion. Inevitably, the Senate was more ready to listen to Eumenes than a monarch who was, in their view, perfidious, belligerent and too independent for their liking.

Jean-Luc Gauville examines the economic and cultural influence of Emperor Constantine's (AD 306-337) reign upon the development of Athens in the fourth century AD. The essay has three sections: methodology of the reconstruction, Athens during the time of Constantine, and the influence of the emperor and his officials in the economic and cultural renewal of the city. The first half of the fourth century was a time of great renewal for the city of Athens after a period of troubles. Constantine and his officials had much to do with this renewal.

David Guretzki sets out to demonstrate how St. Augustine of Hippo was able simultaneously to appropriate and criticise aspects of Neoplatonist thought in the development of his own mature theology. That Augustine was influenced in some way by Neoplatonist thought is incontrovertible. Nevertheless, scholars continue to keep busy with attempts to define the exact nature of the relationship between Augustine and Neoplatonism. In light of this John O'Meara is surely right when he says, "there is no simple statement adequate to describe Augustine's use of the Neoplatonists."

In addition to the research articles, this issue features three short articles: the first narrates how ancient Egyptians used magic texts in preparation for the afterlife; the second examines the treatment of Hyperboreans and Ethiopians by Herodotus in his *Histories*; and finally, the third explains why one can consider the Roman Republic a mixture of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy.

Brooke Johnston narrates the journey in the afterlife which many ancient Egyptians took in the effort to reach a land of pleasure ruled by the god Osiris. Unfortunately, spirits of the deceased

achieved this utopia neither automatically nor after having lived virtuous lives. Salvation came by magic, by the recital of funerary texts. Among these was the *Book of the Dead*, which allowed spirits to overcome the extraordinary dangers encountered after death.

Félix Racine explore les quatre premiers livres de ses *Histoires*. Hérodote décrit le monde selon un plan symétrique : aux peuples durs du Nord (Grecs, Scythes, Hyperboréens) sont opposés les peuples mous du Sud (Perses, Égyptiens, Éthiopiens). Situés aux extrémités du monde, les mythiques Hyperboréens et Éthiopiens sont les archétypes des peuples centraux. Contrairement autres peuples qui évoluent et se situent dans l'histoire, ces deux peuples sont isolés géographiquement et connaissent un état stable et parfait. Dans le récit d'Hérodote, ils deviennent des références utopiques permettant de juger et critiquer les Grecs et les Perses.

Marie-Claude Felton explore le monde politique de l'Empire romain précoce en discutant les différents types de gouvernement qu'exprimait l'ancien historien Polybius. L'Empire était-il une oligarchie? Une vraie démocratie? Une monarchie sous le contrôle des consuls? Ce sont les questions pour lesquelles tant d'historiens modernes ont essayé de trouvé une réponse. Ici, Marie-Claude se mit au milieu du débat concernant le procès gouvernemental à Rome et nous donne sa réponse affirmant la constitution mixte et le pouvoir politique des masses dans l'Empire.

This issue also includes five **doctoral dissertations** in Classics defended between 1998 and 2001: *Principes de relations étrangères: une analyse contextuelle de quelques discours de Démosthènes* par **Spiridon Konstadatos** (Mars 1998); *Boundless Nature: The Construction of Female Speech in Plautus* by **Dorota Dutsch** (September 2000); *Heidegger's Interpretation of Ancient Greek Aletheia and the Philological Response to It* by **Rui de Sousa** (September 2000); *Pindar's Nemean Odes: A Poetic Commentary* by **Carolyn Jones** (December 2000); and *The Numan Tradition and its Uses in the Literature of Rome's "Golden Age"* by **Lise Otis** (October 2001).

Information, tips, and strategies for the upcoming January 2002 Undergraduate Sight Translation Competitions are listed under announcements. These annual competitions are held on twenty university campuses throughout Canada. *Hirundo* is pleased to recognize McGill winners from the 2001 Competitions. **Daniel McCusker** won First Prize in the Senior Sight Translation Competition in Latin and Fifth Prize in the Senior Sight Translation Competition in Greek. **Victoria Newman** won Fourth Prize in the Senior Sight Translation Competition in Latin. **Jean-Philippe Chartré** won Honourable Mention in the National Latin Sight Translation Competition.

Finally, the announcements also include resources for classical studies at McGill University. For more information, please consult the *McGill Libraries Classics Collection Policy* prepared by Dr. Martin Cohen, the classics bibliographer for the Humanities and Social Sciences Library.

Shields of Contradiction and Direction: Ekphrasis in the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid*

Joshua Kotin

The *Iliad* and the *Aeneid* both contain long descriptions of shields wrought by the god of fire. In the *Iliad*, Hephaestus forges an intricate shield for Achilles, bearing scenes of Greek life. In the *Aeneid*, the shield Vulcan produces for Aeneas foreshadows the glories of Rome. The ekphrastic[1] passages in both epics combine word and image in a self-reflexive "temporal-spatial hybrid" (Klarer 3) that offers insights beyond the scope of either traditional verbal narrative or visual art. The shield ekphrases conflate these two genres of communication, producing unique commentaries on each epic's themes and objectives. Moreover, a comparison of the parallel passages in the two works illuminates the relationship between them, casting Virgil's drastic revision as a critique of the Homeric original. The shield of Achilles is one of paradox and confusion, a farrago of images that ultimately lead to understanding; Aeneas' shield, conversely, is a shield of direction, simplifying the hero's quest and celebrating his future lineage. In the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid*, Homer and Virgil manipulate language, in the same way as the fire god manipulates gold, creating distinct descriptions that celebrate and elucidate their unique heroic visions.

Achilles' shield depicts celestial bodies, cities at war and peace, celebrations and harvesting, the four seasons (Heffernan 21), and the "mighty power" of the ocean (*Iliad* 18.708-09). Lessing believes that Homer places on the shield "the very essence of all that had happened in the world by means of but a few pictures."[2] The shields bring together an amalgam of opposing elements of human experience: pleasure and pain; city and country; heaven and earth; law and disorder. The shield is built upon these contradictions: it is a visual artifact represented in words, visual space converted to temporal text. In addition, the layout of the shield is ambiguous: Homer never describes

[1] James A. W. Heffernan defines ekphrasis: "*ekphrasis is the verbal representation of visual representation*" in *Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to Ashbery*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993: 3. More generally, ekphrasis is a verbal description of an artwork.

[2] Quoted in Keith Stanley, *The Shield of Homer*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993: 3.

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where Hephaestus places his mouldings, save "for the final placing of the Ocean River around the rim of the shield" (Heffernan 21). The tension of opposing elements that infuse the shield's decoration suggests the shield's literary function: it visually encapsulates the epic and its themes, portraying humanity through paradox and exploring free will though incompleteness.

In his introduction to the Fagles translation, Bernard Knox argues that the scenes of peace on the shield offset the violence in the main action, creating "an exquisite balance between the celebration of the war's tragic, heroic values and those creative values of civilised life that war destroys" (Knox 62). He remarks on the dichotomy between the scenes of war and the scenes of peace, ignoring the fact that in every long ekphrastic episode on the shield, peace and violence co-exist. Thus, for example, in the peaceful city, men haggle over a "blood-price for a kinsman just murdered" (*Iliad* 18.582) and in the city of war an argument develops in the attacking army over whether to share the plunder with the inhabitants of the city. Moreover, the city Knox describes as "besieged by a hostile army . . . fight[ing] for its existence" (Knox 62) is in fact torn between two factions, in a situation replete with gods and internal dissent. Furthermore, the attacked city (allegorically Troy) is defended by "loving wives and innocent children" (*Iliad* 18.599) as the "men marched out to war" (*Iliad* 18.601). Here, accompanied by Ares and Pallas Athena the men raid their "enemy's flocks" (*Iliad* 18.610), killing innocent shepherds, "playing their hearts out on their pipes" (*Iliad* 18.612). The raid culminates in a battle in which the camps "clashed and fought like living, breathing men / grappling each other's corpses, dragging off the dead" (*Iliad* 18.627-28). In the town war, the battle is not between the innocent and the guilty, just as the Trojan War is ultimately not about good and evil. Knox's reading disregards the most important element of the shield passage: opposites merge in the Iliad and on the shield, issues are complex, and right and wrong are ambiguous. The shield is not separate from war; rather, it is the product of war. As such, it embodies the moral ambiguities of the war through its mouldings.

In the city of war, as in the rest of poem, war is encoded[3] in peace. The two are not distinct states; rather, they are mutually dependent entities, in constant flux. Furthermore, war and peace are not "two poles of the human condition" (Knox 62), they are simply the human condition. For this reason, Knox's "exquisite balance" fails: each scene involves both war and peace, as well as other contradictions. Even the direct allegories between the city at war and Troy are mired in ambiguity. Here, Athena and Ares partner to protect the city, when in the main action they are bitter enemies; and emphasis is placed on the murdered shepherds, when in the rest of the epic Achaean shepherds are not mentioned. These and other paradoxes figuring throughout the description of the shield act as an allegorical microcosm for the entire poem.

James A. W. Heffernan, in his book *Museum of Words*, discusses a number of formal contradictions in Homer's ekphrasis. He focuses on "representational friction, which occurs whenever the dynamic pressure of verbal narrative meets the fixed forms of visual representation and acknowledges them as such" (Heffernan 19). Furthermore, "the friction also occurs when the poet's language registers the difference between the medium of visual representation and its referent" (Heffernan 19). Homer, through the eye of the working forge, describes a field being plowed:

> ...the crews would turn back down along the furrows,
> pressing again to reach the end of the deep fallow field
> and the earth churned black behind then, like earth churning,
> solid gold as it was-that was the wonder of Hephaestus' work (*Iliad* 18.635-38).

The fire god deliberately makes gold look black, as he later stains Death's cloak red "with human blood" (*Iliad* 18.626). The fantastic representation aggrandises the description in a way suitable to epic, and "reminds us that [Homer] is representing representation" (Heffernan 19). This self-reflective characteristic of Homer's ekphrasis strengthens the allegory, emphasising its relation to the greater work, and endows visual art with the magnificent, seemingly infinite power of language.

Homer expands on this "representational friction" by incorporating sound into his golden shield. In the vineyard scene, a young boy plays a lyre "so clear it could break your heart with longing . . . his fine voice rising and falling low" (*Iliad* 18.665, 11.667). Heffernan comments: "Homer makes no distinction between what the artist actually puts on the shield and what can be inferred about the narrative context surrounding the moment putatively depicted" (Heffernan 11). The status of the shield is ambiguous: ultimately, it is impossible to visualise the divine work, as it violates our expectations, much as does the entire epic. Even the proposed function of the shield—to protect Achilles after he has finally decided to go to war—is questionable. It is an "indestructible shield" (*Iliad* 18.709) for a destructible man. The scenes on the shield represent civilisation, in particular, a civilisation that Achilles uses to protect himself. Heffernan argues that the armour represents "the life it is . . . designed to protect," an armament full of men and women unshielded, "fully exposed to the spears of the enemy" (Heffernan 11). But the shield is not made to protect civilisation; it is made to glorify Achilles. In the *Iliad* the individual is continually placed ahead of the community. Achilles enters the war to revenge the death of Patroclus, not to save the Greek fleets. Moreover, Achilles knows his fate: he will die soon after killing Hector. The shield serves Achilles in promoting his fame; it is not immortal in its invincibility, but rather in the status it will bring to the hero. This knowledge inflames Achilles' fighting spirit—"the more he gazed the deeper his anger went" (*Iliad* 18.19.19)—until he kills his enemy. For the reader, the shield, in both form and content, serves as an extension of the epic's scope, expanding its themes into all aspects of human life.

The construction of the shield also allegorises the role of fate in the *Iliad*. There is discord between fate and free will, with Homer never completely accepting or rejecting either one. Hephaestus sculpts the lives of men and women on the shield just as Fate fashions the lives of the poem's characters. But the fire god, like Homer, rarely resolves any of the episodes he depicts: on the shield, incomplete incidents resonate from the epic frame, leaving the intent of the passage "open-ended" (Nagy 195). The "litigation scene" (Nagy 200), which Gregory Nagy describes as marking the inception of the "polis" in the poem, "begins in media res, when one man refuses to take money as a recompense for the killing of another" (Heffernan 17). The "plaintiff wishes . . .

[3] A word suggested in David Foster Wallace's "David Lynch Keeps His Head" in his *A Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never Do Again*. Boston: Little Brown, 1997: 205.

revenge, not ransom" (Nagy 200). The scene abruptly ends before a set of judges, with a prize to the judge who speaks the "straightest verdict" (*Iliad* 18.592). The parallels between this episode and the dispute involving Achilles and Agamemnon are obvious; in addition, however, the structure of the scene parallels the structure of the epic. Homer presents both the *Iliad* and the shield as works in progress: certain events are expected, but never guaranteed. The power of fate is always in doubt. Characters routinely verge on escaping their destinies, and stories are left open, with many possible endings.

On the shield of Achilles contradictions coalesce into an object of astounding beauty. The paradoxes of the shield are also those of the narrative. In both, there is no encompassing morality to order and judge the momentous episodes described. In the *Iliad*, gruesome scenes of violence and death, meaningless war, selfish motives, and individual heroics combine to form "the greatest epic poem in literature" (Knox 63). The epic, and on a smaller scale the shield, contain all the elements of human experience—beauty, violence, and love—locked in the conflict of unending paradoxes.

In the *Aeneid*, Aeneas' shield untangles the paradoxes presented in the *Iliad*. The shield "re-imagine[s]" (Heffernan 22) the Homeric original, centring it in Virgil's moral landscape and using it to celebrate the achievements of Rome. Like Homer, Virgil creates a shield beyond the scope of the visual arts; but unlike Homer, he uses the representational friction and temporal-spatial ambivalence that characterise ekphrasis to enhance the majesty of his epic, more than to reflect his themes. The shield does offer some allegorical references to the greater epic, but not to the same extent as Homer's shield. Primarily, the shield serves as a synopsis of the history of Ancient Rome, relating Aeneas' trials to his objective: Augustus' ascendancy. The pictures on the shield illustrate "Roman victories over moments of peril and crisis" (Eden xx) and, according to S. J. Harrison, emphasise the escape of "the city-state of Rome . . . from destruction or from demotion from its Italian and (later) Mediterranean hegemony" (Harrison 71).

Harrison, in his essay, "The Survival and Supremacy of Rome: The Unity of the Shield of Aeneas," gives a detailed analysis of all the historical events depicted on the shield. He discusses the "[t]he mother wolf" with the "twin boys at play around her teats" (*Aeneid* 8.854-855), relating them to Romulus and Remus and their escape from "intended infanticide" (Harrison 71). He continues, using Livy's histories as his guide, to delineate the other episodes on the shield. "Vivid in the centre" (*Aeneid* 8.912) of the shield is a description of Augustus' victory at Actium. Here, at the focal point of both the shield and epic, Augustus Caesar battles "Antonius with Barbaric wealth / And diversity of arms" (*Aeneid* 8.926-927). He drives Cleopatra in "a frenzy out of Egypt" (*Aeneid* 8.943) and she is pictured "pallentem morte futura" (*Aeneidos* 8.709). Every scene depicted is a triumph for Rome and thus a triumph for Aeneas. The shield provides the last chronological marker in the epic; it illustrates an end to Aeneas' tribulations, providing closure in ways that the *Iliad* does not.

Virgil's shield also contains some elements of allegory. Heffernan cites the similarity between Virgil's treatment of Cleopatra with his treatment of Dido. Both are terrified of the passage of time (Heffernan 34), and like Cleopatra, Dido is "pallida morte futura" (*Aeneidos* 4.644). Another

important allegorical element in Virgil's Homeric revision is his choice to represent the shield as a finished product instead of a work-in-progress as in the Iliad. The shield is finished when we read about it in the poem; the future of Rome and Aeneas has already been set in gold. The ekphrasis of the shield ignores debates between free will and fate; instead, like much of the epic, it concentrates on the divine and fated greatness of Rome.

On the shield, it is clear who is in the right (Romans) and who is in the wrong (non-Romans). We read of the lineage of "so excellent a man every way as Virgil's Aeneas" (Sidney 483). Here, the shield serves a political function as well as an artistic one. It "represent[s] and perpetuate[s] political authority" and associates Rome with the gods, turning Augustus into a deity (Heffernan 35). The shield subverts the aims of Homer, adapting them to meet the needs of Virgil's audience. At the end of the description, when Aeneas sees the armour, he feels "joy in the pictures" (*Aeneid* 8.990), yet knows "nothing of the events themselves" (*Aeneid* 8.989) even though he has a direct, fated future. He is the antithesis of Achilles, who understands that his shield means both his glory and his death (yet remains ignorant of how he will die). The political and moral landscape of the shield also emphasises the ideal Roman character, exemplified in the "excellent" Aeneas in the epic and Augustus on the armour. The future Emperor captures the "conquered races" (*Aeneid* 8.976), rather than killing them, and fights for society, rather than himself, leading all of Rome—"both senators and people, / Household gods and great gods" (*Aeneid* 8.917-918)—into battle against the shameful Antony and Cleopatra.

The shields are thus more than mere ornaments; they represent in both form and content the aims, themes, and philosophies of each epic. In addition, they encompass the characteristics of their age, demonstrating the superb skill of both Homer and Virgil. The ekphrastic descriptions combine visual space with textual time to surpass the properties of cause and effect narration and traditional sculpture and metalwork. The shield of Achilles is a morally ambiguous conglomeration of ideas and emotions. It is an allegory not only of the *Iliad*, but also of all human life. The shield of Aeneas manipulates the conventions established by Homer, producing a shield of glorious clarity, deifying Rome and showing the purpose of Aeneas's hardships. Homer's shield raises questions concerning the interaction of war and beauty. In the poem and on the shield the relationship between the two is paradoxical and troubling. Virgil's shield disregards this problem, placing beauty and glory as the logical consequence of war, celebrating bloodshed and Rome's subsequent hegemony.

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Relating Platonic Forms and Sensible Particulars in the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides*

Jenny Pelletier

What precisely is the relationship between Platonic forms and sensible particulars? We read that snow "partakes" in coldness, that Socrates "participates" in tallness and that unity "is present" in one. "Partakes", "participates" and "is present in" are the most specific terms Plato employs to articulate the kind of relationship that subsists between the forms and sensible particulars. At best, these terms show that in some sense, the properties, qualities and attributes of sensible particulars are instantiations of the Forms "Coldness", "Tallness" and "Unity". But what does it mean to be an instantiation of a form? How do sensible particulars "get" the properties, qualities and attributes they have from the forms? And how can an immaterial entity be the source of material qualities?

In the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides* we find out what the participation relation is not. These two dialogues reveal the inadequacy of any kind of physical model. The physical make-up of sensible particulars cannot include tangible, material parts of a form in virtue of which sensible particulars can be said to be instantiations of forms. This effectively rules out the possibility that the participation relation is causal in the narrowest conception of causality. Plato's critique of the physical model proposed by Anaxagoras leaves open the possibility for alternative participation models, but Plato does not explicitly argue for any one specific alternative as the most plausible or appropriate. However, an examination of Plato's response to the physical model certainly reveals what the participation relation cannot be. Are we left then with only a negative definition of the participation relation?

The most plausible alternative is that the participation relation is explanatory. This is suggested in the *Phaedo* where it is characterized as: the logical definition of a form is such that if it is present in a sensible particular, specific properties and attributes manifest themselves in that sensible particular. I will first discuss Plato's critique of the physical model in the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides* and then turn to an evaluation of the explanatory account of participation.

We first encounter the physical model in the *Phaedo* where it is introduced as a theory of causal explanation. The physical model asserts that sensible particulars have the properties, quali-

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ties and attributes that they do because their material constitution contains a part of the form that is the universal of the specific attribute or property sensible particulars display (*Phaedo* 100a). For example, a ball is red because is contains a piece of redness. On this theory then, the ball participates in redness in virtue of having a piece of redness in it as a material constituent. This explains why the ball is red and makes the further claim that the piece of red in the ball is what causes the ball to be red. This physical model relies on two key presuppositions, both of which Plato will agree with even though he rejects the participation relation that comes out of the physical model. The first is that forms do indeed exist separately and independently from sensible particulars and that some kind of relationship between the forms and sensible particulars exists that grounds any explanation for why sensible particulars have the properties they do. The physical model certainly maintains the existence of such forms. Pure redness must exist in order to ground the claim that the ball is red because it contains a part of pure redness. If pure redness did not exist then such a claim would not hold any explanatory or causal power because without pure redness a sensible particular could not contain a part of pure redness. Although this does not discount the possibility for an entirely different theory of why the ball is red, in the context of the physical model pure redness must exist. Evidently, Plato agrees: pure redness is precisely the Form Redness. As shall we, Plato objects to the claim that a part of pure redness is in the ball and thus causes the ball to be red.

The second presupposition that the physical model relies on is the truth of self-predication. For the physical model to stand, the form must have the same property or quality that it instantiates in the sensible particular as its own predicable property or quality. In other words, redness itself must be red or F, where F is a form, must have f-ness, and where f-ness is a property or quality. Self-predication is required so that the piece of redness in the ball can be said to be itself red. If the Form of Redness was not truly red, then having a piece of redness in the ball would not explain why the ball was red nor could it cause the redness of the ball. Because F has f-ness, any part of F in a sensible particular has f-ness as well. This allows the physical model to explain why the sensible particular has f-ness and it grounds the claim that having a part of F that has f-ness is what causes the sensible particular to have f-ness. In the *Parmenides*, Plato develops a theory of predication that retains the truth of self-predication but does not necessarily ground the physical model.

Initially, the physical model makes some sense in view of articulating what kind of relationship might subsist between the forms and sensible particulars. It provides a plausible account of why sensible particulars have the properties they do by relying on a causal explanation. In short, it claims that the forms play a direct, efficient causal role - the piece of the form that is in the particular is what causes the particular to have f-ness because the piece itself has f-ness. The form (via the "piece" of the form) causes the effect of "having f-ness". But this account gives rise to a variety of problems which Plato explores predominantly in the *Parmenides*. First, the forms, according to Plato's explicit account in the *Phaedo*, are by definition immaterial. As such, any talk of parts or pieces of forms that constitute material components of a sensible particular is rendered incoherent. The immaterial cannot be divided into parts and exist as physical components of physical entities (*Parmenides* 131c). Immateriality implies indivisibility except perhaps in the realm of concepts. A complex idea, for example, can be broken down into the simple ideas that compose it or a multiple

clause sentence can be divided into clauses. But transforming the divided parts of the immaterial, like simple ideas or clauses, into physical parts of a material thing is a transformation that belongs to the supernatural, not the natural. Although all Platonic forms are immaterial it might be possible to contend that forms for physical properties could be divided into physical parts when they are instantiated by sensible particulars. Redness is a physical property when it is displayed in a sensible particular even if the Form "Redness" is immaterial. However, if self-predication holds and forms are universally immaterial, how can something immaterial be red or tall, properties which are displayed only by material entities? Plato admits that natural forms are problematic with respect to self-predication not only in the physical model but also in general (*Parmenides* 130c). The Form of Redness cannot be strictly immaterial if redness itself is a physical quality that redness must display.

Moreover, forms like Beauty, Justice, and Knowledge, even when they are qualities displayed by sensible particulars, can hardly be construed as physical parts of sensible particulars. Like ideas and sentences, the Form of Justice could be divisible but it cannot be transformed into a physical entity. Individuals and laws that are prima facie "just" are in reality not "just" because they contain within them a particular material entity that is just. The Form of Justice itself could never be described as consisting of or containing a physical entity. Furthermore, if Plato admitted that the forms could be divided at all he would have to admit that a divided form is no longer one that is consistent with the claim that the forms are always one (*Parmenides* 131c-131d). So, the basic Platonic claim that forms are immaterial, whether or not a specific form displays a physical property when it is present in a sensible particular, provides the grounds to reject the physical model of the participation relation.

Another problem which arises from the physical model is the following: if the physical model is true, then each time a sensible particular receives a part of a form the form must separate off a piece of itself that finds its way into a sensible particular. The form must get smaller and smaller, eventually disappearing entirely (*Parmenides* 131d-131e). Other problems appear if a form "runs out": Is it replaced? If so, what replaces it? How can a form be replaced if forms belong to an ideal world that is infinite, non-temporal, and changeless? And what happens to relational forms, for example "Largeness", which would presumably become smaller and smaller as each "large" portion is instantiated in an object's sensible particular? Eventually the Form of Largeness will no longer have largeness and self-predication could not hold (*Parmenides* 131e). The physical model also encounters difficulties in explaining forms of relation generally. If Socrates is taller than Plato is but smaller than Aristotle what happens to Socrates' portion of the Form Tallness? Has it shrunk or been in any way diminished? Or are portions of Tallness given to sensible particulars in different quantities so that tall, taller and tallest exist? Socrates could have a portion of Tallness while Aristotle has a larger portion of Tallness, but what could possibly be present in Tallness that would decide which sensible particular received which portion? And again, we return to the enigma of just what occurs when every portion of Tallness has been distributed.

The physical model is entirely problematic. Any similar account of the participation relation will likely fall into similar difficulties. A narrow conception of causality, namely "efficient" causali-

ty, will also be problematic. Efficient causality is inappropriately mechanistic and material in this context, a context which makes no differentiation between the supersensible world of the forms and the physical, sensible world. A broader sense of causality such as the Aristotelian formal cause or the medieval theories of emanation for example, could be more plausible and appropriate. However, Plato himself never explicitly discusses a broader conception of causality as a plausible explanation of the participation relation. In the *Phaedo* the discussion of causality is limited to efficient causality and, as we have seen, it is rejected. If causal explanation is not a viable model, what does Plato propose in its place? As I have suggested, Plato is uncharacteristically silent on this point. After the lengthy critique of the physical model in the *Parmenides*, Plato turns to a discussion on theories of predication in order to maintain the truth of self-predication. But Plato does not explicitly propose an alternative model for participation nor does he explain whether or not theories of predication have any bearing on his critique. Theories of predication, which focus on the ways we predicate qualities, properties and attributes of objects and their possible truth values, do not strictly explain how or why the object (sensible particular) has the properties that it does. Predication theories are concerned not with the origin of properties in objects but about the veracity of true and false statements about those properties.

The initial critique of the physical model we find in the *Phaedo* suggests that the participation model is purely explanatory. In other words, what makes a painting beautiful is that is participates in or partakes in the Form of Beauty (*Phaedo* 100d). This statement does not claim anything further than 1) there are forms; 2) sensible particulars stand in some kind of relation to the forms and 3) that relation reveals that sensible particulars have the qualities they do with respect to the forms. Evidently, this does not explain what the relation actually consists of and how that relation could be explanatory. Furthermore, if this were the basis of the Platonic account of the participation relation it would be empty and devoid of content (*Phaedo* 100d-100e). We have already accepted Plato's preliminary claim that X is f in virtue of f-ness (the painting is beautiful in virtue of partaking in the Form of Beauty, *Phaedo* 100d). Moreover, if these kinds of explanatory statements were sufficient to ground a participation model, Plato would be forced to acknowledge the following difficulty: What if we do not know that X is f so that we cannot make any claim about X having f in virtue of f-ness? In this case nothing is explained and we are still left with the problem of an unclear conception of the participation relation. That the painting is beautiful because it participates in the Form of Beauty does not explain what kind of interaction occurs between the Form of Beauty and the painting such that the statement "the painting is beautiful" is true (that the painting is in fact beautiful) and that the statement is true because of some kind of participation.

Plato suggests a new, more sophisticated theory of explanation that is grounded in some kind of logical definition. The logical definition or structure of the form reveals a specific mode of participation (*Phaedo* 105b-105c). The answer to the question "why does X display f-ness?" or "How is X predicable by f?" is: X is f because X is y and y entails f-ness (the Form F) (*Phaedo* 105c). For example, X is cold because X is snow (y) and the logical definition of snow entails Coldness (f-ness). So, the kind of sensible particular that X is denotes what kind of qualities X can display given that specific qualities are entailed in the logical definition of the form that X instantiates. In this case,

there is a close relationship between the form and the sensible particular. The definition or structure of forms entail certain and discrete sets of predicates. Sensible particulars that are predicable by specific set of predicates do so because they participate in that specific form. If a sensible particular satisfies the conditions, or is predicable by one entire set of predicates, then it can be said that it partakes in that form. This account certainly explains why sensible particulars have the qualities they do by appeal to a more sophisticated notion of explanation. It establishes the conditions a sensible particular must meet in order to participate in a form and it reveals that any precise account of the participation relation will have something to do with logical definition and structure of forms. However, there is still a sense in which the participation relation is left unexplained—we are left with persistent question of how and why sensible particulars stand in relation to forms such that they possess the qualities they do. Or, how does the logical definition of a form and the kinds of predicates that definition entails come to be manifested in a sensible particular?

Although Plato's theory of explanation leaves much unclear, it avoids the difficulties that arise from the physicalist model or the causal theory. And it does explain the nature of sensible particulars by appealing to the ideal world of forms. Socrates is human because he satisfies all the conditions of the definition of "human". If we understand the forms as simply objective, a priori logical definitions that are immaterial, non-temporal and changeless and not quasi-mystical entities that float about and that do not play any direct, efficient causal role in the instances of sensible particulars, then there is a sense in which the explanatory theory does reveal the participation relation. The mistake is to conceive of the forms as having some kind of agency in arranging sensible particulars so that they display in materiality the kinds of predicates the forms themselves have. We must not underestimate Plato's rejection of the efficient causal explanation.

If we characterize the forms as *a priori* logical definitions which entail specific sets of predicates then sensible particulars that are predicable by certain predicates can be said to participate in a specific form simply in virtue of being predicable by those predicates. The semantics of the word "in" as employed during Plato's account of the physical model are entirely false and misleading. The terms "participate", "partakes" and "present in" are all semantically ambiguous as well, because they imply a kind of activity that requires agency on the part of the forms and the sensible particulars. To claim that Socrates participates in Tallness or Humanness implies an active interaction between Socrates the sensible particular and Tallness or Humanness as forms. Under the explanatory model, this active interaction is irrelevant. A more accurate statement would be: Socrates is human because he is predicable by "ensouled body" which is the predicate entailed in the logical definition "human".

The tendency to understand Platonic forms as having agency, as having the causal power to determine the kinds of qualities and attributes and properties in sensible particulars is persistent. The causal explanation is tempting in part because Plato's two-world hypothesis appears to fit into the later philosophical notions of natural law, the principle of sufficient reason and the entire basis of Christian philosophy. The forms mistakenly supply the immaterial causes for why the material world exists as it does. Like natural law and that of the divine, the forms occupy the supersensible

world that is necessarily *a priori*, absolute and unchanging. The belief in the *a posteriori* nature of the material world in contradistinction to the forms gives rise to an understanding of the forms in the same way that divine or natural law is understood—as causal—so that the material world is rendered intelligible by appeal to a transcendental power. The forms understood as primary causes, a position later occupied by God, provides sufficient and necessary reason for the state of the material world. However, I have tried to show that any understanding of the forms which is grounded in an efficient causation model is inappropriate and misleading and is susceptible to the difficulties encountered by the physical model.

The participation relation is nothing more than an explanatory relation that involves the logical definition and structure of forms. Sensible particulars can only be said to "participate" in a logical definition insofar as a sensible particular happens to be predicable by a set of predicates that are entailed in a specific logical definition. Presumably, the forms and their specific sets of predicates can account for every kind of sensible particular and each instance of a predicable quality that we find in the material world. As such, the forms could be construed as *a priori*, non-temporal and objective kinds that sensible particulars belong to depending on which sets of predicates they are predicable by. The forms then still provide a supersensible system of categorization that permits the intelligibility of the material world without being themselves causes of objects in that world. They exist as a system of logical definitions which are distinguished by the predicates they entail and encompass all possible types of sensible particulars, while also explaining why a sensible particular has the qualities it does insofar as those qualities belong to a particular logical definition.

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Whodunit?
The Murder of Philip II of Macedon

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The murder of Philip II of Macedon has been a whodunit since ancient times. The list of suspect conspirators runs the gamut from simply the murderer Pausanias, to the Lyncestian brothers, to the Persian King, to Olympias, to Alexander and to Amyntas IV. Historians tend to believe that Pausanias did not act alone because they question his motive and suspect a mastermind behind his action (Develin 89). Yet before examining each party possibly associated with the murder, it is important to examine the basic account of what happened.

The traditional telling of the murder begins with Pausanias, once Philip's lover, who had been replaced in the king's affections with another young man also named Pausanias. Out of jealousy, the first Pausanias accused the second Pausanias of being a hermaphrodite. Unable to bear the insult, the latter killed himself in battle protecting Philip (Diodorus 16.93.4-6). Attalus, a friend of the second Pausanias, invited the first to dinner, plied him with alcohol, and gave him to the muleteers to rape as a response to the suicide (Diod. 16.93.7). Outraged, Pausanias went to the king to complain. Philip did not punish Attalus, for reasons varying from his relation to Cleopatra, Philip's new wife, to the monarch's need of Attalus' services, whether in internal politics or in the upcoming Persian war (Diod. 16.93.9). According to Diodorus, Philip did attempt to mollify Pausanias with gifts and increased honour among the bodyguards (Diod. 16.93.9), while Justin said Philip put him off with excuses, and not without ridicule (Justin 9.6.6). Pausanias, we are told, henceforth "nursed his wrath implacably, and yearned to avenge himself, not only on the on who had done him wrong, but also on the one who failed to avenge him" (Diod. 16.94.1).

Then came the wedding of Philip's daughter Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus in 336 BC. There was much commotion and many guests including "leading members of the Greek Community, personal friends from the Greek states, notables from the Balkan Empire and of course leading Macedonians" (Hammond 1994: 176). Here Pausanias got his chance: planting escape horses at the city gates, he stabbed Philip with a dagger while the king was entering the theatre alone and unguarded, only to be killed himself by Philip's bodyguards in his ensuing flight (Diod.

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16.94.3-4). Afterwards, Heromenes and Arrabaeus, sons of Areopus, were also tried and executed for Philip's death. Later, Alexander the Great also claimed that the assassination was the mastermind of the Persian king (Arrian 2.14.5), while other sources connect Olympias and/or Alexander with the murder (Plutarch *Alex.* 10).

Thus, Philip II of Macedon died at the hands of Pausanias, a member of his bodyguard. Although some see Pausanias' anger and need for revenge as proof that he acted alone, since ancient times there has been a cloud of suspicion cast on both Philip's wife Olympias and his son Alexander. The questions remain: did Pausanias act of his own volition, or did he have fellow conspirators backing him? Many had the motive, but who had the opportunity and the audacity to commit the crime? Either acting alone or together, the main list of possible culprits includes Pausanias alone, the Lyncestian brothers, the Persians, Olympias, Alexander, and Amyntas IV.

First it is important to consider the sources. The main sources for the death of Philip are Diodorus and Justin's *Epitome of Pompeius Trogus.* In addition, we have a short account by Plutarch in his *Life of Alexander.* Aristotle's brief mention of the event in his *Politics* is the only contemporary account which can serve to reinforce or enlighten the more comprehensive accounts. Both Diodorus and Trogus wrote in the time of Augustus, but they did not use the same sources for their projects (Hammond 1991: 504). Consequently, their information diverges at times. For instance, Pausanias at the time of the rape is showed by Justin to be a youth, while in Diodorus he is a mature man (Hammond 1991: 504). Of the two sources, Diodorus is generally taken as the more reliable one. Justin (Trogus) is sensational and is based on Cleitarchus, who was considered "careless of the truth, a scandalmonger and a popular writer" (Hammond 1991: 504). Not only was Trogus' source unreliable, but Justin was also selective in what he recorded, having "excerpted from his forty-four published volumes all the most noteworthy material [... and] omitted what did not make pleasurable reading or to serve to provide a moral" (Justin 1.1.4).

Let us begin with our only contemporary source for Philip's slaughter. According to Aristotle "Philip was slain by Pausanias for neglecting to revenge him of the affront he had received from Attalus" (Aristotle 1311b). Aristotle uses this assassination as an example in which a citizen, provoked by an outrageous and offensive action by the king, attacked the monarch not from political ambition but for pure revenge. There is little reason do doubt Aristotle's testimony as he was highly familiar with the Macedonian court, with the dynamics behind the scenes, with the political players, with the people involved, and with this particular event. Even though Aristotle establishes a personal motive, this does not prevent Pausanias from having other backers or conspirators (Lindsay 77).

Diodorus agrees with Aristotle, and sees the murder as the result of Pausanias' private initiative. The difference between them is that while Aristotle merely mentions the occurrence, Diodorus gives a fuller account. Diodorus makes neither reference nor allusion to conspirators, saying only that Pausanias was encouraged by the advice of the sophist Hermocrates (Diod. 16.93.1). Both Diodorus and Aristotle claim Pausanias' motive was revenge because of a personal vendetta against Philip, his former lover, who would not redress the sexual humiliation Pausanias had suffered at Attalus' instigation.

One important question must be asked: who was Pausanias? Behind the image of spurned lover, rape victim, and assassin was a nobleman from Orestis; "a bodyguard, one of the noblest in the land" (Badian 247). Modern scholars often assume that Pausanias was a man who had lost his mind, referring to him as a "psychopath," or "demented" and "unbalanced;" a man with a "deranged mind" (Frears 123-4). Yet the ancient sources do not make Pausanias a madman, and seem to believe that his personal motive is legitimate and that lucid planning goes into executing such a revenge. One has to consider that "the job was planned . . . [and] not, as has often been said, the act of a man stung beyond reason" (Develin 89).

Other than infatuation with conspiracy theories, one reason why modern historians are unsatisfied with Pausanias' personal motive is that his rape may have occurred eight years prior to his assassination of Philip (Badian 247). The rape is dated by the corresponding Illyrian war fought at the time, and the last Illyrian war mentioned by Diodorus is dated in 344 BC. This date is also supported by Justin (Frears 121). The Illyrian war is not directly connected to the rape of Pausanias, but to the suicide of the second Pausanias. Yet because the next topic breached by Diodorus was the rape, historians have automatically connected the two. Perhaps the rape was simply the next significant event that tied into Diodorus' narrative, which makes it possible that "it was at an indefinite but later date [after the second Pausanias' suicide] that Attalus added insult to injury by that famous outrage" (Frears 122). Furthermore, it is possible that there was another Illyrian war later which went unmentioned by the sources, perhaps because it was very minor, or because it paled in comparison to other events rocking the Macedonian court. The Illyrians were a constant problem for the Macedonians and it is not a stretch of the imagination that there was some trouble with them in the latter part of Philip's reign.

It does seem like Pausanias' rape must have been some time between the marriage of Philip and Cleopatra (late 338/ early 337) and the sending of an advance military force into Asia in the spring of 336, rather than almost a decade earlier (Frears 120). If this is the case, Philip refrained from punishing Attalus for two reasons (Diod. 16.93.9). First, Attalus was a close relation of Cleopatra, who had just then become Philip's wife. If the rape had occurred eight years earlier, Cleopatra would have still been a child, and it is far less likely that Philip would have been as forgiving. Second, Attalus remained unpunished because he was about to lead a campaign into Asia on behalf of Philip. It is doubtful that Philip had planned the Asian campaign eight years in advance so accurately as to choose its commanders, and was so tied to such a plan so as to feel unable to switch them in the eight years before the campaign. Thus, Pausanias' rape must have occurred after Philip's marriage to Cleopatra and before Attalus left for Asia. Moreover the brutal nature of the attack suggests his reason for revenge was not eight years in the past, but fresh and festering for only a few months.

In any case, as Elizabeth Carney points out, "concern about the date of the rape is not terribly relevant: victims of rape do not forget in a year or two; they brood; the experience tends to affect them the rest of their lives" (Carney 1992: 181). It is easy to see how Pausanias' rape was traumatizing, as he was subject not only to Attalus' "carnal desires but, like a prostitute, to those of his fel-

low diners as well, so making the boy an object of universal ridicule amongst his peers" (Justin 9.6.6). Thus, regardless of the precise date of Pausania's rape, it is nonetheless a valid source for the motive of revenge and therefore should not be lightly dismissed.

Another reason historians doubt the credibility of Pausanias' motive of revenge is, as Ernest Badian points out, because "Pausanias' grievance was against Attalus, who had inflicted the insult on him and who was at that time in Asia (Philip came into it only indirectly, as not having punished Attalus (Badian 247))". Yet it seems probable that he struck when Attalus was in Asia, "because the thought of his enemy winning glory in the field drove Pausanias into action [. . .] enraged by Philip's bestowal of new honours upon Attalus, Pausanias decided to regain honour and glory by striking down Philip, false judge and greatest man in the world" (Frears 123). Obviously, Pausanias hated Attalus, and resented his humiliation while "his enemy was honoured with the rank of general" (Justin 9.6.7). So why was Philip his target? Philip was his former lover, who not only let the degradation of his body and honour go unpunished and thus passively permitted the ridicule of Pausanias to continue, but also contributed to his enemy's honour and prestige by sending him on a glorious preliminary mission to Asia. This was gross aggravation to the insult he had already received.

One must also consider how much of a good tale the assassination of Philip actually is. The successful conqueror was about to embark on the greatest of all missions: the conquest of Asia. His fame, power, and glory increased with every passing day. Yet, on the eve of his departure, his former lover, who felt he had been wronged by not having his honour avenged, swiftly and effectively killed him. Pausanias' story is indeed dramatic, and "his crime fits into the tradition of regicide in Macedonia and has elements in common with other such crimes: concern for masculine sexual honour; a mixture of motives both political and personal but characterized by ancient sources as personal alone; a desire merely to eliminate the ruler, not necessarily to replace him with any particular candidate" (Carney 1992: 182). The presence of this motif throughout Macedonian history gives credence to Pausanias' motives because his actions had a precedent in the past.

Pausanias was part of a society that remembered the past vividly. In the recent past, there was the assassination of king Archelaus, ruler of Macedon from 413 to 399, who was also murdered at the hands of a former lover (Lindsay 77). Some see this as evidence that "elements of the story of the assassin of Philip have been stereotyped" (Lindsay 77). Perhaps Pausanias, knowing what had happened before, was acting on precedent. Greeks took pride in their past, but they continually tried to surpass former glory. Knowing the story of the assassination of king Archelaus, Pausanias could do no less to avenge his honour than his predecessor did. It is true that "the story of Pausanias of Orestis smacks of the sensational: it is a sordid tale of homosexual lust, rape and vengeful murder [. . . but] while it undoubtedly suffers from embellishments, much remains that is highly plausible" (Heckel 56).

It is evident from all the sources that Philip died solely at Pausanias' hands, and that Pausanias' motive was revenge. Yet the question then arises whether he was egged on by anyone, or if anyone else was part of a plot with him. It is Diodorus' mention of waiting "horses" (Diod. 16.93.3), as opposed to just one horse for just one person, which has led scholars to believe that Pausanias must

have had at least one more person in league with him.[1] Other than Pausanias, the people most suspected of doing away with Philip (Olympias, Alexander, the Lyncestians, and Amyntas), are given political motivations; mainly wanting to replace Philip in the seat of power. However, these people would have wanted to remain in Macedon to seize control of the situation and the government. Moreover, running away in itself would have been an undesirably incriminating act. Thus the horses do not shed light on conspirators, but do attest that Pausanias at least had an assistant of some sort, since he left the horses at the city gates and would probably not leave them unattended and risk the chance of them being stolen (Develin 89). Yet an assistant does not necessitate someone who knows of the plot, or an accomplice, and horses are not needed for someone who simply prodded and encouraged action. Thus the 'horses' do not clarify whether or not Pausanias acted alone.

Why, then, is a conspiracy theory so plausible? Pausanias' murder of Philip II did not occur in a political vacuum, but in the Macedonian court; and where there is a court, there is action behind the scenes. It is evident that Pausanias was not the only person who had anger and resentment towards Philip II; others had their own personal or political motives to want him dead. Macedonia around the time of Philip's murder was a web of tangled desires and resentments, and somehow, two of three Lyncestian brothers got caught up in it.

After the death of Pausanias two sons of Areopus, Heromenes and Arrabaeus, were put to death for Philip's murder. A third brother, Alexander the Lyncestian, managed to escape punishment (Arrian 1.25.1). In fact, while his two brothers were executed, he went on to have a position of honour under Alexander. This was not because he was innocent, as we know that "though he had incurred blame Alexander let him off for the nonce, since he had been among the first of his friends to rally to him on Philip's death" (Arrian 1.25.1). It is clear that at the time, all three Lyncestians were seen as guilty, though one escaped death by quickly and unequivocally supporting Alexander at a time when he needed supporters. After all, at the time of the murder, "it was regarded as certain that he had also, with Pausanias, conspired to kill Philip" (Quintus Curtius 7.1.6), but because he supported Alexander and because he was the son-in-law of Antipater (the general who also supported Alexander), he was exempted from punishment.

However, the deaths of the two brothers cannot be attributed to Alexander alone, for even the king did not have the power to kill his subjects whenever it pleased him. Alexander acted essentially as an elected official; the 'head of state.' Trials were still done "in accordance with the ancient custom of the Macedonians, the king conducted the inquiry into criminal cases, and the army passed judgment [. . .] and the power of the king availed nothing" (Curtius 6.8.25). Alexander prosecuted at the trial of the Lyncestian Alexander's two brothers, but the choice whether to convict or not and what the penalty was to be lay with the Macedonians (Hammond 1994: 177). The two Lyncestians were thus not Alexander's scapegoats, but judged guilty by a large jury of soldiers and ex-soldiers. Alexander did not prosecute Alexander son of Areopus because of his quick support of

[1] N.G.L. Hammond in *Philip of Macedon*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994: 178; R. Develin in "The Murder of Philip II." *Antichton* 15 (1981): 89.

him, thus being the Lyncestian's saving grace. Yet, we do learn later during Alexander's Persian campaign, that "while Alexander was busied about Pharselis, he received news that his namesake, son of Areopus, was mediating treachery" (Arrian 1.25.1). It seems, thus, that treachery was not something beyond this Alexander. When Arrian reveals the more recent treachery of Alexander son of Areopus to Alexander the Great, he mentions as a side note the complicity of Heromenes and Arrabaeus in Philip's murder. This does seem to imply that the more recent treachery is a return to the past treachery in the time of Philip.

The Lyncestians are most often presented as scapegoats in the murder, some sort of cover up by Alexander to protect either himself, or his mother. But in ancient times the Lyncestians were evidently seen as guilty enough to be convicted for the murder by a large assembly of men. It is known that Lyncestis, a kingdom in the Pidnus mountains and a neighbour of Macedonia, had been both a traditional rival and often-unwilling subject of the kings at Pella, and was only brought under the Macedonian umbrella during Philip II's reign (Badian 248). The resentment towards Philip II must have been great, and perhaps the Lyncestian brothers believed that with Philip's death the Macedonian domination of their kingdom would end. There may have been a precedent made for the brothers, sons of Areopus, in the figure of another Aeropus, on the Macedonian throne around the end of the sixth century BC (Justin 7.2.5), and yet another Areopus, possibly a Lyncestian usurper of the Macedonian throne who reigned circa 398/7-395/4 BC (Carney 1980: 25).

In any case, Macedonian had a long history of trouble with her northern neighbours. It is also known that when Alexander became king, he "found his realm greatly envied and hated of dangerous enemies [. . .] the barbarous nations that were near neighbours onto Macedon, could not abide the bondage of strangers, but desired to have their natural kings" (Plut. *Alex.* 11). According to A.B. Bosworth, these feelings of resentment were held in check for a while. In his opinion, this was because Olympias ruled the household and the dynasty looked like it would be half Epirote, and so half Northern stock, but the anger resurfaced when Philip married Cleopatra, because "the royal house was no longer a blend of east and west but a dynasty of the plain, and the Upper Macedonians [. . .] may have felt threatened with eclipse rather than incorporation into the regime" (Bosworth 1971: 102). Whether this or the simple quest for freedom was the motive of the possible action of the Lyncestians is a moot point. The fact remains that there was considerable tension emanating from Lyncestis, which is one reason why the Lyncestian brothers should not be set aside as innocent. They may very well have been conspirators in Philip's murder.

Once Pausanias and the Lyncestians were dead, Alexander the King did point the finger at one more culprit. Alexander wrote to Darius, the Great King, saying "my father was murdered by conspirators, whom you instructed, as you yourselves boasted in your letter, before all the world" (Arrian 2.14.5). There is no denying that Pausanias' timing was good for Persia, which was not terribly strong, and about to be invaded by Philip. Yet if the Persians were guilty, then they would have had to have a connection in Macedonia. This covert alliance seems unlikely however, for "we have no shadow of evidence of any connections between Macedonian nobles and the national enemy, until some of them were driven to it by Alexander's initial purge" (Badian 248).

Although we do not actually hear of Macedonian nobles dealing with Persia, that may be because it is doubtful that we would. After all, Philip was about to invade their territory, and any Macedonian noble dealing with the Persians would probably not openly do so. Then again, Alexander of Lyncestis was caught later once more in some form of treachery. This time, we hear that "if he would assassinate Alexander the King, that the Persian king would give him the throne of Macedonia and a thousand golden talents to boot" (Arrian 1.25.5). Did the Persian king approach Alexander because he had been in the past amenable to such an arrangement? Although later duplicity cannot retroactively condemn him, it at least suggests that Alexander is a viable suspect who saved himself by quick thinking. In any case, it is interesting that the two other parties accused of Philip's murder, beyond the obviously guilty Pausanias, came together at a later date to try to assassinate Alexander. Perhaps they were not were innocent on the previous occasion?

Who else could have been involved? Even from ancient times there were suspects in the murder other than Pausanias and the Lyncestians, notably Philip's wife Olympias and his son Alexander. The basis of these accusations rests on the alleged deterioration of relations between Philip and Olympias, and consequently between Philip and Alexander. The main proof of this deterioration is encapsulated in four events: Philip's marriage to Cleopatra; Attalus' wish for a real heir; the Pixodarus affair; and the marriage of Philip's daughter Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus.

In the year 338 BC, or early on in 337 BC, Philip married his last wife, Cleopatra. She was a young maiden, a Macedonian aristocrat, possibly with royal Argead blood, and Attalus' niece, with whom Philip had purportedly become completely enamoured (Plut. *Alex.* 9). Their marriage was a reason for conflict between Philip and his wife Olympia, because it could produce a fully Macedonian heir who could displace her son Alexander. This heir would not merely be another son, but would be the only son who was completely Macedonian, and not half-barbarian like Alexander, and so more legitimate. It was possible that Alexander would live past his bloom of youth and later be supplanted by a younger man. Possibly, Alexander was "spared in the meantime, so that the kingdom might not be left without an immediate successor (for Philip clearly wanted a son of his own to succeed him, and Alexander was the only one who had the necessary character and experience), [but] he knew that he would be safe only until Philip's new wife bore a son-or, at the most, until that son was ready to be trained for succession" (Badian 246).

Attalus was the one who brought this possibility to light. Plutarch relates that "the chiefest cause that provoked Alexander, was Attalus at the marriage of Cleopatra" (Plut. *Alex.* 9). What happened on this occasion was that Attalus, deep into his cups, prayed "to the gods, that they might have a lawful heir of Philip and Cleopatra, to succeed him in the kingdom of Macedon" (Plut. *Alex.* 9), thereby vocally deprecating Alexander's legitimacy. In reaction, an outraged Alexander threw his cup at Attalus and responded with: "Why, traitor, what am I? Dost thou take me for a bastard?" (Plut. *Alex.* 9). Philip then got up, drew his sword, and from sickness and drink he fell to the ground, or was prevented from attacking Alexander by his friends. Although it is doubtful that so close to his departure for Asia Philip would want to convey the idea that the succession was shaky and unstable (Carney 1992: 175), his reaction at the wedding feast did not convey that it was an established sub-

ject. In any case, Alexander left Macedon with his mother, taking her to Epirus, and himself going to the Illyrians. It must be pointed out that Alexander would only have been able to have such freedom of movement with the permission of Philip (Hammond 1994: 173).

The next significant event, according to the ancient authors, was when Pixodarus, a prince of Caria, wanted to ally with Philip and so offered his eldest daughter in marriage to Philip's son Aridaeus (Plut. *Alex.* 10). Alexander's friends and mother kindled Alexander's insecurity by telling him that Philip was trying to advance Aridaeus with such a strategic marriage and in so doing, was intending to displace Alexander. Thus Alexander wrote Pixodarus and offered himself in Aridaeus' place. Upon learning of this, Philip strongly reprimanded Alexander, saying that Alexander "was unworthy to be left his heir after his death, if he would cast himself away, marrying the daughter of a Carian, that was a slave and subject of a barbarous king" (Plut. *Alex.* 10). Afterwards, Philip exiled some of Alexander's companions.

The sources say these events caused dissention among the royal family. Arrian furthermore tells us that "Alexander had various suspicions towards Philip, because Philip had taken Eurydice to wife, and had treated with contumely Olympias the mother of Alexander" (Arrian 3.6.5). The very nature of polygamy implies insecurity upon every new marriage, and Alexander, a young man attached to his mother, was probably highly sensitive to see his father marry a woman whose importance could rival his mother's. Philip was polygamous and "used royal marriages both to build internal stability and to extend Macedonia's power" (Carney 2000: 57). A marriage to a Macedonian would probably secure things at home as he readied to leave for Asia, and was probably a tactical alliance rather than a love match that challenged Olympias' dominant position (Carney 2000: 57). Granted, the new bride was a Macedonian aristocrat, but Olympias was still mother of the heir. This is what gave her status, and this did not change. What also gave her prominence and influence was her strong personality. This is also why she caught the negative attention of the sources, but her status remained. This can be seen later, in the wars of the successors, because even after Alexander's death, she remained a strong political force by virtue of her will and being his mother.

What is interesting to note is that Arrian calls Philip's last wife Eurydice instead of Cleopatra, for Eurydice was also the name of Philip's mother. It is therefore possible, as N.G.L. Hammond suggests, that Philip conferred the traditional dynastic name Eurydice upon his new bride to raise her in status above Olympias, the mother of the heir, suggesting that Cleopatra was the future mother of the future heir (Hammond 1994: 173). On the other hand, pseudonyms were extremely common among Macedonian royal women. Plutarch asserts that Olympias actually began with the name Polyxena, and only later nicknamed Myrtale, Olympias, and Stratonice (Carney 2000: 63). Justin simply asserts that Olympias began as Myrtale (Justin 9.7.13), but nevertheless supports the changing of names. The naming and renaming of royal women indicates that these names functioned as quasi-titles and denoted status (Carney 2000: 63). If this is so, then even though the title of Eurydice relates Cleopatra to Philip's mother, Polyxena was named Olympias, which perhaps denoted a close connection to the gods, and thus perhaps retaining her high status amongst Philip's wives.

Furthermore, the fact that Cleopatra and Alexander of Epirus were married is also seen as a

reaction to dissent within the Macedonian royal family. The marriage is seen by some to have been a deliberate attempt by Philip, Olympias, and by implication Alexander, to secure support from Macedonians who favoured Cleopatra. In this view, Philip negated the backing she could have had from home, and also now had a new alliance with Epirus independent of her. Thus she was no longer a factor in securing good relations with Epirus on the eve of his departure for Asia. This comes from Justin's (Trogus') statement that "Olympias was also trying to induce her brother Alexander, the king of Epirus, to go to war, and she would have succeeded if Philip had not forestalled him by giving him his daughter in marriage" (Justin 9.7.7). Yet, this statement must be mistaken. Epirus could not have conceivably been the grounds of support of Olympias and Alexander if they should turn against Philip. Alexander of Epirus had grown up at the Macedonian court, and was set up as king of Epirus by none other than Philip II, which already in effect made him a client king of sorts. Since Philip was accumulating one victory after another, and Macedonia was growing in fame and size, why would Alexander of Epirus risk confronting the military superpower of Macedon for the sake of a woman, albeit his sister, when he would only lose in the initiative? This marriage probably did little if nothing to destabilize Olympias' position in the Macedonian court.

The positions and concerns of Olympias and Alexander are both interrelated and interdependent. Her high status was based on her son as heir, and on his success. Olympias is consequently considered the major suspect by both ancient sources and modern sources. Plutarch states that "of this murder, most men accused Queen Olympias, who (as is reported) allured this young man, having just cause of anger, to kill [Philip]" (Plut. *Alex.* 10). Thus Plutarch paints a picture whereby Olympias, knowing of Pausanias' resentment and anger towards Philip prodded him to take action and kill her husband, and was actually the mastermind behind the assassination. In support of Olympias' guilt we also find Atheneaus, who, although he gives a different reason, says the murder was a result of domestic squabbles that occurred at her own instigation (Lindsay 76). Justin also makes Olympia guilty (Justin 9.7.1). Why is she such a choice assassin according to so many ancient and modern writers? It is true that she must have felt some resentment towards Philip and his young bride Cleopatra, and some concern at the future position of her son. It is true that she most probably did have some influence with her son Alexander, and did have a voice and strong personality which she exercised in politics. But does she deserve the negative tradition attributed to her? These sources are extraordinarily biased against her, and these biases have permeated into modern times.

It is believed that "a propaganda campaign waged by Cassander in order to excuse his murder of Olympias is the origin of the hostile tradition about Olympias."[2] This campaign, though, was largely successful because ancient public opinion was already presupposed to be against her, first because of prejudice to women operating the political sphere which was traditionally occupied by men; and second because of hostility toward monarchy and polygamy.

As a woman who tried to participate in politics, Olympias "in no way conformed to Greek expectations about conventional female behaviour" (Carney 1987: 36). Men participated in public

[2] Tarn in Elizabeth Carney, "The Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander and The Murder of Philip." *Historia* 41 (1992): 186.

life, and women were relegated to private life, and these were two worlds that could not mix (Carney 1993: 33). Although the basic unanimity in the sources makes it fair to say that she probably did have a powerful character, and probably was determined and ruthless, the same things were said of her son. For a man, however, these were qualities and not character defects (Carney 1987: 40-1). Ironically, the same qualities that made Alexander "The Great" also made Olympias one of history's villains. Consequently, it seems as if "the antipathy her unconventionality inspired in the Greek world is a cultural assessment, not an eternal truth" (Carney 1993: 33).

Unease with the monarchy was directly tied to the place of polygamy, and women, within the system. Women played and important role in the succession, and some like Olympias did have a voice in politics, which was not well looked upon. Women could only have some political power under a monarchy, and under a polygamous monarchy they had more power. Thus, the hostility to such a system, and to the women who gained some power in it, is not surprising. Plutarch, for instance, says that Philip's polygamous marriages created quarrels between his wives that infected his kingdom (Plut. *Alex.* 9). In fact, "all of Theopompus, Satyrus, Athenaeus have a moralistic emphasis when dealing with Philip, showing him as a degenerate, vice-filled, and a polygamous court ruled and destroyed by women" (Lindsay 56). The Greek writers of the time may have been trying to denigrate Philip by accusing Olympias of being a horrible woman because Philip permitted such a woman to be (to a certain extent), active in the male domain of politics. Not only that, but it was she who also gave birth to Alexander, whom many considered a scourge to Greek freedom. Being ruled by an evil woman like Olympias was a further construct not only out of fear of women, but also as a means to denigrate both Philip and Alexander.

Olympias is portrayed as notoriously evil, cruel, vicious, and ruthless in the sources. She is shown as a woman who would stop at nothing to get what she wanted, and who would eliminate anyone who stood in the way of her ambition. Olympias was seen as "a jealous woman, fretting, and of a revenging mind" (Plut. *Alex.* 9), full of "sexual depravity" (Justin 9.5.9). This vicious and almost bloodthirsty nature of hers permeates both the personal descriptions of her and her actions, as "on the death of Philip, his infant son by Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, was along with his mother dragged by Olympias onto a bronze vessel and burned to death... Afterwards Olympias killed Aridaeus also" (Pausanias 8.7.7). This description is very vivid; people believed Olympias was evil, made sure this belief carried on in their works, and thus they spread this belief. Modern descriptions are not more flattering; the woman is still seen as implacable (Heckel 56).

It is true that Olympias did commit political murder. We know that she killed Cleopatra and her son, Arideaus and his wife Adea Eurydice, and other political enemies after Alexander's death. Yet this was not unknown in Macedonian politics, what was threatening was the perpetrator of the act was a female. Accordingly, it seems that the condemnation of Olympias' murders "derive from the expectation that Olympias should have been nice and obviously was not, whereas no one bothers to condemn the equally ruthless and brutal actions of male Macedonians because no one expects them to be nice" (Carney 1993: 41). Yet, she is not the only Macedonian woman who played in power politics: Philip's mother Eurydice was also vilified as a woman who killed her own children

and "sacrificed [them] to her lust" (Justin 7.5.7). It is not clear what her aim was supposed to have been, but she is depicted as wicked, pitiless, and merciless. Either all of the women who stood out in the Macedonian political arena were evil and vicious, or hostile sources portrayed them as such because they were women infringing upon male affairs.

Thus, Olympias' incrimination in the sources is most probably a result of bias and culture rather than actual duplicity. It is true that she had something in common with the actual murderer, since "like Olympias, Pausanias of Orestis was jilted by Philip and insulted by Attalus" (Heckel 56). It is also true that she had a strong and perhaps difficult personality, and was politically involved, sometimes ruthlessly. Nevertheless, these characteristics cannot condemn her as Philip's murderer. For these qualities describe at least one other suspect, Alexander, if not all, in the case. Olympias' personality traits and attributed motives are not enough evidence to make her guilty of Philip's murder.

When Olympias was incriminated, so was Alexander, as their fates and fortunes were interlinked to some degree. Plutarch related that "Alexander also went not clear from suspicion of this murder" (Plut. *Alex.* 10), supposedly prompting Pausanias to kill Philip, Cleopatra, and Attalus (Plut. *Alex.*10). Justin said that it was believed that "Alexander himself was not unaware of the plot to murder his father" (Justin 9.7.1). It is important to note that the sources do not give a reason for the purported degeneration in the relationship between Alexander and Philip. They do, though, cite two events as proof of the disintegrating relationship: Attalus' wish for a real heir at the wedding of Philip and Cleopatra, and the Pixodarus affair.

Attalus' comment about a real heir was a point of dissention between father and son. It does not seem as if the actual marriage was the problem, but Attalus' prompting of Alexander's insecurity. Alexander fled after this, but was persuaded to return to Macedon, at the behest of his father, to reconcile. Philip's reaction in the situation was inconsistent with his usual regard for his son. It was apparent that Philip was grooming Alexander as heir. Largely an absentee father, out on campaign much of the time, he asked Aristotle to groom and discipline his son. Philip later showed his trust and faith in his son by appointing him regent of Macedon during his absence when Alexander was just sixteen, and, two years later, by having him lead the left charge at the battle of Chaeronea.[3] Furthermore, Philip also commissioned a tholos structure to be built at Olympia with chryselephantine statues of himself, his parents, Amyntas and Eurydice, Olympias and Alexander (Fredericksmeyer 307). This in itself is a telling sign of Alexander's imminent succession.

The Pixodarus affair also reinforced the idea of Alexander's eventual succession. Philip's reaction in the Pixodarus affair seems more of a fatherly reaction and a purposefully political one. It seems Philip was not trying to undermine Alexander's basis of support, but to ensure Alexander's strong position as future king with a good marriage alliance. Philip was telling his son that as heir he had to aim higher in marriage, and then sent away the friends of his son he found to be bad influences that led him to make misguided decisions. He did so to protect him, and to protect his relationship with him, as the friends seemed to be arousing in Alexander a distrust of his father. He did

[3] Plutarch. *Alex.* 9; Diodorus 16.86.

not want his son, the future king, to be listening to bad advice from bad influences. In any event, this episode does seem to indicate that Philip fully intended Alexander to succeed him as king.

Even on the day of his death, Philip honoured Alexander by choosing him to march beside him into the theatre at Aegae, along with the groom, in front of the many and varied distinguished people gathered there for the occasion (Justin 9.6.3). Evidently, on the eve of his departure for Asia, Philip wanted to demonstrate the good relationship between him and his son, and show the succession as secure, and the successor was Alexander. That Alexander's eventual succession was Philip's intention is also evident in Alexander's succession, and Antipater's role in it. Antipater had been Philip's close friend and advisor from youth, and this has not changed in the time before Philip's murder (Frears 129). Upon Philip's death, it was Antipater who quickly put Alexander up as king, and his "alacrity in arranging the accession of Alexander can best be interpreted as the execution of a contingency plan created by Philip and himself in case of the king's sudden death" (Frears 130).

Also important is the question of timing. Those who believe in the duplicity of Alexander and Olympias believe the timing of Philip's assassination was perfect, because of Olympias' position in the court was losing importance, and because Alexander's relationship with his father was falling apart. Conversely, it seems that "the timing of the real crime was nearly disastrous for him, yet he could easily have arranged Philip's death in battle and avoided such upset [. . . but] Alexander's involvement in his father's murder at any level is difficult to accept because of his traditional religious beliefs" (Carney 1992: 185). Alexander honoured Philip after his death, not as one who resented him, but as one who cared for and respected him. When he began his reign "Alexander set a perfect example of filial piety; the execution of his father's murderers, the celebration of his funeral rite, and the continuation of his work" (Frears 135). It seems that Alexander did not chose the timing of his father's death, and had no part in Philip's murder.

There was yet another man who could have wanted Philip dead, one who could legitimately reclaim the throne, after all, it had been his father's as well as his own in his youth: this was Amyntas IV. A man for whom "Philip had acted as regent, and who had at that time been recognized as king [. . . until Philip was elected king] whom Philip had allowed to live as a private citizen" (Badian 244). Evidently, Philip did not foresee any form of duplicity by Amyntas, and did not find Amyntas a threat to himself or to his son. Philip even married Amyntas to one of his daughters with no complaint by Olympias or Alexander that was passed down to us (Badian 244). Although he may have had the best motive to be Philip's killer, there is absolutely no evidence even mentioning him in connection to the event. Although we do know that after Philip's death "all Macedonia was festering with revolt and looking toward Amyntas and the children of Areopus."[4]

Later, though, Alexander is recorded as saying that "Amyntas, [his] own cousin, in Macedonia made an impious plot against [his] life, joining with [Attalus] as an ally and an accomplice" (Curtius 6.9.17). Yet one would think that if there was such a plan, Alexander's general Ptolemy would have

[4] Plutarch *de Alex. fort.* 327c in Elizabeth Carney, "Alexander the Lyncestian: the Disloyal Opposition." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 21 (1980): 29.

known about it and Arrian would then have recorded it in his history of Alexander as a legitimate threat to his position. Thus there must have been some dissention from the Amyntas camp, perhaps supported by nobles who wanted a fully Macedonian heir, but its relative absence in the sources serves as an indication that it was probably not a big threat to either Philip or Alexander.

The assassination of Philip II occurred at the wedding feast of Cleopatra and Alexander of Epirus, an occasion that many guests, foreign and native, attended. Any of the guests, both the suspects named, or someone not suspected, could have been responsible for the death. Pausanias was probably not silent about the outrage he had suffered. In many a drinking party could he have found a sympathetic and interested ear to his complaints. This ear could have been that of the Lycestians, or Olympias, or Alexander, or a Persian spy, or Attalus, or someone else. Of course, it is possible that Pausanias may have complained but simply been ignored by people sick of hearing his lamentable story. As we have seen, any claim to outside complicity in Pausanias' murder of Philip is based on perceived motive and character judgements. It is important not to analyse ancient history in the light of modern presuppositions. Motives seen as valid in ancient times were seen to be valid for a reason, because there is a high probability that they were. Nonetheless, the distinction between a good motive and actual guilt must be made; they are not equivalent, and the former is not necessarily conducive to the latter.

Outside of Pausanias, we do not know who else, if anyone, killed Philip. Pausanias' motive is clear and strong; he probably had enough anger and resentment in him to do the deed on his own, but probably would not have rejected any conspirator who wanted to join him. The Lycestian brothers were seen as accomplices by their contemporaries, and had political motives that do not make the ancient assertions unrealistic. On the other hand, Olympias was suspected in ancient times, a suspicion mainly based on her role in politics, and playing in politics as a female under male rules. The person with the best motive and most fiery and irascible personality is not necessarily the one who actually went ahead and killed Philip. Alexander's part in his father's murder is doubtful. The ancients never suspected Amyntas, who probably did not take part in the murder. Philip II was killed by Pausanias in 336 BC upon a valid motive, perhaps with the help of the Lyncestian brothers, or perhaps in a situation masterminded by Persia, but seemingly without the help or suggestion of Olympias, Alexander and Amyntas.

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The Road to Pydna
Philip, Perseus and the Romans, 191-171

Greg Fisher

The Third Macedonian War, which ended the Antigonid dynasty and the aura of promise which followed the declaration at the Isthmus in 196, came about not because Perseus had inherited the war from Philip, or because the new Macedonian King deliberately sought conflict with Rome. Rather, the war was caused by the atmosphere of mutual distrust which had arisen between Philip and the Senate after the hostilities with Antiochus and which continued to grow on the accession of Perseus, whom the Senate immediately regarded with suspicion. The policies of Perseus were not calculated to foster enmity with Rome, but they were not always pursued with tact. They affected Rome's influence in Greece and, of greater importance, the position of Eumenes of Pergamum. Inevitably, the Senate was more ready to listen to Eumenes than a monarch who was, in their view, perfidious, belligerent and too independent for their liking.

Polybius believed that Perseus inherited the war from his father, Philip, comparing it with Philip II's projected invasion of Persia and Alexander's realisation of it.[1] Whether Philip was planning a war or not, Perseus *did* inherit the suspicions of the Senate.[2] During the war with Antiochus, Philip had been an exceptionally accommodating ally, providing financial and logistical support, building bridges and roads, and escorting the Roman forces in their passage through Thrace. He had turned down an alliance with Antiochus and even allowed his people to fight for the Romans if they wished to.[3] After the war, however, Philip's desire to re-secure Macedon upset the Roman settlement which had drawn the Macedonian boundary along the old royal road to Paroreia in Thrace. Outside of this zone were two cities of the Thracian Chersonesus, Aenus and Maronea, which were, among others, intended to act as buffers between Eumenes and Philip. The Macedonian King, aware that this wide and ostensibly independent area of land would provide an easy entry point for the Thracian tribesmen, and believing the cities to rightfully belong to him, seized and occupied them.[4]

[1] Polyb. 22.8; cf. Dudley, Roman Society, p. 74. [2] cf. Livy 39.25.1; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 237.
[3] Gruen, 'The Supposed Alliance Between Rome and Philip V of Macedon,' p. 132; Polyb. 20.5.7; App. Mac. 9.9.5-7; Livy 39.28 ff.
[4] Walbank, Philip V, p. 223; Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 424; Polyb. 22.9; Livy 39.24-33.

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Philip had also received parts of Thessaly, Perrhaebia and Athamania by the treaty which ended the war with Antiochus, during which it was tacitly understood that whatever he captured from the Aetolians he would be allowed to keep.[5] Thus he considered these northern Greek cities his, since many of them had previously been under Aetolian control, while these cities claimed that since they had been absorbed by the Aetolians and were originally independent, they should not be Macedonian possessions.[6] Keen to be released, therefore, they complained to Rome in 186-5 and did not exclude a full report of the seizure of the Thracian cities by Philip, a fact which was repeated by the envoys from Pergamum.[7] Eumenes had fought against Philip in the Second Macedonian War and certainly retained a measure of distrust which was exacerbated by the occupation of Aenus and Maronea, which he felt should be his as they were 'appendages' to Lysimacheia and the Chersonese which he had received after Apamea.[8] More importantly, he was a trusted and voluntary ally of Rome, while Philip had found his alliance forced upon him by his defeat in 197. It is very likely that the Pergamene embassy's corroboration persuaded the Romans to investigate the matter further by sending a commission headed by Q. Caecilius Metellus.[9]

At the Tempe conference Philip faced a barrage of charges from his Thessalian, Athamanian, and Perrhaebian accusers. After Cynoscephalae, they said, he had shown 'poor character' by sacking Thessalian cities before returning them, and by 'enslaving' five hundred young Thessalians. They also charged that Philip had diverted trade away from Phthian Thebes to Demetrias, a city in his possession, which he denied on the grounds that he could not be held responsible for the decisions of merchants. There were objections about Aenus and Maronea, as well as more lurid accusations: he had arranged the assassination of some Thessalian ambassadors while journeying to meet Flamininus, a situation which perhaps recalled memories of the First Illyrian War. Philip answered this by remarking ironically on the number of envoys bearing complaints about him to Rome which had not been attacked.[10] Met with objections which he regarded as unfair and ludicrous, and probably designed to hem him in, he was unable to control his temper. Livy reported that Philip,

> carried away by anger...added that the sun of all his days had not yet gone down, — a menacing statement that the Romans, as well as the Thessalians, took as a threat...[11]

The Tempe decision, brokered by the Romans, was little short of a direct attempt to weaken Philip: the harsh terms handed down by the commissioner required him to remove the Macedonian garrisons in the occupied cities, and more damaging, to be restricted to the ancient boundaries of Macedonia, the exact opposite of Philip's policy. This judgment was so vague that complaints against Macedon were essentially invited.[12] Philip did not make an immediate effort to evacuate the disput-

[5] Livy 39.22.3; 39.23.2-3; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 502.
[6] Walbank, Philip V, pp. 226-227.
[7] Walbank, Philip V, p. 226; Polyb 22.9.1. [8] Livy 39.27.1.
[9] Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 424; Polyb. 22.9.1; Livy 39.24.
[10] Livy 39.25-26; Walbank, Philip V, pp. 226-229.
[11] Livy 39.26.1; cf. Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 120; Plutarch Arat. 8.2-9; Diod. Sic. 29.16.1.
[12] Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 93; Livy 39.27.1; Walbank, Philip V, p. 232; Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 228; FN.

ed cities, but while the Thessalians could be ignored, in the final analysis Eumenes, the person most affected by Philip's occupation of Aenus and Maronea, could not. With the demise of a friendly Antiochus the Great, he underwrote the *status quo* in the Hellespont-Asia Minor area.[13]

The diplomatic bickering between Rome and Macedon worsened as Philip continued to argue for his right to the Thracian cities - what right did Eumenes have to them, when they were not handed to him after Apamea? He complained bitterly about the Romans' attempt to remove territory which he believed had been granted by them to begin with. He had been helpful during the war with Antiochus and expected to be rewarded, not chastised. His appeals were in vain; Aenus and Maronea were to be independent.[14] But Philip, forced from Thessaly and now from Thrace (and "extremely annoyed, because he regarded his kingdom as being now curtailed on every side") was determined to have the last word. He introduced a band of Thracian mercenaries into Maronea by night to slaughter the inhabitants (184).[15] Philip told the legate Appius Claudius that he was not responsible, but the Roman simply replied that he "and his colleagues...required to hear no defence, for they were well aware of what had happened, and who was the cause of it." Philip also confided in his chief friends, Apelles and Philocles, that he was now "clearly conscious that his quarrel with Rome had become serious, and that it could no longer be concealed."[16] Despite these feelings, he continued to pursue his policy of strengthening the borders of Macedon in ways which would irritate Eumenes and the Romans. He offered military help to Byzantium, which was threatened by the Thracians but uncomfortably close to Pergamum. He pushed for an alliance with the Bastarnae, a Danubian tribe who were intended to migrate west, eliminate the troublesome Dardanians and settle on their land as a friendly border tribe, a policy which would return to haunt Perseus. Philip also went after the Thracians, even founding a new city which he named Perseis for his heir (182). But he created dissent by transporting people en masse from the coast to the Paeonian frontier, 'Macedonising' the Axius valley, and replacing the coastal population with Thracians who would be loyal to him alone - a worrying thought for Eumenes.[17]

Philip, quickly realising that his recent actions would not endear him to the Senate, sent his son Demetrius to Rome, where he was known and liked, to defend Macedonian interests.[18] It soon became clear that Demetrius was a beneficiary of Roman favour and goodwill: perhaps they saw him as a second Eumenes, a pliable client. Philip was angry when one of his sons whom he had sent to exonerate him, became a Roman favourite, and when a new commission sent to Macedon to investigate once more the matter of the occupied cities impertinently told the king that he owed all his 'good fortune' to his son.[19] Demetrius increasingly became the man of the moment in Rome.

[13] Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' pp. 229-231; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 241; Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, p. 2; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 501

[14] Walbank, Philip V, p. 233; cf. Livy 39.22-23 & 39.26-29; Polyb. 22.15.1; App. Mac. 9.9.6.

[15] Polyb. 22, 17, 1; Livy, 39.34.1. [16] Polyb. 22, 17-18; Walbank, Philip V, pp. 234-235.

[17] Walbank, Philip V, pp. 237-245; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome to the Battle of Actium, p. 502.

[18] Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 233; Walbank, Philip V, pp. 237-239; Polyb. 23.2.6-11; Livy 39.47.5-11; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' pp. 191-193.

[19] Walbank, Philip V, pp. 239-241; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' p. 193; Plut. Arat. 54.2; Aem. Paul. 8.2-6; Polyb. 23.3 f.

Flamininus, in a policy which was to have disastrous consequences, apparently suggested to Demetrius that the Romans intended him to be next in line for the Macedonian throne. Flamininus was presumably not acting without the approval of the Senate,[20] and with this approach to Demetrius, Roman policy moved from 'petty persecution' to outright interference.[21] The nascent rift in the Antigonid family widened, and was further increased when Flamininus dispatched a letter to Philip asking him to send Demetrius and a number of his friends to Rome.[22] It was not long before this fracture developed into open conflict in the family. Some historians suggested that the blame for Demetrius' subsequent demise lay with Philip and Perseus; but in fact the Romans themselves shouldered a large portion of the responsibility.[23]

After a purification of the Macedonian army Perseus was invited to a dinner given by his brother. Declining, he sent a spy, who was detected and beaten. Demetrius, drunk and angry, took a group of friends to Perseus' house, but nothing came of it. The following morning, however, Perseus accused his brother of an attempt on his life, and Demetrius apparently told his companion, Didas, that he was contemplating fleeing to Rome (182).[24] With unfortunate timing, a letter purporting to be from Flamininus arrived in which the Roman disconnected himself from Demetrius' apparent "desire to rule."[25] The authenticity of the letter is doubtful, and was even thought to be a forgery in antiquity,[26] but real or not, Demetrius *had* listened to Flamininus and had not told his father of the Roman intrigue. It is difficult to gauge the extent of the Roman interference, but the opportunity to destroy "the power of Macedon with one bold blow" was, it seems, too good to miss.[27] Unfortunately, the Senate's clumsy policy ruined Demetrius: on the evidence before him, Philip made his decision and Demetrius was murdered at Herecleia (181).[28]

Philip died shortly after his son, and Perseus, succeeding with little trouble, immediately sent envoys to Rome to renew the φιλια (179).[29] But he would soon be in trouble, for Livy caught half of the truth when he claimed that Philip "would have urged...war himself, if he had lived longer." Livy grasped the sense of Philip's frustration and anger with the Romans, though it is perhaps a stretch to claim that Philip was overtly planning a conflict.[30] Philip had good reason to strengthen his kingdom, as the Senate had consistently tried to weaken Macedon by arbitration before they finally resorted to intrigue and open interference. It appeared as if Rome, having hemmed Philip in

[20] Polyb. 23.3, f.; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' pp. 193-194 & pp. 200-201.

[21] Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 94; see Polyb. 23.3, f. for Demetrius in Rome.

[22] Livy, 39.53.2; Polyb. 23.3,; Plut. Arat. 54.1-3; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' p. 194.

[23] cf. Livy 40.24.1; to a lesser extent, Polyb. 23.3.

[24] Livy, 40.7 ff., esp. 40.23.

[25] Livy, 40.23.

[26] cf. Livy 40.24.1.

[27] Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 94.

[28] Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' pp. 195-199; Livy 40.24; Walbank, Philip V, p. 251; Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 243; Polyb. 23.7.

[29] Livy 40, 58, 1; Polyb. 25, 3; cf. Diod. Sic. 29, 30, 1-2.

[30] Livy 39, 25, 1; so Walbank, Philip V, p. 273.

by ruling against him in Thrace and Northern Greece (and, more insidiously, by attempting to split the Macedonian royal family), was planning Philip's destruction.[31] To the Romans, of course, Philip's northern policy, which did not threaten them directly, did portend a stronger Macedon which could tap into the Balkan manpower reserves and which had already shown itself belligerent on two occasions, a menace to Eumenes, and interested in territorial acquisition in Northern Greece. These misgivings combined with the disastrous murder of the Roman candidate for the Macedonian throne and Philip's less than delicate arbitration to produce an aura of distrust which continued unabated in Roman relations with Perseus and played no small part in the initiation of the Third Macedonian War in 171.[32]

Even had it not been for their suspicion of him, Perseus pursued a number of policies bound to aggravate the Romans. Before he could really establish himself, the new king was, ironically, almost an immediate victim of one of his father's plans. The Bastarnae, perhaps ignorant of their sponsor's death, had crossed the Danube and set out for Dardanian territory. The hapless Dardanians dispatched an embassy to Rome which connected Perseus to the disturbances: they reported that while they feared the Bastarnae, they were more terrified of the King himself; the Thessalians volunteered to corroborate the Dardanian reports. This was not calculated to improve matters between Rome and Perseus, and while the Senate delivered a warning to abide by the treaty, a commission was sent which, even though it decided nothing, "observed that Macedonia was strongly fortified and had abundant war material" (176-175).[33] A later annalistic tradition found in Livy asserted that the sponsored action of the Bastarnae was intended to form a springboard for a Macedonian invasion of Italy.[34] Such fears during the Second Punic War had provided justification for Roman intervention in Greece (the First Macedonian War), but at this juncture they were certainly a fabrication.[35] The closing years of Philip's reign provided this paranoia, with apparent credibility, and Livy linked the fear of an imminent war with Perseus and the Bastarnae.[36]

Perseus also indulged in a number of other activities which increased the simmering suspicion at Rome. He continued Philip's policy of buttressing the Thracian border by expelling one Abrupolis, who unfortunately turned out, in later tradition at any rate, to be a 'friend' of the Romans.[37] To the south Polybius described Perseus' actions as "intriguing in Greece" but they were rather directed at strengthening Macedon. He issued an amnesty to exiled debtors, pardoning people convicted or suspected of treason and even generously offering the restoration of property to all exiles. He posted these proclamations at Delos and Delphi, providing wide publicity. Rome sup-

[31] Walbank, Philip V, p. 273; App. Mac. 9, 9, 6; Plut. Aem. Paul. 8.3-4; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, pp. 119-120; Gruen, 'The Last Years of Philip V,' p. 222; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p.93.

[32] cf. Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 239; Walbank, Philip V, p. 273.

[33] App. Mac. 9, 11, 1; Polyb. 25, 6, 2-6 ; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 240; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 503; Livy 41.19.1-2 & 40.57.1-2.

[34] Livy 40.57.1 ff.; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 239.

[35] Plut. Aem. Paul. 9.3-4; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 125; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 240.

[36] Livy, 41.19.1 & 42.11.1-2; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 240-241.

[37] Polyb. 22.8; Livy 42.13.1; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 124; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 503.

ported the conservative aristocrats in Greece and Perseus' 'revolutionary' measures threatened to subvert the *status quo*.[38]

There was worse to come. Massinissa (perhaps falsely) reported that Perseus had sent an embassy to Carthage, and though this was probably only intended to establish friendly relations, it was certainly "injudicious."[39] In addition, the Dolopi, under Macedonian control, now created trouble by proposing that Rome and not Macedon should be their arbitrator. Perseus responded to this affront by leading a punitive expedition against them, explaining to the inquisitive Senate that the Dolopians were his own subjects and, besides, they had murdered their governor.[40] Perseus also made a gesture which, perhaps intended to show a strong and stable Macedon to the Greeks, also gave precisely that impression to Rome - which did not wish to see it. Having "some religious scruples on his mind" he travelled to Delphi with his army in full attendance, which, while breaching no treaty, was unexpected and aroused further suspicion.[41] On his return through Thessaly and Phthiotic Achaea he sent out letters or agents "to ask that the people should no longer remember the quarrels that had existed between them and his father" (174).[42]

This policy of *rapprochement* was not simply aimed at the Northern Greeks. Perseus particularly wanted to regain the trust and friendship of the Achaean League, which had joined Athens against Philip during the Second Macedonian War. The Achaeans had banned Macedonians from their territory, and a result of this policy had been that escaped Achaean slaves found a haven in Macedon. Perseus, with exceptional good faith, now returned the escaped slaves to their owners. As a result of this and his other lenient policies, he was rewarded with widespread pro-Macedonian feeling (174/3).[43] This was also used against him: when pro-Roman landowners in Aetolia, for example, became "embroiled" with debtors, the policies of Perseus (and the king himself) were inevitably blamed, even though he had had little to do with the problem.[44]

An inscription of 178 listed Perseus as a recognised member of the Amphictyonic council, a position which reflected a certain degree of recognition by other Greeks.[45] The Romans, however, were not happy to have a Macedonian King courting his southern neighbours, as had been implied by the Second Macedonian War. Now, more than before, the Romans wanted to keep Macedonia and Greece apart. The person who would gain the most from this policy, other than the Romans themselves, was Eumenes, but he had become unpopular in Greece, and especially in Achaea, where his benefactions were considered unwelcome and pompous.[46] The growing prestige of Perseus in

[38] Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 29; Polyb. 25.3 ff.; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 246; Giovanni, 'Les Origines de la 3e Guerre de Macedoine,' p. 861.

[39] Adams 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 247. [40] App. Mac. 9.11.6; Livy, 41.22.1.

[41] cf. Livy 42.22.1-2 & n. 3, p. 489 (Penguin ed.). [42] Livy 41.22.1-3.

[43] Livy 41.22-23 ff.; cf. App. Mac. 9.11.1; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 503.

[44] Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 427; cf. Livy 42.2.1-3 & 42.40.1-2; App. Mac. 9.11.3; Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 30; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 87; Polyb. 25.3-4.

[45] Syll. 636 in Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 90.

[46] Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, p. 504; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, pp. 118-119.

Greece was almost certainly as offensive to Eumenes as it was to the Romans, and threatened to isolate the Pergamene from his patrons.

Eumenes' fears had been heightened by another Hellenistic expediency which was once again intended to strengthen Macedonian standing. While the degree of malice in Perseus' actions was doubtful, his poor diplomatic choice was somewhat blatant and, historically at least, was too close for comfort. He proceeded to make an alliance with Prusias II of Bithynia and Seleucus IV, the new King of Syria, who gave his daughter to Perseus in marriage. Since Perseus had only a small navy and Seleucus was not permitted by treaty to sail past Cape Sarpedon, the Rhodians offered to transport Perseus' new bride, Laodice, themselves, and went on to hold a grand naval review, "the fact being that a vast quantity of timber for ship-building had been presented to them by Perseus." The king made lavish displays of his own, presenting gold to the upper-deck rowers on the boat which bore Laodice (178).[47] It did not require a fertile imagination to link this new entente with the 'Syro-Macedonian Pact' between Philip V and Antiochus, and the Rhodian connection threatened a pro-Macedonian navy - a potential threat to Rome's settlements after Cynoscephalae and the war with Antiochus. Matters were not improved by the great number of embassies which arrived to congratulate Perseus on his new marriage and the gift of his daughter to Prusias, son of the king who had sheltered Hannibal after the defeat of Antiochus (184-182).[48]

The actions of Perseus had so far been intended as a sequel to Philip's policy of reviving Macedonian strength. Unlike Philip, Perseus was not given to angry threats or the slaughter of civilians, but in his attempted *rapprochments* he fell afoul of the pro-Roman party in Achaea, and of Eumenes of Pergamum, who felt threatened by a resurgent Macedon. In Greece, the Achaean politician Callicrates claimed that Perseus' intention was clearly "to make an alliance, whereby the treaty with Rome, on which our whole future is based, would be violated."[49] Callicrates succeeded in turning the League towards Rome and away from an alliance with Macedon (175), and Roman influence, bolstered by the removal of pro-Macedonian Achaeans, grew to the point that a Roman envoy was able to illegally summon the Achaean League Assembly on a whim.[50] The concerns of the anti-Roman party for the continued internal "independence" and security of the Achaean League were seemingly borne out by later events in Boiotia, where elements of that League had shown themselves well-disposed to Perseus, who made a treaty with them.[51] Recognising that a pro-Macedonian Greece would be a serious encumbrance if a war with Macedon became a reality, the Romans launched a diplomatic offensive under Q. Marcius Philippus to ensure the primacy of the pro-Roman party. By taking advantage of 'separatist impulses' and by insisting that each city should

[47] Polyb. 25.4 ff.; Livy, 42.12.1.

[48] Livy, 39.51.1-2 & 42.12.1; cf. Polyb. 23, 8; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 91; cf. Bikerman, 'Notes sur Polybe,' p. 503.

[49] Livy, 41.23.3; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 82.

[50] Scullard, A History of the Roman World, p. 265.

[51] cf. Livy 42.42.1 ff.

send a separate delegation, the mission split the Boiotian League into its component parts and thus destroyed the potent popular credibility of the Macedonians there (171).[52]

While the Romans might be irritated by Perseus' Greek diplomacy, the real obstacle to peace was the threat which Perseus posed to Eumenes.[53] In 172 the Pergamene King travelled to Rome in person to deliver charges against the Macedonians and "to urge the Senate...to take countermeasures against the designs of Perseus."[54] He claimed that Perseus had killed Demetrius for being pro-Roman, that he had helped Philip to re-arm, had continued that policy after Philip's death, and was "conciliating the Greeks in every way."[55] Eumenes also pointed to Macedonian control of Thrace and the vast reserves of that land, "a never-failing spring," and provided some disturbing figures: Perseus, it was claimed, had ten years' worth of grain for 30,000 foot soldiers and 5,000 horses, and enough money to pay 10,000 mercenaries for ten years.[56] There were, of course, other charges – the threat that the marriage alliances posed ("the coalition of kings"), the attack on Abrupolis, and the sheltering of the assassins of Arthetaurus of Illyria, another Roman "friend," because Perseus "had discovered some written communication from him" to the Romans.[57] Perseus had aided the Byzantines once more against the Thracians, which was apparently a treaty violation.[58] Eumenes also indulged in fictions, pandering to latent Senatorial fears by decrying Perseus for creating "general confusion and disorder in Thessaly and Perrhaebia by the prospect of abolition of all debts, so that he might overthrow the aristocracy with the help of a mob of debtors under obligation to him."[59]

Other, more sensational, stories were asserted. Lucius Rammius of Brundisium, a leading citizen who looked after Roman officials on their way in and out of the country, had been suborned by Perseus as his guest friend to poison some of them. The king had even offered a new untraceable poison, and Rammius, "afraid that if he refused he might be the first subject of an experiment," apparently told it all to Gaius Valerius, the Roman commissioner who also found "evidence" of Eumenes' charges in Macedon itself.[60] Eumenes stopped at nothing, and even manufactured charges out of "the industry and sobriety of life which [Perseus] showed at such an early age, and the widespread popularity and praise which he had quickly attained." Finally, the Pergamene King "urged

[52] Polyb. 27.2; Livy 42.18-44, esp. 44; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, pp. 82 & 122-125; Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 47; Giovanni, 'Les Origines de la 3e Guerre de Macedoine,' p. 859; cf. Syll.3 646, Austin 78; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 95; App. Mac. 9.11.1, on Perseus' 'nearness to the Greeks.'

[53] Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 94.

[54] Livy, 42.11.1.

[55] App. Mac. 9.11.1.

[56] Livy 42.11-13; Plut. Aem. Paul. 8.5.

[57] Livy 42.11-13; App. Mac. 9.11.2.

[58] Livy 42.13.1 & p. 503 n.8 (Penguin ed.); cf. 42.40.1-2.

[59] for the treaty, interestingly, cf. Gruen, 'The Supposed Alliance Between Rome and Philip V of Macedon,' passim; Livy 42.13.1; the class issue: Gruen, 'Class Conflict and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 48.

[60] Livy 42.17.2 & 42.40.1-2; Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 427; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 86.

the Senate to beware of a youthful enemy so highly esteemed and so near to them."[61] The charges were considered important enough to be inscribed and set up at Delphi (172-171).[62]

The Macedonian envoys did not stand a chance, not only because the Senate was more disposed to listen to a trusted ally than one of whom they were already suspicious, but also because Eumenes had reached them first. The Macedonians were not even allowed an opportunity to refute their accuser face-to-face, and their subsequent loss of patience angered the Senate.[63] Further suspicion was cast on Perseus by the "assassination attempt" on Eumenes at Delphi, whilst on his way home - "if mass poisoning in Italy, why not well-aimed rocks in Greece?"[64] The Cretan Evander, who apparently perpetrated the crime, reappeared at Perseus' court. The rumour of Eumenes' death reached Rome, and Valerius brought back a certain Delphian named Praxo, at whose house the "assassins" of Delphi had stayed.[65]

Perseus refuted the slander of Eumenes with ease.[66] He had armies, not to be directed at Rome, but because he was bound to protect his kingdom; besides, the Romans let others (for example, Eumenes) have armies. He had acted against Abrupolis in self-defence after an attack on Pangaeum; the war with the Dolopians had been an internal matter and, in any case, they had tortured his governor to death. He had expelled the murderers of Arthetaurus when they sought haven in Macedonia, and had provided military aid to the Byzantines against others, not Rome (and his ambassadors had even advised Rome about it). As for the poisoning charges, they were quite absurd. He finished up with an exhortation to the Senate "not to make nearness, sobriety and preparation causes for complaint,' since it would not do for the Senate 'to be stirred by envy or fear like Eumenes."[67] But the Senate had already made up its mind.

From this point on war was inevitable, and the reasons which the Senate provided for their actions were borrowed directly from Eumenes.[68] A Roman commission, snubbed by the king, reported vigorous preparations for war in Macedonia, and the news of the "alliance" between Perseus and Genthius the Illyrian supported their account.[69] Eumenes was prevaricating when he told the Senate that he had no personal gain from his accusations; he was, in fact, the chief advocate of a war with Macedon, and it is certainly significant that Roman suspicion did not seem to boil over into war until he came to the Senate in 172. Cato slyly noted that he was "an excellent man

[61] App. Mac. 9, 11, 2.

[62] Syll.3 643, Austin 76; L&R 71.

[63] Livy 42.14.1; App. Mac. 9.11.3; Plut. Aem. Paul. 23.3-4; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 244-245 & 252.

[64] Green, Alexander to Actium, p. 427.

[65] Livy 42.15-17 ff.; App. Mac. 9.11.4; Diod. Sic. 29.34.2; Shuckburgh, A History of Rome, pp. 504-505.

[66] Livy 42.41.1 ff. - during a meeting with Q. M. Philippus; App. Mac. 9.11.6 ff.

[67] App. Mac. 9.11.5-7; Livy 42.42.2.

[68] App. Mac. 9.11.5; see once again Syll.3 643, Austin 76; L&R 71

[69] Livy 42.18.1 & 42.25.1 & 42.26.1; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 93; Scullard, A History of the Roman World, p. 268; Burn, History of Greece, p. 381; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, p. 95; cf. App. Mac. 9.11.1.

and a friend of Rome...but the animal known as King is by nature carnivorous."[70] Accustomed to vilifying Macedonians, he skillfully took Macedonia's anti-Pergamum stance and transformed it into an anti-Roman one.[71] Interested in the Hellespont region, he was threatened by the new ties between Perseus, Seleucus and Prusias, as well as Perseus' attempts to win Rhodes onto his side; Rhodes had been a stalwart friend of Rome during the Second Macedonian War, but not always the best of friends with Pergamum. Eumenes' apparent involvement in the assassination of Seleucus IV—and *his* rapport with Antiochus Epiphanes—certainly suggests that he wanted Pergamum and Syria in alliance, and Perseus threatened this.[72] Though it is difficult to be sure about Senatorial matters at this time, vacillations in Roman politics probably also played a role. The demand of C. Popilius and P. Aelius, the consuls for 172, that Macedonia be declared a province, even though it was still officially a friend, do suggest a certain amount of war-mongering. C. Cassius Longinus, consul in 171, called for Macedonia as his province, but was so frustrated to receive Italy that he attempted to reach Macedon through Illyria.[73]

The war, which ended in the battle at Pydna in 168, destroyed the Antigonids and any semblance of the leniency which followed Cynoscephalae.[74] Perseus adorned the celebration of Aemilius Paullus and languished in an Italian jail for the remainder of his days. Ultimately it is hard to resist Appian's sober conclusion that

> the Senate, in reality because they did not choose to have on their flank a sober-minded, benevolent King, an hereditary enemy to themselves, attaining eminence so suddenly, but ostensibly on the grounds of Eumenes' allegations, decided to make war on Perseus.[75]

From the Roman point of view, it is possible that Perseus' alliance with Seleucus did threaten a "coalition of kings" and perhaps reminded them of Philip V and Antiochus. Contacting Carthage was certainly a diplomatic blunder (if it happened), and while Perseus' policies in Greece threatened Roman control there it cannot be convincingly argued that Italy was ever at risk. What did threaten Rome was the possibility of a Greece controlled by Macedon, where the pro-Romans like Callicrates might be submerged and where the Greeks would send their embassies to Pella and not the Curia.[76] In the years that followed the visit of Eumenes, Perseus showed his commitment to peace on several occasions, sending three embassies to Rome, offering reparations, proposing to end the war on favourable terms after the Romans had suffered a significant cavalry defeat, and even falling for the blatant duplicity of a truce put forward by Q. Marcius Philippus, who knew well that

70 Plut. Cat. Mai. 8.7-8; Livy, 42.11.2-3 & cf. 42.29.1; Gruen, 'Class Conflict,' p. 47.

71 Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 251.

72 Green, Alexander to Actium, pp. 426-428; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 128; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 246-247; later Rhodian-Pergamene enmity: cf. Polyb. 27.7.

73 Livy 42.9-10 & 43.1.4-12; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 93; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 249; cf. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, pp. 10-11

74 see Gruen, 'Macedonia and the Settlement of 167 BC,' pp. 257 ff.

75 App. Mac. 9.11.2-3.

76 Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, p. 129; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' pp. 247-248.

the Romans had no intention of cancelling hostilities: they were simply not ready (171).[77] An even more abject example of Roman double-dealing came soon afterwards, when the Macedonian envoys, sent to secure peace, were kept waiting in Rome until the last possible minute. By the time that they were seen and rebuffed, the army was on its way.[78]

The real crime of Perseus was to try and act as Rome's equal, and to cement the independence of Macedonia. He did not inherit the war, and certainly did not plan one. He never once indulged in a policy which was seriously anti-Roman, but he trod on the Senate's toes in Greece, suggested the spectre of an independent Balkan power, threatened Eumenes in the East, and, by the time of Eumenes' visit in 172 with a stack of flimsy pretexts, he could not be tolerated.[79] The startling defamation of Perseus in the Roman tradition as expressed by Livy provides us with a monster whom Rome could legitimately fight, but what we know of Perseus proves that he was not demented, was not merciless, and certainly did not drive Rome to war.[80] The Senate, suspicious of him from the start as a result of the activities of Philip and the murder of Demetrius, merely saw what they wanted to believe when Eumenes addressed them in 172.[81] From that point onwards Perseus did not have any choice in the matter.

[77] Polyb. 27.8; Livy, 42.39-43; Adams, 'Perseus and the Third Macedonian War,' p. 256; Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, p. 3; Walbank, Philip V, pp. 226-227; Walbank, 'A Note on the Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus,' pp. 91-93.

[78] Walbank, 'A Note on the Embassy of Q. Marcius Philippus,' p. 93.

[79] cf. Plut. Aem. Paul. 7.2-3; Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 94.

[80] Livy 42.25.1-13; Plut. Aem. Paul. 8, 6-7; Reiter, Aemilius Paullus, pp. 81-87; cf., entertainingly, Plut. Arat. 54, 3; Edson, 'Perseus and Demetrius,' p. 202.

[81] Walbank, 'The Causes of the Third Macedonian War: Some Recent Views,' p. 94.

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Emperor Constantine and Athens in the Fourth Century AD

Jean-Luc Gauville

The first half of the fourth century was a time of great renewal for the city of Athens after a period of troubles. Constantine (AD 273-337) and his officials had much to do with this renewal. The following presentation examines the economic and cultural influence of the reign of Constantine upon the evolution of Athens in the fourth century AD. The essay is divided into three parts: the methodology behind the reconstruction, Athens during the time of Constantine, and the influence of the emperor and his officials in the economic and cultural renewal of the city.

The Methodological Aspects behind the Reconstruction

The reconstruction of Athenian history at the beginning of the fourth century AD can be carried out through the use of ancient sources, archaeology and epigraphy. Epigraphy offers about ten inscriptions found in *Inscriptionum Graecum Atticum* (volume 1), *Année épigraphique* (1887-1993), *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (1943-1995), and the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinorum* (1859-1978). Drawing on two hundred years of excavations on the Acropolis and the agora, archaeology gives indications about the topographical evolution of the city. There are two summaries of this archaeological research, an article by Homer Thompson (*Journal of Roman Studies* 49 (1959), 61-72) and a book by Alison Frantz, *The Athenian Agora (. . .). Late Antiquity, AD 267-700, American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, vol. 24, Athens, 1988. In this essay, Julian and Himerios are principle sources because of the valuable evidence they provide on the role of Constantine in the history of Athens. In addition to the accounts of these two ancient writers, information is taken from the works of Eunapius of Sardis (346-414), Libanius (314-393), Gregory of Nazianzus (330-390), Zosimus (c.450-c.518), Ammianus Marcellinus (c.330-c.400), Synesius of Cyrene (370-412), the anonymous author of the *Exposition totius mundi et gentium* (c.359), and the authors of the *Sudae Lexicon Graecae et Latinae ad fidem optimorum librorum* (c.970-c.995).

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Athens During the Time of Constantine

In the beginning of the fourth century, the city of Athens was a small fortified city like many others in the Balkan provinces of the Roman empire. Like many cities of the region, Athens had suffered from the Barbarian invasions of the third century. What made it different was its position on a peninsula, which gave the city direct access to the Aegean Sea through the Piraeus. This small fortified city contained only the Acropolis and a small part of the agora. The population of Athens was roughly the same as it was in the second century AD (about 25,000) since much of the population had taken refuge in the islands of the Aegean. After order had been re-established, the populace returned. The Athenians were mainly pagan, as was the rest of the Greek population.[1] In fact, there were only three bishoprics in the province of Achaia—Athens, Corinth and Sparta—and of these, only the bishop of Athens travelled to the Council of Nicaea.[2] There was a small Jewish community whose members worked in the lamp-making industry (Thompson 71). To these three groups, one can add the large number of students coming to Athens from the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire. The town also contained a small minority of aristocrats who held all the major official and religious offices in the city. This aristocracy allied itself frequently with the most influential sophists through marriage alliances and grants of citizenship.[3] The poor of the city had a voice only through their work in the ceramic, lamp-making, and leather-making industries.

The Influence of the Emperor and His Officials Upon the Economic Renewal of the City of Athens

The effects of the peace created by Constantine during the second half of his reign can be seen in the economic renewal of Athens. Although the schools of the sophists played a great role in the wealth of the city, it is interesting to note that under Constantine Athens still had strong commercial links with the eastern part of the empire (Thompson 71). Through an analysis of the coinage found in the agora, a picture of Athenian commerce can be deduced.[4] The Athenians traded chiefly with the cities of Asia Minor and less with those of Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. The products

[1] "Hurtful as Athens was to others in spiritual things, and this is of no slight consequences to the pious, for the city is richer in those evil-riches-idols than the rest of Greece, and it is hard to avoid being carried along with their devotees and adherents, yet we, our minds being closed up and fortified in the faith, form our perception of their trickery and unreality, which led us to despise these divinities in the very name of their worship." Gregory of Nazianzus, *Eulogy of Basil*, 21.5 (*Post-Nicene Fathers*' translation)(cf. Alison Frantz, "From paganism to christianity in Athens," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 19 (1965): 187-205).

[2] F. van der Meer and Christine Mohrmann, *Atlas of the Early Christian World*, London, 1958; A. Frantz, "From paganism to Christianity in Athens," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 19 (1965): 188.

[3] cf. The example of Julian of Cappadocia, Proahairesius, and Himerius.

[4] A.R. Bellinger (*American Journal of Archeology* 32 (1928): 496-501) studied coins from the time of Constantine found at Athens. He drew a list of mints, and most of the coins were produced in mints from the Propontid and Macedonia. These areas of minting offer a good indication of the cities with which fourth-century Athens traded. (cf. John Day, *An economic history of Athens under Roman Domination*, New-York, 1942: 269-270).

exported by the Athenians included honey (*Exposition* 52), leather-goods (Synesios *Epist.* 52), silver,[5] and lamps.[6] The Piraeus remained an important centre of commerce of the eastern Mediterranean during the fourth century (Synesios *Epist.* 54). This portion of the Athenian economy depended only indirectly upon the emperor. However, the other part-its schools and its monuments-depended far more on the emperor's good will. To see the role of the city's schools and monuments, one need only read this short passage on Achaia found in the *Exposition*:

> After Thessalia, there is the land of Achaia [Greece and Laconia], which abounds in learning, but in other respects is not self-sufficient, for it is a small and mountainous province and can not produce as much grain as Thessaly. But it yields a small amount of oil and Attic honey, and it is to be praised rather for the renown of its philosophy and rhetoric: in other respects not so much. It has these fine cities: Corinth and Athens. Corinth, a city with much commerce, has an outstanding building in its amphitheatre, but Athens has learning and ancient traditions and something worthy of mention in the Acropolis, where it is wonderful to see wars of men of old celebrated by the many statues.[7]

The main staples of the Athenian economy were its monuments and its schools. These were maintained partly by state subsidies, and partly by private donations. In the fourth century AD, these two types of investment were essential for the well-being of the city, which was still in ruin due to the invasions of the third century. The state clearly intervened during this period of peace. Although Constantine was not the agent of this intervention, his officials in Achaia were. Of these government agents, the proconsul of Achaia was the most conspicuous.

The proconsuls of Achaia in the fourth century were in general pagans and did not enforce the laws of the emperors against paganism. We know the names of four of these officials during the reign of Constantine: Aurelius Valerius Tullianus Symmachus Phosporius (318-320), Domitius Zenophilus (323-324), Ceionius Rufius Albinus (c.330) (Barnes 1982: 160), and Cervonius (335-339).[8] The last is the most interesting because of the many restorations he carried out in Athens. He is known by the panegyric made in his honor by Himerios (c. 310-c. 384 AD).[9] In this speech,

[5] J. Day, *An Economic History of Athens under the Roman Domination*, New York, 1942: 268; A. Butcher, "Late Romans from a mine gallery at Thorikos," *Studies in South Attica I*, ed. P. Spitaels, Gent, 1982: 137-143.

[6] "The lamps have provided evidence of commerce in both goods and ideas. In the third and fourth centuries, for instance, Attic lamps were exported to various parts of Greece proper, to the Aegean islands and the coastal cities of Asia Minor, to Pannonia and South Russia, and a few to Egypt. A striking and well attested instance of exportation comes from the French excavations at Begram in the heart of Afghanistan. A plaster medallion found at the site bears a bust of Athena identical with that found on a lamp from the Agora. The dependence of the medallion on the lamp is proved by the shadow of a filling hole that appears on the medallion. On the other hand a number of lamps made in Athens in the fifth and sixth centuries were evidently patterned on lamps imported from North Africa and Asia Minor and an imported specimen of the sixth century is of a type that appears to have been at home in Sicily." H.A. Thompson, "The Athenian Twilight: AD 267-600," *Journal of Roman Studies* 49 (1959): 70-71.

[7] cf Exposition totius mundi et gentium, 52 (trans. by J. Rougé with a correction the acropolis (arcem) instead of triumphal arch (arcum); cf. Oliver, J.H., "Achaia, Greece, and Laconia," *Greek, Roman, & Byzantine Studies* 21 (1980): 75-81).

[8] E. Groag, *Die Reichbeamten von Achaia in spätrömischer Zeit*, Budapest, Pannoniae dissertatio I, 1946: 27-28. (cf. *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum XV*, ed. A.G. Woodhead, Amsterdam, 1958: 83, n. 323).

Himerios wrote that the proconsul Cervonius rebuilt the city (Himerios Oration 4 (38)). Archaeology shows us that three major renovations were made in the last years of Constantine's reign: the roof of the temple of Hephaistos (the basilica of St. George), the colonnade of the Parthenon, and the roof of the theatre of Dionysos.[10] The question remains, however, whether the policy of the proconsul was approved by the emperor.

By and large, the answer is yes, since the emperor himself had shown honor to the Hierophantes (high-priest of Eleusis), Nicagoras.[11] In 326, the emperor had subsidized the trip of this pagan priest to Thebes, Egypt. In gratitude, Nicagoras left an inscription honoring Constantine on the rocks of Syringes in Egypt (Jan 461-462.). For Constantine, the policy was a means to support Greek culture within his empire.[12] This support of culture could explain why Constantine might have tolerated paganism in Athens. Another reason could also be a desire by Constantine to honor a city for its support during a difficult war against Licinius. The Piraeus was the starting point of Constantine's fleet which ultimately defeated Licinius at sea, allowing the emperor to blockade him in Nicomedia and forcing Licinius to surrender (Zosimus 2.22.3-2.28.1). During the same period, Constantine had served as *strategos*, an annual office dealing with the provisioning of the city during the Roman period.[13] All these elements demonstrate a good relationship between Athens and Constantine.

In this same way, a good relationship explains the other less controversial renovations done by the proconsul Cervonius in Athens. He renovated the city aqueduct built by Hadrian[14] and rebuilt many stoae and gymnasia in the agora (Himerios *Oration.* 4.9 (28)). Finally, Alison Frantz attributed to Cervonius the enlargements made to the circuit wall of Athens (Frantz 1979: 396). This benevolent state policy was followed by private benefactors. The evergetism of Athenian aristocrats can be seen through certain acts of piety in honor of the city's cults. For example, it was only at the end of Constantine's reign that the procession of *Panathenae* was re-established in Athens (Frantz 1988: 23-24). The *Panathenae* was an annual Athenian festival, occurring during the month of July

[9] cf. Eunapios, *Lives of Philosophers and Sophists*, 494; Photius, Himerius, 165; C. Schenck, "Himerios," *R.E.* VIII.A (1913), 1622-1635; B. Balwin, "Himerios," *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, vol. 2, ed. A. P. Kazhdan, Oxford, 1991: 932-933; T.D. Barnes, "Himerius and the fourth century AD.," *Classical Philology* 82 (1987): 206-225.

[10] A. Frantz, "Did Julian the Apostate rebuild the Parthenon ?" *American Journal of Archaelogy* 83 (1979): 395-401; A. Frantz, "The date of the Phaidros' bema in the theatre of Dionysos," *Hesperia, suppl. XX: Studies in Athenian Topography, Architecture and Sculpture presented to Homer A. Thompson*, Princeton, 1982: 36-39.

[11] This priest was the man in charge of the Eleusian mysteries and the cult of Demeter and Koré on the agora, divinities honored in the mysteries.

[12] P. Graindor, "Constantin le Grand et le dadouque Nicagoras," *Bysantion* 3 (1926): 209-214; G. Bowden, "Nicagoras of Athens and the Lateran obelisk," *Journal of Hellenic Study* 107 (1987): 51-57.

[13] Julian, *Panegyric of Constantius*, 1.6; P. Graindor, *Album des inscription attiques d'époque impériale*, Ghent, 1926: 73.

[14] "Cervonius too has brought water to Athens but he is credited in more flowery language: the nymphs have left their groves to play in the streets of Athens, and the place flourishes as a spring meadow (Himerios, *Oration*, 4 (38))." (. . .) The literary evidence that substantial measures were taken to increase the water supply or improve its distribution, whether by Cervonius, Julian, or ordinary civic enterprise, is corroborated by the rebuilding of the Antonine aqueduct in the southeast corner of the agora and by the sudden surge in the construction of new baths and the restoration of old ones all over the city." A. Frantz & alii, *The Athenian Agora (. . .). Late Antiquity, AD. 267-700, American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, vol. 24, Athens, 1988: 21-22.

and having as its main purpose the bringing of a new *Peplos* (dress) for the statue of Athena on the Acropolis. In his earliest surviving speech, the orator Himerios devotes a few words to the procession by describing the barge carrying the statue of Athena. This panegyric honours an Athenian aristocrat, Basileios,[15] who paid for the repairs to the barge.[16] An inscription shows a similar act of piety performed by Phaidros, an *archon* or chief annual magistrate, who rebuilt the Bema (the stage) of the theatre of Dionysos (Frantz 1982: 34-39).

The Influence of Constantine Upon the Cultural Life of Athens

Another example of Athens' economic recovery is the rebirth of its schools under Constantine. The schools of Athens had suffered a great deal from the sack of Athens by the Heruli in 267 AD. Despite this terrible ordeal, the teaching offered in Athens remained wide-ranging, touching on subjects such as philosophy, poetry, geometry, music, and rhetoric. Because of the fragmented evidence offered by existing sources, this presentation will dwell on the teaching of rhetoric in Athens prior to and during the reign of Constantine.

Reading through Eunapius' account of these schools, it becomes clear that the Athenian educational establishments delivering lessons in rhetoric suffered between c. 270 and c. 330. While the system remained in place for a time, it soon went into decline. We know only a few facts;[17] after the departure of the Heruli, Paullus and Andromachos were two of the official sophists employed by Athens (Eunapius, *Lives.* 457). Through the *Sudae Lexicon Graecae et Latinae ad fidem optimorum librorum*, we also know that Munician taught rhetoric there at the same time and became a member of a powerful aristocratic family.[18] Details are sketchy; however, it can be shown that while Paullus lived until the reign of Constantine (*Sudae* 147), Andromachos taught Greek rhetoric in Nicodemia under Diocletian (*Sudae* 390-391). Also under Diocletian, there were conflicts between the schools of Callinicos and Tlepolemos (Libanius *Autobio.* 1.11). Under Constantine, Athens was dominated by the great sophist Julian of Cappadocia after a long contest for supremacy with another famous rhetorician Apsines.[19] We also know that there were many schools of rhetoric and that the professors taught in their homes instead of in the great gymnasia built during earlier ages (Kennedy 135-136). Instead of the classics, the teaching offered by the sophists was a presentation of the different types of discourse described in the handbooks of Menander (Kennedy 133), a rhetorician of the middle empire. Few among them wrote much about the theory behind the art of rhetoric (Kennedy 104-109). These symptoms of decline are further emphasized by the fact that,

[15] Little is known in respect to this Basileios outside of this panegyric of Himerios. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify him with an evergete of the city of Patras. Inscriptions from Patras inform us that he had donated to the city grain and olive oil from his own lands in Elis. The inscriptions also show that Basileios was fervent in his piety in respect to Demeter (cf. R. Balladié, *Le Péloponnèse de Strabon. Etude de géographie historique*, Paris, 1980: 184).

[16] Himerios, *Oration*, 3 (47).12; J.W. Leopold, "Himerios and the Panathenae," *Ancient World* 12 (1985): 121-127.

[17] cf. F. Millar, "P. Herennius Dexippus: the Greek world and the third century imvasions," *Journal of Roman Studies* 59 (1969): 18-19.

[18] "Municianus," in the Suda M, (cf. P. Graindor, *La chronologie des archontes athéniens sous l'Empire*: 263).

[19] Eunapios, *Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists*, 482-485; *Sudae Lexicon* [. . .], volume 1: 1008.

early in Constantine's reign, Athens could subsidize only one teacher of rhetoric instead of the previous three. Other factors also made the educational system fragile. In their works, Libanios and Gregory of Nazianzus mention the disturbing effects which rival groups of students had upon education: riots among the various factions, the forced enrolment of new students under a particular sophist, and the usual troubles associated with student life.[20] In such a sombre atmosphere, it is natural that the death in 336 of Julian of Cappadocia, the holder of the official rhetorical chair with state-paid salary, served as the spark for a riot among the various factions.[21] It is known that six candidates offered themselves for Julian's vacant position: Epiphanios, Diophantes, Sopolis, Parnasios, Hephastion, and Prohairesios (Kennedy 137-8). The extent of the riots is clear from the works of Libanios and Eunapios: the town elders had called the proconsul of Achaia to intervene.

The name of the proconsul is not mentioned in these accounts. But it may again have been Cervonius, for the date fits. In addition, in his panegyric of the proconsul, Himerios congratulates him for putting an end to riots occurring between the various student factions (Himerius *Sophistae.* 4.9). As a result of his stay in Athens, the following changes were brought about to the organization in the Athenian educational system. Cervonius seems to have increased the number of official teaching positions from one to three. We also know of the three chair holders for the year 337: Prohairesios, Diophantes, and Epiphanios.[22] This return to the more ancient system used under the early empire is a sure sign of the strength of the renewal that took place in the Athenian schools of rhetoric.[23] Cervonius also increased the number of gymnasia through his many renovations, thus ensuring closer supervision of students as well as better facilities for teaching. Ten years later, however, Gregory of Nazianzus still complained of the contentious behavior of his fellow students, but speaks highly of the rhetoricians who taught in Athens (Gregory *Eulogy.* 15-25).

Far from limiting himself to the actions of his proconsuls, Constantine showed his personal interest in education through his legislation and through his support of writers' endeavours (*Codex Theodosianus* 1.12.1; 1.16.6-7; 6.35.4; 7.20.2; 9.1.4; 10.10.2; 11.7.3). When Libanios arrived in Athens, the city council asked him to produce official documents showing his place of origin, his reasons for travelling to Athens, as well as the sophist school in which he had enrolled. By acting in this way, the Boule of Athens was only following imperial edicts.[24] These innovations by Constantine and his officials need not be stressed unduly, since under Diocletian and Galerius conditions might not have been any different.

Like Diocletian, Constantine was favorable to the sophists of Athens. For the emperors, the

[20] Libanius, 1.19-24; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Eulogy of Basil,* 15.3-18.1. (cf. Jean Bernardi, "Un regard sur la vie étudiante au milieu du I'VE s. après J.-C.," *Revue des études grecques* 103 (1990), 79-94).

[21] cf. Eunapius, *Lives,* 487-8; Libanius, 1.24-25.

[22] Eunapius, *Lives,* 485-487; G.A. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors,* Princeton, 1983: 137-138.

[23] cf. J.W.H. Walden, *The Universities of Ancient Greece,* London, 1913, chapter 8: 134-161, on the nomination process in Athens in respect to the chairs in rhetoric.

[24] "Emperors Valentinian, Valens, and Gratian Augustuses to Olybrius, Prefect the City: All persons who come to the City because of their desire for learning shall first of all upon arrival present to the master of tax assessment [*magister census*] the requisite written documents from their several provincial judges [praeses], by whom the right to come to the City must be given. These documents shall contain the name of the municipality from which each student comes, together with the birth certificate and letters of recommendation certifying to his high attainments. In the second place, immediately upon matriculation the students shall indicate the profession for which they intend to study. In the third place, the office of tax assessment shall careful investigate the life of the students at their lodging places, to see that they actually do bestow their time on their studies which they assert that they are pursuing [. . .]" *Codex Theodosianus* 14.9 (trans. Ch. Pharr)

schools of rhetoric furnished many capable officials and sophists who became an asset to smaller cities.[25] Constantine invited the famous philosopher Sopater to his court at Constantinople (Eunapius *Lives.* 462). In Athens, the rhetorician Praxagoras wrote a history of the wars of Constantine, which he then dedicated to the emperor (Photios *Biblio.* 62). Another sophist, Bemarchios, held one of the official posts in Greek rhetoric at Constantinople because he had composed a biography of the first Christian emperor.[26] Finally, Dionysos, the music master teaching at Athens, dedicated a series of works on the theory of music to Constantine (*Musici Scriptores Graeci*).

Conclusion

The cultural and economic renewal of Athens offers a valuable example of the important role played by Constantine in the renewal of the Roman Empire during the fourth century AD. The emperor's interest in Athens is surprising when one looks at the laws issued by his sons against pagan religious practices and against the renovation of temples.[27] Athens does not seem to have been threatened during his reign.[28] On the contrary, it is during the end of Constantine's reign that most of the pagan temples of the city were renovated. Here one sees Constantine's desire to support education throughout his empire, even at the price of providing assistance to a pagan city. The emperor correctly saw that the schools of rhetoric were an important pool of new recruits for the imperial service.[29] For the first Christian emperor, the official cults of Athens were less dangerous to Christianity than the mystery cults. The new constructions in Athens are a sure sign of the economic recovery that occurred during the fourth century. In my view, these positive changes should be seen in terms of a general recovery taking place throughout the Roman empire rather than one limited to the areas near government centers such as Trier, Milan, Sirmium, Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria. As it was in Africa, the fourth century in Athens was a period of urban expansion, not one of decline.

[25] "Les professeurs d'Athènes [en 362] nous livrent des soldats et non des rhéteurs." Libanius, *Correspondance,* 715 (trans. Paul Petit) (cf. H.I. Marrou, *L'histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité,* Paris, 1848 (1965): 444-445).

[26] Libanios, *Oration,* 1.39; *Sudae,* "Bemarchios," vol. 4, p.: 4 (ed. G. Berhardy) (cf. T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius,* Cambridge, 1981: 222-223). [27] Eusebius, *Life of Constantine,* 2.44-50; *Codex Theodosianus,* 16.10.1; 16.25.

[28] "My own desire is, for the common good of the world and the advantage of all mankind, that thy people should enjoy a life of peace and undisturbed concord. Let those who still delight in error, be made welcome to the same degree of peace and tranquillity which they have who believe. For it may be that this restoration of equal privileges to all will prevail to lead them into the straight path. Let no one molest another, but let every one do as his soul desires. [. . .] With regard to those who will hold themselves aloof from us, let them have, if they please, their temples of lies [. . .]" Eusebius, *Life of Constantine,* 2.56. (cf. 2.60; T.G. Elliott, "Eusebian frauds in the Vita Constantini," *Phoenix* 45 (1991): 170).

[29] "Musonius, the vicarius [of the diocese of] Asia, who had previously been a teacher of rhetoric in Athens, realized that, because no one resisted them, [the Isaurians] laid to waste everything with the most destruction;" Ammianus Marcellinus, 27.9.6. (cf. H.I. Marrou, *L'histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité,* Paris, 1948 (1965): 445-447).

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The Function of "Mediator" in St. Augustine's *De civitate Dei*, Book IX

David Guretzki

St. Augustine acknowledges that "the books of the Platonists" played an important role in teaching him "to seek for truth beyond corporeal forms."[1] Elsewhere Augustine exhorts Christians not to fear philosophers who have said anything that is true and agreeable to the faith, "the Platonists above all."[2] That Augustine was influenced in some way by Neoplatonist thought is therefore incontrovertible. Nevertheless, scholars continue to keep busy with attempts to define the exact nature of the relationship between Augustine and Neoplatonism.[3] In light of this John O'Meara is surely right when he says, "there is no simple statement adequate to describe Augustine's use of the Neoplatonists".[4] This article will seek to demonstrate how Augustine was able simultaneously to appropriate and criticise aspects of Neoplatonist thought in the development of his own mature theology.[5]

Unfortunately, providing a theory that can account for the complexity of the relationship between Augustine's thought and that of the "Platonists" is difficult, especially since the relationship itself seems to have dynamically changed throughout Augustine's life. This article, therefore, will focus upon Augustine's mature doctrine of incarnation vis-à-vis his concept of "mediator" as used in Book IX of *De civitate Dei*.[6] Here it will be argued that Augustine seeks to provide a *discerning response* to what he saw as certain inadequacies of Neoplatonist thought, even while continuing to uphold other key Neoplatonist assumptions. As the evidence will show, "mediator" for Augustine serves both a rhetorical and theological function. Rhetorically, "mediator" functions for Augustine as an apologetic "point of contact" with Neoplatonism and in particular, Neoplatonist demonology. Theologically, however, "mediator" simultaneously functions as a thorough critique of Neoplatonist ontology and soteriology and as the foundation of a truly Christian ontology and soteriology. In short, Augustine certainly makes use of Neoplatonist thought, but as James McEvoy has put it so well, "The parting of the ways between Platonism and Christianity is the Incarnation of the Word and the doctrine of the mediation of Christ" (McEvoy 167).

The Structure and Content of Book IX

Reading through Book IX, one must not forget that Augustine writes not only as a theologian, but also as a master of rhetoric.[7] Thus, it is just as important to heed any rhetorical clues that the struc-

[1] *Confessions* 7.9.13; 7.20.26. Citation from Augustine, *The Confessions*, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Maria Boulding. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997. It is clear that Augustine read the "Platonist books" in a Latin translation and it is commonly understood that the translator was Marius Victorinus. For a helpful article exploring the theological and philosophical influence of Victorinus upon Augustine, see Mary T. Clark, "Augustine the Christian Thinker," *From Augustine to Eriugena: Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O'Meara*, ed. F.X. Martin and J.A. Richmond. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991: 56-65.

[2] *Teaching Christianity* 2.40.60. Citation from Augustine, *Teaching Christianity*, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1996. For an examination of Augustine's own view of the Platonists, see Dennis House, "St. Augustine's Account of the Relation of Platonism to Christianity in *De civitate Dei*," *Dionysius* 8 (December 1983): 43-48.

[3] Though by no means an exhaustive list, the following works are representative of the type of work being done to understand the influence of Neoplatonism upon Augustine. See Dominic J. O'Meara, ed. *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1982; Chris Humphrey, "'There the Father Is, and There Is Everything': Elements of Plotinian Pantheism in Augustine's Thought," Montreal: McGill University, 1986; F.X. Martin and J.A. Richmond, eds. *From Augustine to Eriugena: Essays on Neoplatonism and Christianity in Honor of John O'Meara*, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991; Thomas Finan and Vincent Twomey, eds. *The Relationship Between Neoplatonism and Christianity*, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1992. Though not exclusively limited to the influence of Neoplatonism upon Augustine, see also the chapter entitled, "The Influence of Neoplatonism," in R. T. Wallis, *Neoplatonism*, London: Duckworth, 1972.

[4] John J. O'Meara, "The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine," *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982: 41.

[5] It is unfortunate that certain theologians who are critical of Augustine have oversimplified this relationship in favour of Neoplatonism. British theologian Colin Gunton, for example, argues that it was "platonist" philosophy which lead Augustine to be "suspicious of the material world." This leads Gunton to characterize Augustine's thought as an "anti-incarnational platonism." See Colin Gunton, "Augustine, the Trinity and the Theological Crisis of the West," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 43, no. 1 (1990): 36-7. To be fair, it must be noted that Gunton's article is primarily focused upon Augustine's Neoplatonism as evidenced in *De Trinitate*. But as appropriate as it is to focus in on one particular work of Augustine's, what is surprising is how Gunton makes such sweeping generalizations about Augustine's theology of incarnation without reference to Augustine's discussion of the topic outside of *De Trinitate*, e.g., *De civitate Dei*. As a result, Gunton's indictment of Augustine's doctrine of the incarnation fails to take into account evidence contrary to his thesis.

[6] Translations taken from St. Augustine, *[De civitate Dei] The City of God Against the Pagans*, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*. Edited and translated by R. W. Dyson. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Citations hereafter will indicate book and chapter.

[7] See Joanne McWilliam, Ed. *Augustine: From Rhetor to Theologian*, Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1992. The title of this otherwise excellent collection of essays, even if not intended to say as much, seems to imply that Augustine moved away from his early career in rhetoric to more overtly theological concerns. Unfortunately, the intended sense of the title of the book is not explained in either the "Introduction" nor in any subsequent essays. However, the "Introduction" explains that the overriding theme of the conference which gave rise to the essays contained in the book was "Conversion." This is all the more unfortunate because one is left with the impression that Augustine was "converted" from rhetor to theologian. No matter which side one takes on the current debate on Augustine's relationship to Cicero's theory of rhetoric, it is difficult to argue that Augustine ever ceases to be a rhetorician, even if it can be argued that he moves significantly away from his earlier rhetorical commitments. For a succinct description of Augustine's rhetorical theory, see George A Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition From Ancient to Modern Times*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980: 150ff.

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ture of the book may provide as it is to pay attention to the content of what Augustine actually says. In true Augustinian fashion, content and form (or, to use his own related terms, *res* and *signa*) should not be considered separately.[8]

Book IX contains 23 chapters. Augustine's fondness for structural symmetry in such books as *De Trinitate* (which is written in 15 books divided into two seven-book halves with Book VIII holding the halves together (Charry 120)), suggests that Book IX, though obviously not replicating the structure of *De Trinitate*, nevertheless reveals a quite deliberate structure. In one analysis, Book IX consists of three main sections of seven chapters each, with a single climactic chapter (chapter 15) separating the second and third sections, and concluding with a single chapter (chapter 23). The following outline can help visualize this structure:

I. An examination of the "psychology" of demons (chaps. 1-7)
II. An examination of the "ontology" of demons (chaps. 8-14)
III. The superiority of the One Mediator, the Man Jesus Christ (chap. 15)
IV. The problem of contamination (chaps. 16-22)
V. Conclusion: Demons are inadequate to the task of mediation (chap. 23)

Before analysing his use of "mediator," a broad overview of the content of Book IX will be undertaken to demonstrate the flow of Augustine's argument from beginning to end.

In chapters 1-7, Augustine delves into what will here be called the "psychology" of demons. Augustine succinctly encapsulates the key point of departure in Book IX when he says, "[The Platonists] believe also that, because no god has dealings with men, . . . demons are appointed as mediators between men and the gods, to carry our prayers to them and to bring their answers back" (*De civ. D.* 9.1). This early mention of the concept of "mediation" undoubtedly points to the important role it will play throughout the book.

In order to address this belief in "demonic mediation," Augustine suggests in chapter 2 that it is necessary to examine the distinction, "whether held by Platonists or anyone else," made between the demons themselves (*De civ. D.* 9.2). At this point, Augustine does not reject this distinction outright, but instead allows the hypothesis of two species of demons to stand. But before engaging in an extended examination of the validity of this distinction, Augustine turns in chapter 3 to the teachings of the Platonist philosopher Apuleius, particularly his belief that demons, whether good or bad, are subject to the "irrational passions of the soul" and are thus "agitated by storms and tempests"(*De civ. D.* 9.3). As if anticipating those who would object to saying that demons are indeed subject to passion, Augustine turns to a discussion of the concept of "passion" itself, especially in the philosophy of the Peripatetic and Stoic philosophers (chapter 4), both of whom apparently disagree on whether such passions can disturb the truly wise man. But in the end, Augustine concludes that the difference of opinion is only a matter of "verbal controversy" and is not a substantial dis-

[8] For an excellent examination of Augustine's rhetoric vis-à-vis Neoplatonism, see Martin Camargo, ""Non Solum Sibi Sed Aliis Etiam": Neoplatonism and Rhetoric in Saint Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana," *Rhetorica* 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 393-408.

agreement (*De civ. D.* 9.4). Augustine then outlines an alternative Christian perspective on passion (chapter 5). Christians, he says, are indeed subjected to the influence of passions, but they do not allow passions to turn them toward vice, but rather train themselves to direct these passions toward righteous action. This is in stark contrast to the demons, which allow their minds to be "subjugated and oppressed by vicious passions" (*De civ. D.* 9.6).

Having given this rather extended discussion on passion and its effects, Augustine asks, How is it possible to distinguish between the poetic description of "gods," who are said to be separated from passion yet engaging in factional strife, and "demons," who also appear to be subject to these same passions? Apuleius' answer is that it is a "poetic fiction" written under "poetic license" that demons are said to be gods. In reality, he says, it is only demons that exercise such factional strife, and not the gods (*De civ. D.* 9.7). Thus, Augustine concludes, Apuleius "seems to have been at pains to ensure that, when these tales were sung by the poets, they should not be believed of the gods themselves . . . but of the demons who occupy the middle region" (*De civ. D.* 9.7). Though to be examined more fully later in the article, it is interesting to note that even here Augustine simply leaves the explanation of Apuleius standing, even though, as will become clear later in the book, he is certainly not satisfied with the explanation given.

Augustine then shifts his discussion in chapter 8-14 from the "psychology" of the demons to the place of demons in relationship to the gods and to humans. Or to put it another way, Augustine shifts from a discussion of "psychology" to "social ontology." Whereas in the opening section Augustine centres his discussion upon the *character* of the demons, in the second section he focuses more upon the *ontological position* of the demons in the "intermediate" location supposedly held between "gods" and "men."

At the outset of chapter 8, Augustine introduces Apuleius' definition of demons. According to Apuleius, demons are "animal in genus, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in body, and eternal in duration" (*De civ. D.* 9.8). However, Augustine is disappointed with this definition because it in no way specifies how "good" demons are to be distinguished from "bad," even though this normative distinction between "good" and "bad" appears to be crucial to certain Platonists. Then, in chapter 9, Augustine extends the argument further and asks, If these demons are truly intermediaries between the gods and men, what kind of mediators are they? Ironically, he says, these beings who are supposedly men's mediators, are "suspended upside down" because they have "an eternal body, like the gods" but, due to the fact (already discovered in chapters 1-7) that demons are agitated by passion, they have "a flawed soul, like that of men" (*De civ. D.* 9.9). Ingeniously, in chapter 10 Augustine appeals to the authority of Plotinus to support his suspicion that the demons are unable to act as men's mediators. For it is Plotinus who says that men are indeed happier than demons; for though men may be miserable in soul, they are mortal in body and therefore can escape the bounds of earthly misery. On the contrary, demons are miserable in soul, but cannot escape their bounds of misery, because they are imprisoned in eternal bodies.

As if to leave no stone unturned in his questioning of the truth of the Platonic belief in demonic mediators, Augustine engages in chapter 11 the opinion of Apuleius who suggests that the souls

of men become either good or bad demons, depending on whether they depart this life deserving well or ill. But Augustine will have none of this and immediately refutes this suggestion, arguing that if this were true, then the souls of wicked men in this life could look forward to being "invoked with sacrifices and divine honours." Surely such a suggestion is a "whirlpool of moral perdition!" (*De civ. D.* 9.11).

Chapters 12 to 14 are crucial to Augustine's argument and therefore worthy of more careful analysis, for it is here that he most explicitly explores the possibility of demons being mediators between the gods and men. Apuleius concludes that there is no means of direct communication between gods and men because of a great gulf separating them. This is because of the gods' "sublimity of location, everlastingness of life and perfection of nature." Naturally, Augustine concludes, men must be the opposite of the gods and therefore have the attributes of "lowliness of station, mortality, and misery" (*De civ. D.* 9.12). This being the case, demons, as intermediary beings, must reside "in the middle." This is without controversy, Augustine concedes, because it is reasonable that demons, having aerial bodies, reside between the sublime position of the gods and lowly station of men. But the problem is that to be truly intermediate beings, in the full ontological sense of the term, they must then share one remaining attribute each with the gods and with men, lest "they either rise upwards or fall downwards, as the case might be" (*De civ. D.* 9.13). This means there are only two options if Apuleius' characterization is correct: demons either share immortality with the gods and miserable souls with men, or they share mortal bodies with men and blessed souls with the gods. For if they share immortal bodies and blessed souls with the gods, then they fail to be intermediate beings and are closer to gods than to men. But if they share mortal bodies and miserable souls with men, then they cannot in any way give aid to men since they would be closer to men than to the gods. In light of this dilemma, Augustine finally and soundly indicts the Platonist position: "The Platonists will labour in vain to show how the good demons, if they are immortal and blessed, can rightly be placed midway between the immortal and blessed gods and mortal and miserable men." Therefore, he concludes, "when we search for a being intermediate between the blessed immortals and miserable mortals, we should look for one which is either mortal and blessed or immortal and miserable" (*De civ. D.* 9.13).

In his search for a true "mediator," Augustine briefly considers in chapter 14 the possibility that certain wise men, though mortal, may actually succeed in obtaining blessedness of soul in this life. If so, then such men could apparently function as mediators between the gods and men. But Augustine takes a "humbler view of mankind's condition" (*De civ. D.* 9.14) and posits, at the beginning of his climactic chapter 15, that a more credible and probable view is that "all men must necessarily be miserable while they are mortal." Consequently, the only solution is to "seek a Mediator Who is not only man, but also God: Who, by the intervention of His blessed immortality, may lead men out of their mortal misery to a blessed immortality, and Who must neither fail to become mortal nor remain mortal" (*De civ. D.* 9.15).

It is in chapter 15, the pinnacle of Book IX's argument, that Augustine explains why there can only be one mediator between God and man. As if to give the platonic system one last chance,

Augustine grants that demons, even if given ontological status as mediators, are finally, without doubt, *evil* mediators. And the nature of an evil mediator is necessarily to "interpose himself in order to prevent us from passing to a blessed immortality, for that which impedes our passage, namely misery itself, persists in him." Indeed, Augustine acknowledges, "there is, then, an evil mediator, who separates loved ones" and "there are many mediators who separate." But before one despairs, there is also "a good Mediator Who reconciles enemies." Who is this Mediator? For Augustine the answer is clear: "the uncreated Word of God, through Whom all things were made, and by participating in Whom we are blessed" (*De civ. D.* 9.15).

Of crucial importance, however, to Augustine's introduction of the One Mediator is his insistence that Christ is Mediator on the basis of his *humanity*, not on the basis of his divinity, even though Augustine here obviously upholds both aspects to be true.[9] Augustine is more than clear in this point and is worth quoting at length:

> He is not, however, the Mediator because He is the Word; for as the Word, supremely immortal and supremely blessed, He is far removed from miserable mortals. Rather, He is the Mediator because he is Man; and by His manhood He shows us that, in order to obtain that good which is not only blessed but bliss-bestowing, we need not seek other mediators by whose aid, as we might suppose, we are gradually to strive towards it. We have no need because a God Who is blessed and bliss-bestowing has become a sharer in our humanity, and so has furnished us with all that we need to share in His divinity. For in redeeming us from our morality and misery, He does not lead us to the immortal and blessed angels so that, by participating in them, we may ourselves also become immortal and blessed. Rather, He leads us to that Trinity by participating in Whom the angels themselves are blessed. Therefore, when He chose to take the form of a servant, lower than the angels, so that He might be our Mediator, He remained above the angels in the form of God, being Himself both the Way of life on earth, and life itself in Heaven (*De civ. D.* 9.15).

It may seem odd that Augustine, having come to such a grand conclusion to the problem of mediation posed by platonic demonology, would not simply complete the book in triumphant doxology! But, as if not satisfied that the full import of the One Mediator has sunk in, Augustine indefatigably carries on in chapter 16 to 22 to explore further problems posed by the platonic demonology. It is as if Augustine deliberately refrains from dealing the platonic system a final death blow and prefers to continue to work, as it were, respectfully though cautiously, from within. But from chapter 15 on, his work is aided with a new tool in hand: the theology of the Incarnate Mediator.

Starting in chapter 16 Augustine turns his attention to the problem of "contamination." Again, assuming the Platonists are right, then gods can have no contact with men, lest they become con-

[9] Harrison's observation is certainly apropos: "The rationally ungraspable contradictoriness and paradoxality of the doctrine of the Incarnation-of God become man-means for Augustine (as for any theologian) that two groups of terminology are held together and treated together in order to speak of it; one with human referents, one with divine referents; one comprehensible, the other incomprehensible." Carol Harrison, *Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992: 192-3.

taminated in some way. But if this is so, Augustine argues, then how can the demons, who supposedly mediate between men and gods, not also be contaminated? For if the gods are separated so as to avoid contamination, how indeed are demons, as lesser beings, able to avoid contamination? In frustration, Augustine asks, "Who could believe such things, unless the most deceitful demons had practised their deceit on him?" (*De civ. D.* 9.16).

Once again, Augustine allows the platonic assumption to stand: "things below, which are mortal and impure, cannot approach the immortal purity which is above." Therefore, "to remedy this condition of separation from God, a mediator is indeed needed." But unlike the demonic mediators, who share in the situation of men in having a "diseased soul," humans "need a Mediator Who is united with us in our lowest estate by bodily mortality, yet Who, by virtue of the immortal righteousness of His spirit, always remains on high." Who is this? None less than that one which Holy Scripture proclaims: "the 'Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus.'"[10]

Finally, in chapters 18 to 22, Augustine begins to wrap up his examination of the platonic demonology, pointing out its theological weaknesses along the way. Augustine concludes in chapter 18 that contaminated demons fail to "furnish us with a path to God; rather, they prevent us from keeping to the path" (*De civ. D.* 9.18). Paradoxically, they are mediators who fail to mediate! With this in mind, Augustine then pushes the argument thus pursued to the logical end in the final chapters. This ontological category of spiritual beings-demons-is said to consist of both good and bad, but such a categorization goes against common usage and, Augustine quips, "hardly any literate and educated mean would venture to say, in praising his slave, 'You have a demon'" (*De civ. D.* 9.19).

Yet does not the word "demon" itself suggest something worthy of consideration? Alluding to Plato's *Cratylus*, Augustine admits that the word "demon" signifies "knowledge." In response, Augustine says, Yes, demons do have knowledge, but it is a knowledge without charity (*De civ. D.* 9.20). Unlike the angels, who dwell in the presence of God's "immutable light," the demons are only exposed to enough light to "terrify those whose tyranny He was about to redeem the predestined of His kingdom" (*De civ. D.* 9.21). As a result, when speaking about these beings, whether angels or demons, the distinction is not to be made between good and bad demons, but between angels, who "enjoy participation in [God] and contemplation of Him endlessly" and demons, all of whom "do not contemplate in the wisdom of God" (*De civ. D.* 9.22).

By now, Augustine has reached the limits of his argument, and thus, in one final chapter, brings a conclusion to his explorations. That the Platonists may wish to call "the angels gods rather than demons . . . let them say this if they wish." For Scripture testifies that God truly is God over all the gods. But let us not, Augustine exhorts, allow evil spirit beings to be spoken of as gods, but let us rightly distinguish between the immortal, blessed creatures which are God's holy angels, and the miserable beings who "deserve their misery because of their malice." But most importantly of all, he concludes, let us not assume that these beings, whether good or bad, or specified as angels, gods,

[10] *De civ. D.* 9.17. Cf. 1 Timothy 2:5.

or demons, are able to mediate solely by their ontological status as intermediary beings. Rather, the sign of a good intermediary versus a bad intermediary is that the good one will "desire that religious worship be offered only to the one God by whom they were created" while the bad intermediaries, simply stated, will not.

The Function of "Mediator": An Analysis

Having outlined the flow and logic of Augustine's argument in Book IX, noting especially the strategic role of chapter 15 in the argument, it is now possible to analyze how Augustine uses the concept of "mediator" throughout the book. This analysis will suggest that "mediator" plays both a rhetorical and theological role throughout the book.

In the first place, it is noteworthy that in the first two sections of Book IX (chapters 1-7 and chapters 8-14), Augustine engages the neoplatonic demonology, as it were, from within its own structural logic. And the point of departure in his engagement is the Platonist belief that "demons are appointed as mediators between men and the gods" (*De civ. D.* 9.1). Though conceivably Augustine could have immediately countered this assumption through appeal to Scripture or Christian tradition, he instead allows the assumption to stand. In fact, it is noteworthy that Augustine, within the first fourteen chapters, repeatedly allows Platonist doctrines to stand, without a point-by-point refutation. This is confirmed through a quick look at the apparatus in Dyson's text which reveals that there is not a single citation or allusion to Scripture in chapters 1 to 14. Contrast this with chapters 15 to 23 in which there are at least 18 Scriptural allusions. What is the significance of this? Russell's observations are helpful here:

> In defending the true and unique mediatorship of Christ against the Porphyrians of his time, Augustine was compelled to confront them on the common ground of the Platonic tradition which they claimed to represent. Recourse to the authority of the Gospels would have been futile since, as Augustine noted in his review of an earlier work, *De consensu Evangelistarum*, many of these had accused Christ's followers of having been led into error concerning the divinity of Christ himself. Besides . . . Porphyry's severe indictment of the moral integrity of the disciple [sic] was enough to strip their testimony of any credibility. (Russell 408).

From a rhetorical standpoint, it reasonable to conclude that Augustine is concerned that his audience will "hear him out." So, rather than engaging in an immediate polemical tirade against his opponents, complete with Scriptural support, he carefully and patiently exposits the Platonist position with generous appropriation of one of their own prized philosophers, in the case of Book IX, Apuleius. In this way, Augustine's concern here is not so much to provide an alternative system of thought for intellectual consideration (i.e., Scriptural Christianity) as much as he is concerned to expose the internal incoherence and weaknesses of the system so espoused.

But more significantly, the core of Augustine's exposition of the Platonist doctrine centres in on the question of "mediation." True, Augustine is disturbed by the psychology of the demons and their agitated passions and spends a good portion of the first section of Book IX dealing with this issue. However, he does not allow this aspect to sidetrack him from dealing with the question at

hand: How can these demonic beings, so agitated in their souls by passion and vice, be mediators? Through allowing the Platonists themselves to speak about these passions experienced by the demons, Augustine, by implication, calls the worthiness of the demons as mediators into question. However, this is *not* to say that Augustine calls into question the *need* for mediation. On the contrary, he upholds the Platonist principle of "mediation" as necessitated by the gap between the divine and the human.

But Augustine does not stop there. In fact, he goes one step further and accepts the Platonist criterion of what would qualify as a successful mediator: a mediator would ideally share equally in the attributes of the divine and the human. Again, he appeals to Apuleius' definition and distills the attributes down to the three pairs of opposites: location (high or low), status of soul (blessed or miserable), and status of body (mortal or immortal.)

But when he proceeds to examine the demons as candidates for being mediators, he finds they fall short, even by Platonist expectations. Not only have the demons already failed from the standpoint of their psychological constitution, being suspect to the agitations and tempests of passion, but they also fail in that they share the miserable soul of men and therefore are rendered incapable of mediation. Though ontologically they are intermediary beings, that is, "half-way" between gods and men by virtue of their "aerial bodies," this virtue alone is in no way adequate to represent men before the gods.

The foregoing analysis has shown that throughout the opening section of Book IX, Augustine makes use of the concept of "mediator" as a rhetorical, or, as it were, apologetic point of contact with the Platonist philosophers. But Augustine's use of "mediator," however, is not restricted to the rhetorical. In addition, Augustine uses the "mediator" concept in a uniquely *theological* way. And it is precisely in his theological use of "mediator" that the complexity of the relationship between Neoplatonist and uniquely Christian categories are illustrated. In fact, Augustine's theological use of "mediator" provides evidence to show that Augustine's use of neoplatonic categories is highly nuanced. Though Augustine is willing to accept the necessity of "mediator" in neoplatonic terms, it is in his simultaneous commitment to the necessity of *incarnation*, that Augustine demonstrates his willingness to part ways with *Platonist* doctrine, when necessary, in favour of genuinely *Christian* conclusions. Or as Robert Russell concludes, "As an apologist . . . it was incumbent upon Augustine to show, not where Platonism had *succeeded*, but where it had *failed*" (Russell 410). Four lines of evidence to demonstrate this conclusion can be cited.

First, though Augustine's opening discussion on the "psychology" of demons and their propensity toward passionate vice is clearly meant to indict the demons as flawed in character, Augustine does *not*, however, rule out the proper place of passion, and in particular, *compassion*. Citing Cicero as an eminent authority, Augustine counts compassion itself as a virtue. As he says, "For what is compassion but a kind of fellow feeling in our hearts for the misery of another which compels us to help him if we can?" (*De civ. D.* 9.5). Though Augustine does not explicitly link this definition to the mediator at this point, one can sense, at the very least, a foreshadowing of the compassionate character of a good Mediator. But such a Mediator, in order truly to display such "fellow

feeling" would obviously need to be a "fellow" partaker of the human situation; in contradistinction, demons (or angels, for that matter) cannot experience this kind of genuine compassion for or with humans.

Second, Augustine accepts as a given the great gulf between the divine and human; in this, he is unified with the Platonists. On the other hand, Augustine refuses to accept first, the theory so prevalent among the Platonists, that it is humanity *qua* humanity which contaminates the divine, and second that demons, by virtue of their aerial bodies, are better suited to function as mediators. On the contrary, Augustine argues, "There are two wholesome lessons of no small importance which His incarnation reveals to us at the present time: that true divinity cannot be contaminated by the flesh; and that demons are not to be thought better than ourselves because they do not have flesh." Thus, for Augustine, a true and good Mediator is not one who shuns human flesh. Rather, the good Mediator shares fully "in the humanity with which He clothed Himself" (*De civ. D.* 9.17). The Mediator is *ensarkos Logos*, the Word clothed in flesh.

It is in Augustine's affirmation of the incarnate Mediator that he is able, in the last section of Book IX, to deal with the problem of contamination. For unlike the Platonists who see the problem in terms of bodily contact, Augustine refuses to see this as a problem at all. In contrast, Augustine's "Mediator," by virtue of being human himself, upholds the essential goodness of the created human body while simultaneously rejecting the neoplatonic ontology which requires a mediator to somehow occupy an intermediate locale to bridge the gap between the divine and the human. Instead, Augustine's solution is for the divine to *become* human and thus to solve the problem of mediation while simultaneously ruling out the need for a mediator located in a spatially intermediate location between heaven and earth. In other words, mediation between two "realms" does *not* occur through introducing the necessity of a *third* realm—the realm of the demonic (or angelic). Rather, mediation occurs through the divine being actually entering into the human realm. In this way, Augustine deconstructs the neoplatonic ontology of *three* types of beings (i.e., divine, demonic and human) and maintains the distinctive Christian ontology of *two* types of beings (Uncreated Creator and created creatures).

This ontology is not to be confused with Augustine's distinction, in the rest of *De civitate Dei*, with the twofold distinction between the "City of God" and the "City of Man." For even in the present state of affairs, as history moves forward to its consummation, angels and demons are already associated either with the City of God or as part of the City of this world respectively; their ultimate destiny is already determined. However, humans presently reside, in Markus' terms, in an intermediate "ambivalent" state called the "secular," that is, a realm "capable of being linked either with damnation or with salvation, depending on the ultimate purposes to which it is harnessed" (Markus 85). But this is a realm which, upon completion of history, will cease to exist. According to Augustine, however, created creatures will *always* remain ontologically created beings, though some of these creatures will suffer eternal damnation and separate from the bliss of God's presence (Cf. *De civ. D.* 21) while others will eternally contemplate, in their resurrected bodies, the bliss-bestowing Beauty of the Eternal God. (Cf. *De civ. D.* 22).

Third, Augustine's Mediator *becomes* Mediator on the basis of his humanity more than upon any other factor. This is especially important to emphasize in light of Colin Gunton's assertion that "the doctrine of the divinity of Christ is more important for Augustine than that of the humanity" (Gunton 37). In Book IX, particularly chapter 15, Augustine clearly and resoundingly confutes this description. Not only does Augustine repeatedly quote from 1 Timothy 2:5 ("the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus") but he even goes so far to say that it was precisely in the *humanity* of Christ that mediation was possible.

> He is not, however, the Mediator because He is the Word; for as the Word, supremely immortal and supremely blessed, He is far removed from miserable mortals. Rather, ***He is the Mediator because he is Man***; and by His manhood He shows us that, in order to obtain that good which is not only blessed but bliss-bestowing, we need not seek other mediators by whose aid, as we might suppose, we are gradually to strive towards it.[11]

It is interesting that Augustine opens the door to a human mediator in chapter 14, though, he asks, if there are such wise and blessed humans, "why is it not these same wise men who are appointed as mediators between miserable mortals and the blessed immortals?" (*De civ. D.* 9.14). Of course, in the end the Mediator *is* human and it is precisely *because* he is human that he is enabled to be the best Mediator after all.

Fourth and last, Augustine argues that for a mediator to be effective *as* a mediator, he or she must in some way "lead" humans to the divine. Yet the demons, so Augustine argues, can hardly be trustworthy in this task. For in the first place, their minds are tossed about by the storms of evil passion. As a result, "they cannot even been compared even to wise men . . . [because] such wise men do not yield to the temptation to approve or do anything which might turn them aside from the path of wisdom" (*De civ. D.* 9.4). Consequently, "they do not furnish with a path to God; rather, they prevent us from keeping to the path" (*De civ. D.* 9.18). And secondly, demons, because they are "suspended upside down" are hardly to be trusted to lead mortals to the divine. Rather, the evil mediator "interposes himself in order to prevent us from passing to a blessed immortality." This is in stark contrast with the good Mediator who "interposes Himself" in order that he may "lead us" to God the Trinity (*De civ. D.* 9.15). In so leading humans to God, the Mediator must have overcome mortality, lest he be rendered incapable of leading other humans once he himself dies. But unless the Mediator was once mortal himself, he would be unable to represent the miserable mortal soul in her or his state. As a result, the Mediator must be one who himself was mortal, as humans, but only in a transient way. Thus, the good Mediator must have "passed through mortality" so that "He might make the dead immortal by the power by which He showed in His own resurrection, and bestow upon the miserable the blessedness which He Himself had never relinquished" (*De civ. D.* 9.15). Thus, for Augustine, the Mediator is not one who sheds the flesh of humanity, but rather the one who, more accurately, sheds the *mortal* flesh. For Augustine, the contrast is between the corruptible and incorruptible, not the soul and the body.

[11] *De civ. D.* 9.15. [Emphasis added to text]

Conclusion

Evidence has been given in this paper that Augustine, as a Christian Rhetorician and Bishop, did not simply synthesize Neoplatonist thinking with Christianity in an undiscerning fashion. Though it is true that Augustine made use of neoplatonic categories throughout his life, even in his most mature work, this was usually not without discerning qualification. What has been demonstrated, however, is that Augustine makes use of neoplatonic categories of thinking as the rhetorical starting point of contact with his neoplatonic interlocutors. But it has also been demonstrated that Augustine's starting point is definitely not his ending point. For though the discussion of Mediator is formed upon certain neoplatonic assumptions which Augustine apparently accepts, he is not satisfied until he has gone on to provide a thorough critique of the failure of Neoplatonism to provide that which itself has prescribed. Put another way, Augustine accepts how Neoplatonism specifies the *need* and the *criteria of qualification* for a Mediator between God and humans, but he deconstructs, and ultimately rejects, the Neoplatonist *solution* to mediation, namely the role of the demonic. In its place, he argues for the need for a single, superior Mediator who fulfills all of the neoplatonic expectations while simultaneously showing the inadequacies of the neoplatonic ontology itself. Consequently, Augustine's Mediator is one whom the Neoplatonists stumble over and ultimately, are unable to accept. Thus, Russell is surely right when he says,

> Although [Augustine] remained convinced that Platonism, more than other philosophies, had more closely approached the Christian faith, yet any doctrine that proposed a mediatorship apart from that of Christ was of itself sufficient to turn Platonism from a philosophic ally of Christianity into a formidable and dangerous enemy (Russell 407).

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The Book of the Dead: Magic and Salvation in the Egyptian Afterlife

Brooke Johnston

For many ancient Egyptians, the afterlife took place in a land of pleasure ruled by the god Osiris, which was a perfected version of the earthly world. Residents were young, fit, attractive, and enjoyed all the benefits heaven had to offer (Tyldesley 264). Unfortunately, spirits of the departed neither achieved this utopia automatically nor after having lived virtuous lives. It could be attained only once the body had been properly prepared and the appropriate rites administered. The physical body would be preserved by mummification while the eternal survival of its spirit would be ensured by the recital of funerary texts. Among these was the *Book of the Dead*, which revealed the secret knowledge required by spirits in order to enjoy a pleasant existence in the afterlife. The *Book* allowed these spirits to overcome the extraordinary dangers that would inevitably be encountered after death (Budge 6).

The roots of the *Book of the Dead* reach back quite far into Egyptian history. During the Old Kingdom, the period of Egyptian history encompassing the 4th to the 8th dynasties and lasting from about 2575 to about 2130 BC, workers carved inscriptions, the *Pyramid Texts*, on walls in the tombs of royalty so that their inhabitants might be able to ascend to heaven with the sun god Re. In the First Intermediate Period, the period of Egyptian history encompassing the 9th dynasty and lasting from about 2130 to 2080 BC, rich people began decorating their coffins with passages and illustrations derived from the *Pyramid Texts*. This demonstrates the change in social patterns occurring at this time. With the collapse of the central authority of the Old Kingdom, people no longer regarded the king as unique in having the ability to achieve eternal salvation (Tyldesley 264). By the time of the New Kingdom, an even more liberal attitude emerged towards the acceptance of common people into heaven. Many Egyptians of moderate status were buried with spells written on linen shrouds or papyrus scrolls. Nearly two hundred incantations were recorded in a collection that came to be known as *The Chapters of Coming Forth By Day*, or the *Book of the Dead*. For royalty, this procedure was for more conspicuous. Funerary texts, describing the perils of the underworld, would elaborately decorate the walls of their tombs. The Egyptians, rich and poor alike,

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regarded these texts as a type of insurance policy for the soul. So long as they had access to the spells in their tombs, they would be able to gain acceptance into heaven (Dersin 151).

The Egyptians believed that entrance into heaven was neither automatic nor easy. After death, the deceased would embark on a fantastic journey through the unknown, traveling through a surreal environment where he or she would be repeatedly confronted by terrifying dangers. A spirit's voyage to heaven could be successful only if he spoke the correct words and performed the appropriate procedures along his voyage. One chapter of the *Book of the Dead* provides spells against decapitation, while another is meant to ensure that the deceased will not decay in the netherworld (*Book of the Dead,* 43; 45). Similarly, malevolent deities and ghostly opponents, ready to harm the defenseless traveler at any time, would need to be quelled by reciting lines from the Book.

Knowing the name of the demon or object standing in the way of one's intended destination appears to be useful in overcoming them. An excerpt from the *Book of the Dead* of the New Kingdom demonstrates this: "I will not let you enter through me," says the doorjamb, "unless you know my name." The deceased correctly replies: "Plumb-bob in the Place of Truth is your name" (Tyldesley 265). Later, a pair of door lintels also demand to be identified, and the spirit once again provides the correct answers: "Scale pat that carries maat and Scale pan of wine." At another point, the spirit is stopped by the floor, which will not let him progress because it is not familiar with his feet. The spirit is therefore required to recite the name of the floor: "Who enters before Min and Wenpet of Nephthys" (Dersin 148). Without the aid of the *Book of the Dead,* he would not have been able to journey any farther.

Menacing demons hunting the soul with throwsticks, spears, bird-traps or nets would also need to be defeated. Those spirits who were captured faced a horrible second death where they might be beheaded, chopped into pieces, or burned like sacrificial animals. The *Underworld Books* in many royal tombs depict violent scenes of those who fall victim to these monsters (Pinch 154). Like the above example of the doorjamb, knowing the identity of the foe was essential in defeating it; however, it was also necessary to know the secret names of every part of their weapons. An alternative way to survive was to trick the demon and transform oneself into a powerful deity. The *Book of the Dead* provides several spells which make this possible. For example, if offers instructions for taking the form of a falcon, the incarnation of the god Horus, which would allow the spirit to absorb some of that deity's power and defeat any opposition (Dersin 147). The perils of the underworld could therefore be avoided by adhering to the appropriate chapters of the *Book of the Dead.* By demonstrating his mastery over its forces, the spirit could earn a safe passage through the afterlife.

After the spirit had defeated all the threats of the netherworld, its achievement of eternal bliss was still uncertain. Once the labyrinth had been safely completed, the soul would have to be judged before Osiris in the Hall of the Double Truth (or Maat). This court was originally just one of the many challenges that the deceased would have to face, but as time progressed, it assumed the most important role in the quest for immortal happiness (Pinch 154). The spirit entered humbly before a tribunal of forty-two gods, each of whom had to be addressed by name (*Book of the Dead,* 125). He would make a series of formal speeches proclaiming his virtuous behavior in life. Interestingly,

these speeches were in the form of "negative confessions," listing sinful things the spirit did not do while he was living, which would have been contrary to preserving the Maat (Pinch 155). For example:

> Not have I despised God. Not have I caused misery.... Not have I killed. Not have I made the order for killing for me. Not have I done harm to mankind. Not have I taken aught of the oblations in the temples.... I have not repulsed God in his manifestations. I, even I, am pure (*The Book of the Dead,* 125).

Then, as now, few people could realistically measure up to these standards of morality; by reciting this incantation, however, a magical spell would be cast which ensured a foolproof result (Dersin 150).

As the gods scrutinized the deceased, the divine scribe Thoth would prepare the verdict. At the center of the court lay the final and most important challenge. The spirit's heart, which represented emotion, intelligence, and memories (and was therefore the sole witness for salvation), would be lowered onto a scale and measured against a feather representing Maat (Dersin 150). This is therefore a literal measurement of the heart against truth, and even the slightest hint at dishonesty would condemn the defendant. If the spirit is deemed pure, he will have open access to eternal bliss in the Fields of Reeds. If he is not reprieved, a horrifying monster named Ammit, or Devourer of the Dead, will be released to feast upon his heart (Dersin 149). But, as was the case with the negative confessions, the recital of parts of the *Book of the Dead* could trick his heart into not revealing his crimes (Pinch 156). Failure in this court leading to an afterlife of eternal damnation, the *Book of the Dead* played a most important role in ensuring salvation.

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Éthiopiens et Hyperboréens chez Hérodote

Félix Racine

Les premiers livres des *Histoires* d'Hérodote sont une description organisée du monde connu, possédant une certaine structure et une logique interne. Bien qu'Hérodote semble procéder avec sincérité à une description du monde, celle-ci obéit à une logique narrative qui lui donne cohésion et direction. Le présent travail vise à examiner la place qu'occupent dans le récit d'Hérodote deux peuples: les Éthiopiens (dont la description principale est donnée en *Histoires* 3.7-25) et les Hyperboréens (*Histoires* 3.31-35). Dans un premier temps, il sera question de la situation et de la signification de ces peuples dans la structure du monde d'Hérodote. Puis, seront examinés l'attitude de l'auteur face à ces peuples et les relations qu'ils présentent avec les autres peuples.

Dans le récit d'Hérodote, les descriptions des Éthiopiens et des Hyperboréens sont reliées entre elles et se répondent. Il est possible de les comparer sur deux registres différents, deux thèmes contenus dans les *Histoires*: la description symétrique du monde et la description merveilleuse des limites du monde.

La description des Éthiopiens et des Hyperboréens s'inscrit tout d'abord dans un monde conçu comme symétrique. Hérodote possède un esprit de système: il se passionne d'abord et avant tout pour les choses incroyables et étranges (d'un point de vue grec) et il tend à préférer celles qui révèlent une certaine symétrie entre elles (Redfield 102-3). Pour lui, cette symétrie ne se révèle pas à l'intérieur même d'une culture mais dans le monde; ce sont les cultures dans toute leur diversité qui forment une structure ordonnée (Redfield 106). La symétrie hérodotienne se déploie entre l'Europe d'un côté et l'Asie/Libye de l'autre. En premier, au centre géographique du monde, se retrouvent Grecs et Perses qui s'opposent par la guerre (étape ultime et raison d'être des *Histoires*) et surtout par leur caractère: les Grecs sont durs, alors que les Perses sont mous (ou plutôt ramollis par leurs conquêtes[1]). À la périphérie sont opposés la Scythie et l'Égypte, les deux prototypes du peuple

[1] J. Redfield, "Herodotus the Tourist." *Classical Philology* 80 (1985): 111. Selon Hérodote, le ramollissement du caractère perse est causé par la conquête de la Lydie qui introduit chez eux le luxe, jusque là ignoré (I, 76).

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chaud et du peuple froid.[2] Finalement, aux limites du monde, se trouvent les Hyperboréens et les Éthiopiens, qui sont respectivement le plus nordique et le plus austral des peuples.

Alors que les Scythes et les Égyptiens sont encore du domaine connu, directement observables par Hérodote, les Hyperboréens et les Éthiopiens sont des cultures mythiques. De ce fait, l'opposition entre eux semble moins marquée qu'entre Scythes et Égyptiens ou Grecs et Perses. L'opposition cependant demeure: tout comme les Scythes sont un peuple insaisissable, fuyant devant l'ennemi, le récit des Hyperboréens est vague et aucune description de leur pays n'est donnée. Les Éthiopiens, à l'instar des Égyptiens qui reçoivent un traitement étendu (tout un livre), sont mieux précisés: les espions perses font le récit de ce qu'ils ont vu et les paroles du roi des Longue-vie sont rapportées. Une autre opposition majeure existe dans la direction de la relation entre le monde historique et ces peuples mythiques. D'un côté, le roi perse Cambyse envoie des espions ichthyophages chez les Éthiopiens, chargés de cadeaux (*Histoires* 3.20). Le sens de la relation est donc du centre vers la périphérie. De l'autre côté, ce sont les Hyperboréens qui ont envoyé deux vierges, puis des offrandes régulières à Délos (*Histoires* 4.33), qui est au centre du monde d'Hérodote, instaurant une relation allant de la périphérie vers le centre.

En plus de se retrouver dans une description symétrique du monde, Éthiopiens et Hyperboréens sont inclus dans un exposé des limites du monde. Ce monde est l'*oikoumenè*, le "monde connu", sur lequel il est possible d'avoir de l'information sans recours à la spéculation (Romm 37). Éthiopiens et Hyperboréens, étant à la limite de la connaissance, ne sont pas accessibles directement. Des intermédiaires sont nécessaires pour les connaître, que ce soit les espions ichthyophages ou les Déliens. Dans les deux cas, un obstacle de taille les sépare du monde intérieur. Pour les Éthiopiens, un obstacle chaud : un désert impénétrable.[3] Pour les Hyperboréens, un obstacle froid: un hiver "tellement rigoureux que [. . .] il y fait un froid insupportable" (*Histoires* 4.28). La distance qui sépare ces derniers du monde est symbolisée par leur nom, *huper boreas*, "au-delà du vent Borée" qui est la source du froid.[4] Cette situation exceptionnelle confère aux deux peuples une belle situation ou de grandes richesses: "l'Éthiopie [. . .] produit beaucoup d'or, des éléphants énormes, toutes sortes d'arbres sauvages, de l'ébène; les hommes y sont les plus grands, et y vivent plus longtemps" (*Histoires* 4.114). Les Éthiopiens Longue-vie possèdent une source qui les fait vivre plus de cent ans, l'or y est abondant, la Table du Soleil les fournit en nourriture. Les Hyperboréens, pour leur part, ont chez eux les meilleures choses et, brisant l'équité de la nature qui donne et retire à la fois, un climat paradisiaque (Romm 66). Se retrouve ici le topos qu'Hérodote énonce ailleurs:" Les extrémités de la terre ont reçu, dirait-on, en partage ce qu'il y a de plus beau" (*Histoires* 3.106). Une dernière distance, symbolique, sépare les peuples mythiques du monde historique: les hommes s'approchant des frontières du monde quittent la civilisation et retombent dans un état primitif. Ainsi, l'armée de Cambyse devient cannibale en traversant le désert (*Histoires* 3.25). Près des Hyperboréens vivent des êtres à l'humanité douteuse: "des hommes n'ayant qu'un oeil et des griffons gardiens de l'or" (*Histoires* 4.27).

[2] F. Hartog, *Le miroir d'Hérodote*, 2e éd., Paris, Gallimard, 1991 (1980), p. 35. En plus d'être culturelle, l'opposition entre Egypte et Scythie est géographique : le Nil et le Danube seraient, seon Hérodote, symétriques. (II,34).

[3] Où l'armée de Cambyse périt. *Histoires* 3.25.

[4] Romm, p. 65. Selon Hérodote "S'il y a des hommes qui sont hyperboréens, il y en a aussi qui sont hypernotiens." *Histoires* 4.36. Ainsi les Éthiopiens ne seraient pas l'opposé symétrique des Hyperboréens? Cependant, puisque Hérodote ne présente pas d'Hypernotoriens, les Éthiopiens sont bel et bien l'antithèse géographique des Hyperboréens.

L'attitude d'Hérodote face aux Éthiopiens et aux Hyperboréens donne un clair indice du rôle qu'il entend leur donner dans son récit. Plutôt qu'adopter à leur égard une attitude ethnocentriste, il préconise une attitude de magnification. L'attitude ethnocentriste qui consiste à comparer négativement une peuplade étrangère réelle ou fictive face aux Grecs est fréquente dans la littérature grecque, un exemple étant le traitement des Cyclopes dans Homère. L'attitude de magnification, au contraire, tend à valoriser la peuplade décrite face aux Grecs. Les Phéaciens (ainsi que les Éthiopiens eux-mêmes) sont un autre exemple homérique. Le récit hérodotien des Hyperboréens et des Égyptiens appartient clairement à cette deuxième veine.[5] La quasi-perfection de ces peuples est opposée à un monde méditerranéen imparfait (Romm 54). Cette opposition se manifeste le plus fortement dans le récit de l'ambassade perse en Éthiopie. Le roi des Longue-vie démasque rapidement les espions perses et tient pour des bagatelles les cadeaux de Cambyse, qui sont pourtant très prisés dans le monde méditerranéen.[6] Aux Perses mous est ici opposé un peuple mou mais vertueux. Bien que la coutume des Perses leur interdit le mensonge, les Éthiopiens (leur extrême mythologique) les démasquent et les font apparaître faux (Darbo-Peschanski 178). À un moindre niveau, la même opposition existe entre les Hyperboréens et le peuple intérieur qui leur correspond, les Grecs. Les Hyperboréens ont fondé, par leur passage, quelques-uns des sanctuaires de Délos (*Histoires* 4.35). Étant aussi proches d'Apollon (Romm 61-63), ils semblent l'emporter sur les Grecs en piété, un domaine où ces derniers prétendent être supérieurs. Grecs et Perses trouvent ici leurs extrêmes respectifs, auxquels ils sont comparés négativement.

Les relations entre les peuples extrêmes et les peuples historiques sont complexes car tous deux ne procèdent pas de la même réalité: les uns participent au mythe inchangeable et les autres participent à l'histoire qui est mouvement. Les Éthiopiens comme les Hyperboréens sont un peuple stable. La nature mythique des extrêmes leur interdit de changer: puisqu'ils ont atteint une quasi-perfection et s'y tiennent. Ils sont à l'abri de toute influence étrangère, soit par les obstacles physiques, soit par la mentalité: bien que les Éthiopiens reconnaissent les vertus du vin, il n'est pas dit qu'ils adoptent son usage (tout particulièrement parce qu'ils n'en ont pas besoin, étant déjà heureux (*Histoires* 3.22). Bien plus, les extrêmes sont séparés du monde central par les Scythes et les Égyptiens, qui sont pour les Grecs et Perses le prototype de leur caractère (Redfield 110), donc qui ne peuvent changer non plus car ils forment pour les peuples centraux un autre modèle, cette

[5] Dans un autre passage, Hérodote combat l'ethnocntrisme en prêchant le relativisme des coutumes (comparaison neutre des Grecs qui brûlent leurs morts et des Indiens Callaties qui les mangent, 4.38).

[6] *Histoires* 3.21-22. Le seul présent qui obtient grâce aux yeux du roi des Longue-vie est le vin, sur lequel " les Éthiopiens étaient vis-à-vis des Perses en état d'infériorité" (*Histoires* 3.22). Cette affirmation ne semble pas marquer un état inférieur des Éthiopiens face au monde historique: plutôt, les Éthiopiens, qui ignorent l'usage du vin, une boisson civilisée, reconnaissent ses vertus. Ce jugement positif rehausse le le prestige des Éthiopiens dans le récit d'Hérodote.

fois historique et non pas mythique Scythes et Égyptiens sont "self-contained, self-created" (Redfield 106), ils n'échangent pas avec leurs voisins. Au lieu de servir de courroie de transmission entre le centre du monde et les extrêmes, ils les isolent d'avantage.

Hyperboréens et Éthiopiens ont pourtant une influence sur les autres peuples du monde. Chez Hérodote s'effectue un changement par rapport aux auteurs antérieurs: alors que ceux-ci donnaient l'Océan comme limite du monde, Hérodote décrit des territoires déterminés par des populations humaines (Romm 39-40). Tout en gardant leur aspect mythologique, ces limites du monde sont maintenant identifiables et descriptibles. Tout en plaçant Éthiopiens et Hyperboréens à distance, Hérodote les inclut dans son système de raisonnement. L'auteur parle des "régions extrêmes qui entourent le reste du monde et l'enferment entre elles" (*Histoires* 3.116), la limite qui détermine le monde. Ainsi donc, elles constituent un idéal lointain vers lequel les peuples centraux peuvent tendre (Cambyse tentant de conquérir les Éthiopiens) ou qui détermine de lui-même un peuple central (les Hyperboréens entraînant la fondation des temples de Délos). L'influence des régions mythologiques sur les régions historiques se fait au niveau idéologique: Hérodote détermine le centre par les extrêmes. Les peuples centraux sont toujours à un désavantage lorsque comparés aux extrêmes: cette comparaison sert de révélateur de leur imperfection, elle invite à relativiser leur situation. La description que l'auteur rend des Éthiopiens et des Hyperboréens est fabuleuse, ce qui empêche à jamais aux peuples historiques (et Hérodote s'adresse à un public Grec) d'atteindre leur état. En ce sens, les peuples centraux seraient constamment à perfectionner, à remettre en doute. "Greek are unlike the Massagetae, Ethiopians, and Scythians; they are a historical people, and are changing" (Redfield 114). En ce contexte, les peuples extrêmes servent de point fixe à partir duquel juger ce changement.

En somme, dans les *Histoires* d'Hérodote, Éthiopiens et Hyperboréens s'inscrivent dans un double schéma. D'une part ils s'insèrent dans une description symétrique du monde: aux peuples centraux qui sont historiques (les Grecs et les Perses) correspondent des prototypes historiques (Scythes et Égyptiens respectivement) et, au dernier niveau, des peuples mythiques (Hyperboréens pour les Grecs, Éthiopiens pour les Perses). D'autre part, ces peuples s'inscrivent dans une description des limites de la terre: ils habitent un pays inaccessible et inchangeant, qui leur procure une grande félicité. L'image que présente Hérodote de ces peuples est merveilleuse et favorable. En cela, ils constituent un modèle absolu auquel les peuples historiques peuvent être comparés et à l'aide duquel ils sont jugés.

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La constitution mixte de la République romaine

Marie-Claude Felton

L'histoire politique et sociale du monde s'est forgée à travers les luttes pour le pouvoir ou la liberté de faire valoir ses droits. Dans notre société qui vient tout juste de franchir le cap du troisième millénaire, la démocratie et les droits qui s'y rattachent sont toujours considérés essentiels et fondamentaux. Pouvons-nous considérer qu'il y ait eu un gouvernement mixte caractérisé, entre autres, par une démocratie véritable durant la République romaine (509 à 27 av. J.-C.)? Plusieurs raisons nous permettent de répondre par l'affirmative, si l'on considère le contexte de l'époque. Afin de démontrer l'existence de tels arguments, nous verrons d'abord en quoi la question suscite un réel débat pour ensuite voir de quelles façons le peuple de Rome exerçait un pouvoir à ne pas négliger.

La question que nous traitons ici n'est en aucun cas considérée comme résolue à ce jour. En effet, tous ne s'entendent pas pour dire que le peuple romain avait un véritable rôle à jouer. Pour plusieurs, le gouvernement n'était qu'une forme d'oligarchie aristocratique. Les professeurs de cette théorie soutiennent que les aristocrates avaient le contrôle sur les trois sphères politiques du système gouvernemental puisque eux seuls pouvaient être consuls, et former le Sénat parce qu'ils contrôlaient les votes avec leurs relations patron-client. En outre, les supporteurs de cette théorie mettent l'accent sur les avantages des plus nantis, comme l'exprime J.A North en disant que: "In the assembly that conducted elections the voting system was heavily loaded in favor of the well-off voters" (North 19). De plus, les historiens contre l'idée d'un gouvernement romain mixte démontrent combien les électeurs ne représentaient pas l'ensemble de la population: "The voter turn-out was thus two percent or less" (MacMullen 455). Néanmoins, il est maintenant temps pour nous de voir comment ces derniers arguments ne viennent pas tout à fait effacer le pouvoir de la masse.

Premièrement, il est de mise de démontrer comment la balance des pouvoirs assurait un gouvernement mixte. Polybius explique que les trois types de gouvernement, soit la monarchie par les consuls, l'aristocratie par le Sénat et la démocratie par l'Assemblée, étaient reliés entre eux et interdépendants : "[. . .] in this way no element would develop beyond its due and be distorted into the cognate corruptions, but the power of each element would be counteracted by that of the others"

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(*Histories* 6.10). Pour le démontrer, il explique notamment que les consuls ont besoin du consentement du Sénat pour obtenir des provisions à la guerre, que le Sénat doit également avoir l'appui du peuple, car celui-ci a le pouvoir de réduire les privilèges sénatoriaux et que le peuple dépend du Sénat pour obtenir de différents avantages (*Histories* 6.15). Le dernier élément nous conduit à la notion du patronage qui doit nécessairement retenir notre attention.

La relation dite patron-client est celle d'un échange de bons procédés. Cet échange n'est toutefois pas synonyme de corruption ou d'affaiblissement démesuré du pouvoir populaire dans la mesure où les électeurs ne voteraient que pour ce qui avantage leur protecteur. Premièrement, il est vrai qu'un tel échange était courant: "Therefore, since all citizens are bound to the Senate by ties of clientship and are apprehensive about some unknown situation in which they may need the Senate's help, they avoid carefully any obstruction or opposition to the Senate's decrees" (*Histories* 6.17). Toutefois, Polybius considère cet échange comme allant de soi, puisqu'une faveur doit naturellement en attirer une autre (*Histories* 6.6). Mais il ne faut pas ici comprendre que les électeurs votaient indubitablement à l'aveuglette. En effet, pour obtenir un appui quelconque, les sénateurs devaient tout de même faire un effort de persuasion sur toute la masse électorale notamment en leur accordant de nouvelles requêtes: "[. . .] careerist politicians in search of political triumphs needed to evoke popular support; and they did this, at least in the first century B.C., by putting forward policies reflecting the needs and problems of potential voters."[1] En outre, il serait injuste de qualifier le système de corruption, car il était notamment punissable par la peine de mort d'offrir de l'argent en échange d'un vote (Millar 11). Par surcroît, il n'est pas nécessairement entendu qu'un client devait voter pour son protecteur: "No source explicitly attests that a client was under an obligation to vote for his *patronus*, still less for a politician ally of his *patronus*" (Millar 12). Ainsi, le supposé grand contrôle des aristocrates chez les électeurs n'était pas si considérable. Et comme Fergus Millar dit: "[. . .] it is time to abandon the once established presuppositions of a hereditary 'nobility', of aristocratic factiones, and of an all-embracing network of dependence and clientship" (Millar 19).

Dans un autre ordre d'idées, plusieurs historiens n'admettent pas la mixité du gouvernement romain de la République à cause du contrôle des familles puissantes: "The popular will of the Roman people found expression in the context, and only in the context, of divisions within the oligarchy" (North 18). Il est toutefois intéressant de noter que le groupe de personnes influentes qui forment ce que certains appellent une oligarchie, n'était pas tout à fait fermé. En effet, même s'il restait difficile d'intégrer cette classe privilégiée, des ouvertures étaient possibles. Par exemple, Cato qui n'avait pas d'ancêtres ayant tenu une magistrature, put devenir consul par son election (Millar 12). De plus, le groupe socialement et politiquement en avantage au début de la République, les patriciens, se voient contraints de laisser de plus en plus de pouvoirs à la plèbe. En effet, la lutte des plébéiens pour l'obtention des mêmes privilèges que les patriciens marque la République et est un signe évident d'un élément démocratique. Par exemple, au cours des années, par des pressions qui

[1] Pirelli, *Movimento popolare*, dans J. A. North, "Democratic Politics in Republican Rome," *Past and Present* 126 (1990): 3-21.

démontrent leur certain pouvoir, les plébéiens obtiennent plusieurs avantages autrefois réservés aux plus riches. En effet, en 494 av. J.-C., la plèbe se regroupe pour former le *consilium plebis* afin de gérer elle-même ce qui la concerne tout en ayant ses representants, les tribuns de la plèbe (Hanes 70). En outre, vers 450 av. J.-C., le Sénat se voit forcé d'accorder aux plébéiens le droit d'être jugé selon les Douze Tables ce qui leur assurait des jugements impartiaux et objectifs. De plus, ils obtiennent en 287 av. J.-C. un droit de veto, peuvent par après se marier aux patriciens et finissent par avoir enfin le droit de voir un des leurs se faire nommer consul (Hanes 70).

Par ailleurs, il est pertinent de préciser toutes les fonctions et les pouvoirs que détenait le peuple. La plèbe avait en effet de multiples rôles: le peuple donnait les honneurs et les punitions, votait à propos des lois, des colonies, de l'admissibilité à la citoyenneté romaine et sur la guerre ou la paix (Millar 19). De plus, c'est le peuple qui avait la responsabilité de confirmer et de ratifier les traités (*Histories* 6.14). Et même si les propositions sur lesquelles le peuple devait se prononcer venaient du Sénat, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il avait le pouvoir de les arrêter. Même aujourd'hui, le système gouvernemental québécois, par exemple, fonctionne de cette façon où l'Assemblée ne fait souvent qu'accepter les projets de lois dictés par le Conseil des ministres. Si nous qualifions notre système gouvernemental de démocratique, alors celui caractéristique de Rome sous la République a aussi raison de l'être. En outre, les membres de l'Assemblée avaient parfois l'occasion de debattre sur des sujets: "[. . .] the great issues of foreign relations did not always pass without public debate"(Millar 4). Ainsi il n'est pas juste de dire que le peuple ne jouait que le rôle d'observateur.

En conclusion, plusieurs raisons peuvent nous faire penser que la République romaine eut un véritable gouvernement mixte. En effet, nous avons vu comment le peuple romain réussissait à jouer un rôle relativement important dans le système gouvernemental. De fait, la plèbe était alors un élément nécessaire au bon fonctionnement du gouvernement, car elle avait pour fonction d'entériner les décisions politiques les plus importantes. De plus, il a été vu combien le patronage, quoiqu'il affaiblisse la notion de liberté démocratique, n'était pas si influent, car les clients n'étaient pas obligatoirement tenus de voter ou d'agir seulement dans l'intérêt de leur protecteur. En outre, on a vu que la classe sociale la plus influente n'était pas tout à fait fermée (d'autant plus que les plébéiens ont pu s'y joindre petit à petit). Pour finir, on a vu combien de rôles et de fonctions significatifs étaient confiés a l'Assemblée. Bien entendu, il ne faut pas oublier les arguments contre l'existence d'une démocratie. En effet, ceux-ci dont le faible pourcentage des citoyens participant à la vie politique et le fait que les avantages politiques et sociaux restent majoritairement dans les mêmes familles, viennent ajouter une limite à l'idée démocratique que nous défendons. Le gouvernement romain pouvait toutefois rester mixte dans son essence tout en étant formé d'une démocratie limitée. Aux États-Unis, par exemple, la démocratie peut également être qualifiée de limitée. En effet, bien que le suffrage soit universel, ceux qui prennent véritablement les décisions sont des représentants. De plus, le pouvoir politique peut encore être considéré comme un héritage familial. Par exemple, du fait que George Bush ait été président, son fils est allé dans les meilleures écoles et a hérité de bons contacts de son père pour devenir le chef de la nation américaine à son tour. Cet exemple nous démontre combien les choses, même la démocratie, n'ont pas tant évoluées depuis nos lointains ancêtres romains et que pour les comprendre, il faut également se regarder soi-même . . .

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Summaries of Dissertations for the Degree of Ph.D in Classics (1998-2001)

Principes de relations étrangères: une analyse contextuelle de quelques discours de Démosthènes

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Le but de cette thèse est d'examiner certains aspects de la pensée de l'orateur Démosthène concernant la politique étrangère. Ayant le corpus démosthénien comme point de départ, la recherché va au-delà de la question dont chaque discours traitait, afin de repérer des principes permanents qui régissaient la politique de l'orateur et déterminaient ses choix. Il est notamment question de l'attitude de Démosthène à l'égard de certains notions, telles que l'intérêt, la puissance, les alliances, le prestige et le droit, son choix entre la guerre et la paix, enfin l'importance que l'orateur accordait à la chance et à l'occasion. Après l'examen contextuel de ces notions, la thèse suggère l'existence d'un ensemble de principes, dont la base fut l'intérêt de la cité; vue l'instabilité de l'époque, cet intérêt nécessitait une puissance que seules les alliances pouvaient assurer. Pour y arriver, une cité devait cultiver son image, puisque elle n'était pas en mesure d'imposer des alliances. Quant à la chance, il est suggéré que, loin d'être un fataliste, Démosthène en tenait sérieusement compte.

Boundless Nature: The Construction of Female Speech in Plautus

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The existence of specific lexical features marking the speech of female characters in Roman Comedy is signaled in scholiastic literature, and has been confirmed by modern quantitative research. This thesis, focusing on the comedies of Plautus, investigates the question of why the playwrights made specific linguistic choices for female personae.

Greek and Roman literary theory stipulated that the speech of women in drama had to be constructed so as to reveal the speakers' feminine nature. Philosophical doctrines that construed gender as a

polar opposition evince a fundamental distinction, defining male as 'bond' and female as 'boundless'. The association of female with boundlessness, it is argued, also determines woman's position with respect to speech. A study of Greek New Comedy reveals that the reflections on female nature and expression found there depict woman as adverse to limits, a concept which Plautus seems to have subsequently adapted from his sources.

Donatus's scholia to Terence characterize female speech as disorderly and disrespectful of the norms of verbal interaction. Concrete linguistic patterns are rationalized as symptoms of 'softness' and querulousness, both representing the female propensity to violate interpersonal limits. The text of Plautus, examined for meta-textual asides on female speech, confirms the scholiast's observations. An inquiry into the Plautine perception of blanditia reveals that female mannerisms are interpreted as tokens of a contagious moral disorder, and that they mark the feebleness of female (and effeminate) personae. The otherness of female complaints, emphasized during the performance of palliata by both verbal and para-verbal means, is intimately associated in the text of the comedies with the chaos within women's minds. Female speech patterns in Plautus thus illustrate the concept of infirmitas sexus.

Heidegger's Interpretation of Ancient Greek Aletheia and the Philological Response to It

Rui de Sousa (September 2000)

Classics Program, Department of History
Supervisor: Professor M. Silverthorne

This thesis tries to provide a critical review of Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth in the different stages of his career and it also examines the philological response that his work on this question elicited. The publication of *Sein und Zeit* made Heidegger's views on aletheia available to a wide public and thereby launched a heated debate on the meaning of this word. The introduction tries to give an account of the general intellectual background to Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek truth. It also looks at the kind of interpretative approach favored by the philologists responding to Heidegger's views on aletheia. The thesis first examines his arguments on ancient Greek truth and language in *Sein und Zeit* from the point of view of the larger philosophical project of Heidegger's seminal work. It then looks at some initial philological responses to Heidegger along with Heidegger's views on aletheia in a few works following the publication of *Sein und Zeit*. As a next step, the bulk of the philological work responding to Heidegger is carefully examined with a special focus on the interpretative approaches of the various authors. Heidegger's attempt to respond to some of these philologists is also reviewed. Finally, Heidegger's retraction of his earlier views on aletheia is examined in light of a growing critical consensus among philologists. The very latest philological responses to Heidegger are also considered. The conclusion looks at the contributions made by Heidegger and his philological respondents to our knowledge of ancient Greek truth. Some suggestions are also made for future research on this topic.

Pindar's Nemean Odes: A Poetic Commentary

Carolyn Jones (December 2000)
Classics Program, Department of History
Supervisor: Professor M. Silverthorne

This professes to be a poetic commentary to the Nemean odes of Pindar. It argues for a re-evaluation of this poet's epinikia as poetry and has taken as its principal focus the stuff that is critically ignored or devalued. Much that Pindar writes is difficult in that it is at once dense and dynamic, obedient to the strictures of a genre and yet never ruled by them. He invites commentary and scholars have for the most part centred their considerable efforts on decoding genius. There is as much literature on the poet and his relatively inaccessible work as there is an absence of poetic appreciation of it. The desire for a system of language, a master decoder of metaphor, imagery and thought processes, and the desire to find unity of thought, for Grundgedanken, for correspondences, structural parallels and polarities is the engine that drives the philologist reading these odes. But Pindar defies system.

The Numan Tradition and its Uses in the Literature of Rome's "Golden Age"

Lise Otis (October 2001)
Classics Program, Department of History
Supervisor: Professor W. Richardson

This dissertation presents a critical analysis of literary texts that recount fully or briefly the life and legend of King Numa Pompilius. Focusing on the "Golden Age," it comprises the Numan accounts of Cicero, Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Ovid. These authors lived at a time when Rome was trying to reconcile for herself and for her subjects the price of her military world domination with the belief in her foreordained supremacy. This reconciliation was to be achieved by a re-acquaintance with the Roman ancestral values whose observance had merited Rome her dominion and whose neglect had driven the state to civil war. The question of roman national identity is at the heart of the Numan accounts of the chosen prose-writers. In his portrayal of Numa, who combines the civilizing virtues of classical Athens with native Roman virtue, Cicero offers a rebuttal for Greek critics who questioned Rome's supremacy because of her lack of civilizing virtues. Livy investigates the leading causes of Rome's world domination and identifies the national values and institutions that many generations of leaders forged. Numa is one such leader, having established laws, religious rite and a peaceful way of life. Dionysius represents Numa as the Greek ideal of kingship in order to establish for the Greek world the excellence of the Roman national identity founded on Greek virtue. The Numan accounts of Livy and Dionysius, composed in Augustus' principate, do not draw direct parallels between Numa and Augustus, although the narration sometimes suggests a special relevance to Augustan rule. Finally, Ovid, the only poet, recounting traditional Numan tales, offers analogies and allegories of certain Augustan ideas and measures that may be seen to flatter the ruler.

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Tips and Strategies for Translating "Sight" Passages

1. Note carefully any heading or description and refer to it constantly as you proceed. Do not fail to use any vocabulary that might be given.

2. Read the whole passage through, quite quickly.

3. Re-read the passage, commencing to work through the sense in your head.

4. Proceed with writing your first draft in rough (not to be handed in), attacking the sense in terms of the suspected content. Keep this content in mind sentence by sentence. Do not be satisfied with nonsense.

5. If you get stuck on part of a sentence, skip it and keep going. Return to it, perhaps with a better understanding, after doing what follows.

6. After writing out the rough draft go back to the unsatisfactory bits, making very sure you have left nothing out.

7. Study the draft against the passage and seek to put it into normal, natural, modern, but quite formal English (or French). Strive for uniformity and consistency of style throughout. Avoid use of brackets, alternatives, etc. This is your second draft, also not to be handed in. Polish this version and check for omissions, until ready to copy.

8. Copy out neatly, double-spaced, your final, clean version. Make your last, important check for omissions in the copying. Hand it in.

Tips and Strategies kindly supplied by T. Wade Richardson

Text taken entirely from McGill University Library documents available online at the *Classics Subject Guide Page*: http://www.library.mcgill.ca/human/SUBGUIDE/classics.htm

McGill University Resources for Classical Studies

The **Humanities and Social Sciences Library** is the major location for the University's collection in Classical and Modern Greek Studies. The **Department of Rare Books and Special Collections** has a fine range of early editions of the classics as well as prints and maps of interest to classicists. The **Otto Ribbeck collection** consisting of monographs and some 6,000 offprints and pamphlets is a rich source of secondary materials for classical scholarship in the 19th century. The monographs have been incorporated into the main collection, the rest are in the process of being catalogued. **Osler Library** has strong holdings of primary and secondary sources relating to classical medicine and science as well as a few purely literary texts in very early editions. The **Law Library** collects seriously in Roman law. The **Wainwright (rare book collection)** includes some non-legal material of interest to the Classical scholar e.g. the backfile of the *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions.* **BlackaderLauterman Library** is the main resource for Ancient Greek and Roman Art and Architecture. It is very strong on Byzantine art. **Islamic Studies Library** includes important publications describing the Greek and Roman colonies in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. The **Religious Studies Library** holds some material of interest for the study of religion in the classical world. **Blacker-Wood Library** and **Physical Sciences and Engineering Library** have interesting holdings in the history of science and technology in antiquity.

Regional Resources

Bibliothèque nationale du Québec: Because this library holds the historic collection of the Sulpicians, there is a wealth of retrospective materials relating to the classical world. **Université de Montréal, Bibliothèque des lettres et sciences humaines** has significant holdings of critical works in French and of French translations of the classics. It has a long-standing subscription to the Les Belles Lettres series. The outstanding feature of the collection is its strength in retrospective and current publications concerning imperial Rome. The **Centre for Canadian Architecture** has outstanding holdings concerning classical architecture, and some materials related to construction and town planning in the ancient world.

Consortia and Document Delivery

The **Center for Research Libraries**, a consortium to which McGill belongs, has an excellent historical collection of European dissertations and acquires virtually all European theses automatically. **Research Libraries Group** and **OCLC** memberships provide access to vast bibliographic databases and to efficient document delivery systems based on the holdings of North America's most eminent research collections.

Classics: a selective list of reference sources at McGill

This guide lists selected titles found mainly in the **Humanities and Social Sciences Library (McLennan-Redpath)**. Many more titles are available in McGill libraries; check MUSE by author, title, subject, and keyword. Please ask library staff at the Reference Desk for assistance.

Guides to the Literature

Bibliographical Guide to Classical Studies 2v	Ref Z6209 C65W485 1997
Classical Scholarship: An Annotated Bibliography	Ref Z7016 M252 1986
Classical Studies, a Guide to the Reference Literature	Ref Z7016 J4 1996
Classics: A Guide to Reference Sources (at McGill)	Ref Desk

Dictionaries & Handbooks - General

Archaeological Method and Theory: an encyclopedia	Ref CC75 A654 2000
Chronology of the Ancient World	Ref D11.5 W46
Civilization of the Ancient Mediterranean (3v.)	Ref DE59 C55 1988
Encycopedia of Ancient Egypt	Ref DT58 O94 2000
Encyclopedia of Greece and the Hellenic tradition	Ref DF757 E53 2000
Handbook to Life in Ancient Greece	Ref DF77 A35 1997
Illustrated Encyclopaedia of the Classical World	Ref DE5 A8x
Kleine Pauly	Ref DE5 K5
Medieval Archaeology an encyclopedia	Ref D125 M42 2001
Oxford Classical Dictionary	Ref DE5 O9 1999
Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites	Ref DE59 P7

Dictionaries & Handbooks - Mythology

Crowell's Handbook of Classical Mythology	Ref BL303 T75 1970
Dictionnaire de la mythologie grecque et romaine (Grimal)	Ref BL715 G7 1982
Dictionary of Classical Mythology	Ref BL715 B44 1982
Dictionary of Classical Mythology (Grimal)	Ref BL715 G713 1986
Encyclopedia of Ancient Deities	Ref BL473 C67 2000
Mythology of All Races, v. 1	Ref BL25 M8 1964
Place Names in Classical Greek Mythology	Ref BL715 B445 1991
What Men or Gods Are These	Ref BL782 B6
Women of Classical Mythology	Ref PA31 B83 1991

Dictionaries & Handbooks - Literature

Ancient Writers: Greece and Rome (2v)	Ref PA3002 A5 1982
Classical and Medieval Literature Criticism (CMLC)	Ref PA1 C52
Crowell's Handbook of Classical Drama	Ref PA3024 H35
Dictionnaire des auteurs grecs et latins	Ref PA31 B83 1991
Greek and Latin Authors 800b.c. - a.d.1000	Ref PA31 G7
Oxford Companion to Classical Literature	Ref PA31 O94 1989

Dictionaries & Handbooks - Biography

Classical Scholarship, a Biographical Encyclopedia	Ref PA83 C58 1990
Roman Emperors, a Biographical Guide	Ref DG274 G73
Who Was Who in the Greek World	Ref DF208 W5
Who Was Who in the Roman World	Ref DG203 W45

Langauage Dictionaries

Greek-English Lexicon (Liddell & Scott)	Ref PA445 E5L6 1996
Latin Dictionary (Lewis & Short)	Ref PA2365 E5A7 1962
Oxford Latin Dictionary	Ref PA2365 E5O9 1982

Atlases

Atlas of Classical Archaeology	Ref, McL & B-L G1046 E15A8 1977
Atlas of Classical History	Ref G1033 A833 1985
Atlas of the Classical World	Ref DE29 H463 ATLAS STANDS
Atlas of the Greek and Roman World in Antiquity	Ref G1033 A84 1981 ATLAS STANDS
Atlas of the Greek World	Ref DF77 L43
Atlas of the Roman World	Ref DG77 C597 1982

Bibliographies

Aristotle's Metaphysics: annotated Bibliography of the 20th Century Literature	Ref Z8044 R3513 1997
Bibliographie critique de la philosophie greque...1453-1953	Ref Z7129 G7V6
Bronze Age, Greek and Roman Technology...	Ref Z7914 H5O42
Classical Greek and Roman Drama: an Annotated Bibliography	Ref Z7108 D7F67 1989
Classical Mythology: an Annotated Bibliographical Survey	Ref Z7836 P4x
Classical Scholarship, an Annotated Bibliography	Ref Z7016 M252 1986
Greece & Rome: New Surveys in the Classics	Search MUSE under this title for series
Past Ruined Ilion, a Bibliography...Based on Greco-Roman Mythology	Ref Z2011 B67 1982
Greek and Roman Authors: A Checklist of Criticism	Ref Z7016 G9 1982
Philosophy of Cynicism	Ref B508 N38 1995
Recent Studies in Myths and Literature, 1970-1990	Ref Z2014 M985 1991
Rome in the Fourth Century AD	Ref Z2340 R653 1991
Women in Antiquity: an Annotated Bibliography	Ref Z7961 G66

Bibliographies - Translations

Classics in Translation (before 1930) (Smith)	Ref Z7018 T7E87
Classics in Translation: A Selective Bibliography, 1930-76 (Green)	Ref Z7018 T7E872x

Periodical Indexes

Année philologique	Index Stands

Eelectronic Resources

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http://www.library.mcgill.ca/human/SUBGUIDE/classics.htm